Earnings management and abnormal returns: Evidence from the 1970–1972 Price Control Regulations

We examine the association between abnormal returns and earnings management in the context of price control regulations to test the construct validity of the earnings management model. Abnormal returns are used as a market–based measure, and discretionary accruals are employed to measure earnings management. Our results support the hypotheses that (1) price control regulations affect firms' security prices negatively, (2) firms make income–decreasing discretionary accruals to increase the likelihood of price increase approval, and (3) firms that are affected most negatively by the regulations manage earnings more aggressively. We conclude that the earnings management model we use in this study is capable of predicting opportunistic discretionary accruals.     

Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings Management Explanation

Prior research has documented a kink in the earnings distribution: too few firms report small losses, too many firms report small profits. We investigate whether boosting of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation for this kink. Overall, we are unable to confirm that boosting of discretionary accruals is the key driver of the kink. We caution the use of the ratio of small profit firms to small loss firms as a measure of earnings management. We investigate and discuss a number of alternative explanations for the kink.     

Expected Accrual Models: The Impact of Operating Cash Flows and Reversals of Accruals

This paper augments the Jones (1991) model with operating cash flows and lagged accruals to evaluate the impact of (1) the negative association between accruals and concurrent cash flows, (2) the positive association between accruals and lagged cash flows, and (3) the reversal of accruals. I find that operating cash flows greatly improve the explanatory and predictive power of the Jones model; but, lagged accruals do not. A market test of the expected and unexpected components of accruals indicates that unexpected accruals are on average informative with respect to concurrent stock returns; however, the market does not fully understand the implications of accruals anticipated at the beginning of the return period.This paper has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions from Tae Hee Choi, In-Kyu Moon, and two anonymous reviewers on earlier versions of this paper. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Queens School of Business.     

Does Investor Sentiment Affect Earnings Management?

I hypothesize and find that earnings management via accruals is driven partially by the prevailing market‐wide investor sentiment. Managers inflate earnings in periods of higher sentiment, but report more conservatively during periods of low sentiment. Moreover, the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises is also positively associated with investor sentiment. These results are robust to: (i) controls for time‐varying firm characteristics such as growth, investment opportunity sets, future profitability, leverage and size; (ii) macroeconomic variables such as future inflation, GDP growth, and growth in industrial production; (iii) multiple proxies for investor sentiment; and (iv) discretionary revenues as alternative measure of earnings management. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that firms whose stock returns co‐move more with investor sentiment are more (less) likely to manage earnings upward via abnormal accruals in quarters of higher (lower) sentiment. The findings of managers’ strategic use of abnormal accruals show the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to heightened managerial incentives to overstate earnings and to report optimistic earnings numbers during periods of high investor sentiment.     

Systematic Measurement Error in the Estimation of Discretionary Accruals: An Evaluation of Alternative Modelling Procedures

This paper evaluates the extent of predictable measurement error induced by five alternative approaches to the estimation of discretionary accruals. The source and magnitude of the error is assessed by reference to the strength of the association between the discretionary accrual estimate and proxies for the non-discretionary components of total accruals. Results indicate that discretionary accruals generated by the Healy model are associated with the highest level of predictable measurement error. While the remaining four models generate significantly lower error levels, the magnitude of error remains highly significant. Findings highlight the limitations of existing models and emphasise the need for further developments in relation to the measurement of earnings management activity.     

Cost of Capital, Strategic Disclosures and Accounting Choice

Abstract:   Theory suggests a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital. However, empirical research has not, in general, confirmed this. In particular, Botosan (1997) finds no evidence of a negative relationship for firms with a high analyst following, and moreover, Botosan and Plumlee (2002a) find that firms' cost of capital increases with timely disclosures. There are several possible explanations for this puzzle. First, the theory‐driven hypothesis may be false and require re‐specification. Second, there may be correlated omitted variables contaminating the results. Finally, these inconclusive results may have arisen due to problems with the measurement of disclosure. We construct an innovative measure of timely disclosure, that attempts to capture quality rather than quantity of strategic disclosures. In addition, motivated by new theoretical research by Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) , we control for a possible omitted variable, namely accounting policy choice. With this revised research design, we find the expected negative relationship. Furthermore, as predicted by Gietzmann and Trombetta, this relationship is only significant for firms adopting aggressive accounting policies.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

The Usefulness of Measures of Consistency of Discretionary Components of Accruals in the Detection of Earnings Management

Abstract:  Prior research has shown the prevalence of measurement error in models used to estimate aggregate discretionary accruals. In these models, the incremental information content of the various components of accruals is ignored. Limited prior research and data gathered from firms under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation indicate that managers use either one or more than one component of accruals simultaneously, in a consistent way to manipulate bottom-line earnings in a given direction. I propose two measures that capture the consistency between the discretionary components of accruals and test their significance in earnings management (EM) detection in firms that have artificially added accrual manipulation and firms that were targeted by the SEC for accrual manipulation. There is evidence that this information is incrementally useful in detecting EM. This finding paves the way for improvements in the discretionary accruals measure by including consistency information from the components of aggregate accruals.     

继任审计师关注前任审计师的声誉吗?——前任会计师事务所的审计质量与可操控性应计利润

本文讨论了前任会计师事务所的审计质量对公司更换审计师以后可操控性应计利润的影响。我们发现,四大对国内非四大转过来的新客户更加谨慎。这些客户在接受四大审计的第一年,可操控性应计利润水平显著低于四大所审计的其他公司,包括从其他四大转来的公司。这说明,四大已经在客观上提高了前非四大客户的审计风险。但是对于非四大而言,则没有这种差异,无论新客户的前任审计师是四大还是非四大,其所审客户的整体可操控性应计利润水平没有显著差异。本文的研究结果表明在一定程度上国内事务所对前任事务所审计风险的敏感度低于四大。     

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,UNEXPECTED DEPRECIATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ADJUSTMENT

Prior management and manipulation of financial accounting information research has overwhelmingly been focused within a private sector setting. This study adopts a public sector focus in empirically examining the use of a specific discretionary accrual (i.e., depreciation) to adjust the financial performance of New South Wales (Australia) local governments. Findings indicate a significant positive association between absolute unexpected depreciation and absolute local government income before capital contributions, and a significant positive association between absolute unexpected depreciation and capital contributions. Overall, the results make significant contributions to various literature streams with implications for various stakeholders interested in local governmental financial performance.     

The revaluation of assets as a signalling device: a theoretical and an empirical analysis

In many countries, firms can choose whether or not to report a revaluation in the financial statements. An analytical model is developed to indicate conditions in which it is more likely that successful firms will choose not to revalue assets as a credible signal to potential investors. These industry settings include a high variance in performance and low equity-to-debt ratios. The empirical results for Belgium confirm that successful firms are less likely to revalue assets in those industries. However, only the revaluation of fixed tangible assets and not financial assets seems to be a credible signal. Finally, the results support the choice to revalue, but not the amount of revaluation, as a signalling device.     

Earnings Management in IPO Lockup and Insider Trading: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper examines the hypothesis that the timing of lockup expiration is crucial to earnings management (EM) behavior in the period after an initial public offering (IPO). Taiwan's unique two-stage lockup regulations make the Taiwanese sample an excellent candidate for examining this hypothesis. Three main results are reached. First, we find positive discretionary accruals (DAs) from the IPO quarter to the quarter after the expiration of the first-stage lockup. The DA in the quarter of the second-stage lockup expiration is significantly positive. The evidence shows that the lockup provision is key in the findings of significant EM in the IPO year and the following year. We also find a positive association between DAs in first-stage lockups and subsequent insider selling activity, indicating that insiders' selling after lockup expiration accounts for EM in the lockup period. Third, the extent of EM in first-stage lockup is negatively related to that around the IPO, consistent with the reversal nature of DAs.     

The Relationship Between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Evidence from Japan

Using stock price data drawn from the 1990s in Japan, this paper empirically shows that bank risk is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, indicating that investors misinterpreted high reported earnings as favorable information about bank financial health. We also show that the negative relationship was very powerful prior to the major bank failures in late 1997 and 1998, but it diminished subsequent to the failures. We conclude that investors started to anticipate potential manipulation of financial reports by bank managers more rationally after the major bank failures.     

行业专长与审计质量——基于投资者和财务报告视角的经验研究

本文从投资者和财务报告视角实证检验了行业专长和审计质量之间的关系。我们利用我国2001～2006年约6000家上市公司样本数据,构造了盈余反应系数模型和操控性应计模型,主要采用多元回归方法进行了统计分析。结果显示:在控制了相关变量的影响后,行业专长事务所审计客户的财务报告质量高于非行业专长事务所审计客户的财务报告质量。这表明行业专长促进了审计质量的提高。     

Highly Valued Equity and Discretionary Accruals

Abstract:  Overvalued equity provides a strong incentive for managers to report earnings that do not disappoint the market (  Jensen, 2005 ). We find that this can be extended to highly valued equity more generally. In the year following the classification as highly valued and compared to firms with less extreme valuations, highly valued firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals and exhibit a more pronounced positive association between discretionary accruals and proxies for the likelihood of failing to meet earnings targets. These findings are consistent with the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings in support of extreme valuation. Because highly valued equity will likely result in CEOs with valuable stock and stock option portfolios, we test whether and show that the overvalued equity incentive is incremental to a CEO's equity portfolio incentive. One implication is that directors and audit committees should be especially on guard for possible earnings management when a firm has extremely high valuation multiples and when the CEO has a lot of equity at risk.     

Managing Earnings with Intercorporate Investments

Abstract:  We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.