浙江产业集群的动力机制--基于企业家的视角

企业家对产业集群发展演变的影响不仅表现为其企业自身较好的经济绩效，更重要的是他们对地方主体产生的直接或间接的作用。浙江集群的案例表明，一方面，地方企业家的行为引发外部效应(即示范效应和竞争效应)，激励地方持续创新；另一方面，地方企业家通过创建地方产业网络，重新配置地方要素资源，并促进资源、技术与信息在整个地区的流动与传递。地方企业家联盟亦是重要的网络关系，可能导致竞争势力的强弱交替，并引发地区市场结构改变。内外企业家联盟(尤其是与海外投资商的联盟)是推动集群纵深演进的另一重要网络关系，他们共同推动集群技术水平提升、增强集群品牌效益，并引发浙江集群系统效应。     

产品兼容、网络效应与企业竞争力

在网络效应较强的产业中，技术设置的兼容性是左右企业成长的关键因素。随着技术进步、新兴产业的发展和市场竞争的加剧，产品兼容、网络效应对企业竞争力具有越来越重要的意义。在计算机、电信、银行、旅游、媒体、软件等产业中，用户在购买时十分注重产品或服务的兼容性和网络效应。本文以差异产品竞争模型为基础，考察了产品兼容、网络效应对企业竞争力的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用这两个产品差异变量增强其竞争力进行了分析。     

企业价值网络竞争优势研究

本文提出的企业价值网络概念是对各种新兴运作模式的提炼与深化。企业价值网络具备网络经济、规模经济、风险对抗、粘滞效应和速度效应五种基本竞争优势效应。企业构筑价值网络的主要职责是：明确网络的客户价值定位，制定网络战略；根据网络战略吸收网络成员，建立通畅的信息沟通模式和有效的协调机制；合理分配网络利益，增强网络成员之间的信任，及时调整网络成员。     

论技术标准化与产业标准战略

在经济全球化和信息技术发展的背景下，技术标准已经成为高技术产业市场竞争的战略工具。网络效应的存在加剧了技术标准的竞争，而企业联盟则是企业参与标准竞争的重要形式。由于技术标准化与知识产权制度的非对称安排，技术标准的专利化趋势在给跨国公司带来重大战略利益的同时，也对专利缺乏的发展中国家企业产生了不利影响。政府在技术标准化过程中的作用主要体现在，通过制定产业技术政策和竞争政策，提高本国产业和企业的技术标准竞争力。我国产业标准战略的核心问题是要建立起基于企业联盟的技术标准形成机制。     

对网络效应及其包含的非理性因素的思考

本文从网络和网络经济的范畴入手，逐步解释了何为网络，网络效应等一系列相关的概念，并指出了网络效应也有它的技术和边界限制，通过对网络效应的反思达到对其更深的理解，从而正确指导实践工作。     

网络外部性、市场"锁定"与标准选择——联通CDMA与移动GPRS市场竞争的经济学分析

本文从网络外部性的角度研究了中国移动通信产业2G和2.5G的市场竞争问题。研究结果表明，随着中国移动通信市场的成熟和网络外部性效应的影响，在向3G过渡的2.5G竞争中，联通选择了CDMA标准与移动的GPRS相竞争，这为联通在市场竞争中胜出提供了契机。但哪种标准将占领市场，这将取决于网络效应中消费者对市场的预期以及技术标准对用户安装基础的控制。     

信息产品需求特性与垄断性市场结构

信息产业在供给、需求、市场结构等方面具有与传统产业不同的一些特征。某些特征决定了信息产业中垄断性市场结构为一种常态。本文从信息产品的需求角度出发，通过假设临界点的方法，分别针对信息产品的网络效应和局部边际效用递增效应建立模型，分析了这两种效应对于垄断性市场结构形成的影响，揭示了信息产业在一定条件下垄断性市场结构效率优于完全竞争市场结构。本文表明，信息产品的需求效应对于信息产业的垄断市场结构有着重要影响，往往使得垄断结构强化表现出有利于社会整体福利的趋势。因此，在制定针对信息产业的反垄断政策时，需要考虑信息产业与传统产业的不同特质。本文还以流行音乐产业为例，对模型进行了初步的验证。     

企业联盟对长三角城市经济关联的影响——基于网络演化博弈的视角

联盟是企业获取外部资源、 降低经营风险的有效策略。 本文基于网络博弈动力学理论分析企业联盟演化过程, 并结合熵值TOPSIS 算法提出企业联盟博弈模型, 研究在企业联盟背景下城市之间的经济联系和功能。 研究发现： 创新能力是企业在联盟博弈中获得持续竞争优势的关键因素; 企业更多关注联盟能否给自身带来收益, 增加联盟收益能促使企业参与联盟; 制造业的企业联盟对长三角城市群的整体经济关联影响大, 生产性服务业对单个城市地位和层级的影响力更强; 促进企业联盟对扬州、 马鞍山、温州和徐州等城市融入长三角制造业产业集群, 无锡、 常州、 宁波和芜湖等城市融入长三角生产性服务业产业集群具有显著意义。     

基于竞争与合作关系的网络组织成员间知识溢出效应分析

在分析网络组织成员间知识溢出效应及其影响因素的基础上,本文构造了基于成员关系的网络组织中知识共享的溢出模型,并分析了网络组织成员之间竞争与合作关系对成员之间知识共享中知识溢出效应影响的机理。在模型基础上进一步分析发现:在一个竞争与合作关系合理的网络组织中,知识溢出效应可以使得成员企业认识自身的知识状况,改变知识结构,并提高其知识竞争力。最后,为了强化网络组织成员之间的知识溢出效应并提高其知识共享效率,提出了几点管理建议。     

非对称网络权力与产业网络的空间组织——以我国台湾地区流行音乐产业网络为例

本文探讨了产业网络中非对称网络权力的形成机理,构建了非对称网络权力与产业网络空间组织间相互关系的理论分析框架,并从我国台湾地区流行音乐产业网络案例的分析获得实践支撑。结论表明:在产业网络中企业因要素占有或支配能力差异,形成由技术权力区、渠道权力区和权力塌陷区构成的非对称网络权力,产业网络的组织层级与空间层级间呈现相互对应的海默关系,而企业空间组织行为的区位锚定效应进一步强化网络权力的非对称结构。     

Platform competition with complementary products

We characterize the pricing structure in a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are exclusive to each platform, respectively. We highlight the presence of indirect network effects: platforms and complementors benefit from the quality and number of firms in their group and suffer from the quality and number of firms in the rival’s group through their effects on prices and market share. We then determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium. We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors. Finally, we discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.     

Endogenous formation of coalitions with composite goods

We construct a model of endogenous formation of coalitions when three goods are necessary for a composite good, and composite goods are substitutes for each other. This analysis extends Economides and Salop’s [Journal of Industrial Economics XL (1992) 105] model of composite goods where two goods are necessary. We analyze the welfare implications of coalition structure, and investigate which coalition structure leads to the highest social welfare. The paper investigates whether the most desirable coalition structure represents an equilibrium, and provides a sufficient condition for the socially efficient coalition structure to be a stable Nash coalition structure.     

网络竞争与网络产业改革

本文运用博弈分析,论证了在不触动网络垄断的情况下,网络产业的纵向结构分离或开放接入会产生内在的提高下游产品或服务价格的驱动力量,从而对近年来我国网络产业下游产品或服务的价格上涨给出了新的解释。建立有管理的竞争机制,允许绕道、开放用户选择权,是网络产业实现有效竞争并使竞争惠及最终用户的可行途径。     

Resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry-wide adoption

We consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition. We find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anti-competitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers. Indeed, we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market, consumer welfare under a laissez-faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which RPM is banned. Government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry-wide adoption of RPM can have adverse welfare effects in the model. We further show that proposed guidelines in the United States and Europe may come close to minimizing welfare.     

An Anticompetitive Effect of Eliminating Transport Barriers in Network Markets

This paper examines the welfare effects of physically interconnecting two (network) markets that were previously separated. In each market a different set of capacity-constrained firms operate. Firms engage in a supergame and collude whenever it is rational for them to do so.We find that, under certain parametric restrictions, interconnection of the two markets reduces total welfare. The collusive horizon may extend from a single market to the overall integrated market. In such case, interconnection can be viewed as “exporting” collusion, rather than competition.      

On the competitive effects of vertical integration by a research laboratory

An independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation ready to be used by an industry that produces differentiated goods. We analyze whether the laboratory prefers to license the innovation as an external patentee or to merge with one of the firms in the industry, licensing the innovation as an internal patentee. Under linear demand and Cournot competition, we show first, that the vertical merger is profitable only in the case of small innovations, whereas a merger increases welfare only for significant innovations; second, all profitable vertical mergers reduce welfare. However, some profitable mergers are welfare improving under price competition.     

Is a Big Entrant a Threat to Incumbents? The Role of Demand Substitutability in Competition Among the Big and the Small

We establish a model of market competition between large and small firms and investigate the way in which demand substitutability affects how the entry of big firms impacts incumbents. We focus on the relative strength of two opposing effects of entry on large incumbent firms’ demand: the direct substitution effect among large firms (negative) and the indirect feedback effect through the change in small firms’ aggregated behavior (positive). If the substitutability between large and small firms is sufficiently high, the indirect effect dominates the direct effect and large incumbents’ equilibrium prices and profits increase. We show that welfare effects are ambiguous, which calls for careful assessment when regulating large firms’ entry.     

Innovation and competition: The role of the product market

We study how competition impacts innovation (and welfare) when firms compete both in the product market and in innovation development. This relationship is complex and may lead to scenarios in which a lessening of competition increases R&D and consumer welfare in the long run. We provide conditions for when competition increases or decreases industry innovation and welfare. These conditions are based on properties of the product market payoffs. Implications for applied work and policy are discussed.     

FUNCTIONAL DEGRADATION AND ASYMMETRIC NETWORK EFFECTS*

In markets subject to network effects, firms often remove some functions of their original products and sell a functionally‐downgraded version at a lower or zero price. This paper aims to provide a pure network effect based explanation of such a practice. Building a functional degradation model with asymmetric network effects, we investigate when and why firms have incentives to introduce a functionally‐degraded good and discuss its welfare implication.     

CUSTOMER POACHING AND ADVERTISING*

This paper is a first look at the dynamic effects of customer poaching in homogeneous product markets, where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness. When a firm is able to recognize customers with different purchasing histories, it may send them targeted advertisements with different prices. It is shown that only the firm which advertises the highest price in the first period will engage in price discrimination, a practice that clearly benefits the discriminating firm. This poaching gives rise to ‘the race for discrimination effect,’ through which price discrimination may act actually to soften price competition rather than intensify it. As a result, all firms may become better off, even when only one of them can engage in price discrimination. This paper offers a first attempt to evaluate the effects of price discrimination on the efficiency properties of advertising. In markets with low or no advertising costs, allowing firms to price discriminate leads them to provide too little advertising, which is not good for consumers and overall welfare. Only in markets with high advertising costs, might firms overadvertise. Regarding the welfare effects, price discrimination is generally bad for welfare and consumer surplus, though good for firms.