基于声誉视角的企业社会责任实施策略研究

企业应当如何寻求社会责任与社交媒体交融背景下的企业社会责任(CSR)实施策略?这已成为全球经济面临的现实难题,对于处在声誉压力下的中国企业更是如此。文章通过全面回顾"声誉机制与CSR之间存在关联"的相关研究成果,以来自中国的两家企业(联想与宏碁)为商业案例,从公司治理、工作环境以及企业公民实践三个维度对其CSR实践进行了详细比较与系统分析,以期验证西方学者提出的"声誉机制对CSR实施策略具有正面影响效应"观点。结果表明:声誉机制确实可以促进企业加强自我约束,选择负责任的商业实践,成为法律规制、政府监管等正式制度的有益补充和替代,对中国企业来说也不例外。最后,结合中国企业现实处境,文章提出从回报角度认知CSR、取得行业标准认证、从局部小处起步等将CSR策略性融入到企业日常运营中的几点启示。     

信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例

本文使用网上拍卖交易数据,就卖者信誉对市场交易的影响进行了实证研究。我们发现,卖者的信誉评价一方面影响物品成交的价格,另一方面还对物品拍卖成功的概率有着显著的正面影响;但相对来说,卖者的信誉评价对后者的效果比对前者要更显著。这是本文的主要发现。该结果验证了在一个没有政府干预、近乎自由放任的“虚拟”市场上信誉机制的积极作用。     

Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Corruption and Reputation

This paper examines corruption in a random matching game where past actions are imperfectly observed and players have the option to continue trading with their existing partners. It shows that the effect of individual reputations for honesty may outweigh the effect of a bad collective reputation depending on the expected value of a continued match relative to the corruption gain.     

Simple Reputation Systems*

We develop a model of simple “reputation systems” that monitor and publish information about the behavior of sellers in a search market with asymmetric information. The reputations created influence the equilibrium search patterns of buyers and thus provide for market‐based “punishment” of bad behavior. We show that a reputation system that rewards honesty can enhance welfare by allowing good sellers to truthfully signal their type. However, the same system can be prone to strategic manipulation by sellers who always have low‐quality products. In that case, we show that an alternative system which assigns reputations based on product quality rather than honesty can be superior.     

Reputation and imperfect information

A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a “small” amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the “reputation effect” that one intuitively expects.     

Reputation with observed actions

Summary A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous orsequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for theStackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.The financial support of the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-7999, and of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank David Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Seminar Participants at UCLA, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and University of Naples for useful discussions and suggestions.     

道德、信誉与合约

市场经济之初,人们体会最深,感叹最多的是道德问题和信誉问题。市场经济离不开道德和信誉,缺乏道德和信誉支持的市场经济只能是灾难经济。然而,信誉和道德有着本质区别,但日常生活中人们将它们混在一起来谈论,有时甚至是不分的,本文力图从合约的角度辨清二者之间的关系。     

Presidential Reputation and the Veto

This paper develops a dynamic model of the bargaining between a legislature and an executive with veto power. The dynamic nature of the model provides the executive with incentives to use the veto as a reputation building device in order to gain more favorable legislative outcomes. The model illustrates that the implicit threat of building a reputation may cause the legislature will be more accommodating in its proposals to the executive. The model illustrates the possibility of a ``honeymoon period' of legislative accommodation followed by a decline in the president's influence. This paper also explores ways in which the legislature might mitigate the effects of presidential reputation building.     

Reputation and exogenous private learning

Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff.     

经营好"名气"

名气,是一个地方、一个人特有知名度、美誉度、信誉度的总称.每个地方都有自己的名气,只是大小不同而已.利用并经营好“名气”,可引来旺盛的人流、物流、资金流,增添发展活力和动力,成为一大经济优势和不需太多投入就能取得较大产出的无形资产;利用不好,经营不善,则可能为名所累、所困、所缚,成为一大包袱.     

非正式制度视角下的集群企业信誉机制

产业集群中的企业信誉是保证产业集群有序运作的前提,要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。与科层组织的信誉机制不同,产业集群中企业间的信任和合作主要是依靠非正式制度。文章从关系性嵌入、专用性投资,以及联合制裁三个方面对此问题进行了阐释。文章的结论是,产业集群中特有的信誉机制是导致产业集群竞争优势的一个重要原因。     

论信誉资产的优化配置

本文从经济学角度，重点论述了信誉资产的优化的配置问题，指出，信誉是资产，而且是可以量化的资产，它和有形资产一样是企业发展必备的资本要素，因此必须通过市场机制进行优化配置。     

Investment in Tourism Market and Reputation

Recent contributions in tourism economics acknowledge that the tourism market is imperfectly competitive and, as such, should be studied from an industrial organization perspective. This approach seems especially relevant to shed lights on one issue of importance for tourism destinations: how to achieve sustainable tourism development? Indeed, it has long been empirically observed that tourism development follows a life cycle. After a period of growth, the development of touristic (mountain and seaside) resorts usually stagnate and decline. At least part of the explanation for this pattern is to be found in the evolution of destinations' reputation over time. The present paper investigates the incentives for adjacent tourist resorts to invest in quality in order to maintain their collective reputation. We propose a dynamic model where (1) several adjacent tourist resorts select their tourist flows and (2) invest in order to remedy to the detrimental effects tourism flows have on local environmental amenities. The overall tourist presence and the sum of investments made by tourist resorts jointly define the quality of the touristic product offered by this tourism destination. We assume that this quality cannot be observed by consumers at the time of purchase. However, in this situation of imperfect information, consumers form expectations about the quality of the touristic product offered at any point of time. These expectations define the collective reputation of tourist resorts, determine the position of the tourist resorts' demand curve and constitute the state variable in the differential game. We characterize and compare equilibrium strategies under a noncooperative and investments coordination regimes.     

Reputation for quality and adverse selection

We analyze a dynamic market with a seller who can make a one-time investment that affects the returns of tradable assets. The potential buyers of the assets cannot observe the seller׳s investment prior to the trade or verify it in any way after the trade. The market faces two types of inefficiency: the ex-ante inefficiency, i.e., the seller׳s moral hazard problem, and the ex-post inefficiency, i.e., inefficient ex-post allocations due to the adverse selection problem. We analyze how the observability of information by future buyers, through which the seller builds a reputation, affects the two types of inefficiency as well as the interplay between them.     

技术市场信用体系建设探讨

目前技术市场不完善的信用体系使得交易成本上升，交易效率低下，限制了交易规模的扩大．产生该问题的原因是法律法规不完善、科研项目评估制度不健全、技术市场管理不规范以及缺乏信用道德规范。为完善技术市场信用体系，必须加强制度及道德建设，以提高技术市场的交易效率，从而促进科技成果产业化。     

证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的关联性研究

作者通过构建不对称信息结构下的两阶段博弈模型,应用Bayes法则对证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的动态化以及二者声誉变动的关联性进行了研究。模型结论显示,监管者对承销商的违规或错误评估行为的“宽容”以及任何“下不为例”的监管思维不仅会加剧自身声誉的下降,而且会导致承销商评估失误概率的上升和承销商声誉的下降,表明监管者声誉和承销商声誉具有一损俱损的关联性。     

企业传播视角的中国制造声誉提升

本文借鉴Balmer＆Gray（2000）的“分层传播思想”,提出通过第一层次传播、第二层次传播和第三层次传播来塑造和提升中国制造声誉的动态模型。文中把传播划分为三种类型,由拙劣型传播、失衡型传播到完美型传播构成了中国制造声誉提升的传播路径,文中进一步分析了中国制造声誉塑造与提升的具体传播对策。     

组织污名及其相关研究述评

组织污名会给一个企业组织带来非常严重的不良后果。在对个体污名与组织污名的比较中,归纳了组织污名与组织污名化的概念,分析了组织污名对组织的消极影响,梳理了组织污名化的过程,初步提出了组织污名应对策略模型,并对未来研究进行了展望。     

声誉、认同与组织动态

笔者刻画了维系社会经济组织运行的两种机制:集体声誉和个体声誉的互动,与内化的价值和组织认同.第一种机制表明:组织声誉对组织的成员具有激励效应,一个组织的声誉租金越高,这个组织中的成员就会越诚实可靠.第二种机制表明:组织成员对这个组织的认同感越强,那么它自己违规的激励就越小,而且还会有更强的激励来惩治其他违规的成员.笔者最后还讨论了对中国社会转型的含义.