基于声誉视角的企业社会责任实施策略研究

企业应当如何寻求社会责任与社交媒体交融背景下的企业社会责任(CSR)实施策略?这已成为全球经济面临的现实难题,对于处在声誉压力下的中国企业更是如此。文章通过全面回顾"声誉机制与CSR之间存在关联"的相关研究成果,以来自中国的两家企业(联想与宏碁)为商业案例,从公司治理、工作环境以及企业公民实践三个维度对其CSR实践进行了详细比较与系统分析,以期验证西方学者提出的"声誉机制对CSR实施策略具有正面影响效应"观点。结果表明:声誉机制确实可以促进企业加强自我约束,选择负责任的商业实践,成为法律规制、政府监管等正式制度的有益补充和替代,对中国企业来说也不例外。最后,结合中国企业现实处境,文章提出从回报角度认知CSR、取得行业标准认证、从局部小处起步等将CSR策略性融入到企业日常运营中的几点启示。     

信誉的价值:以网上拍卖交易为例

本文使用网上拍卖交易数据,就卖者信誉对市场交易的影响进行了实证研究。我们发现,卖者的信誉评价一方面影响物品成交的价格,另一方面还对物品拍卖成功的概率有着显著的正面影响;但相对来说,卖者的信誉评价对后者的效果比对前者要更显著。这是本文的主要发现。该结果验证了在一个没有政府干预、近乎自由放任的“虚拟”市场上信誉机制的积极作用。     

Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Reputation with observed actions

Summary A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous orsequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for theStackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.The financial support of the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-7999, and of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank David Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Seminar Participants at UCLA, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and University of Naples for useful discussions and suggestions.     

Reputation and imperfect information

A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a “small” amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the “reputation effect” that one intuitively expects.     

Reputation and exogenous private learning

Short-run competitors in the chain store game receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm's type. The history of signals, which in the limit is fully revealing, is observable to the competitors but possibly not to the incumbent. As long as there is sufficient noise in the signals, then in any equilibrium a patient weak incumbent obtains a payoff strictly higher than her minmax payoff.     

经营好"名气"

名气,是一个地方、一个人特有知名度、美誉度、信誉度的总称.每个地方都有自己的名气,只是大小不同而已.利用并经营好“名气”,可引来旺盛的人流、物流、资金流,增添发展活力和动力,成为一大经济优势和不需太多投入就能取得较大产出的无形资产;利用不好,经营不善,则可能为名所累、所困、所缚,成为一大包袱.     

Presidential Reputation and the Veto

This paper develops a dynamic model of the bargaining between a legislature and an executive with veto power. The dynamic nature of the model provides the executive with incentives to use the veto as a reputation building device in order to gain more favorable legislative outcomes. The model illustrates that the implicit threat of building a reputation may cause the legislature will be more accommodating in its proposals to the executive. The model illustrates the possibility of a ``honeymoon period' of legislative accommodation followed by a decline in the president's influence. This paper also explores ways in which the legislature might mitigate the effects of presidential reputation building.     

道德、信誉与合约

市场经济之初,人们体会最深,感叹最多的是道德问题和信誉问题。市场经济离不开道德和信誉,缺乏道德和信誉支持的市场经济只能是灾难经济。然而,信誉和道德有着本质区别,但日常生活中人们将它们混在一起来谈论,有时甚至是不分的,本文力图从合约的角度辨清二者之间的关系。     

非正式制度视角下的集群企业信誉机制

产业集群中的企业信誉是保证产业集群有序运作的前提,要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。与科层组织的信誉机制不同,产业集群中企业间的信任和合作主要是依靠非正式制度。文章从关系性嵌入、专用性投资,以及联合制裁三个方面对此问题进行了阐释。文章的结论是,产业集群中特有的信誉机制是导致产业集群竞争优势的一个重要原因。     

论信誉资产的优化配置

本文从经济学角度,重点论述了信誉资产的优化的配置问题,指出,信誉是资产,而且是可以量化的资产,它和有形资产一样是企业发展必备的资本要素,因此必须通过市场机制进行优化配置。     

证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的关联性研究

作者通过构建不对称信息结构下的两阶段博弈模型,应用Bayes法则对证券监管者声誉和承销商声誉的动态化以及二者声誉变动的关联性进行了研究。模型结论显示,监管者对承销商的违规或错误评估行为的“宽容”以及任何“下不为例”的监管思维不仅会加剧自身声誉的下降,而且会导致承销商评估失误概率的上升和承销商声誉的下降,表明监管者声誉和承销商声誉具有一损俱损的关联性。     

企业传播视角的中国制造声誉提升

本文借鉴Balmer＆Gray（2000）的“分层传播思想”,提出通过第一层次传播、第二层次传播和第三层次传播来塑造和提升中国制造声誉的动态模型。文中把传播划分为三种类型,由拙劣型传播、失衡型传播到完美型传播构成了中国制造声誉提升的传播路径,文中进一步分析了中国制造声誉塑造与提升的具体传播对策。     

Reputation, control rights and game equilibrium

Using the reputation model of Kreps (1982), Vickers (1986) and Barro(1986), we develop a dynamic game model with incomplete information to examine the relations between the managers of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) in China and the government as the enterprise’s owner. Employing the model, we show that even a noncoopertive manager will not intrude the owner’s interests until the last period of his term in order to maximize his long term utility. The paper also discusses some phenomenona in state-owned enterprises in China, such as “insiders’ control”, “59 phenomenon” and excess on-the-job consumption.      

Reputation,Social Identity and Social Conflict

We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced‐form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the population contains both rational players and behavioral players. Behavioral players aggressively discriminate against members of the other social group. The existence and specification of the behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff‐relevant consequences. We show that rational players can contribute to the conflict by aggressively discriminating and that this behavior is consistent with existing empirical evidence. Our paper relates to the empirical literature which finds that social heterogeneity tends to be increasing in economic variables which we interpret as indicating inefficiency. We provide an explanation that, as social groups compete for surplus, disagreement and inefficiency can result. Our work also relates to the social conflict literature, which examines the relationship between macro level factors such as unemployment and civil disturbances. This literature finds that the amount of social conflict tends to be increasing in the inequitability of the environment.     

声誉、债务与会计稳健性——信任视角的一项经验研究

文章从信任的角度研究了公司声誉如何影响债务契约对会计稳健性的要求。声誉较好的债务人能够赢得债权人的信任,从而降低债务契约对会计稳健性的要求。文章运用我国上市公司的数据,采用三种声誉度量方法,实证检验发现债务水平对会计稳健性有正向影响,债务人的良好声誉能够降低这种正向影响。文章以信任概念为基础整合了声誉和会计稳健性的理论关系,拓展了财务会计研究的视野,并为声誉对法律的替代作用提供了新的经验证据。     

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision, and can be a driving force for more serious conflicts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, the emergence of social tensions has been studied only rarely in the literature. In the present contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective effects of ethnic fractionalization, polarization and segregation are analyzed. The differences between ethnicity and class, and the role of social mobility are also studied. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence.     

医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制

不确定性和信息不对称常常被认为是医疗市场失灵和政府干预的依据,但政府的过度干预会导致医疗声誉机制的扭曲。改革现行“管办不分”的医疗卫生体制,由市场声誉取代政府行政干预,通过重复博弈建立医生与患者之间的长期稳定关系,解决医疗卫生领域的难题。     

声誉、政治关系与企业垂直整合

文章针对我国经济转轨的实际,利用上市公司数据,实证考察了声誉和政治关系对企业垂直整合的影响。研究发现,由于较易与利益相关者订立合约,声誉良好企业垂直整合的程度较低;相反,政治关联企业更有动机和能力通过涉足上下游产业来攫取垄断利润,从而垂直整合的程度较高。基于制度环境的分析显示,声誉和政治关系对企业垂直整合的影响在弱制度环境下更为明显。此外,公司所有权也影响了声誉、政治关系与垂直整合间的关系。声誉良好的民营企业表现出更低的垂直整合度,而有政治关联的国有企业进入上下游产业的动机更强。     

自创商誉相关会计问题的探讨

针对目前会计界只确认外购商誉、而不确认自创商誉的情况,笔者提出自创商誉确认与计量的理由:符合资产的确认标准、保持了会计原则的一致性与可比性、符合权责发生制原则及符合经济发展的需要。同时提出自创商誉的账务处理方法及相关的其他问题。