Is Job Insecurity Higher in Leveraged Buyouts?

This article assesses whether job insecurity is higher in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) than elsewhere. It draws on matched employer‐employee data from the British 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study linked to data from the Centre for Management Buyout Research. The analysis finds no consistent evidence of higher job insecurity in LBOs as measured by workforce reduction practices (redundancy rates, job security/no‐compulsory redundancies policies and redundancy consultation), dismissal rates, labour use practices (non‐permanent employment contracts and outsourcing) and employees’ job security perceptions. Job insecurity is no higher in either current or former LBOs than elsewhere. Contrary to what might be expected, it is also no higher in private equity (PE)‐backed LBOs, management buy‐ins or high‐debt LBOs and there is only partial and weak evidence of higher job insecurity in short‐hold LBOs. Job insecurity is also no higher in perfect storm LBOs (PE‐backed management buy‐ins that are short‐holds with high‐debt). Concerns over the negative implications of LBOs for job security thus appear misplaced.     

Governance,ownership structure,and performance of IPO firms: the impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments

This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France. We expand and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand‐collected dataset of 224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity investors' retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that concentrated ownership improves IPOs' performance. The research also shows that the two types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal institutions in a given country moderate this impact. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Frequency and directional reversal of equity ownership change in international joint ventures

Changes in equity ownership between international joint venture (IJV) partners over an IJV life-course represent an important behavioral manifestation of relational dynamics. We examine each occurrence of equity ownership change for two salient temporal properties: frequency (how often ownership change occurs) and directional reversal (when a partner buys and then sells, or vice versa, equity shares from another partner). Building on social exchange theory, we propose that initial partner equity imbalance and partners’ country’s individualism-collectivist culture has an imprinting effect on the likelihood of ownership change for both temporal properties. We developed a data set consisting of all equity changes in 200 Japanese automotive suppliers’ IJVs and found support for our hypotheses while controlling for transaction cost explanations. Our findings contribute to IJV research by shedding light on temporal aspects of equity ownership change over an IJV’s life course as well as the underlying exchange dynamics and the stability of IJV equity ownership distribution among partners.     

Capital subsidies,profit maximization,and acquisitions by partially privatized telecommunications carriers

A recent phenomenon in competition policy is the acquisition of a private firm by an enterprise that is either wholly owned by government or in the midst of privatization. Such an acquisition poses the question of how public ownership may alter the incentives of a firm to engage in anticompetitive conduct. It also prompts one to examine the process by which such altered incentives revert, as the level of government ownership declines, to the same incentives that face purely private firms. Using Deutsche Telekom's acquisition of VoiceStream Wireless as a case study, this article presents the economic questions relevant to evaluating the competitive consequences of acquisitions by partially privatized firms. It predicts gains or losses to various constituencies of producer groups. It then analyzes bond ratings and weighted-average costs of capital to determine whether such data are consistent with the hypothesis, advanced by parties opposed to such foreign investment, that partially privatized acquirers benefited from the government subsidization of their credit.     

所有权与自然垄断产业规制——组合模式及选择

对于自然垄断产业采用何种所有权结构的规制模式,在理论研究与实践操作中都存在着多样化的选择。本文主要比较分析了民营外生规制、国有内生规制和混合所有权规制三种不同组合模式,并认为混合所有权规制模式较好地兼容了其他模式的优点,可以成为自然垄断产业改革与治理进程中的一个可取路径。欧盟国家自然垄断产业的改革经验,从实践上证明了混合所有权规制模式的可行性,尽管其也存在一定的局限性。同时,本文认为对于转型改革时期的中国,针对自然垄断行业的国有企业,可以考虑采用混合所有权规制模式的改革路径,通过股权开放的形式放松民营资本进入自然垄断产业的行业管制,并有效、平稳地建立起自然垄断产业规制体系。     

中国制造业部门劳动报酬比重的下降及其动因分析

本文发现中国制造业部门中存在劳动报酬比重过低,以及增长乏力的典型事实,是造成中国宏观层面的劳动报酬占GDP比重持续降低的重要因素。企业微观层面的经验结果表明:资本报酬提升的挤压、资本偏向性的技术进步、资本密集度的提高,以及外资进入,是对我国制造业企业劳动报酬比重造成抑制效应的重要因素。而且,劳动力的地区流动也对我国制造业企业劳动报酬比重造成负面效应。相对于其他所有制类型企业,民营企业中的劳动报酬比重更低,这是造成我国制造业劳动报酬比重偏低的重要因素。相反,市场竞争程度的提高、地区劳动者保护程度的强化,以及员工工资的提高,对我国制造业企业劳动报酬比重起到正面促进作用。我们还发现,企业规模和年龄与企业劳动报酬比重之间的正相关关系表明,企业成长会朝着有利于劳动者利益的方向发展。进一步的稳健性分析也从各个方面验证了以上结论。我们的研究成果充分说明从微观视角来重新审视中国所面临劳动报酬比重降低问题的成因,尤为具有重要的理论和实践意义。     

中国企业杠杆率周期演变机制探析

2008年国际金融危机以来中国经济增速逐渐放缓,然而企业杠杆率却呈现“逆周期”上升,同时国有企业与民营企业的杠杆率呈现“所有制分化”。上述中国企业杠杆率特有的周期演变机制有待探索。在优质资产相对缺乏和政府影响力较为强大的背景下,预算软约束和政府隐性担保对企业杠杆率的周期变化具有深刻的影响。本文基于Dewatripont and Maskin(1995)关于预算软约束的建模思想,引入经济基本面和政府隐性担保,考察了企业与银行间借贷博弈的均衡性质,进而探究了企业杠杆率在不同经济基本面下的变化规律。本文的理论模型证明,给定隐性担保水平,企业杠杆率的周期性取决于预算软约束的周期性,随着经济形势由差转好,预算软约束先增强后减弱,企业杠杆率逐渐从“周期性不定”转为“逆周期”变化。本文进一步分析了政府隐性担保的内生选择路径,发现其周期性变化对企业杠杆率周期演变过程中的所有制结构分化具有解释力,在其“递减型”或“倒U型”路径下,民营企业杠杆率周期性不定,国有企业杠杆率则在较长区间内呈“逆周期性”。本文最后还将现实中的有关政策措施纳入模型,讨论了机制优化的思路及其对企业杠杆率周期性的影响。     

民营化为何不能改善公司经营绩效——国光瓷业民营化的案例研究

本文以国光瓷业民营化为例,研究发现公司业绩并没有在“国退民进”之后表现出极大改善,相反正在急剧恶化。我们运用产权理论详细分析了民营化前后的所有权安排,指出民营化后的所有权安排并没有显著改善。基于这种所有权安排的控制权收益是导致公司业绩恶化的直接原因,“国有”时期的控制权收益体现在上市公司为政府的多元化经营目标服务,偏离了企业以盈利为导向的经营目标,而“民营”时期的控制权收益则体现为民营股东从上市公司转移资源。因此,通过完善证券市场的基础法律环境,约束甚至严惩控股股东获取控制权收益,是保证国有上市公司“国退民进”取得成功的基础。     

Anatomy of a public-private partnership: Hold-up and regulatory commitment in Ultrafast Broadband

In recent years, the preference for purely private funding and ownership of telecommunications networks has given way to a ‘new wisdom’ that some form of public funding is now likely necessary if faster and more capacious next generation access (NGA) networks are to be constructed in a timely fashion for the majority of the population. Policy-makers are charged with deciding how that public investment will take place. One approach is via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), where public and private actors collaborate in UFB (Ultrafast Fibre Broadband) investment, construction and operation. However, the body of analysis of PPPs in NGA networks to guide policy-makers is scant.By using the concept of regulatory commitment, the paper compares the experiences gained in a hold-up situation in PPPs in other infrastructures (e.g. roading) with the UFB context. A case study of New Zealand's Ultrafast Fibre Broadband Initiative is used to draw new insights for government purchasers and regulatory agencies. In comparing the different forms of PPPs, the paper shows that UFB PPPs reverse the typical direction of financing and ownership observed in roading PPPs. Financing and asset ownership are separated in UFB PPPs, increasing the potential for misalignment of incentives and the likelihood that the public party can use its legislative powers to alter regulatory settings after the PPP contract is signed, and thereby hold up the private party once existing network assets are sunk. Whilst the government instigating the PPP may not be inclined to act opportunistically, a successive government facing different political priorities does not face the same incentives. To the extent that the private party can anticipate this risk, it should structure the initial agreement to ensure that the public party is penalised if such an event occurs (i.e. an automatic right to favourable renegotiation or payment of compensation). Such terms will discourage opportunism, so that the project benefits from time-consistent alignment of incentives and objectives.     

中小型制造企业创新特征分析:基于德阳企业调查数据

本文利用2009年四川德阳地区地震灾后中小型企业调查数据,从产业、所有制及企业规模等角度系统地考察了当地中小型企业的创新特征,并分析了其中存在的主要问题。我们发现,企业的平均专利数量及专利结构具有明显的产业异质性,在考虑专利申请的集中度后,产业的专利密度与研发密度呈现负相关性;各种不同所有制企业在创新动力、创新类型与创新的信息来源方面存在显著差异;发明专利密度与企业规模呈倒U形关系,而实用新型及外观设计专利密度随企业规模的增大而减小;政府研发资助存在选择效应,规模较大的企业更有可能获得政府的创新扶持。本文突破既有研究的数据限制,为我国中小型企业在创新模式转变中的差异性提供了证据,并为政府相应的创新扶持政策提供了借鉴。     

天玛公司混合所有制发展历程与展望

天玛公司是煤炭系统较早探索混合所有制的企业,在其发展历程中经过合资、外资退出、自主创新发展等阶段。摸索出一条以公有制与个人所有制联合、形成资本所有制与劳动者利益共同体的混合所有制模式,从而充分调动员工主观能动性,实现企业稳步较快发展和国有资产保值增值。并就混合所有制下一步改革方向进行了探讨。     

并购失败：管理者利益保护还是经济安全威胁解除？——凯雷收购徐工案例研究

凯雷集团并购徐工机械是国内第一起由国际私人股权基金获得大型国有企业绝对控股权的案例。文章采用事件研究法,以徐工机械控股的上市公司徐工科技为研究对象,分析了此次并购过程中的五个事件：首次签署并购协议,博客门事件,修订并购协议,二次修订并购协议,协议到期。研究表明上市公司股东在前两个事件中获得了显著的正超常收益,而在后两个事件中的超常收益显著为负,至协议到期并购失败后又获得显著为正的超常收益。从并购过程中的市场反应来看,支持经济安全威胁的证据比支持管理者利益保护的证据更强。     

山西冀中能源集团混合所有制经济建设的探索

经济发展需遵循市场经济规律。混合所有制是传统单一国有或单一民营向现代企业制度迈进过程中一个典型过渡和实现形式。介绍了山西冀中能源集团在发展混合所有制经济方面的探索和创新,分析了在推进混合所有制经济建设过程中取得的成效,并提出发展混合所有制经济,要完善产权流动的市场机制和产权保障的法律体系,发挥好政府在市场经济中的地位和作用等相关建议。     

Business group affiliation and firm performance in a transition economy: A focus on ownership voids

In a transition economy, how does business group affiliation make a difference in firm performance? Under the broad label of institutional voids, what specific voids can business groups fill? This paper addresses these questions by drawing on insights from property rights theory and an institutional perspective. We argue that ownership voids, as a subset of institutional voids, occur due to the lack of unambiguously specified ownership of state assets in transition economies, and that business groups emerge to serve as the direct owners of state-owned enterprises to replace such voids. Based on a sample of 1,119 publicly-listed Chinese companies, we find that the interaction of business group affiliation and state ownership has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. Our findings point to business group’s substitution role in filling ownership voids in China’s transition economy.     

煤炭企业混合所有制改革与公司治理机制优化

煤炭企业混合所有制改革是煤炭企业建立现代企业制度的必然要求。煤炭企业混合所有制改革要求在国有煤炭企业中引入民营投资、外商投资,形成煤炭企业投资主体多元化的格局。煤炭企业混合所有制改革要求煤炭企业按《公司法》要求改制为规范的公司制企业,构建以股东会、董事会、监事会、经理层为代表的现代公司治理结构。煤炭企业混合所有制改革拓宽煤炭企业融资渠道,引入国内外战略投资者,可优化煤炭企业的公司治理机制。总之,煤炭企业混合所有制改革有利于煤炭企业公司治理机制的形成和优化。     

Host Country’s Intellectual Property Rights and Firm’s Equity Participation

There has been an important debate on whether the degree of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in a host country affects the choice of ownership structure of a transnational firm (TNF) for its affiliate. It is argued that a TNF’s equity participation in its affiliate is used to exert control and to protect its assets. Firms with greater equity ownership can control better the extent of the technology spillover, and thus compensate for weaker IPR protection in the host country, than can firms that do not have as large an equity participation in their affiliates. Using a unique data set of a newly developed country’s (South Korea) TNFs, this paper shows that there is a negative relationship between a host country’s standards of IPR protection and a TNF’s equity participation.      

The network structure of big business in Taiwan

This paper takes a network approach to understanding ownership patterns and director interlocks in Taiwan. In particular, this paper analyzes ties among Taiwan’s top 200 publicly listed companies in 1990 and 2000. The speed of change in Taiwan’s economic organization during the period has been striking. Not only have the identities of many of Taiwan’s largest firms changed, there seems to have been a substantial pruning and thinning of director ties over time and also a substantial transformation of the ownership network. What continuity remains appears to be largely a consequence of business group membership, and the strength of those ties appears to be considerable. Overall, this research finds that Taiwan’s financial sector has been quite central to the island’s big business network, that business groups are an extremely important category for understanding patterns of ownership ties, and that most director interlocks in Taiwan appear to cross industry boundaries rather than occur within them.     

基于价值网络的企业价值计量模式研究

企业生活在一个多维价值网络系统中,这一价值网络系统由企业外部的微观价值网络体系、产业价值网络体系和社会价值网络体系共同构成。多维价值网络体系促进了企业智力资本的积累与发展,导致企业无形价值边界逐步脱离有形价值边界,产生了企业的双重价值边界,提升了企业无形价值和整体价值。多维价值网络环境下的企业价值计量包括有形价值计量和无形价值计量,有形价值计量以测量企业物质财富的经济价值为目的,通常采用财务计价或财务估价模式,无形价值计量以测量企业智力资本的价值创造潜力为目的,通常计量、财务计价、财务估价、非财务价值计量、非财务价值估计等多种模式综合并用。     

改制对企业绩效影响的实证分析

本文运用来自竞争性行业的451家样本企业(1994—1999年)的数据研究了改制对企业经营绩效的影响。通过产权结构作为连续变量的分析，发现国有产权对企业绩效具有显著的负作用，而非国有资本具有积极的绩效效应，其中个人资本具有最为显著的提高效益的正相关作用。在不同资本控股权的分析中，个人资本相对控股权分组的利润率显著高于国有资本相对控股权的分组，并且经营者持股比例的增加可以显著提高改善经营绩效的可能性。