Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations

This paper introduces a general framework for the fair allocation of indivisible objects when each agent can consume at most one (e.g., houses, jobs, queuing positions) and monetary compensations are possible. This framework enables us to deal with identical objects and monotonicity of preferences in ranking objects. We show that the no-envy solution is the only solution satisfying equal treatment of equals, Maskin monotonicity, and a mild continuity property. The same axiomatization holds if the continuity property is replaced by a neutrality property.     

A characterization of the extended serial correspondence

We study the problem of assigning objects to a group of agents. We focus on probabilistic methods that take agents’ ordinal preferences over the objects. Importantly, we allow for indifferences among objects. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) propose the extended serial correspondence to solve this problem. Our main result is a characterization of the extended serial correspondence in welfare terms by means of stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance no-envy and “limited invariance,” a requirement we adapt from Heo (2014a). We also prove that an assignment matrix is selected by the extended serial correspondence if and only if it satisfies “non-wastefulness” and “ordinal fairness,” which we adapt from Kesten et al. (2011).     

Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited

Thomson (1995a) proved that the uniform allocation rule is the only allocation rule for allocation economies with single-peaked preferences that satisfies Pareto efficiency, no-envy,one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance on a restricted domain of single-peaked preferences. We prove that this result also holds on the unrestricted domain of single-peaked preferences. Next, replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by one-sided replacement-domination yields another characterization of the uniform allocation rule, Thomson (1997a). We show how this result can be extended to the more general framework of reallocation economies with individual endowments and single-peaked preferences. Following Thomson (1995b) we present allocation and reallocation economies in a unified framework of open economies. Received: 20 February 1999 / Accepted: 15 February 2000     

Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects to agents, such as dorm rooms to students, or offices to professors, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For these problems population-monotonicity, which requires that agents are affected by population changes in the same way, is a compelling property because tentative assignments are made in many typical situations, which may have to be revised later to take into account the changing population. We completely describe the allocation rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efficiency. The characterized rules assign the objects by an iterative procedure in which at each step no more than two agents “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”     

When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?

We study the problem of allocating objects using lotteries. For each economy, the serial assignment, the assignment selected by the (probabilistic) serial rule, is $sd$-efficient and $sd$-envy-free (“$sd$” stands for stochastic dominance) but in general, it is not the only such assignment. Our question is when the uniqueness also holds. First, we provide a necessary condition for uniqueness, termed top-objects divisibility. Exploiting the structure revealed by top-objects divisibility, we then provide two sufficient conditions: preference richness and recursive decomposability. Existing sufficient conditions are restrictive in that they are satisfied only if there are sufficiently many agents relative to the number of objects; and that they only focus on preferences, ignoring other aspects of the problem that are also relevant to uniqueness. Our conditions overcome these limitations and can explain uniqueness for a wide range of economies.     

Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: $n$ houses (stand for “indivisible objects”) are to be allocated to $n$ agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; $k$ houses are initially unowned; $k$ agents initially do not own houses; the remaining $n-k$ agents (the so-called “existing tenants”) initially own the remaining $n-k$ houses (each owns one). In this setting, we consider various randomized allocation rules under which voluntary participation of existing tenants is assured and the randomization procedure either treats agents equally or discriminates against some (or all) of the existing tenants. We obtain two equivalence results, which generalize the equivalence results in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Sönmez and Ünver (2005).     

Multi-stage point and interval estimation of the largest mean ofK normal populations and the associated second-order properties

Summary We havek independent normal populations with unknown meansμ ₁, …,μ _k and a common unknown varianceσ ². Both point and interval estimation procedures for the largest mean are proposed by means of sequential and three-stage procedures. For the point estimation problem, we require that the maximal risk be at mostW, a preassigned positive number. For the other problem, we wish to construct a fixed-width confidence interval having the confidence coefficient at least 1-α, a preassigned number between zero and one. Asymptotic second order expansions are provided for various characteristics, such as average sample size, associated risks etc., for the suggested multi-stage estimation procedures.     

On the application of the Minkowski-Farkas theorem to sampling designs

In the paper, we consider the following problem: Let {π_k} be a sequence satisfying 0π_kΣ1 (k=1,…, N) and π=n.Tben, is there an unordered sampling design such that, for each k=1,…N, the inclusion probability of unit k is equal to π? It is shown that it can be solved by the straightforward application of the Minkowski-Farkas theorem.     

No-envy,solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

Given a group of agents, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we characterize interesting subfamilies of the VCG mechanisms by investigating the implications of either no-envy or solidarity requirements. First, we present a characterization of the strategy-proofand envy-freemechanisms. Next, we present characterizations of VCG mechanisms satisfying one of two different formulations of cost monotonicity or population monotonicity. Finally, we show that among the envy-free and strategy-proof mechanisms, the only ones that satisfy one of two formulations of cost monotonicity or population monotonicity are extensions of the pivotal or the reward-based pivotal mechanisms.     

A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium

We provide a continuous and feasible double implementation of the Walras equilibrium. In our game form the set of traders is partitioned intok subsets,k>-2, and for each member of the partition there is an (outside) auctioneer. Also, each agent announces a price-allocation pair so that all agents become price takers. The outcome allocation is defined as the feasible (and budget balanced) allocation which is closest to the aggregate announced allocation. No assumptions are made on the preferences of the traders.     

Bounds for the mean residual life function of a <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-out-of-<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis> system

In the reliability studies, k-out-of-n systems play an important role. In this paper, we consider sharp bounds for the mean residual life function of a k-out-of-n system consisting of n identical components with independent lifetimes having a common distribution function F, measured in location and scale units of the residual life random variable X _t  = (X−t|X > t). We characterize the probability distributions for which the bounds are attained. We also evaluate the so obtained bounds numerically for various choices of k and n.     

A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies

To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies, we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency, (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility), and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets, the agencies’ private information has to be taken into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement (regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is to assign all agencies the same budget set, as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly, we show that the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise, there are no efficient, strategy proof and fair mechanisms, no matter how small these constraints are.     

Standardization of Variables and Collinearity Diagnostic in Ridge Regression

Ridge estimation (RE) is an alternative method to ordinary least squares when there exists a collinearity problem in a linear regression model. The variance inflator factor (VIF) is applied to test if the problem exists in the original model and is also necessary after applying the ridge estimate to check if the chosen value for parameter k has mitigated the collinearity problem. This paper shows that the application of the original data when working with the ridge estimate leads to non‐monotone VIF values. García et al. (2014) showed some problems with the traditional VIF used in RE. We propose an augmented VIF, VIF_R(j,k), associated with RE, which is obtained by standardizing the data before augmenting the model. The VIF_R(j,k) will coincide with the VIF associated with the ordinary least squares estimator when k = 0. The augmented VIF has the very desirable properties of being continuous, monotone in the ridge parameter and higher than one.     

Wealth effects of time variation in investor risk preferences

We investigate the source of risk premiums: individual risk preferences. By examining the wealth characteristics of agents of different risk preferences, we study the financial incentive of investors to demonstrate different risk preferences. To accomplish this, we model the stock market utilizing artificial adaptive agents. If investors have incentive to vary their risk preferences, or if investors of a constant risk preference vary the way they participate in the market under different market conditions, this could lead to time variation in market risk premiums. We find that agents have significant incentive to demonstrate different risk preferences under different market conditions.(JEl G12)     

A top-down approach for approximate data anonymisation

Data sharing in today's information society poses a threat to individual privacy and organisational confidentiality. k-anonymity is a widely adopted model to prevent the owner of a record being re-identified. By generalising and/or suppressing certain portions of the released dataset, it guarantees that no records can be uniquely distinguished from at least other k?1 records. A key requirement for the k-anonymity problem is to minimise the information loss resulting from data modifications. This article proposes a top-down approach to solve this problem. It first considers each record as a vertex and the similarity between two records as the edge weight to construct a complete weighted graph. Then, an edge cutting algorithm is designed to divide the complete graph into multiple trees/components. The Large Components with size bigger than 2k?1 are subsequently split to guarantee that each resulting component has the vertex number between k and 2k?1. Finally, the generalisation operation is applied on the vertices in each component (i.e. equivalence class) to make sure all the records inside have identical quasi-identifier values. We prove that the proposed approach has polynomial running time and theoretical performance guarantee O(k). The empirical experiments show that our approach results in substantial improvements over the baseline heuristic algorithms, as well as the bottom-up approach with the same approximate bound O(k). Comparing to the baseline bottom-up O(logk)-approximation algorithm, when the required k is smaller than 50, the adopted top-down strategy makes our approach achieve similar performance in terms of information loss while spending much less computing time. It demonstrates that our approach would be a best choice for the k-anonymity problem when both the data utility and runtime need to be considered, especially when k is set to certain value smaller than 50 and the record set is big enough to make the runtime have to be taken into account.     

Notes and Comments: Sup-convolutions of HARA utilities in the affine term structure

Abstract In the financial literature, the problem of maximizing the expected utility of the terminal wealth has been investigated extensively (for a survey, see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1998), p. 153, and references therein) by using different approaches. In this paper, we extend the existing literature in two directions. First, we let the utility function U(.) of the financial agent (who is a price taker) be implicitly defined through I(.)=(U ^′ (.))^–1, which is assumed to be additively separable, i.e., I(.)=∑ _k=1 ^N I _k (.). Second, we solve the investment problem in the general affine term structure model proposed by Duffie and Kan (1996) in which the functions I _k (.), k=1,...,N are associated to HARA utility functions (with possibly different risk aversion parameters), and we show that the utility maximization problem leads to a Riccati ODE. Moreover, we extend to the multi-factor framework the stability result proved in Grasselli (2003), namely, the almost-sure convergence of the solution with respect to the parameters of the utility function. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B28 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: G11     

Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem

We introduce two notions of ex-post fairness, namely ex-post favoring ranks (EFR) and robust ex-post favoring ranks, which consider whether objects are received by those agents who have the highest rank for them. We examine their compatibility with standard properties of random assignments and state some impossibility theorems. We also propose and formalize a revised version of the Boston mechanism and prove that it provides an EFR random assignment.

     

A study on the mean past lifetime of the components of (n − k + 1)-out-of-n system at the system level

In the present paper, we consider a (n − k + 1)-out-of-n system with identical components where it is assumed that the lifetimes of the components are independent and have a common distribution function F. We assume that the system fails at time t or sometime before t, t > 0. Under these conditions, we are interested in the study of the mean time elapsed since the failure of the components. We call this as the mean past lifetime (MPL) of the components at the system level. Several properties of the MPL are studied. It is proved that the relation between the proposed MPL and the underlying distribution is one-to-one. We have shown that when the components of the system have decreasing reversed hazard then the MPL of the system is increasing with respect to time. Some examples are also provided.     

Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses

A house allocation rule should be flexible in its response to changes in agents’ preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be swap-sovereign over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile and assigns her the other house when she instead reports preferences that simply swap the positions of the two houses. A pair of agents is said to be mutually swap-sovereign over their assignments at a profile if the rule exchanges their assignments when they together report such ‘swap preferences’. An allocation rule is individually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has a swap-sovereign agent, and is mutually swap-flexible if any pair of houses has either a swap-sovereign agent or mutually swap-sovereign agents. We show for housing markets that the top-trading-cycles rule is the unique strategy-proof, individually rational and mutually swap-flexible rule. In house allocation problems, we show that queue-based priority rules are uniquely strategy-proof, individually swap-flexible and envy non-bossy. Varying the strength of non-bossiness, we characterise the important subclasses of sequential priority rules (additionally non-bossy) and serial priority rules (additionally pair-non-bossy and pair-sovereign).     

Comparison of test vs. control treatments using distance optimality criterion

We consider the problem of comparison of one test treatment (τ₀) with a set of v control treatments (τ₁, τ₂, …, τ_v) using distance optimality [DS-optimality] criterion introduced by Sinha (1970) in some treatment-connected design settings. It turns out that the nature of DS-optimal designs is quite similar to that for the usual A−, D− and E− optimality criteria. However, the optimality problem is quite complicated in most situations. First we deal with the CRD model and derive DS-optimal allocations for a given set of treatments. The results are almost identical to the A-optimal allocations for such problems. Then we consider a block design set-up and examine the nature of DS-optimal designs. In the process, we introduce the method of weighted coverage probability and maximize the resulting expression to obtain an optimal design. Received: December 1999