Measures of the Amending Power of Government and Parliament. The Case of Italy 1988–2002

On the basis of a unique data set consisting of all the amendments to the Italian financial laws from 1988 to 2002, we empirically test whether and how the amending power is an instrument of the parliament or of the government and whether the use of this power was modified by the change of the electoral system in 1994. We show that, in both electoral systems, governments controlled the agenda and parliaments never exploited this power to increase the deficits beyond the planned value. The structural break of the Italian budgetary policy was determined by the Maastricht fiscal rules.     

Urbanisation,fiscal decentralisation and economic development: A time series evidence

Several empirical tests using Multiple Regression Analyses were conducted on several hypotheses using time series data obtained from the federal and state governments. The results of our analyses establish that the degree of fiscal decentralisation is dependent on intergovernmental transfers and states income per capita. However intergovernmental transfers were not dependent on expenditure decentralisationper se. The degree of urbanisation was found to be inversely related to fiscal decentralisation. The variable measuring the degree of openess was found not statistically significant as an explanatory variable for fiscal decentralisation. However, the share of agriculture was found significant in revenue decentralisation but loses its importance in expenditure decentralisation.The policy implications of the study are that: (i) There is need for the states to develop plans to increase their per capita income, improve their tax collection system, introduce new tax bases and reduce the high degree of free ridership in public goods and services exhibited by the urban population. (ii) The Federal Government should provide specific grants to state governments for urban development, because of the high per capita cost of public goods and services. (iii) The existing Revenue Allocation Act should be reviewed to reflect state government efforts in generating their own revenue from internal sources.     

Organised decentralisation,uneven outcomes: employment relations in the Italian public health sector

This article looks at the difficulties of adapting a very centralised employment relations system in a country characterised by a deep regional economic divide. In particular, by looking at the Italian public health sector, it is contended that organised decentralisation of employment relations implemented against wide regional differences led to uneven outcomes in second‐level (organisation) collective bargaining.     

Government debt and fiscal execution efficiency

Governments have used deficit policies in recent years, yet many still face fiscal debt problems. Thus, this research uses Range Directional Measure Dynamic Directional Distance Function model with negative data to explore the financial efficiency of local governments in Taiwan from 2011 to 2018. This article has three major contributions: (1) The research uses RDM Dynamic DDF model with negative data to solve the problem of negative values on input and output data and uses dynamic models to make up for the deficiencies of past research. (2) Due to the differences in regions, local governments have different fiscal budgets. Therefore, this article uses the Wilcoxon Test to explore the efficiency differences of local governments in different regions. (3) This article analyzes the impact of central subsidies and government deficits (debts) of local governments on fiscal efficiency, and discusses the efficiency of government fiscal execution. The results are as follows. (1) Seven counties and cities with the best efficiency, and seven local governments with poor efficiency. (2) The fiscal performances of outlying islands and eastern local governments are better than those of western local governments. (3) Kaohsiung City has the highest accumulated debt and Tainan City exhibits poor financial performance.     

A NEW DIRECTION IN WORLD BANK URBAN LENDING TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES*

The urban development loans of the World Bank are acquiring a regional rather than a city-specific orientation in several countries, especially in Latin America. These broader operations often dovetail national trends of decentralization in the political, administrative and fiscal structures. Given the current constraints of the central governments in meeting the growing demands of urbanization through incremental top-down grants, these operations aim at a gradual substitution of unrequited transfers with long-term loans to regional and local governments. The paper reviews the implications of this approach in terms of distribution and efficiency and suggests that it may be more suitable in countries undergoing economic adjustment. The objective is to sustain motivation in fiscal effort and resource mobilization at the city level, and possibly establish a different rationale for external credit supporting local infrastructure and service improvements.     

THE ECONOMICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

Abstract There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: ‘first generation approach’ and ‘an emerging second generation approach’. The discussion generally covers the two notions of fiscal decentralization: ‘fiscal autonomy’ and ‘fiscal importance’ of subnational governments as the background of the most recently developed index of fiscal decentralization in Vo. The relevance of this discussion to any further development of a fiscal decentralization index is briefly noted.     

INTEREG: A Twenty-region Input–Output Model for Italy

Since the regional scale turns out to be the scale at which fiscal devolution is likely to be accomplished in Italy, and that at which trade and growth interdependencies as well as regional convergence can be most conveniently investigated, a new 20-region input–output model for Italy seems to be a useful tool of analysis. Although various regional and interregional models have been constructed since the 1950s, none has been implemented for the whole system of 20 Italian administrative regions considered in their tight mutual dependence; also, the pool approach has not been greatly favoured, even in situations where direct information on regional trade is lacking. The main purpose of this paper is to report on the structure of the model, the rather complex procedure used in the model construction and the adopted solution technique. Some space is devoted to the problems encountered in handling regional trade endogenously in an input–output setting and to a comparison between the pool approach, used in the Italian model, and other current techniques. The paper also reports on some preliminary results regarding the regional impact of fiscal policy.     

我国土地出让收入增长的影响因素与地区差异——基于空间动态面板模型的实证研究

利用1999～2008年的省级面板数据和空间动态面板广义矩(GMM)估计方法,本文考察了我国各地区土地出让收入增长的影响因素和地区差异。研究发现,各地方政府的土地出让收入间存在横向竞争,土地出让收入在全国范围内呈现一定的收敛性。财政分权程度、经济发展水平和市场化水平是影响各地土地出让收入增长的主要因素,并且其影响程度和方向呈现明显的地区差异。具体而言,东部地区的横向竞争程度高于全国平均水平和中西部地区。财政分权和经济发展水平对东部地区土地出让收入增长的影响不显著,市场化水平的影响显著为正。而财政分权对中西部地区土地出让收入增长的影响显著为负,经济发展水平的影响显著为正,市场化水平的影响不显著。     

The ‘postcode lottery’ of the Italian public health bill analysed with the hierarchy Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis

Over the last two decades, due to strong decentralization and widespread budget constraints, the Italian co-payment for health care has become a way to finance public health. This phenomenon has provoked a continuous increase of private costs of public health and an evident regional heterogeneity. As a result, a pervasive spatial inequality of access to public health care is becoming increasingly clear. The aim of this paper is to measure this inequality, mainly determined by the differences among regional co-payment prices. Access, equity, and needs are all part of the phenomenon ‘inequality of access’, and they are difficult to define and measure in health care. For this reason, most of the previously proposed measurement methods have inherent limitations and have prompted us to use an innovative approach focused exclusively on the supply side. In particular, we focus only on the cost of health benefits (co-payment). From a methodological perspective, we use a recent new version of the Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis (SMAA), which is a methodology mainly used to build composite indicators of multidimensional phenomena out of the market. In order to deal with the hierarchical structure of the Italian health care system, we use the Hierarchy Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis (HSMAA), which takes into account the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the considered criteria, as in the standard SMAA, but also the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the considered sub-criteria. Applying for the first time HSMAA to measure inequality allows us to create a unique index for each region and then to make a classification among them. The results show that, since there are different prices for the same health benefits among different regions, there are strong spatial inequalities in the cost of the Essential Levels of health care in Italy.     

Variable population size issues in models of decentralized income redistribution

We examine the distributive implications of decentralized redistribution in a federation with mobility. From a regional perspective, redistribution involves variable populations. As distribution and population issues are normatively inseparable, regional social preferences should exhibit reasonable properties in both respects. Critical-level (CL) utilitarianism does so. In autarky, CL utilitarian governments implement an egalitarian solution. With free mobility some degree of inequality always proves optimal when critical levels are fixed. Egalitarianism can be reached as a Nash equilibrium if and only if average incomes are used as variable critical levels. Since this is unacceptable on efficiency grounds we conclude that under reasonable assumptions egalitarian outcomes do not survive in fiscal games.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL VERSUS STATE EDUCATION FINANCE IN MEXICO

While decentralization is on the forefront of the reform agenda of many developing countries, few studies have performed empirical analysis to provide a holistic picture of the important fiscal, efficiency, and equity issues. Specifically, decentralization nearly always involves fiscal and administrative decisions by both national and sub-national governments, as well as intricate intergovernmental relations. Here, two empirical models are presented for the Mexican primary and secondary education sector. The first analyzes the efficiency-equity trade-off implicit the Mexican Federal Government's educational fiscal transfers to states. Unlike most similar analyses, this model analyzes the distribution of outcomes not simply expenditures. The second model analyzes the relative productivity of separate expenditures by the Federal and state governments before Mexico's recent educational decentralization legislation. The findings show that before the decentralization, the Federal Government exhibited some concern for equity, but that in doing so also treated states unequally according to criteria that have little to do with either efficiency or equity. In addition, the results show that the Federal Government may indeed have been the more efficient provider of primary and secondary education, raising concern for the fiscal and administrative relationship set up by the decentralization legislation: the Federal Government will continue to pay, while the states have gained relative autonomy over expenditures.     

Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries

This paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency (PSE). We first use a theoretical framework that illustrates the two opposing forces that shape a non-monotonic effect of fiscal decentralization on PSE. Subsequently, we carry out an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2000. A country-level dataset is used to measure PSE in delivering education and health services and the new indices are regressed on well-established decentralization measures. Irrespective of whether PSE concerns education or health services, an inverted U-shaped relationship has been identified between government efficiency in providing these services and fiscal decentralization. This relationship is robust across several different specifications and estimation methods.     

财政分权有利于贫困减少吗?——来自分税制改革后的省际证据

本文从公共支出效率和公共支出结构两个角度,论述了财政分权和贫困减少之间的理论联系。一方面,财政分权通过增加亲贫式支出的配置效率来实现减贫目标;另一方面,财政分权加剧了地方政府间的竞争程度,而地区竞争会扭曲公共支出结构,阻碍减贫目标的实现。利用我国分税制改革后的省际数据发现:就北京、上海和天津而言,财政分权程度的增加恶化了贫困状况;而对于其他省份,财政分权程度的增加则有利于缓解贫困。     

Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games

We consider a set-up where two governments have either conflicting or matching preferences on the provision of differentiated (local) goods supplied by a common monopoly bureau. We develop a two-stage game. At stage-1, the two governments decide whether or not to merge into a single institution. At stage-2, all players simultaneously and independently take their decisions in terms of production and rents, with perfect knowledge of the other players' strategies. We solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, and show that, if the bureau immediately updates its objective function to institutional changes, then the governments always prefer merging. However, if there is an initial bureaucratic inertia in adjusting the bureau's objective function to the institutional change, then ruling politicians may prefer decentralisation to centralisation, depending on the strategic properties of the compliance game and on their own discounting. Received: May 1999 / Accepted April 2000     

MNE regional head offices and their affiliates: talent management practices and challenges in the Asia Pacific

The paper explores the processes and challenges involved in multinational enterprise (MNE) establishing and operating regional headquaters (RHQs) as bridges between the parent HQ and their subsidiaries within a region. The role of regional structures has been neglected in research on international management, and, until recently, especially in research on HRM and talent management (TM). We know little about how MNEs develop, introduce and adapt TM (global TM (GTM) in this context) to accommodate local/country/regional contexts and challenges. The paper addresses these lacunae by reviewing the literature on GTM, MNE regional structures and GTM in the Asia Pacific region, and by presenting our findings from a study of the recent establishment by a multinational vehicle manufacturer of a regional headquarters in the Asia Pacific region. Four main challenges were identified: setting up the regional headquarters, legitimacy and contribution issues relating to the role of the RHQ, specific regional TM matters and centralisation versus decentralisation within the region.     

财税政策影响产业升级的理论机制分析——基于地方政府竞争视角

财税政策通过促进关键生产要素流入可促进产业升级。通过构建动态模型分析地方政府财税竞争对要素流动、社会福利及产业升级的影响。研究发现,提高生产要素的税率不仅会导致该生产要素外流,还会导致其他生产要素外流;在税率变化冲击下,要素存量调整至新的均衡状态与生产函数凹性和调整成本函数凸性有关;对发达地区落后产业实行高综合税率以及新兴产业实行低综合税率会促进地区产业升级,对落后地区实行低综合税率会促进地区经济发展和产业升级;政府的财税协调有利于地区间实现产业升级和提高社会福利水平;地区居民对企业的持股份额会影响地区福利水平。     

浅议欧洲债务危机及启示

为防止全球经济过度衰退,各国政府统一行动,采取了积极的财政货币政策,最大限度地减少金融危机所带来的影响,而欧元区国家却为此陷入了巨大的债务危机。本文讨论了导致债务危机产生的主要原因及影响,着重探讨债务危机给各国政府带来的启示教训,认为金融监管体系改革、透明化以及政府实行财政、金融改革,实施可持续公共财政是关键因素,对我国政府采取措施,建立一整套全面危机应对体制防范可能的金融风险提出了意见和建议。     

Fiscal performance and elections in the context of a transition economy

It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.     

Coordination Mechanisms for Implementing Complex Innovations in the Health Care Sector

Abstract

Coordination is a central element in the public sector, especially for introducing complex innovations. In health care, this issue takes on great importance since many stakeholders are involved, pursuing multiple interests, and influencing the outputs and outcomes of the health care system. This paper discusses the introduction of a specific health care innovation (i.e. electronic patient records) in two Italian regions, and it aims to contribute to the debate on coordination in health care, depicting the coordination mechanisms that took place in two different contexts in order to introduce the same kind of innovation, and highlighting any potential enabling conditions.