Vertical Disintegration: A Dynamic Markovian Approach

In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its intermediate‐input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of independent suppliers decrease when their number increases), the assembler’s marginal return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than the market value of an independent supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm’s initial number of upstream subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads to a mixed strategy whereby the assembler keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability.     

沥青路面离析问题

沥青道路路面早期损坏的一个重要原因是路面存在不均匀性,而沥青混合料的离析问题是造成路面不均匀性的主要原因.文章结合市政道路施工的实际,从材料运输、温度影响、摊铺机的影响等方面阐述了沥青路面离析的问题.     

沥青路面离析问题

沥青道路路面早期损坏的一个重要原因是路面存在不均匀性,而沥青混合料的离析问题是造成路面不均匀性的主要原因。文章结合市政道路施工的实际,从材料运输、温度影响、摊铺机的影响等方面阐述了沥青路面离析的问题。     

质量目标的确定及其在相关层次上的分解落实

确定富有挑战性、竞争性和可测量性的质量目标,是一个组织贯彻实施ISO9000族标准的重要环节,也是落实组织质量方针和持续改进质量体系的重要步骤。但许多组织对如何确定组织的总质量目标以及如何在各相关层次上加以分解落实,却缺乏办法。《质量目标的确定及其在相关层次上的分解落实》一文,通过实例对此问题进行了阐述。     

Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains

The design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players' expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling (1960)). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey. JEL classification L22, L42, L81.     

Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure

A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.     

Vertical Integration and Firm Productivity

This paper uses three cross‐industry datasets from China and other developing countries to study the effect of vertical integration on firm productivity. Our findings suggest that vertical integration has a negative impact on productivity, in contrast to recent studies based on U.S. firms. We argue that in settings with poor corporate governance, vertical integration reduces firm productivity because it enables inefficient rent‐seeking by insiders.     

Strategic Delegation and Vertical Integration

This paper proposes a game‐theoretic model to analyze owners' vertical integration choices if they delegate pricing decisions to their managers. We find that all three vertical structures are possible Nash equilibrium outcomes. If the products are weak substitutes, then the outcome is that both owners adopt vertical integration. When the products are close substitutes, both owners adopt vertical separation in equilibrium. When substitution between the products is medium, the coexistence of vertical integration and vertical separation is the equilibrium outcome, and the owner corresponding to vertical separation offers exactly a profit‐maximization contract to his or her manager under this situation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical externality and strategic delegation

This paper examines the effects of vertical externality generated by the upstream monopoly on the incentives that owners of competing downstream firms give their managers. It is shown that the introduction of the upstream monopoly may have significant effects on the incentive schemes for the downstream firms' managers. In particular, it is shown that in equilibrium, each owner obtains the simple Nash equilibrium outcome regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price) in the downstream market. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

探析布雷顿森林体系解体后战争对黄金价格的影响

文章通过研究布雷顿森林体系(1944~1973)瓦解后先后八次相关的国际战争之前、之时以及之后的全球现货黄金价格的变动,探析相关国际战争对黄金价格的影响机制并归纳出规律性的结论。     

企业纵向并购的税收筹划

作为企业获得战略性发展的重要方式之一,并购日益成为企业界和学术界关注的焦点。而税收作为影响每一个企业的重要经济因素,是企业并购决策不容忽视的内容。合理的税收筹划有助于并购的最终成功,反之则可能导致并购的失败。本文立足于企业纵向并购,从不同的目标企业、融资方式、实现方式等角度对纵向并购中的税收筹划进行了剖析。     

Product Differentiation by Competing Vertical Hierarchies

We revisit the choice of product differentiation in the Hotelling model, by assuming that competing firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products' characteristics. The “principle of differentiation” does not hold because retailers with private information about their marginal costs produce less differentiated products in order to increase their information rents. Hence, information asymmetry within vertical hierarchies may increase social welfare by inducing them to sell products that appeal to a larger number of consumers. We show that the socially optimal level of transparency between manufacturers and retailers depends on the weight assigned to consumers' surplus and trades off two effects: higher transparency reduces price distortion but induces retailers to produce excessively similar products.     

Vertical externalities and control of politicians

A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government. Received: June 30, 2000 / Accepted: April 4, 2001     

纵向并购的经济学分析

本文首先对契约、交易费用与纵向一体化进行比较分析,然后着重通过模型阐述了在不同的一体化方式及程度下,企业的利润变化情况,以从经济学角度解释纵向一体化存在的原因。     

Vertical Integration and Proprietary Information Transfers

Suppose that rival downstream producers of a final good contract with the same upstream supplier of an input and, in the process, reveal private information. A vertical merger between the upstream supplier and one of the downstream firms may dissipate the information advantage of the remaining downstream firms. The welfare consequences of such a merger and related information sharing depend on the value of information, the benefits of integration apart from information sharing, and the nature of upstream competition. In this paper, conditions are found under which owners of a vertically integrated firm are better off breaking up into independent firms. This result may explain AT&T's recent spinoff of Lucent Technologies. Further results suggest that a prohibition on information transfers, such as that often proposed by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice as a precursor to approving vertical mergers, may actually reduce expected consumer surplus and expected social welfare.     

巧用竖式学习被动语态

被动语态是英语中一个重要的语法项目,而各个时态的被动语态却是学生学习中的一个难点。笔者利用了知识的正迁移,将数学中的竖式巧妙地应用于各个时态被动语态的学习之中,使学生能够轻松牢固地学习并掌握各个时态的被动语态。     

铰链门垂直刚度探析

铰链门的设计要素及评价指标较多,其中最重要的要素是垂直刚度指标。垂直刚度指标的确立及研究对车门设计具有指导意义。文章重点阐述了垂直刚度的分析方法及指标。     

甘肃庆阳N_2~(cr)红黏土崩解特性研究

银(川)-西(安)高铁下穿甘肃庆阳地区董志塬,该黄土塬区下层普遍发育了一层15～40m的新近纪上新统红黏土。为了研究其物理、力学性质及崩解特性,为隧道施工快速判定围岩强度提供依据,通过室内实验获得基本物理、力学参数,并进行浸水崩解试验。研究结果表明:该层红黏土浸水崩解初期体现出黄土崩解特性,5d后体现出泥岩的崩解特性,崩解过程趋于收敛。     

Space Grabs: Colonizing the Vertical City

Much attention has been paid recently to land grabs in rural and urban areas of the global South, but relatively little attention has been paid to such activities in the third dimension—vertical space. Yet vertical space has also been increasingly colonized, as manifest in the transformation of mega-city skylines through the proliferating number and height of high-rises in both central cities and peri-urban developments. We investigate how floor area ratio policies, originally designed to control densification, have been reworked to facilitate densification through floor area uplift. Thus a tool originally developed to advance public welfare has been used to facilitate the profitability of real estate projects for developers and to benefit local governments. Taking DKI Jakarta as our case study, we sketch out the coevolution of this policy with urban regimes, focusing on the mid-2010s when compensation measures were formalized and made transparent. By using a particular project in Jakarta's central business district we show how the benefits of floor area uplift favor private sector developers over the local government. In a context of rapidly increasing land values, increasing demand for housing from an emergent middle class, and particularly the privatization of planning, this unevenness systematically favors the private sector.     

Vertical mergers and the balance of trade

This paper examines the relationship between the vertical merger and the balance of trade. Our results show that the effects of the vertical merger on the trade balance and consumers' welfare depend on the production technology adopted by the final good manufacturers. The vertical merger will improve both the trade balance and consumers' welfare when fixed-coefficient technology is adopted. However, these positive effects could not be held when variable-coefficient technology is used to produce the final good.