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1.
Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.  相似文献   

2.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
World output, which was strengthening immediately prior to last October, appears to have barely suffered in the short term from the stock market crash. Apart from an early reaction by US consumers - since reversed - demand is proving robust and in early 1988 OECD industrial production is, we estimate, 6 per cent up on year-earlier levels, with GNP more than 4 per cent higher. Indeed such is the strength of activity that the present balance of risk is not that recession is imminent but that inflation may pick up again. In the United States, where activity rates are at their highest level for eight years and unemployment is at a fourteen-year low, monetary policy has been tightened and interest rates are moving higher. The Bundesbank is keen to follow suit and the BoJ is keeping the situation under review. Nevertheless, with wages in most countries still adjusting to the low inflation rates of the last two years, there is little evidence yet that prices are accelerating.
We expect to see world interest rates edging higher in the second half of the year as recorded inflation picks lip. But we believe that underlying inflation remains low and that, even on the assumption that oil prices return to 18 a barrel, OECD consumer price inflation will peak early next year at a little over 4 per cent. Tighter monetary policy is also expected to hold back demand over the next 12 months. Consequently, we expect some weak- ness in output in the first half of next year but discount the possibility of a severe recession. GNP growth in the OECD area is forecast to decline from the 3 per cent rate of 1987–8 to a little over 2 per cent next year and to a sustainable 2½ per cent p.a. over the medium term.  相似文献   

3.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1986,10(9):2-3
A pause in world activity held back UK industry in the first quarter of the year and, even though we expect faster growth from now on, we forecast total output growth of only 2 per cent this year. But next year a stronger world economy and pre-election tax cuts lift growth to 3 1/4per cent. Lower oil prices and falling interest rates help keep inflation at its current level both this year and, as long as wages respond, next. In the medium term we expect the growth rate to fall back but, assuming that a fairly tight fiscal policy is pursued by whichever government is in power, we predict that inflation stays below 3 per cent  相似文献   

4.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.  相似文献   

5.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
Over the last 12 months industrial production in the OECD area has risen by 8–9 per cent, only slightly less rapidly than in the first year of recovery from the OPEC 1 oil crisis. Much of the growth in output stems from a very rapid expansion in North America although, in the second half of 1983, output in Europe and Japan began to accelerate. We expect the recovery to be maintained during 1984 with some convergence of growth rates. For the year as a whole we are now forecasting 61/2 per cent growth of industrial production, 33/4 per cent for total GNP. By the end of 1983 the long-standing reduction in inflation had run its course and OECD consumer prices were about 5 per cent higher than a year earlier. Within the area some countries, such as France and Italy, were still reducing inflation, but this was offset by the US where inflation has been rising slowly since the summer. We expect these trends to continue in 1984, i.e. stable inflation in the OECD but accelerating prices in the US, producing in each case about 5 per cent inflation. In 1985 we are now forecasting a slowdown in the world economy. This is expected to be centred on the United States, where the problem of the Federal Budget remains to be tackled. By the time of the Presidential election the US economy will have registered two years of relatively rapid growth. This is likely to be producing upward pressure on prices and interest rates and, as a result, a pause in 1985 in the growth of output. In Europe and Japan, where output has grown more slowly, we expect the recovery to be sustained in the medium term.  相似文献   

6.
The world economy is in poor shape. OECD industrial production fell 0.5per cent in both 1991 and 1992 arid though it may now have stopped falling it is still, on our estimates, below year-earlier levels. The US recovery continues to disappoint; recession persists in Japan and Europe; inflationary pressures, already weak, are waning. Next month's UK forecast would normally be based on the world forecast published in June's International Economic Outlook, when we were looking for G7 output to rise 1.2 per cent this year, 2.5 per cent next. But this now looks on the high side and although a detailed revision to the world forecast mist wait until the December IEO, as at1 input to the UK forecast we are shading our G7 growth forecasts - to I per cent this year and 2.25 per cent in 1994. Similar downward revisions are also in train at the OECD arid IMF, according to recent press reports. The more sluggish output performance is already having mi impact on the oil price, which has fallen below £16 a barrel. Together, these developments imply lower world inflation and, particularly in post-ERM Europe, a faster easing of monetary policy than we had allowed for in June.  相似文献   

7.
Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.  相似文献   

8.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the course of the world economy in 1988 was a product not so much of the stock market crash of October 1987 but of the reaction to the crash. Monetary policy and to a lesser extent fiscal policy were eased and consumer spending responded to cuts in interest rates and rising real incomes. With the world recovery in its sixth year, capacity pressures began to emerge and investment also boomed, helped by a lower cost of capital. As a result of this strong private sector demand, OECD output increased 4 per cent in 1988 as a whole and industrial production and world trade rose even more rapidly. Against the background of buoyant demand and output, inflationary fears have resurfaced. Since the spring monetary authorities in most countries have been tightening policy, raising interest rates by early 1989 above the levels which helped bring about the stock market crash. Their aim is to effect a slowdown in demand before a significant upward movement in inflation and inflationary expectations takes hold. In our judgement the present policy stance will achieve its aim of a "soft landing" for the world economy. The pick-up in world inflation is contained below 5 per cent and by the second half of this year inflation eases, paving the way for a relaxation of monetary policy. Output growth slows from 4 per cent to 3 percent in 1989 and 2 per cent in 1990, picking up again as interest rates are lowered in 1991–2.  相似文献   

9.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
In the course of 1984 growth rates in the major economies came together. This reflects a slowdown in the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, from the middle of the year and continuing recovery in Europe. This convergence is expected to continue in 1985 when total output in the OECD area is forecast to increase by 3 per cent. Within this total it is likely that the US, West Germany and the UK all achieve about 3 per cent; Japan should grow more quickly, France more slowly. In spite of a rapid recovery in output from the late-1982 trough, inflationary pressures remain weak. Measured in dollar terms, non-oil commodity prices have fallen and the oil price is under considerable down wards pressure. We expect inflation to stay at about its preset level in the US, West Germany, Japan and the UK and decline further in France, Italy and other countries where policy reaction to the 1979-80 oil price shock was delayed. In the medium term we expect the world economy to experience steady growth combined with a constant or slightly increasing inflation rate. This reflects a stable policy environment and falling real oil prices. After the excesses of the 1970s and early 1980s it is possible that the rest of the decade will experience u greater stability than at any time since the 1960s.  相似文献   

10.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
The world recovery, now 18 months old, suffered two major setbacks in May: heightened political tension in the Middle East and a crisis in financial markets following a rise in US interest rates. On the assumption that oil supplies are not disrupted, we forecast that industrial production in the OECD area will rise by 7per cent in 1984 compared with 1983 and that total GNP will be 4 per cent higher. The Fed3 decision to tighten monetary policy, and run the risks of a US banking crisis, underline its determination to prevent the re-emergence of high inflation in the US. Higher interest rates are expected to produce a pause in the US recovery later this year, but, by reining back the economy and dampening down inflationary expectations, they should avert both a return to high inflation and the need for a more pronounced US recession at a later date. Compared with the January forecast, therefore, in which we assumed that, for political and debt-crisis reasons, the US authorities would avoid a rise in interest rates, the present forecast embodies higher interest rates and an earlier pause in the American recovery but, in the medium term, lower inflation and steadier growth of output. For the European and Japanese economies, where policy has remained more restrictive throughout, we have not changed our view that inflation will continue either to remain low (West Germany, Japan) or to moderate (France, Italy), thereby underpinning a sustainable medium-term recovery.  相似文献   

11.
WORLDOUTLOOK     
German monetary unification is expected to result in a major expansion in autonomous demand from East Germany. In economic terms this is equivalent to a fiscal shock to West Germany broadly similar to that experienced in the US in the early years of Mr. Reagan's Presidency. Led by the Bundes bank, the monetary authorities' response is again likely to be a tightening of policy, leading to several years of high real interest rates. Overall, the combined monetary-fiscal shock should strengthen growth with only moderate increases in inflation. Germany is expected to grow very rapidly in the -per cent range for several years, with only a slight upturn in inflation. Japan, after a pause over the next year, should be able to return to its under lying growth path fairly quickly. However the US situation is more precarious. FUN adjustment from the previous Reagan shock has not yet taken place, leaving the US vulnerably dependent on increasingly scarce imported capital. In the absence of a significant *peace dividend: the result is the necessity of continued tight policy and sluggish growth in the American economy. US growth stays around 2 per cent, but this allows a substantial reduction in the current account deficit.  相似文献   

12.
13.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
The world recovery, now three years old, has proved more resilient than many expected and will be sustained in 1986 by lower oil prices. Fears that the early-1985 slowdown would turn into renewed recession have proved unfounded, as output in both the United States and Europe picked up in the second half of the year. The improvement stemmed from lower interest rates, falling inflation and weak commodity prices and was further helped by the sharp correction to the value of the dollar following September's G5 agreement. To these factors, which will remain supportive this year, is now added a lower oil price. The recovery in world output has not produced an increase in oil demand and, as the oil price rise of 1979-80 gave a further boost to supply from non-OPEC sources, a severe imbalance has emerged in the oil market. To maintain a £26 marker price (itself cut from £29 last July) has required a cutback in production of ever-increasing magnitude from Saudi Arabia in its role as OPEC's swing producer. Now that Saudi Arabia has abandoned this role in favour of stabilising its market share, oil prices have fallen sharply. We assume that the oil price will fall to £20 by the end of this year, a fall in real terms of 30 per cent. As a result the world recovery is given renewed impetus and output accelerates over the next twelve months. A cyclical peak in activity emerges in 1987, after which output growth settles at 2%-3 per cent and inflation at 4–5 per cent.  相似文献   

14.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
Unless the international debt situation or the crisis in the US domestic financial system worsens or there is a further lurch into protectionism, we expect world output to advance more rapidly over the next 2 months than it has over the last year. We argued in May that the world recovery was pausing, just as it did in 1977, and that conditions were falling into place for a pick-up in output. The requirements were seen as a lower dollar, to improve US competitiveness and to alleviate protectionist pressures, and stronger domestic demand elsewhere, to offset the resulting loss of US markets. Since then the case for a lower dollar has been recognised by the Group of Five Finance Ministers, interest rates have fallen and, at the G5 meeting, West Germany and Japan tentatively revealed a further modest stimulus. Output optimism is underpinned by the fall in world inflation to levels not seen since the early 1970s which, our forecast suggests, will be consolidated over the next 12 months. This reflects falling real oil and non-oil Commodity prices and decelerating earnings, which makes a further tightening of policy unlikely. In these circumstances the prospects for output are improving and over the next 12 months we forecast an increase in OECD output of 4per cent.  相似文献   

15.
The Government has recognised that the balance of risks has shifted in the last six months. Even though the pound has been devalued by around 15 per cent and suspended from the ERM, the probability of a significant pick-up in inflation over the next 12 months is low: the more serious risk is that the recession, which showed signs of deepening in the third quarter, turns into a slump. It is for this reason that the Autumn Statement announced measures, both monetary and fiscal, to increase demand and more particularly to try to rebuild confidence which has taken a battering over more than two years of recession, most notably in the housing market, where in the immediate aftermath of the ERM diédâle prices continued their sharp fall. On the fiscal side the measures were constrained by a seriously adverse trend in the PSBR, with some imaginative use of ‘time-limited’ measures which will boost demand in the short run without adding to government borrowing in the medium term. On the monetary side the Chancellor sanctioned the third 1 percent reduction in interest rates since the pound has been in free float. He was responding partly to criticism that the earlier two cuts had achieved rather little, though Mi. Lamont might have been advised that steering the economy by monetary policy is akin to steering an oil tanker: it takes a considerable time to respond. The danger, especially if rates come down to 6 per cent before the end of the year or even, as some are urging, to Sper cent, is that rates will have to rise sharply again before the end of next year to head off a renewed bout of inflation. This may seem a remote possibility at the present time but, as Milton Friedman taught us long ago, the lags in monetary policy are long and variable: it is nonsense to imagine that the cuts in rates that we have seen in the last two months could have yet had any impact on the economy. The worry is that, with the pound I5 per cent down on ERM levels, they will have an adverse effect on inflation in, 1994-5.  相似文献   

16.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1985,10(1):2-3
As the Chancellor recognised in his Mansion House speech, sterling M3 is once again proving to be a wayward indicator, and it is the exchange rate which is currently the principal instrument of the government's policy to reduce inflation. The strength of sterling, reinforced by the Group of Five commitment to a lower dollar, is the main factor behind decelerating retail prices and we endorse the Chancellor's forecast that inflation will fall to under 4 per cent in the middle of next year. A strong exchange rate, however, hits UK competitiveness and results in a slower rate of growth in output next year. Output growth, over 3% per cent this year including the post-strike rebound, remains at 2% per cent in 1986 and comes down to an underlying 2 per cent in the medium term.  相似文献   

17.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1989,14(1):2-3
The sluggish response of the current account to severe monetary tightening has put pressure on the exchange rate, which was instrumental in the decision to raise base rates to an eight-year high of 15 per cent. In so doing, the government has declared itself ready to risk recession to hold the pound - its main bulwark against rising inflation. Our forecast illustrates the risk. Compared with June, when we saw the economy avoiding a hard landing in the short term (at the cost of a protracted battle to reduce inflation over the medium term), the present forecast projects a sharp deceleration in output next year. Over the medium term output grows a disappointing 2 per centp.a., unemployment starts to rise and it is not until 1992 that retail price inflation is back below 5 per cent.  相似文献   

18.
WORLD OUTLOOK     
Clear signs that the world recovery is underway have e merged in the first half of 1983. We have revised our forecast upwards and predict an increase of 1 3/4 per cent in OECD GNP in I983 and a further 3% per cent in 1984. By hirtorical standards such a recovery would be extremely modest and would not be expected to trigger off a resurgence in inflation. If so GNP could advance a further 2% per cent in each of I985 and 1986. However, there is a danger that the relaration of monetary policy in the US in conjunction with the expansionary fiscal stance will bring about a very rapid upswing in the second half of 1983, thereby generating upward pressures on US interest rates. If, as the Presidential election approaches, these pressures are resisted and US monetary growth maintains its recent rapid expansion, an increase in the rate of inflation would be likely in 1984. If this were met with a tighter policy response (higher interest rates both in the US and elsewhere) after the election, the prospects would be for a sharp slowdown in the world economy in 1985.  相似文献   

19.
There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.  相似文献   

20.
Forecast Summary     
《Economic Outlook》1986,11(1):2-3
The lower exchange rate offers UK industry a remarkable competitive advantage in world markets which, we believe, will be expanding rapidly over the next two years. As domestic demand is also likely to be strong in the run-up to the General Election, output is forecast to rise 3 per cent both next year and in 1988. But, even so, the short-term supply response is not expected to be sufficient to prevent the current account from recording a large deficit next year. Excess demand pressures also point to a higher rate of inflation from now on. We forecast a steady increase in inflation to 3¾ Aper cent by the end of next year and a peak of 4½ per cent in late 1988.  相似文献   

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