西部地区民营经济发展面临的约束因素及其对策措施

我国西部地区民营经济的发展存在着观念、制度、资金、市场、技术、人才和民营企业自身等因素的制约。加快西部地区民营经济发展,需要进一步解放思想、转变观念,规范政府对民营企业的管理,建立科学的民营经济管理体制,保持一个非扭曲的政策环境。     

河北省民营经济发展态势分析

在我国社会经济发展的现阶段,地区经济之间的发展差距主要体现在民营经济的发展差距上。哪个地区民营经济发展快,哪个地区的经济就活跃。河北省经济之所以发展不够迅速,其重要原因之一,就是民营经济的发展落后,导致了市场活力不足。河北省民营经济发展与发达省份的差距,从本质上讲是制度问题,这是因为“制度是一种稀缺资源”,制度短缺及制度供给的滞后制约了民营经济的发展。本文从新制度经济学的角度出发,采用制度需求与制度供给的分析框架,结合“进一步优化环境,加快河北省民营经济发展”的调研结果,分析了河北省民营企业家的制度需求与政…     

制度环境视野下的民营经济发展问题探析

从历史发展进程和地区民营经济发展差别上看，制度环境变迁推动了中国民营经济的大发展，也造成了地区间的差异性。当民营经济发展所面临的制度环境是无效率的制度环境时，民营经济的发展就会受阻。摒弃原有不合理的政策制度，按照市场经济规则进行制度环境优化，创新制度环境，打造现代服务型政府，中国民营经济的发展将会上一个新台阶。     

“一带一路”背景下东北地区民营经济发展问题研究

"一带一路"建设的推进为"东北亚开发之窗"的我国东北地区带来新一轮发展机遇,对于促进东北地区经济结构转型、发展新兴产业、发掘民营经济的巨大经济潜力、突破东北地区经济发展瓶颈有着重要意义。目前,东北地区民营经济面临有效投资严重不足、制度供给不到位、民营企业对外开放技术创新能力不强、缺乏市场核心竞争力、专业分工协作性差等问题。为此,东北地区民营经济需要借助地缘优势,尽快融入"一带一路"建设中。政府应进一步加大力度支持民营经济发展,加快打造东北地区对外合作大通道、大平台。企业应内外兼修进行制度创新,提升对外合作水平和能力,开拓对外合作新途径,为新一轮东北振兴和发展提供新动能。     

论我国商会制度的完善与民营经济的发展

当前我国民营经济发展还存在信誉度差、交易成本高、制度环境不公平、“走出去”战略遭遇障碍多等问题,这些都与我国商会制度的发育滞后有关。商会制度是现代市场经济体制的重要组成部分,对民营经济的发展起着诸如代言、自律、维权、服务、整合等许多独特的作用。从我国现状来看,商会制度还很不完善,对民营经济的帮助也很不够。为了更好地促进民营经济的发展,我们要转变观念,加强商会组织建设,加快商会立法,借鉴国外商会先进经验,转变政府职能,以充分发挥商会的作用。     

我国技术创新能力低下的原因分析

我国技术创新能力低下的原因主要表现在实验室经济发展滞后、价值取向偏离创新文化环境差、人力资源配置扭曲、科考式的教育制度等,其中最为主要的是中国社会价值取向偏离,价值取向偏离也是人力资源配置扭曲的一个重要原因.只有坚持以人为本,树立正确的人才观,彻底根除官本位,扭转社会价值偏离,科技创新能力才有可能迅速提升,国家的经济发展才会具有长远发展动力.     

民营经济发展的制度失衡及其制度环境的优化

本文认为,民营经济发展制度化过程的迟滞,使得其在发展过程中面临一系列的障碍。由于制度供给和需求不能很好地对接,从而导致的制度失衡是制约民营经济做强做大的关键。只有通过各层面的制度创新,加大针对民营经济的有效制度供给,形成良性的制度互补,为其发展营造一个良好的制度环境,才能真正推进民营经济的发展。     

营造公平竞争环境 做优做强民营企业

改革开放40年来,我国民营经济不断发展壮大,然而无论政策还是舆论,整个社会都不同程度存在对民营经济的歧视,致使民营企业发展面临多重困境。如何以制度呵护,用信心浇灌,为民营企业发展创造公平公正的健康发展环境,成为亟需解决的问题。必须正视民营经济发展面临的环境和体制性障碍,把扶持政策落地、落细、落实,真正帮助民营实体经济实现高质量发展,从而推动民营经济发展再上新台阶。     

民营经济融资困境及对策研究

文章首先从民营经济的概念和发展阶段入手,导出民营经济发展面临的主要问题——融资困境,尤其是民营中小企业的融资难问题。同时对民营经济的融资渠道作一个全面的考察,引出民营经济融资困境的现状和原因分析。最后,结合国内的情况和国外的一些经验,对民营经济融资困境提出相应的解决办法。     

聊城市民营经济问题研究

发展民营经济是我市加快经济发展的必由之路。近年来,我市民营经济保持了较高的发展速度、特色产业初具规模、民营经济对整个国民经济的贡献越来越突出,已成为我市经济的重要组成部分。但从民营经济自身发展情况看,总体水平存在很大差距;从民营经济发展环境看,制约因素还很多;从民营企业内部管理看,民营业主素质不高,管理水平落后。为了加快发展我市民营经济,当前急需采取的对策措施有:突破四大瓶颈、建设六大体系、打造六大优势。     

官商结盟的体制效应——以近代中国民营企业发展为例的分析

开放经济条件下,在一个相对集权的体制中,为规避潜在的风险,民营企业通常会采取"消极适应或积极适应"两种发展形式。"以牺牲企业对外部(技术、市场)变化适应性为代价换取产权安全"的消极适应型发展的直接后果是使得政府提升国家产业竞争力的努力受挫。与消极适应型发展模式不同,一些民营企业会选择积极适应型的发展模式,即通过寻求官方庇护的政治方式来确保创新收益安全,企业发展与滋生腐败之间极易发生联系。"‘腐败’成为企业发展‘润滑剂’"现象的出现,侵蚀了国家政治体制,加剧了政府和社会大众的不满,客观上加大了企业发展面临的潜在风险。体制"怪圈"的形成,既不利于国家竞争力的提升,又极可能引发政府统治的合法性危机。本文分析表明,只有将民营企业从坏体制"始作俑者"的角色中解放出来,才能破解体制怪圈。这需要从根本上改变民营企业"既是被需要的,同时又是被歧视的"尴尬处境。中国近代史上有关民营企业发展的案例为本文假说提供了丰富的实质性内容。     

Effects of regulatory burden and corruption on firm performance: Evidence from Moldova

Firms in Moldova face a high level of regulatory burden, as proxied by the number of inspections by public authorities. At the same time, they face high levels of corruption. We examine the effect of frequent inspections on four measures of firm performance: labour and total factor productivity, and levels of tangible and intangible assets. We also investigate how corruption affects the relationship between inspections and firm performance. We perform panel data analysis using firm-level administrative data and survey data from Moldova in 2005–2015. The results show that inspections and corruption each affect firm productivity negatively, but corruption moderates the negative effect of inspections. We also find that inspections and intangible assets are positively correlated, but this correlation is weaker for higher levels of corruption. Finally we examine whether these results differ by industry, firm size and ownership types. Inspections and corruption affect medium and large firms, and state-owned enterprises differently from micro and small firms and private firms respectively.     

The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

Corruption,workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector

We examine the impact of corruption on workforce selection and personnel allocation in the public sector. Using Italian data, we find that the selection of public employees in terms of human capital worsens in comparison to that of their private sector counterparts in areas with higher levels of corruption. Moreover, corruption is associated with educational mismatch in the allocation of human resources and, in particular, with an increase in the rate of under-qualification. These results are robust to several alternative indicators and specifications, including IV estimation using past dependence on public spending and the historical relevance of foreign domination as exogenous sources of variation for current corruption.     

Corruption and growth: The role of governance,public spending,and economic development

This paper analyses how the quality of governance, the size of public spending, and economic development affect the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth. The analysis shows that the interaction between corruption and governance shapes the efficiency of public spending, which in turn, determines the growth effects of corruption. Specifically, corruption improves economic efficiency only when the actual government size is above the optimal level. It implies that a growth-maximising level of corruption is possible. This paper also finds that the incidence of corruption declines with economic development. This is because with economic development the wage rate rises and makes private rent seeking costs higher, thereby, discouraging corruption. The main policy implication is that targeting tax evaders instead of bureaucrats is more effective in terms of both reducing corruption and improving the growth potential of an economy.     

Private enforcement,corruption, and antitrust design

We examine how the rationale for enabling versus precluding private antitrust enforcement depends on whether antitrust enforcement is corruption-free or plagued by corruption. Corruption in courts affects the incentives to bring forth private antitrust lawsuits. This, in turn, along with corruption in antitrust agency enforcement, alters the incentives to commit antitrust violations. The social welfare effect of enabling private antitrust enforcement in the presence of corruption depends on whether corrupt officials in the ensuing bribery contests favor a particular firm and if so which one and to what extent. Under some circumstances, corruption actually increases the social desirability of private antitrust enforcement relative to the no-corruption scenario. Our analysis highlights that the effects of a given legal arrangement for antitrust enforcement critically depend on the corruption environment and, thus, that the appropriate design of antitrust institutions is context-specific.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

Modelling the dynamics of corruption and unemployment with heterogeneous labour

This paper presents an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous labour, endogenous unemployment, and public sector corruption. Unlike most previous studies, the model does not separate public officials and private individuals into two distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appointment as a public servant is modelled as an occupational choice, which then allows for the endogenous determination of the proportion of public officials, the share of corrupt officials among them, and the public investment efficiency of the economy. The dynamics of endogenous corruption and unemployment are studied using numerical policy experiments based on a stylized representation of a middle-income African economy with high corruption and unemployment. The main finding is that, large-scale public infrastructure push has no effect on raising growth in an economy with high corruption. However, if preceded by social and anti-corruption policies that successfully induce a structural change, it will then be effective in raising growth.     

中国地区腐败对民营企业国有化的影响

本文使用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。     

腐败影响的宏观经济分析

文章首先将腐败引入Arrow-Kurz-Barro新古典生产函数,在Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans模型框架下,建立宏观经济动态模型,求解最优条件、讨论稳态均衡值的存在性和稳定性,并进行稳态比较的动态分析和短期分析。研究结果表明,贿赂水平的永久增加将减少稳态的资本积累,但对稳态消费的影响则呈现多种可能;短期贿赂水平变动对资本存量与消费水平的影响也呈现出多种可能性。