Securitization without adverse selection: The case of CLOs

In this paper, we investigate whether securitization was associated with risky lending in the corporate loan market by examining the performance of individual loans held by collateralized loan obligations. We employ two different data sets that identify loan holdings for a large set of CLOs and find that adverse selection problems in corporate loan securitizations are less severe than commonly believed. Using a battery of performance tests, we find that loans securitized before 2005 performed no worse than comparable unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank. Even loans originated by the bank that acts as the CLO underwriter do not show under-performance relative to the rest of the CLO portfolio. While some evidence exists of under-performance for securitized loans originated between 2005 and 2007, it is not consistent across samples, performance measures, and horizons. Overall, we argue that the securitization of corporate loans is fundamentally different from securitization of other assets classes because securitized loans are fractions of syndicated loans. Therefore, mechanisms used to align incentives in a lending syndicate are likely to reduce adverse selection in the choice of CLO collateral.     

Securitization and systematic risk in European banking: Empirical evidence

Using a unique dataset of 592 cash and synthetic securitizations issued by 54 banks from the EU-15 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2007 this paper provides empirical evidence that credit risk securitization has a positive impact on the increase of European banks’ systematic risk. Baseline results hold when comparing estimated beta coefficients with a control group of similar non-securitizing banks. Building several sub-samples we additionally find that (a) the increase in systematic risk is more relevant for larger banks that repeatedly engage in securitization, (b) securitization is more important for small and medium financial institutions, (c) banks have a higher incentive to retain the larger part of credit risk as a quality signal at the beginning of the securitization business in Europe, and (d) the overall risk-shifting effect due to securitization is more distinct when the pre-event systematic risk is low.     

Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk

An additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets. When risk-neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities, structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists’ demand on risky tranches. With disagreement about default correlation, low-correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless. High-correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good. Risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass-through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching.     

Inf-convolution of risk measures and optimal risk transfer

We develop a methodology for optimal design of financial instruments aimed to hedge some forms of risk that is not traded on financial markets. The idea is to minimize the risk of the issuer under the constraint imposed by a buyer who enters the transaction if and only if her risk level remains below a given threshold. Both agents have also the opportunity to invest all their residual wealth on financial markets, but with different access to financial investments. The problem is reduced to a unique inf-convolution problem involving a transformation of the initial risk measures.Received: December 2004, Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 60G35, 91B28, 91B30, 46N10JEL Classification: C61, D81, G13, G22     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

关于我国目前推行资产证券化难点问题的思考

资产证券化是国际金融领域近三十年里最重要的一种金融创新。目前，国内学界对我国进行资产证券化的研究论述较多。中国人民银行戴相龙行长在今年 5月份的《财富》论坛上指出“正在准备将住房贷款证券化”。然而，我国目前进行资产证券化的条件是否具备呢 ?史焕平同志撰文从进行资产证券化的程序开始分析，认为我国目前进行资产证券化工作还存在不少的难点和问题，只有在近几年努力做好各项基础工作，才能为资产证券化的推出创造条件。详见第 20页。     

Securitization and Bank Performance

Using predominantly precrisis U.S. commercial bank data, this paper employs a propensity score matching approach to analyze whether individual banks did improve their performance through securitization. On average, our results show that securitizing banks tend to be more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure. Despite a more diversified funding structure, they face higher funding costs. We also find that securitizing banks tend to hold larger and less diversified loan portfolios, have less liquidity, and hold less capital. However, our analysis does not provide evidence to suggest that securitization had an impact upon bank performance.     

Corporate Taxes and Securitization

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.     

住房贷款证券化好事多磨

"中国建设银行的资产证券化方案根本没有遭否定",应红在接受记者采访时开门见山指出,"一些媒体的报道是不准确的和不负责任的,我们正在和相关媒体交涉".应红是新近成立的中国建设银行房地产金融部证券化处处长,这个处成立的目的就是专门运作个人住房抵押贷款证券化业务,无疑应红处长的回答极具权威性.     

Securitization and optimal foreclosure

Does securitization distort the foreclosure decisions of non-performing mortgages? In a model of mortgage-backed securitization with an endogenous foreclosure policy, we find that the securitizing bank adopts a tougher foreclosure policy than the first-best, despite resulting in higher loan losses. This is optimal because foreclosure mitigates the adverse selection problem in securitization by making the optimal security, a risky debt, less information-sensitive. We further show that policies that limit mortgage foreclosure would discourage the bank’s ex ante screening effort, reducing the quality of securitized mortgages. Our model yields novel testable predictions on the effect of mortgage securitization on foreclosure rates, loan performance, and mortgage servicing.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

Information asymmetry and risk transfer markets

We provide a tractable model of counterparty risk in a risk transfer market, and analyze the consequences of this risk being private information. We show that unknown type information can be revealed in the presence of a large trader identification policy; however, the market allocation is shown to be constrained inefficient. The inefficiency is highlighted by considering the imposition of a transaction tax, which can improve welfare by encouraging more information revelation and increasing risk transfer. The results suggest that increased transparency and/or central counterparty arrangements in over-the-counter derivative markets may promote transparency of counterparty risk.     

Regulatory capital and asset risk transfer

We explore whether life insurers use a unique reinsurance arrangement to manage assets tied to their regulatory capital. Typical reinsurance allows insurers to reduce their regulatory capital by transferring liabilities (reserves), and the associated assets, to reinsurers. With modified coinsurance (ModCo), insurers maintain control of their liabilities and assets while transferring regulatory capital requirements to the reinsurer. Holding fixed an insurer's reported capital, we find that ModCo allows insurers to report higher risk-based capital ratios. Insurers with ModCo are less likely to fire sale downgraded bonds. We also find suggestive evidence of regulatory arbitrage, as most ModCo is purchased from reinsurers in countries with low capital requirements or within the same insurance group.     

资产证券化不是圈钱运动

我国金融学界对信贷资产证券化的探讨由来已久,但是仍有相当一部分业内人士将资产证券化仅仅理解为解决四大国有独资商业银行不良资产的手段,这种做法有欠妥当,容易使投资者将其误解为另一种形式的“圈钱运动”,从而将这一尚未在我国深入开展的新兴业务引入歧途。     

论我国住房抵押贷款证券化

本文以借鉴和运用资产证券化这一金融创新工具为出发点，论证我国实行住房抵押贷款证券化的必要性，并提出应采取的对策选择。     

企业资产证券化融资的财富效应——基于浦东建设资产证券化研究

选取浦东建设资产证券化作为典型案例,对"企业资产证券化是否会增加发起人的股东和债权人的财富"进行了实证检验,结果表明:浦东建设资产证券化给其股东带来了平均0.154%的财富增加;在资产证券化当年,浦东建设资产证券化给其债权人带来了正的财富效应;但在资产证券化后,对债权人产生了负的财富效应。     

谨慎实施住房抵押贷款证券化

尽管推行住房抵押贷款证券化有助于拓展房地产金融业务，促进房地产市场发展，但我国实施这一举措的基础环境尚待改善，因此，有必要审慎，渐进地推行住房抵押贷款证券化，切忌操之过急。与此同时，应切实，有效地推行有助于个人住房贷款发展的政策措施，培育个人信用制度，建立和健全相关法规体系，为实行住房抵押贷款证券化奠定坚实基础。