The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited

Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 50 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial "pecking order" in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required.
In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other "contracting") costs, and information costs all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (the levels of debt and equity in relation to the target) and flows (or which security to issue at a particular time).     

What Drives Security Issuance Decisions: Market Timing,Pecking Order,or Both?

We study market timing and pecking order in a sample of debt and equity issues and share repurchases of Canadian firms from 1998 to 2007. We find that only when firms are not financially constrained is there evidence that firms issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued (undervalued) and evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower postannouncement long‐run returns. Similarly, we find that only when firms are not overvalued do they prefer debt to equity financing. These findings highlight an interaction between market timing and pecking order effects.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Since the formulation of the M & M irrelevance propositions 40 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes current firm value. Some finance scholars have followed M & M by arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the increased probability and costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M & M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other “contracting”) costs, and information costs (the main factor in the pecking order theory) all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much if not most of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (leverage ratios) and flows (specific choices between debt and equity). Even if companies have target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation from those targets—one that will depend on the transactions and information costs associated with adjusting back to the target relative to the costs of deviating from the target. As the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the target.     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

CAPITAL STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT AS A MOTIVATION FOR CALLING CONVERTIBLE DEBT

Using a matched-pairs methodology, we present empirical evidence of systematic changes within a corporation that are associated with calls of convertible debt. We find that calling firms experience significantly greater growth than noncalling firms in the same industry, as measured by retained earnings and long-term debt. Also, the converted debt provides a significant source of new book equity, and calling firms issue significantly less other new equity. The pattern of growth in balance sheet accounts is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis and supports the notion that some firms call convertible debt to reduce their total cost of obtaining additional external financing. The evidence also shows that, on average, calling firms experience a significant decline in their leverage ratio based on book value but no significant change in their leverage ratio based on market value of equity. This is consistent with the call's being used as part of the firm's management of its capital structure.     

Time-varying managerial overconfidence and pecking order preference

This paper examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. firm investment and directors’ trading) overconfidence measures. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (J Financ Econ 51:219–244, 1999) regression framework. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance deficits. This new evidence is consistent with the proposition that overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of future earnings believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing. Thus, managerial overconfidence can lead to a reverse pecking order preference. We also find that managerial overconfidence significantly weakens pecking order preference especially in firms with high earnings volatility and small firms.     

The Impact of Financing Surpluses and Large Financing Deficits on Tests of the Pecking Order Theory

This paper extends the basic pecking order model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers by separating the effects of financing surpluses, normal deficits, and large deficits. Using a panel of US firms over the period 1971-2005, we find that the estimated pecking order coefficient is highest for surpluses (0.90), lower for normal deficits (0.74), and lowest when firms have large financing deficits (0.09). These findings shed light on two empirical puzzles: 1) small firms, although having the highest potential for asymmetric information, do not behave according to the pecking order theory, and 2) the pecking order theory has lost explanatory power over time. We provide a solution to these puzzles by demonstrating that the frequency of large deficits is higher in smaller firms and increasing over time. We argue that our results are consistent with the debt capacity in the pecking order model.     

Bloomberg Intelligence Roundtable on The Theory and Practice of Capital Structure Management

Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial “pecking order” in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In this roundtable, a leading finance professor is joined by six practitioners in discussing whether and how capital structure decisions and payout policies can create value, with special attention to the healthcare industry. The consensus is that for those parts of the pharma industry with large growth opportunities, equity financing should be the main source of capital. But for those parts of the industry with shrinking prospects, increasing levels of debt and raising dividends are recommended.     

Do Portuguese private firms follow pecking order financing?

This paper tests for pecking order behavior in medium-sized private Portuguese firms. In contrast to the usual split between internal funds, debt, and external equity, we separate debt into four components – cheap trade credits (CTC), bank loans (BL), other loans, and expensive credits (EC). We use breakpoint tests to identify when firms switch between funding sources by examining the change in each funding source based on the financing deficit remaining after the previous pecking order funding source has been used. Our tests indicate that Portuguese companies generally move from lower cost to higher cost financing sources, but they do not exhaust each type of debt before moving on to the next funding source in the pecking order. Such behavior is consistent with a loose interpretation of pecking order financing, but not a strict interpretation of the theory. Instead, Portuguese firms may be balancing pecking order financing with a need to maintain some degree of financing flexibility.     

The pecking order,debt capacity,and information asymmetry

We quantify the empirical relevance of the pecking order hypothesis using a novel empirical model and testing strategy that addresses statistical power concerns with previous tests. While the classificatory ability of the pecking order varies significantly depending on whether one interprets the hypothesis in a strict or liberal (e.g., “modified” pecking order) manner, the pecking order is never able to accurately classify more than half of the observed financing decisions. However, when we expand the model to incorporate factors typically attributed to alternative theories, the predictive accuracy of the model increases dramatically—accurately classifying over 80% of the observed debt and equity issuances. Finally, we show that what little pecking order behavior can be found in the data is driven more by incentive conflicts, as opposed to information asymmetry.     

SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND CHOICE OF FINANCING: A TEST OF THE PECKING ORDER HYPOTHESIS

This paper studies the impact of sales growth above a sustainable level on the financing choices of the firm. Myers [1984] indicates that firms typically employ a pecking order of financing choices, using internal equity before the issuance of external debt, followed by the issuance of external equity. Contingency table analysis performed in this paper provides indirect evidence that the faster firms are growing, the more they use up available internal financing and, thus, must raise funds externally. In addition, logit analysis shows that firms with lower asymmetric information tend to raise the majority of their funds externally, with debt being the primary choice. Together, both sets of results provide indirect support for Myers' pecking order theory since it appears that firms use available internal financing, then debt, then new equity to finance growth.     

Do Managers Have Capital Structure Targets? Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs

The two main theories of capital structure—the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory—have opposite predictions about the expected relationship between corporate leverage and profitability. According to the tradeoff theory, companies that earn higher profits will use more debt both to shield their income from corporate taxes and to discipline corporate investment policy. In contrast, the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable companies will borrow less mainly because they have less need to borrow.
Corporate spinoffs provide a unique opportunity to investigate the influence of profitability and other asset characteristics on the design of capital structure. In their study of 98 spinoffs over the period 1979–1997, the authors began by investigating the popular argument that managers routinely assign more debt to subsidiaries than parents in order to leave the parents less encumbered—a possibility they reject after finding that the average leverage ratios of the parents and spunoff units were roughly equal. At the same time, the authors reported large differences in the leverage ratios among both parents and spun-off units, and that the variation was explained primarily by differences in three factors: asset tangibility and the level and variability of cash operating profits. Consistent with the tradeoff theory (but not the pecking order), the study found a significantly positive correlation between a post-spinoff company's cash profitability and its assigned debt load, as well as a negative correlation between debt and the variability of operating cash flow.     

Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory

This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODEL

Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity.
The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios.     

Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal Debt

We argue that domestic business groups are able to actively optimise the internal/external debt mix across their subsidiaries. Novel to the literature, we use bi‐level data (i.e. data from both individual subsidiary financial statements and consolidated group level financial statements) to model the bank and internal debt concentration of non‐financial Belgian private business group affiliates. As a benchmark, we construct a size and industry matched sample of non‐group affiliated (stand‐alone) companies. We find support for a pecking order of internal debt over bank debt at the subsidiary level which leads to a substantially lower bank debt concentration for group affiliates as compared to stand‐alone companies. The internal debt concentration of a subsidiary is mainly driven by the characteristics of the group's internal capital market. The larger its available resources, the more intra‐group debt is used while bank debt financing at the subsidiary level decreases. However, as the group's overall debt level mounts, groups increasingly locate bank borrowing in subsidiaries with low costs of external financing (i.e. large subsidiaries with important collateral assets) to limit moral hazard and dissipative costs. Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of a complex group wide optimisation process of financing costs.     

Capital structure and signaling game equilibria

In this article we model the financing decisions of a firm asa sequential signaling game. We prove that, when insiders haveperfect information regarding the firm's future case flows,the application of 'refinements' to the set of admissible equilibrialeads to the dominance of debt over equity financing. However,we show that when insiders observe the firm's cash flows imperfectly,there may exist sequential equilibria in which this 'peckingorder' breaks down and some firms strictly prefer equity todebt financing. We also prove that, despite the breakdown ofthe pecking order, the announcement effect of equity financingwill be negative relative to debt financing.     

Trust‐Preferred Securities and Insurer Financing Decisions

We analyze insurance holding company (IHC) issuance of trust‐preferred securities (TPS) from 1994 to 2013. We find that larger and more financially levered IHCs issued TPS in 1996 and 1997, as well as those that obtained financial strength ratings from A.M. Best. Abnormal stock price returns are positively related to financial distress costs, growth opportunities, and tax burden, but negatively related to size. Consistent with the pecking order theory, intent to use TPS proceeds to retire debt is positively related to abnormal stock returns, whereas intent to use proceeds to retire preferred equity is negatively related to abnormal stock returns.     

上市公司融资方式选择的偏好顺序分析——来自四川的经验数据

论文以2006-2010年四川省53家上市公司为样本,对其融资方式选择的偏好顺序及影响因素进行实证分析。研究结果与融资优序理论相悖,四川上市公司的融资偏好顺序依次为短期债务融资、股权融资、长期债务融资、内部融资。其中,短期偿债能力、长期偿债能力、资产营运能力、资产盈利能办、市场竞争能力、股利支付能力在不同程度上分别影响上市公司的内部融资度、债务融资度和股权融资度。     

Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt

Confirming predictions shared by the trade-off and pecking ordermodels, more profitable firms and firms with fewer investmentshave higher dividend payouts. Confirming the pecking order modelbut contradicting the trade-off model, more profitable firmsare less levered. Firms with more investments have less marketleverage, which is consistent with the trade-off model and acomplex pecking order model. Firms with more investments havelower long-term dividend payouts, but dividends do not varyto accommodate short-term variation in investment. As the peckingorder model predicts, short-term variation in investment andearnings is mostly absorbed by debt.