The effects of corporate governance and audit and non-audit fees on IPO Value

This paper examines the effects of non-executive board members, audit committee composition and financial expertise, and fees paid to audit firms on the value of 375 UK initial public offerings (IPOs). Empirical findings show that underpricing decreases in audit fees whereas it increases in non-audit fees. A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the firm’s board and audit committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and financial accounting expertise of their members positively moderate the inter-relationships between underpricing and both audit and non-audit fees paid by companies going through an IPO. Further investigations using the adjusted price-to-book value as a proxy for firm value at IPO confirm our main findings that internal governance mechanisms may complement services provided by the auditors in terms of generating higher valuations. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees, our results remain consistent.     

Non-audit fees, long-term auditor–client relationships and earnings management

We examine whether auditor independence is affected by the amount spent on non‐audit services. Faster growth in non‐audit fees and longer time periods over which non‐audit services are purchased might reduce the auditor's independence from that client. Our results do not provide any support for a relationship between non‐audit fee growth rates or the length of time of the non‐audit fee relationship with the client and discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. We do find some evidence that the interaction of the non‐audit fee time‐period measures and client importance is positive and significantly related to discretionary accruals.     

Client Importance and Audit Quality at the Individual Audit Partner,Office, and Firm Levels

We investigate whether audit partner level data provides a more powerful measure than office or firm level measures of client importance. We find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of audit fees to the total audit fees received by audit partners from all their clients. We also find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of non-audit services fees from a client to total non-audit service fees, and the proportion of total audit and non-audit service fees from a client to total fees from all their clients at the office and firm levels. Our findings provide evidence to regulators, audit clients, and stakeholders that audit partners do not succumb to pressure from economically more important clients as audit quality has a positive association with client importance.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.     

Disclosure of fees paid to auditors and the market valuation of earnings surprises

We investigate if the SEC’s recently mandated disclosure of fees for audit and nonaudit services paid by firms to their incumbent auditors affected the market’s perception of auditor independence and earnings quality. Following the initial fee disclosures in 2001, we find that the market valuation of quarterly earnings surprises (earnings response coefficient) was significantly lower for firms with high levels of nonaudit fees than for firms with low levels of such fees. In contrast, in the year prior to the new fee disclosures, there was no reduction in earnings response coefficients for firms that subsequently reported high nonaudit fees. Our evidence suggests that mandated fee disclosures provided new information that was viewed by the market as relevant to appraising auditor independence and earnings quality.

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.     

Audit report information content and the provision of non-audit services: Evidence from Spanish lending decisions

This study examines whether auditor economic independence affects the information content of going concern audit reports in the European setting. We conduct an experiment where 80 experienced Spanish loan officers from the second largest European commercial bank review a loan request under two lending scenarios: (1) a potential borrower receiving an unqualified but modified going concern opinion, and (2) a potential borrower receiving a qualified going concern opinion. Auditor economic independence, measured by the provision of non-audit services (NAS), is manipulated (absence vs. presence of significant NAS). We find that a qualified going concern audit report is interpreted as a primary warning signal (death penalty). However, the provision of NAS acts as a second order mechanism that only activates loan officers’ professional skepticism in the case of an unqualified but modified going concern report scenario. Therefore, we find evidence suggesting that the potential negative impact of a perceived lack of auditor independence depends on the nature of the audit report. Our findings have important implications for the European regulator, which is currently considering establishing an auditor independence regulation framework similar to that in the United States of America.     

The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

The distraction effect of non-audit services on audit quality

Regulators have expressed concerns that an emphasis on non-audit services (NAS) could distract from the audit function, even for clients with minimal NAS purchases. Motivated by this concern, we examine whether a greater emphasis on providing NAS to audit clients generally (i.e., not to a specific client) can distract from the audit function, thus reducing audit quality. We find evidence of an NAS distraction effect, where a greater emphasis on NAS at the audit office-level results in more client financial statement restatements, even after controlling for client-specific NAS. Further, the association exists among clients that purchase minimal NAS, suggesting that this association relates to distraction effects in addition to independence issues examined in prior research. This study should be of interest to audit firms, audit committees, and regulators because it provides new evidence regarding issues related to a business model that includes both audit and non-audit services.     

Perceived auditor independence and audit firm fees

Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.

Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. This paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.     

Non-audit services, auditor quality and the value relevance of earnings

This paper tests the hypothesis that there is an inverse relation between non‐audit services (NAS) provided by a firm auditor and the value relevance of earnings (measured as the earnings response coefficient) and that this relation is weaker for firms with Big 6 auditors. The hypothesis is based on anecdotal evidence and previous research that suggests that the provision of NAS by the external auditor is likely to adversely affect investors’ perceptions of the credibility of financial reports, and that Big 6 auditors, because of reputational capital and litigation costs, are likely to mitigate the adverse effects of NAS. Results using 840 firm‐year observations of Australian companies document a statistically significant inverse relationship between NAS and the value relevance of earnings, and this inverse relationship is weaker for Big 6 auditors, therefore supporting the hypothesis.     

Audit pricing and auditor industry specialization in an emerging market: Evidence from China

In this paper we examine the determinants of audit fees by focusing on auditor industry specialization and second tier auditors in the Chinese market. We find evidence of Big 4 premiums for brand name as well as industry specialization in both the statutory and supplementary market. Big 4 industry specialists earn additional premiums in the statutory market as compared to non-industry specialists. We also find that market expansion did not provide the second tier auditors any price advantage. These auditors increased their market share mainly in the mid- and small-sized clienteles. Moreover, industry experience developed by the second tier firms may have helped them gain economy of scale and reduce service fees. This may be their strategy to win future clients that seek low-priced audits.     

Stock market response to analysts' perceptions and earnings in a technology-intensive environment

This paper investigates the contemporaneous stock market response to financial analysts' perceptions of the firm and accounting earnings in the telecommunication and electronics industry in Finland. Analysts' perceptions used in the study are based on the Most Admired Companies survey similar to that conducted by Fortune magazine in the United States. The results indicate the nonfinancial information of the firm measured in terms of the analysts' perceptions has value relevance in a technology-oriented stock market.     

Audit effort and fees under concentrated client ownership: Evidence from four international audit firms

Using proprietary audit hour and fee data from the internal records of four Big Six firms in Finland, this study examines the influence of audit client ownership type on audit effort and fees. The primary argument is that there are differential effects of ownership concentration depending on the particular nature of concentrated ownership (i.e., firms in which the majority of shares are manager-owned versus foreign-owned versus state-owned). Consistent with this, the paper documents that audit hours and fees are lower for companies majority-owned by their management and higher for subsidiaries of foreign companies than for other firms. However, no difference between companies owned by the state or municipalities and companies with a more diverse ownership structure can be found. This suggests that governmental ownership is actually closer to a dispersed than a concentrated ownership structure in terms of audit quality.The results show that replacing the variable indicating majority-ownership with the variables capturing the type of a controlling owner increases the explanatory power of the models significantly, which demonstrates the importance of ownership type in the production and pricing of an audit. The findings have important implications for those examining audit markets with client firms owned by different types of controlling shareholders.     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

Characteristics of non-audit services and financial restatements in Malaysia

Various types of purchased non-audit services (NAS) and their recurring nature affect the likelihood of financial statement restatements in Malaysia. Based on 953 firm-year observations during the period 2007–2009, evidence of a negative relationship between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements is provided. The purchase of both tax-related and audit-related NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements. Recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of restatements. These findings support our hypothesis that both types of NAS and their recurrence provide knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and financial reporting quality. When considering institutional settings, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to require financial restatements than non-politically connected firms, while audit committee independence and the purchase of tax-related, recurring tax-related and other NAS decrease this likelihood. The purchase of audit-related and recurring audit-related NAS and non-recurring other NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements for non-politically connected firms.     

Audit fees and audit adjustments: evidence from Welsh local authorities

This paper exploits the availability of pre-audit financial statements to investigate the scale and incidence of audit adjustments and their impact on audit fees in Welsh local authorities. Adjustments to the politically-sensitive general fund, which represent a significant proportion of all adjustments, are associated with increased audit fees. The authors also found that audit adjustments on average result in more conservative reporting of the surplus/deficit and the balance on the general fund, with the number and value of downward adjustments exceeding those of upward movements.     

The effect of non-audit services on client risk, acceptance and staffing decisions

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibited auditing firms from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients and left open the possibility that other currently non-prohibited services could also be banned. This prohibition hinges, in part, on regulatory concerns that auditors were willing to accept prospective higher risk clients in order to obtain more profitable non-audit service engagements. Accounting firms rejected this claim. Given the prospect that more non-audit services could be prohibited, we revisit this debate by examining these competing claims in an experiment in which we manipulate risk and the potential to sell non-audit services and then observe the impact of these variables on auditors’ client acceptance and subsequent staffing decisions. Specifically, audit partners received client information and were asked to make an acceptance decision and propose a staffing plan for a potential engagement. We find that a higher (lower) level of risk decreased (increased) the likelihood of acceptance and this relation did not vary with the potential to provide non-audit services. These results do not support the regulators’ claims but are consistent with the firms’ claims. Further, we found that more experienced auditors were assigned to the prospective client whose management had lower integrity. This staffing plan is consistent with a risk adaptation strategy for the client with lower integrity. The prohibition of certain non-audit services has been justified on the grounds that auditors might engage in systematic opportunistic behavior. However, our results do not find such behavior which should inform the current PCAOB deliberation over whether additional services should be banned. Alternatively, different justification must be found for the prohibitions.     

Non-audit service and auditor independence: an examination of the Procomp effect

This paper examines whether non-audit service provision impairs auditor independence, and whether the degree of auditor independence in Taiwan changed in the wake of the 2004 Procomp scandal. The auditors involved in the Procomp affair were suspended from practice for 2 years and were sued, and we posit that these unprecedented sanctions and litigation affected subsequent auditor behavior. Considering the measurement errors involved in discretionary accruals, we propose an alternative analytic approach in which the dependent variable in the regression analysis is the difference between audited earnings and forecast earnings, scaled by total assets, and the primary independent variable is the non-audit fees ratio. After controlling for the effects of financial leverage, operating and market performance, industry, company size, audit firm size, management forecast error, and management attempts to manipulate earnings, regression analysis indicates that the coefficient for non-audit fees ratio is negative and significant in 2003 but not in 2004. Using non-audit fees instead of non-audit fees ratio to conduct the regression analysis yields similar results. This finding is consistent with the notion that auditors make a trade-off between gaining service fees and avoiding litigation and reputation loss. Limitations and policy implications are also offered.

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.