上市公司可持续发展有效途径的探讨

在当前资本市场中,我国上市公司的盈利能力不断提高,但是上市公司的可持续发展问题也随之而来,如何处理好我国上市公司的可持续发展问题将成为我们关注的焦点。本文从上市公司发展的动力机制出发,对我国上市公司的现状进行了论述,分析了阻碍上市公司可持续发展的原因,并提出建立上市公司可持续发展机制的有效途径。     

试论上市公司合并会计报表中的几个问题

我国社会主义市场经济体制的不断完善,我国很多企业成了上市公司,意味着我国企业必须面对更为规范和有序的市场秩序,上市公司必须对外公开、公平、公正地披露相关信息,从而使得我国上市公司合并会计报表的主体结构和业务范围等发生了巨大的变化,在实际操作过程中也积累了不少问题需要解决.文章围绕上市公司合并会计报表展开进一步讨论,首先分析了合并会计报表的相关理论,然后指出上市公司合并会计报表中存在的若干问题,最后提出了一些解决措施,以不断提高上市公司会计信息质量,从而促进我国上市公司稳步发展.     

我国交叉上市公司内部控制信息披露研究

在《企业内部控制配套指引》即将在我国交叉上市公司首先施行的背景下,本文研究了我国交叉上市公司内部控制信息披露的现状,分析了我国交叉上市公司内部控制信息披露存在的问题,并对完善我国上市公司内部控制信息披露提出了建议     

我国上市公司会计信息失真成因及对策研究

上市公司是推动我国国民经济发展的重要力量,因此上市公司的会计信息质量在很大程度上影响我国国民经济能否稳定发展。本文从可靠性、相关性和及时性分析上市公司会计信息的披露现状,阐述了导致我国上市公司会计信息失真的原因,并提出改进我国上市公司会计信息质量的对策。     

上市公司治理中独立董事与监事会角色定位分析

随着我国上市公司群体的扩大,上市公司治理问题成为影响我国资本市场发展的一个重要问题。独立董事制度的引入,强化了上市公司监管,对提高我国上市公司治理水平产生了良好的促进作用。但同时,同样担负监督职能的监事会如何发挥自身作用,在公司治理中处在什么地位,也引起了各方的争议。考察独立董事制度、监事会制度在国外公司治理实践中的作用,应在我国现有上市公司治理结构下明确独立董事与监事会的角色定位,以改善我国上市公司治理水平。     

关于提高上市公司融资效率的建议

我国资本市场的日益成熟为上市公司提供了多种融资方式,然而我国上市公司不合理的融资决策还普遍存在,如何提高上市公司融资效率具有理论及实践意义。笔者从分析影响上市公司融资效率的环节出发,认为完善上市公司治理结构是关键,并且相应为提高上市公司融资效率提出了几点建议。     

我国上市公司资本结构的影响因素分析

上市公司是重要的市场经济主体之一,在经济生活中备受人们的关注。而关于资本结构的决策一直是上市公司进行财务管理的核心,资本结构决策的好坏直接关系到上市公司的后续发展。本文分析了我国上市公司资本结构的现状,并结合资本结构的几个重要理论从内部和外部两方面阐述了影响我国上市公司资本结构的因素。根据我国上市公司资本结构的影响因素以及存在的问题,文章提出了几点优化上市公司资本结构的建议。     

我国上市公司资本结构的影响因素分析

上市公司是重要的市场经济主体之一,在经济生活中备受人们的关注。而关于资本结构的决策一直是上市公司进行财务管理的核心,资本结构决策的好坏直接关系到上市公司的后续发展。本文分析了我国上市公司资本结构的现状,并结合资本结构的几个重要理论从内部和外部两方面阐述了影响我国上市公司资本结构的因素。根据我国上市公司资本结构的影响因素以及存在的问题,文章提出了几点优化上市公司资本结构的建议。     

略论上市公司差异化监管的思路

我国传统的上市公司统一监管模式已不能适应社会经济发展的要求,上市资源的多元化、法律法规的非完备性、证券监管资源的有限性、上市公司之间的低水平均衡竞争等因素都要求对我国的上市公司进行差异化监管.本文分析了我国上市公司差异化监管的必要性,并提出我国上市公司差异化监管的思路与对策:上市公司差异化监管应从多层次、多角度展开实施;在对上市公司实施差异化监管后,应注意保持法律法规对放松监管后的上市公司的持续威慑力,同时,应加强对中介机构的监管.     

我国上市公司治理结构的问题及完善对策

目前我国的上市公司数量越来越多,这代表着我国社会经济的发展又上升到了一个新的高度,也说明我国的企业正处于蓬勃发展的最佳时期。但同时因为我国的市场经济正处于转型的关键时期,一些经济转型时期的问题也同样影响着我国上市公司的发展。现本文主要分析了我国上市公司治理结构中存在的主要问题,继而就其应对策略进行了探讨,以期为我国上市公司更好的发展提供一些参考。     

West meets east: Understanding managerial incentives in Chinese SOEs

State-owned enterprises (SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging. Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform.     

Openness,Ownership, and Regional Economic Growth in Vietnam

ABSTRACT

In this article, we examine the influences of exports, multinational corporations (MNCs), and the share of state-owned enterprise (SOE) production in regional economic growth in Vietnam for the years 1996–2006. Various estimations, without and with considering the endogeneity problem, confirm that exports and the presence of MNCs are influential factors on promoting economic growth. Crucially, provinces with a higher ratio of SOE production have experienced higher economic growth. However, the positive relationship between SOE share and economic growth should be carefully interpreted.     

Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.     

Government Affiliation and Peer-To-Peer Lending Platforms in China

With thousands of co-existing and competing platforms, the Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market experienced both high growth and high failure rate. We hand collect unique data for these P2P platforms and investigate the differences in performances and survivals for platforms with and without affiliations with state-owned enterprises (SOEs). P2P platforms with SOE affiliations have higher trading volumes, attract more investors, and offer lower interest rates. These platforms also survive significantly better than those without the SOE affiliations, especially during market downturns. Using P2P platforms with fake SOE affiliations as identification, we show that the SOE affiliation itself (not related to the fundamentals) is an important signal for P2P market participants. These results can be helpful to investors and regulators, especially those from other emerging markets.     

The impact of state ownership,formal institutions and resource seeking on acquirers’ returns of Chinese M&A

We examine the effects of state ownership, institutions and resource-seeking behavior on post-acquisition stock price returns of Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions over the period 1998–2008. Chinese acquiring firms experience negative returns ranging from 2.92 to 10.80 % in 12- and 60-month post-event periods, respectively. State ownership (SOE), interaction between R&D and SOE, formal institutional distance and acquirer size have a positive and significant impact on the long-term acquirer returns. However, the interaction between tangible resources and SOE and acquirer cash holdings appears to have a negative and significant impact on long-term returns. Overall, our results suggest that the state and institutions constitute important sources of long-term value creation for Chinese acquirers.     

Tracing back to the source: Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs

Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards. We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs: state involvement in ownership and market incentives. With the state involved in ownership, SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which results in an enhanced governance effect. Under market incentives, SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem (Type I agency problem) and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem (Type II agency problem). In terms of the governance effect of boards, directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems, and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs. Independent directors, especially those with a professional background, also play a role in improving corporate governance. However, independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor, which limits their governance effect. This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.     

China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China?s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.     

Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings

Exploiting the first default of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China, we analyze the role of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings. We consider two causes of implicit government guarantees. First, we suggest a “too big to fail” effect by revealing positive associations between credit ratings and issuer size, number of employees and taxes paid. Second, we propose a “government link” effect by showing positive associations between credit ratings and an issuer's state ownership, indicators for SOEs and central SOEs. Importantly, after the first SOE default, both dimensions of implicit government guarantees are weakened when explaining credit rating variations. Extending to analyses of yield spreads, we find that debt pricing relies more on credit ratings after the default event, consistent with bond investors weighing credit ratings more with weakened beliefs in implicit government guarantees. Collectively, our study proposes two dimensions of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings and shows how the initial SOE default significantly changes the role of such guarantees in credit ratings.     

Does Internal Corporate Governance Complement or Substitute for External Auditing? Evidence from China's Anti‐corruption Campaign

Two competing hypotheses have been developed for the relationship between internal corporate governance and external auditing. One proposes a complementary relationship, while the other suggests it is substitutable. This study takes advantage of China's recent anti‐corruption campaign as a quasi‐natural experiment to explore this relationship. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that, after the campaign, internal corporate governance improved more in SOEs (state‐owned enterprises) than in non‐SOEs. SOEs were less likely to choose Big 10 auditors after the campaign, while audit firms assigned less experienced auditors to their SOE client firms and charged lower audit fees. These effects were more pronounced in SOEs that exhibited greater improvement in corporate governance. Overall, we find the anti‐corruption campaign improved corporate governance in SOEs but, at the same time, reduced external audit quality, which supports the substitution view. We argue that this result might be driven by the fact that SOEs have limited demand for high‐quality accounting information because the Chinese government maintains strong control over the capital markets.     

增值税转型、产权特征与企业投资

以产权特征为视角,实证分析了增值税转型对不同企业的影响.研究发现:增值税转型增加了企业投资规模;国有企业投资规模显著高于民营企业;中央国企和地方国企投资均明显增加,二者差异在统计上不显著.政府干预程度较高地区的地方国企投资规模显著高于干预程度较低地区.此外,增值税转型使得国有企业长期回报率明显低于民营企业.