Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation

We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preferences on which efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness are compatible. A preference relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining houses. We also show that on this domain mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D63, D71.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining

We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent, the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded, sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less aggressively than under complete information, giving rise to disagreement and/or underinvestment. Our experiment support these predictions.     

Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.      

Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games

We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play. We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially difficult environment for learning subgame perfection. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D64, J52     

Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness

This paper explores whether generosity in experiments is truly evidence of concern for desirable social outcomes. We conduct an experiment using a binary version of the dictator game. We introduce several treatments in which subjects are able to leave the relationship between their actions and resulting outcomes uncertain, either to themselves or to another subject influenced by those actions, thus giving subjects the moral “wiggle room” to behave self-interestedly. We find significantly less generous behavior in these manipulations, relative to a baseline in which the relationship between actions and outcomes is transparent. We conclude that many subjects behave fairly in the baseline case mainly because they intrinsically dislike appearing unfair, either to themselves or others. We thank Cristina Bicchieri; Iris Bohnet; Colin Camerer; Robyn Dawes; Ernst Fehr; George Loewenstein; John Patty; Charlie Plott; Matthew Rabin; seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, Berkeley, Cornell, Emory, and Princeton; participants at the 2003 Public Choice, 2003 ESA, 2003 SJDM, and 2004 BDRM meetings; and anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We greatly appreciate the access to resources at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. This research was funded by a Carnegie Mellon Berkman Faculty Development Grant to Weber and a Russell Sage Behavioral Economics Small Grant to Dana.     

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.     

Compensation payments for habitat heterogeneity: Existence, efficiency, and fairness considerations

Compensation payments for voluntary conservation measures have become an important tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide. Each year substantial financial resources are spent on such measures, particularly in the context of agri-environmental schemes. In Europe, a debate has started on whether this money is spent effectively. In response to this debate it has been suggested that a portfolio of measures leading to habitat heterogeneity be implemented. Although payments for heterogeneous conservation measures have been analysed in the literature, it has never been questioned that payments can be designed in a way that encourages enough land users to carry out each conservation measure within a portfolio of measures. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that such payments do not always exist. Moreover, in cases where payments for habitat heterogeneity exist the payment scheme may require overcompensation of the land users, posing a limit to both efficiency and fairness considerations.     

在科学发展观下坚持效率和公平的统一

在收入分配领域,效率和公平的关系从根本上看是统一的。树立全面、科学的效率观,是落实科学发展观的基础。更加注重社会公平,有利于扩大内需、缓解收入分配差距和促进经济结构的调整,为转变经济发展方式创造有利条件。当前促进社会公平的重点,是落实初次分配的公平。在理顺分配关系的基础上,采取多种措施提高低收入群体的劳动报酬,并提高劳动报酬在初次分配中的比重。     

“Si él lo necesita”: Gypsy fairness in Vallecas

“Si él lo necesita” (if he really needs it) was the most common argument given by the subjects who accepted the zero offer in the ultimatum game (strategy method) during experiments conducted among illiterate (adult) gypsies in Vallecas, Madrid. Interestingly the acceptance of the zero offer was not a rare case but, in contrast, was the modal value. This is even more remarkable if we consider that the 97% of the subjects proposed the equal split. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9126-0. JEL Classification D63 · D64 · C93 · J15     

A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility

Summary. Current social utility models posit fairness as a motive for certain types of strategic behavior. The models differ, however, with respect to how fairness is measured. Distribution models measure fairness in terms of relative payoff comparisons. Reciprocal-kindness models measure fairness in terms of gifts given and gifts received. Reference points play an important role in both measures, but the reference points in reciprocal-kindness models are conditioned on the actions available to players, whereas those in distributive models are not. Data from an ultimatum game experiment that stress tests the kindness measure is consistent with the distributive measure. Data from an experiment that stress tests the distributive measure is inconsistent with the distributive measure, but moves in the direction opposite that implied by the kindness measure. A measure that combines relative payoff comparisons with a reference point conditioned on feasible actions provides a first approximation to our data.Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 27 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, C91, D63. Correspondence to: Axel OckenfelsBolton gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation. Ockenfels thanks Alvin Roth and the Harvard Business School for their generous hospitality, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for their support through the Emmy Noether-program. Both authors gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the Making Choices project at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld during the summer of 2000. We also thank an anonymous referee and seminar participants in Bielefeld, Boston, Columbus, Harvard, and Jena for helpful comments.     

International support of climate change policies in developing countries: Strategic, moral and fairness aspects

International transfers in climate policy channeled from the industrialized to the developing world either support the mitigation of climate change or the adaptation to global warming. From a purely allocative point of view, transfers supporting mitigation tend to be Pareto-improving whereas this is not very likely in the case of adaptation support. We illustrate this by regarding transfer schemes currently applied under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto framework.However, if we enrich the analysis by integrating distributional aspects, we find that international adaptation funding may help both the developing and developed world. Interestingly this is not due to altruistic incentives, but due to follow-up effects on international negotiations on climate change mitigation. We argue that the lack of fairness perceived by developing countries in the international climate policy arena can be reduced by the support of adaptation in these countries. As we show - taking into account different fairness concepts - this might raise the prospects of success in international negotiations on climate change. Yet, we find that the influence of transfers may induce different fairness effects on climate change mitigation negotiations to run counter.We discuss whether current transfer schemes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto framework adequately serve the distributive and allocative objectives pursued in international climate policy.     

A Model of Commodity Differentiation with Indivisibilities and Production

This paper presents an existence theorem in a general equilibrium model of a production economy with commodity differentiation and indivisibilities. The model is motivated by the existence of markets with indivisible commodities, such as the markets for automobiles and computers. As is standard in the literature, the space of commodity characteristics is described by a compact metric space and a commodity vector is described by an integer-valued Borel measure on the space of commodity characteristics. An atomless measure space of producers and consumers is assumed to overcome the problem of non-convexity of the production and consumption sets induced by indivisibilities. This paper is based on a chapter from James Marton’s dissertation. We would like to thank Marcus Berliant, Wilhelm Neuefeind, and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

Wage and Mobility Effects of Trade and Migration on the Austrian Labour Market

This study analyses the effect of trade and migration on wages and labour marketmobility. We estimate wage growth equations and a multinomial logit mobilityequation on an individual data set ranging from 1991 to 1994. We find substantialdifferences in the reactions of white and blue-collar workers wages and mobilityto trade and migration. In Austria exports have a positive and imports a negativeimpact on wage growth only for blue-collar workers. Migrants also reduce onlyblue-collar workers wage growth. Our results indicate that higher imports and aninflow of migrants reduce sectoral mobility of all types workers. The risk of beingout of work by contrast is increased by migration and imports only for blue-collarworkers, but reduced by exports for all types of workers. In general our results suggestenlargement of the EU would have only small effects on the Austrian labour market.     

论“三层次”税收公平观与中国税收公平机制重塑

传统税收公平观存在明显的局限性,主要表现为考察的视野不开阔和涵盖的内容不丰富.所以,对税收公平的理解和判断,必须延伸到经济的、社会的角度,应当建立起包含税收的负担公平、税收的经济公平和税收的社会公平三个层次的广义的税收公平观,这样才能真正把握税收公平的全部内涵.根据这一思路,对中国现行税制的公平性进行了全面考量,发现存在诸多有悖于税收公平的因素,并提出了重塑中国税收公平机制的具体构想.     

Teachers' Unions and Student Achievement in High School Economics

High school students in unionized schools score higher on the Test of Economic Literacy than students in nonunion districts, ceteris paribus.     

Beyond lectures and tutorials: Formal on-the-job training received by young European university graduates

This paper examines the probability of receiving job-related formal training and the returns to on-the-job training in Europe using a sample containing personal, educational, and firm characteristics. The results show that certain occupations, such as managers and professionals, receive more training than others. Furthermore, certain types of workers are more likely to receive training—for example, those graduates in the public sector and those working in larger firms. With respect to the returns to training, estimation results show that the training measure has a significant impact on wages. In estimating the returns to training we have also taken into account the fact that participation in training is endogenous and not random.     

Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient.     

Wages fund, high wages, and social conflict in a classical model of unemployment equilibrium

The aim of the paper is to provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment in a classical (post-Ricardian) framework. The model describes a three-stage bargaining process with four agents (governments, firms, unions, workers). In the first stage, firms determine the wage offered, following a short-run version of the wages fund theory. In the second stage, unionists determine the wage demanded, which depends on workers’ tendency to conflict, while firms decide the number of employed under a “right to manage” hypothesis. In the third stage, governments tax the wages fund and pay unemployment benefits. Public intervention is subject to a trade-off between accumulation and legitimation.