Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,” where the time interval between periods becomes small. Here we study a simple example of a commitment game with a long-run and short-run player in order to examine different specifications of how the signal distribution depends upon period length. We give a simple criterion for the existence of efficient equilibrium, and show that the efficiency of the equilibria that can be supported depends in an important way on the effect of the player's actions on the variance of the signals, and whether extreme values of the signals are “bad news” of “cheating” behavior, or “good news” of “cooperative” behavior.     

An Investigation of Analysts' Praise of Management During Earnings Conference Calls

Through the textual analysis of a large sample of earnings conference calls, the authors find that analysts praise management on over half of earnings conference calls by saying complimentary phrases such as “congratulations on the great quarter.” The results show that analysts' complimentary phrases reflect the nature of the information released at the earnings announcement. The authors find that the amount of praise by analysts on an earnings conference call is strongly associated with the earnings surprise and to a greater extent the earnings announcement stock return. They also find that there is value to investors in tracking analysts' flattery of management during earnings conference calls, as it predicts abnormal stock returns over the following quarter. The findings, which are incremental to prior research on the tone of earnings conference calls, highlight a previously ignored aspect of analyst feedback.     

Institutionalism,Planning, and the Current Crisis

This article originated in a shock of recognition. In the second volume of his discourse on “Civilization and Capitalism,” Fernand Braudel muses on the “eclecticism” of “the most advanced kind of capitalism”: “As if the characteristic advantage of standing at the commanding heights of the economy … consisted precisely of not having to confine oneself to a single choice, of being able, as today’s businessmen would put it, to keep one’s options open.”¹ My colleagues and I work as venture capitalists and as investment bankers of a specialized kind, engaged in raising capital to support the growth of technologybased companies and in realizing liquidity for their founding investors—often ourselves—by managing public offerings of their shares or by merging them into much larger companies. A primary virtue of our practice is the opportunity to choose with broad discretion where to commit our own and our clients’ capital across what Braudel calls “the differential geography ofprofit.”²     

Do Irrational Investors Destabilize?

In a financial market where all investors have valuable private information, full rationality requires that investors have an unlimited ability of figuring out the equilibrium model. Instead, I assume that due to a lack of knowledge or experience, some investors do not know the equilibrium model and use only their private information in forming their demand. By investigating the investment behavior of these “boundedly rational” investors and contrasting it with that of the rational ones, I find that in a market where the two kinds of investors coexist, it is the boundedly rational investors who contribute to price stability. The welfare implication is that, although each investor benefits from conditioning his asset demand on the information transmitted by the equilibrium price, it can happen that all investors lose by doing so because the equilibrium price becomes too volatile.     

Investment banks' stock ratings,call warrant issuance,and responses from heterogeneous investors: Evidence from Taiwan

We investigate the responses of the different types of investors on stock rating change announcements made by investment banks around call warrant issuances in Taiwan. The unique characteristics of the Taiwan warrants market allow investment banks to make stock rating change announcements around call warrant issuances for the same stocks they rate. In Taiwan, investment banks are also dealers of call warrants, and thus, the profit and loss results from their warrant business are potentially in conflict-of-interest for their stock ratings. Another feature of the Taiwan stock market allows us to disentangle the types of investors initiating the stock trades. We identify three types of investors: institutional investors, experienced retail investors, and ordinary retail investors. Our findings suggest that institutional investors are able to “see-through” the conflict-of-interest in investment banks; experienced investors are able to partially “see-through” the conflict-of-interest, and ordinary retail investors are unable to “see-through” the conflict-of-interest of investment banks.     

WAGES,PROFITS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT*

We model capital flight as the outcome of a non-cooperative differential game between workers (who control the wage share) and capitalists (who control investment at home and abroad). There are three equilibria for such a game. Along the interior equilibrium, the domestic economy becomes “decapitalized” as investors build up their holdings of foreign assets, in a situation reminiscent of the experience of several developing countries.     

Can foreign equity funds outperform their benchmarks? New evidence from fund-holding data for China

We investigate whether foreign institutional investors can outperform domestic benchmarks. Using portfolio holding-based approaches for the Chinese Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs), we identify fund’s active manager opinions and information on the future value of stocks. We find stocks actively traded by QFIIs, and stocks with higher deviation from benchmarks (DFB) outperform their benchmarks in the subsequent one to three quarters. Such “hot hand” phenomenon is driven by foreign institutions’ investment skill in incorporating stale information rather than fresh information into asset pricing. Our findings shed new light on the roles of foreign equity funds in eliminating mispricing in emerging markets, and provide evidence on rethinking the role of financial intermediation in a capital-controlled economy.     

Is There a Hold‐up Problem?

We report on a hold‐up experiment in which unilateral investment is followed by bilateral bargaining according to Nash’s demand game. Without communication, investment is low and coordination is poor. Unilateral communication facilitates coordination, but not perfectly. Successful coordination predominantly entails “fair” outcomes. Perhaps surprisingly, sellers (investors) do at least as well under buyer communication as under seller communication.     

Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending a message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where agents can send any combination of available messages, we develop an Extended Revelation Principle and characterize the incentive constraints which implementable allocations must satisfy. When not all message combinations are feasible, static mechanisms no longer suffice. If a ‘punishment’ allocation exists for each agent, then implementable allocations can be characterized as equilibria of a “Revelation Game,” in which agents first select from the menus of allocation rules, then the mediator requests each agent to send some verifying messages. When a punishment allocation fails to exist for some agent, dynamic games in which agents gradually reveal their evidence implement a larger set of outcomes. The latter result provides a foundation for a theory of debate.     

Market reaction to second-hand news: inside the attention-grabbing hypothesis

This article investigates whether the market reaction to second-hand information is due to price pressure or information dissemination. We use the perspective of attention grabbing to analyse the market reaction to the dissemination of analysts’ recommendations published in print media. This perspective is able to explain the asymmetric market reaction to ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ advice, which is difficult to rationalize within the price pressure hypothesis. We base our empirical analysis on the content of a weekly column in the most important Italian financial newspaper, which publishes past information and analysts’ recommendations on listed companies. Our findings show asymmetric price and volume reactions on the publication day. Contrary to previous evidence, we document a positive relationship between the number of analysts quoted in the column and the price (volume) increase associated with positive recommendations. Because the weekly columns seem to simply attract investors’ attention, with no additional new information, observing a reaction positively related to the column’s salience (proxied by the number of quoted analysts) is natural. In addition, we find that the market reaction is higher when the order size is lower, i.e., when individual investors’ trades constitute a higher fraction of the total trading activity in the market.     

分析师的估值模型会影响评级的信息含量吗?

本文基于2014—2018年发布的沪深两市A股上市公司深度研究报告,考察了分析师报告中关于估值方法的描述,探究分析师估值模型的选择是否会对其投资意见的信息含量产生影响。研究发现,分析师采用绝对估值模型能够提高评级调整的市场反应,具有一定的增量价值。进一步分组检验发现,在公司成长性较高、不确定性较大、券商实力较弱、分析师之间的竞争程度较高的情况下,使用绝对估值模型对于提高分析师评级调整的信息含量作用更大。本文的研究结论对于理解分析师估值过程的价值和有效性以及分析师研究报告信息含量的影响因素具有重要意义,并为投资者如何使用和评价分析师研究报告提供了一定的参考。     

Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement

We consider the supplier’s strategic choice on delivery time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm’s opportunistic behavior on the optimal investment timing when production costs are uncertain. We model the supplier’s trade-off between the option value to defer the contract execution and the penalty payment in the event of delays. We also take into account the issue of penalty enforcement, which in turn depends on both the discretion of the court of law in voiding contractual clauses and the “efficiency” of the judicial system (i.e. the average length of civil trials). We test our main results on Italian public procurement data showing that the supplier’s incentive to delay is greater the higher the volatility of production costs and the lower the “efficiency” of the judicial system. We then calibrate the model using parameters that mimic the Italian scenario on public works procurement and calculate the maximum amount that a supplier is “willing to pay” (per day) to postpone the delivery date and infringe the contract provisions. Our calibration results are consistent with the theoretical model’s predictions and the empirical findings.     

An Alternative Post-Keynesian Framework for Understanding Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

This article contributes to the establishment of a framework for the analysis of international capital flows, with a specific focus on emerging markets. It is based on a “monetary” analysis of the economy, as well as on the works of Hyman Minsky and Jan Toporowski in particular. The key aspects of such an approach are the following. First, in a monetary economy, capital flows need to be understood as “flows of funds” that pertain to the realm of financial choices, as opposed to the traditional understanding of capital flows as based on “real” variables, such as saving and investment. A consequence of this is the need to focus on gross flows rather than capital flows. Second, liquidity preference considerations also apply at the international level, particularly in relation to the liquidity of emerging-market currencies that, in turn, depends on context-specific “Keynesian fundamentals.” Third, the rise of institutional investors is the key historical development in the financial system, shaping the current reality of cross-border capital flows, including to emerging markets. I argue that institutional investors’ liabilities, in light of the theories of Minsky and Toporowski, are one of the most important variables in determining these investors’ portfolio choices. I synthesize these elements by defining capital flows to emerging markets as the demand for emerging-market assets by institutional investors. I propose a framework to categorize the various channels that guide this demand.     

Multinational Corporations, Stackelberg Leadership, and Tariff-jumping

In this paper we consider the traditional entry mode choice of an incumbent monopolist facing entry by a single foreign firm. By allowing entry to be either via exporting or foreign direct investment and for the possibility of Stackelberg equilibria where firms can set quantities in one of two time periods, namely “early” or “late,” we find conditions where both Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria emerge endogenously. Furthermore, by introducing a simple linear tariff, we see that it not only affects the choice of exporting and FDI in a nonlinear way, but that it can also affect the type of equilibrium that emerges.     

Exploring Ambiguity and Familiarity Effects in The “Earnings Game” Between Managers and Investors

Prior evidence suggests that managers and investors play an earnings game in which managers bias their earnings forecasts downward as the earnings announcement date approaches. Knowing managers’ incentives to provide biased guidance, investors still revise their expectations downward helping to create “positive earnings surprises.” Using a 2 (ambiguity) × 2 (familiarity) between subject randomized experimental design where MBA students playing the roles of manager and investor answer a series of questions related to earnings guidance, we investigate whether earnings environment ambiguity and manager-investor familiarity influence behavior during the “earnings game.” In general, results from this study suggest that ambiguity contributes to managers’ propensity to mislead and investors’ propensity to follow, and a false sense of familiarity may amplify investors’ reliance on managers’ guidance.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information,abstention, and coordination in standing committees

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria – swing voterʼs curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on “letting the experts” decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.     

Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game

In this paper, we model private art market agents’ strategic interactions in presence of two types of asymmetric information, about artwork quality and buyer’s knowledge, assuming the seller does not know how informed is the buyer while the buyer does not know the quality of the artwork before purchase. If the seller can choose either a high or a low price and the buyer can signal his type to the seller, we identify the conditions for both equilibria with pooling buyer signalling strategy and with separating strategy, as well as conditions for equilibria where the seller fixes the price according to the actual quality and where he posts prices trying to take advantage of buyer’s limited information. Finally, we identify the condition for the emergence of a “counter-lemon” result, where low-quality artworks and uninformed collectors exit the market, suggesting that seller uncertainty does not directly benefit the buyers, but it can impact the quality traded in the market.     

Accruals quality,managers’ incentives and stock market reaction: evidence from Europe

We investigate if accruals quality is a valuable indicator of earnings quality for stock market investors. Our particular focus is on the incremental informative value of taking into account managers’ incentives for using accruals. We propose a market-based approach for assessing the usefulness of this indicator to improve investors’ decisions. Specifically, we examine the association between accruals quality and information asymmetry among stock market participants. Our empirical study uses data on European firms and our results are consistent with a positive association between poor earnings quality and high information asymmetry. However, given some previous studies suggesting that accruals-based measures may be noisy indicators of earnings quality, we develop a method to increase the informational content of the accruals quality measure. Based on our results, we find that combining accruals quality with the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts provides a better indicator of earnings quality rather than only accruals quality.