Fiscal and Monetary Problems in Developing States: Proceedings of the Third Rehovoth Conference

This study considers social capital and religious adherence as determinants of child poverty in the United States and finds that both social capital and religious adherence play a role in U.S. child poverty at the county level. The study also disaggregates the total religious adherence variable into Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics and finds that the effects of these denominations on child poverty are mixed. The model is tested for spatial dependence bias and the test results show that without spatial correction, the OLS results may be biased and inefficient.     

Communism as the unhappy coming

We show that Eastern Orthodox believers are less happy compared to those of Catholic and Protestant faith using data covering more than 100 countries around the world. Consistent with the happiness results, we also find that relative to Catholics, Protestants and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital and prefer old ideas and safe jobs. In addition, Orthodoxy is associated with left-leaning political preferences and stronger support for government involvement in the economy. Compared to non-believers and Orthodox adherents, Catholics and Protestants are less likely to agree that government ownership is a good thing, and Protestants are less likely to agree that getting rich can only happen at the expense of others. These differences in life satisfaction and other attitudes and values persisted despite the fact that communist elites sought to eradicate church-going in Eastern Europe, since communists maintained many aspects of Orthodox theology which were useful for the advancement of the communist doctrine. The findings are consistent with Berdyaev’s (1933, 1937) hypothesis of communism as a successor of Orthodoxy.     

Trust as belief or behavior?

Despite its proposed importance for economic performance, there seems to be little agreement on what trust really is. In economics, trust is generally viewed as a belief regarding the action that is to be expected from others. This contrasts with the view that trust is a way of acting. In his influential book on the nature of explanation in the social sciences, Jon Elster argues that trusting is to act with few precautions. I argue that it is possible to reconcile these seemingly conflicting views about trust. I develop a simple model of trust where both beliefs and precautions play an important role – and where Elster’s understanding of trust can be viewed as a special case.     

宗教信仰与信任:一个实验经济学的研究

本文采用实验方法研究宗教信仰对个人信任行为的影响.本文首次以佛教徒、基督教徒、穆斯林和非宗教信仰者四类群体为研究对象进行信任实验,并通过虔诚度问卷调查,全面分析宗教影响个体信任行为的内在机制.研究结果表明:(1)当把三类宗教被试合并为一个整体时,其与非宗教信仰者在信任行为上没有显著差异,也不存在明显的组间效应;(2)但...     

Religion,discrimination and trust across three cultures

We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how individuals are socially identified and connected. Religiosity and religious affiliation may serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, affiliation to the same religion may enhance group identity, or affiliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice. We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants׳ willingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We find that interpersonal similarity in religiosity and affiliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Religious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity amplifies this effect. Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.     

THE GOSPEL AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM A TRUST GAME

This paper studies how individual religiosity affects people's behaviour. In particular here I study the behaviour of the second players in a standard trust game. While the extant literature has looked for religiosity to increase the stakes passed by the subjects, the results presented here show that more religious people tend to choose an even allocation of these resources, whilst the less religious participants are either opportunistic or generous.     

The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation is faced with substantial competition, while Catholics tend to contribute more when they represent a minority church in a heavily concentrated market. This outcome is explained by arguing that churches with more competition react by providing a more satisfactory product and do a better job of filling niches in the religious marketplace.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

Trust in the image of God: Links between religiosity and reciprocity in Haiti

Are religious believers more prosocial than other people? In a trust game field experiment with 774 subjects in Haiti, we elicit willingness to pay to play in the presence of religious images, and argue that this can be interpreted as a measure of the strength of religiosity. More religious individuals trust others more and reciprocate more than others, with effect sizes between 14% and 21% of mean behaviour depending on the measure. They do not reciprocate more in the presence of religious images than without them, nor towards members of the same denomination as themselves. The results support the view that religious affiliation is correlated with intrinsic trustworthiness. We show that lab behaviour correlates with intuitive measures of religiosity outside the lab and with participation in borrowing and lending networks.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

建立虚拟企业合作伙伴信任关系的途径

虚拟企业是一种新的组织形式,在虚拟企业中伙伴关系的管理十分重要。传统的方法如契约方法已不能保证虚拟企业的成功,必须在合作伙伴问建立信任的关系。本文介绍了在整个虚拟企业生命周期中伙伴信任关系的源泉,并在分析我国背景情况的基础上从宏观和微观层面上提出了建立虚拟企业伙伴信任关系的一些建议。     

Gender differences in trust and reciprocity: evidence from a large-scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects

This article examines gender differences in an experimental trust game. Recent studies have shown that men trust more and that women are more reciprocal in laboratory experiments. Participants in these studies, however, are typically university students who may not be representative of the entire population. In this study, we use data from a large-scale experiment with heterogeneous subjects who are representative of the German population. We find that men exhibit not only more trusting behaviour, but also more reciprocating behaviour than women. Moreover, our results are indicative of age-dependent gender differences. For men, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between age, on the one hand, and both trust and reciprocity, on the other; however, we do not find age effects for women.     

Civic participation of secular groups in Canada

Using two recent nationally representative Canadian surveys, this paper investigates how secularization affects civic participation, inclusive of political engagement and philanthropy. Three mutually exclusive categories of secularized individuals are considered. The analysis suggests that Canadian secular groups are relatively less engaged with politics and volunteer fewer hours, compared with the actively religious. They are, however, found to contribute significantly more money to secular causes, controlling for a wide range of individual attributes. Various explanations are explored.     

手机银行服务质量对持续信任的影响研究

通过建立手机银行服务质量与顾客持续信任之间的研究模型,利用问卷调查的方法进行数据收集,并通过结构方程模型进行数据分析,对研究模型进行实证检验。结果表明：除服务过程质量对持续信任的产生不明显之外,服务保障质量、服务结果质量、服务补救质量均对顾客持续信任产生着积极的影响。     

HUMAN NATURE, COMMUNICATION AND TRUST

ABSTRACT ** :  The facts that people can sometimes commit to fulfill promises even when there are no binding penalties and that kind and trusting acts are often reciprocated by trustworthy ones make possible forms of group action that might be ruled out in a hypothetical world of perfectly opportunistic individuals. I discuss some new experiments with a modified Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) ' trust game' that provide evidence that most subjects adhere to non-binding agreements, that many are prepared to rely on trust rather than use binding but moderately costly contracts, that the possibility of exchanging words rather than mere numerical proposals enhances trusting and trustworthiness, and that subjects are drawn to fair and efficient exchanges despite the self-interest model's prediction of outcomes more favorable to first-movers.     

Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives

Individuals are often given the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of a group or an organization. However, little is known about preferences or behavior in such contexts. In an adapted trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group-representatives differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous situation. Group-representatives are given the responsibility of unilaterally and privately making a decision on behalf of a three-person group. Results from both the main and the follow-up studies show that people trust less and reciprocate less as group-representatives, and thus demonstrate that the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect not only exists in group behavior but also in individual behavior of group-representatives. Moreover, results show that trusting behavior is driven by reciprocity expectations, while reciprocating behavior is not sensitive to the first mover's behavior, i.e., the level of trust experienced.     

Cooperation,Trust and Economic Development: An Experimental Study in China

Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e. whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination of public goods, gambling game and trust game experiments, we investigate the links among cooperation, trust and economic development in four regions of China. Our results suggest that, first, there is a U‐shaped or V‐shaped relationship between cooperation and economic development. Second, on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other hand, more cooperative behaviour may be created by rewarding trusting behaviour. Third, men are more cooperative and trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used ‘GSS trust’ question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions ‘GSS fair’ and ‘GSS help’ have weak predictive power for trusting behaviour but not for cooperative behaviour.     

Deus Vult: The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church

The Catholic Church is a religious tradition with a highly centralised organisational structure which operates worldwide but that must adjust itself to and effectively operate in local and world-regional contexts that can often challenge and threaten to subvert its central doctrines, operational principles, and political compromises with secular authorities. The Church has long provided the source and model, with its base in the sacred origins of sovereignty, for a quintessentially Western statehood. In this context, I wish to raise three points for further discussion using the significant example of the Catholic Church that future research on the contemporary confluence between religion and geopolitics should address. The first is whether a church can have “geopolitics.” I answer in the affirmative with a number of arguments for doing so. The second is the idea, made in writing and in his practice by Pope Benedict, that Western civilisation is in crisis and that only a restoration of a historic Christendom (Europe) based on a reinvigorated Catholic Church can save it. I dispute the strategy of “hard” or coercive power and the focus on Europe he has apparently chosen as departing from what has often best served the Church in the past. Third, and finally, in the global struggle for souls, numbers matter. Somewhat akin to the struggle for primacy between states in the modern geopolitical imagination, the struggle for souls between faiths (Catholics and Protestants, Moslems and Christians, etc.) is once more in ascendance. But doesn't this quantitative emphasis risk subverting the Church's post-Vatican II emphasis on Christian practice in everyday life? The overall purpose of the article is to introduce religious organisation and associated theological claims into the problematic of geopolitics using the case of the world's largest Christian denomination.     

CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT INCOME DIFFERENCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The purpose of this paper is to analyse income differences betweeen Catholic and Protestant families in Northern Ireland (NI) using Family Expenditure Survey micro-data. The paper's first conclusion is that there is much greater inequality within the Catholic and Protestant communities than there is between them. It's second conclusion, based upon econometric analysis of data for full-time employees, is that the lower mean income of Catholics, relative to Protestants, could be entirely explained in terms of different rates of reward attached to a given set of labour market characteristics.     

Government Size and Trust

This paper uses individual level data from the Japanese General Social Survey to examine how government size influences generalized trust. After controlling for the endogeneity of government size using instrumental variables, I found: (1) using all samples, government size is not associated with generalized trust, and (2) after splitting the sample into workers and non-workers, government size does not influence generalized trust for non-workers, whereas it significantly reduces generalized trust for workers. This suggests that workers, through their work experience, might have to face greater bureaucratic red tape coming from “larger government,” leading to negative externality effects on relationships of trust in the labor market.