论我国企业家市场的建立

建立我国企业家市场是市场经济发展的的必要造反报我国企业家市场的特征,提出了培育企业家市场的四大机制。     

企业家网络发展方向--能力导向型企业家网络研究

基于对企业家能力及市场经济基本特征的认识，本文首先提出了企业家网络发展的基本方向及主导形式－－能力导向型企业家网络；在此基础之上构建了能力导向型企业家网络的供需模型，并对影响该模型的相关因素进行了分析；最后将能力导向型企业家网络理论应用于我国企业家市场问题的研究，并指出现阶段我国企业家市场建设存在着较大的困难，规范的企业家市场培育有待其它改革措施的配套与落实。     

构建竞争性企业家市场的思考

随着我国建立现代企业制度步伐的进一步加快以及公司制度的进一步推进，为企业家职业化、市场化奠定了基础，一支具有高素质的企业家队伍正在形成，渐渐开始把企业家推向市场。中国需要竞争性的企业家市场，建立竞争性的企业家市场已成为社会主义市场经济的客观要求，也是当前深化企业改革的当务之急。笔者认为，当前注重构建竞争性企业家市场的探讨和研究，具有重要的现实意义。一、构建竞争性企业家市场，必须按照市场机制进行运作，使之形成全方位开放的企业家市场竞争性企业家市场的培育和发展巳成为推进现代企业制度的重要内容。企业家…     

企业家情怀是打造"百年老店"的底层逻辑

企业家情怀决定着企业的责任、目标及战略发展方向,是企业健康成长的"指路明灯".打造"百年老店"、永保基业长青即是企业家的梦想与追求,更是企业家的情怀所向.本文在系统梳理企业家情怀的内涵、特征,分析企业家情怀与企业家成长的关系,探究企业家情怀与打造"百年老店"的底层逻辑的基础上,从培育企业家责任担当、创新精神、家国情怀等方面提出了培育企业家情怀的建议,即培育企业家的责任担当和创新精神;培育企业家的家国情怀;培育情怀要从"娃娃"抓起;培育企业家情怀离不开"亲清"的政商关系.     

论企业家人才市场的培育

企业家人才市场是企业高级人才市场配置的场所和载体,过去人们仅把企业家人才市场看成是一个中介环节,而本文认为企业家人才市场在激发企业家人力资本效能中居于源头性的地位,从我国企业家人才市场的发育状况来看,存在着思想障碍,体制障碍,市场主体素质方面的障碍,市场软件障碍,为了加快我国企业家人才市场的培育,当前应采取措施,增加供给主体,需求主体,拓展空间范围,优化外部环境。     

培育我国企业家市场必须解决的若干问题

培育我国企业家市场必须解决的若干问题陈忠卫，马振英企业家市场的运行机制包括相辅相承的四个方面，其中：选拔机制是企业家诞生的必要前提；激励机制是企业家成长的内在动力；监督机制是企业家行为规范化的约束条件；培训机制是企业家素质的有效保证。现阶段我国企业家...     

培育企业家市场非一日之功

随着改革开放的逐步深入,我国的企业家市场经历了从无到有的发展历程。由于受各种主客观因素的制约,目前对这一专门化领域的建设还不够完善,我国的企业家市场存在着人才供给不足、市场机构匮乏、人才流动困难、市场运行机制不完善等问题。笔者认为,应尽快确立我国培育企业家人才市场的基本模式,以此为目标逐步解决各种具体问题,加快发展与社会主义市场经济相配套的企业家市场的建设工程。理想的企业家人才市场的总体目标应该是:在国家宏观调控下,实现企业家人才在全国范围内自由流动、自主择业,企业自主择人用人,建立市场中介与信息网络高度…     

企业家与企业家型中小企业

时代变化使得企业家的作用越来越突出,甚至可以说我们迎来了一个企业家时代,而企业家型中小企业是企业家时代的核心。企业家型中小企业的特征主要体现在注重创新,敢于冒险等方面。我们培育并促进更多的企业家型中小企业健康发展。     

面对“入世”企业家能力亟待培育提高

加入WTO意味着我国在更大范围参与世界竞争与合作,市场竞争将发生新的根本性变化。入世对企业家能力提出了更高要求,但我国企业家的能力仍面临着严峻考验。因此,迫切需要培育提高企业家能力,应突出强化更新观念、重视培育和转变培育方式等工作。     

论企业家市场化

企业家是一个国家或地区的重要而又稀缺的资源,这种资源必须由市场配置,即实现市场化.企业家市场化必须首先职业化,即企业家将经营管理企业作为终身职业,社会公认企业家是经营管理企业的专家,国家建立相应的稳定和发展企业家队伍的制度与机制.我国必须建立合理的激励机制,借鉴市场经济发达国家的做法,推行企业家年薪制和企业家股票期权制,建立统一与完善的企业家市场,遵循市场交易规则,防范和减少市场风险.在经济全球化浪潮中,我国实现企业家市场化十分迫切.     

基于企业家成长的地方产业集群战略

产业集群发展的基础是市场机制,培育和善待作为市场主体的企业家群体,是产业集群战略的起点和突破口。企业家的成长,不仅具有经济学的意义,而且具有社会学的意义,能引起社会结构的变迁。地方政府基于企业家成长的产业集群发展战略,重在夯实产业集群的微观基础、激活企业家的创新功能、优化企业家的生存环境。     

企业家人才市场建设势在必行

在21世纪,我们面对的是更加复杂而竞争激烈的生存环境。企业的发展更加需要善经营懂管理的企业家。企业家队伍的成长既需要教育、培养和在经营管理的实践中造就,也需要有企业家市场,企业家市场的建设,可以促使企业家的竞争、流动和素质的提高。而企业家人才市场的建设是一项涉及到多方面问题的复杂工作,只有进行相应的配套改革,才能保证这项工作的顺利进行。     

Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market?

This paper challenges the widespread belief that competitive markets favor entrepreneurs who operate efficient technologies. In the context of a dynamically incomplete markets model, I show that, ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs operating efficient technologies can be driven out of a competitive market by entrepreneurs operating inefficient technologies.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

控制权配置对企业投资行为的影响研究——基于企业家注重声誉的视角

如何通过提高企业家声誉来优化企业投资行为事关我国企业的健康发展。通过构建企业投资支出的回归模型,对控制权配置与企业投资行为进行实证检验。实证分析表明,在企业家注重声誉的前提下,第一大股东持股比例与企业投资支出水平负相关,而当内部现金流充裕时,股权制衡比例与企业投资支出水平正相关。因此,可以通过建立企业家征信制度、完善充分竞争的企业家市场、确保企业家有长远预期和培育合格的市场主体等措施,提高企业家声誉,优化企业投资行为。     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

Search and the market for ideas

We study a market where innovators, who are good at coming up with ideas, can sell them to entrepreneurs, who might be better at implementing them. The market is decentralized, with random matching and bargaining. Ideas are characterized by five salient features: they are indivisible; partially nonrival; intermediate inputs; subject to informational frictions; and difficult to collateralize. This last feature gives rise to a demand by entrepreneurs for liquidity. We determine which ideas get traded in equilibrium and compare this to the efficient outcome, emphasizing the impact of bargaining and liquidity considerations. Among other applications, we study how outcomes in the idea market affect the labor market.     

Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies

We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations, and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection. The severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs, which is working for wages. This links credit, product and labor markets. A rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem. These multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria. If it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones. However, if screening is possible, e.g., if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans, then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes.     

Homeownership and new entrepreneurs: first empirical evidence of a bidirectional interaction

Literature linking housing and professional choices focuses on the supply side of the labour market (the search for a job as employee), thus considering the unemployment rate as the only measure of labour market outcomes. Indeed, the usually neglected link between homeownership and entrepreneurship is equally important for assessing labour market performance. This empirical article represents one of the first attempts to test the interplay between homeownership and (new) entrepreneurs. Effectively, using a panel data analysis in Italy, we find a first empirical evidence of a positive and bidirectional interaction between homeownership and new entrepreneurs (precisely, small businesses and the self-employed).     

要素市场扭曲对企业家寻租及创新的影响

Baumol认为企业家行为模式受到所在制度环境的影响，良好的制度环境会促进企业家从事增加社会福利的生产性活动，比如创新；而制度环境不佳会导致企业家从事攫取社会利益的非生产性活动，比如寻租。Baumol的企业家才能配置理论在中国具体情境中，是否有其适用性？以我国2009-2014年省级层面面板数据，利用各省份人均土地出让面积作为地区要素市场扭曲的工具变量，在有效控制内生性可能导致的模型估计偏误后，实证考察了要素市场扭曲对企业家寻租活动的作用效应。研究发现，转轨时期我国地区要素市场扭曲程度越深，企业家寻租活动就越多。进一步通过系数检验以及Bootstrap方法考察企业家寻租活动在地区要素市场扭曲和企业创新强度之间的中介效应，证实了“要素市场扭曲→企业家寻租活动增多→企业创新强度减弱”传导机制的存在，可为深化中国要素市场机制改革提供理论和实证支持。