Wage-shifting effects of severance payments savings accounts in Colombia

In 1990, Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance payments with a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Although severance payments are often justified on the grounds that they provide insurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employers and distort employment decisions. The extent of these distortions depends largely on how much of the costs of severance pay can be shifted from employers to workers. One reason why the effects of severance pay may not be completely shifted is that workers may fear the firm will “take the money and run” by declaring bankruptcy. A system of SPSAs eliminates this moral hazard problem, so it should facilitate the shifting of severance payments' costs to workers in the form of lower wages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveys (NHS) indicate that the introduction of SPSAs lowered wages by between 60% and 80% of total severance payment contributions. These results are consistent with increased shifting after SPSAs were introduced.     

Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates,Bargaining, and Unions*

A substantial share of severance payments derives from private contracts or collective agreements. In this paper, we study the determination of these payments. We analyze joint bargaining over wages and severance payments in a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers. Individual bargaining results in levels of severance pay that provide full insurance, but also depend on unemployment benefits and job-finding rates. Unions also choose full insurance. Because their higher wage demands reduce job creation, this requires higher severance pay. Severance pay observed in eight European countries, to which we calibrate the model, lies between predictions from the bargaining and union scenarios.     

What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al.

In this study we examine the effect of severance pay on employment and unemployment, using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear’s [(1990) Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 699–726] dictum that severance payment requirements unfavorably impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimonious specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the positive effect of severance pay on unemployment garners some support, there is no real indication of adverse effects in respect of the other employment outcomes identified here, namely, the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and long-term unemployment. Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination, the role of institutions is also more muted than suggested in the literature. We thank, without implicating, an anonymous referee for most helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.     

Experience Rating versus Employment Protection Laws in a Model where Firms Monitor Workers*

While layoff costs in the U.S. are mostly due to experience‐rated unemployment insurance, layoff costs in European labour markets are primarily a consequence of employment protection laws. In this paper we compare the effects of experience rating and employment protection laws on employment and welfare in a model where unemployment arises due to efficiency wage setting and where labour turnover is inefficiently high. We show that a revenue‐neutral introduction of experience rating reduces labour turnover and increases employment and welfare. The introduction of employment protection laws may also reduce labour turnover but employment declines.     

Employment protection reform in search economies

The design of employment protection legislation (EPL) is of particular importance in the European debate on the contours of labor-market reform. In this article we appeal to an equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of EPL reform which reduces the red tape and legal costs associated with layoffs and introduces a U.S.-style experience-rating system, which we model as a combination of a layoff tax and a payroll subsidy. The reform considered shows that it is possible to improve the efficiency of employment protection policies without affecting the extent of worker protection on the labor market. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable, not only as an integral component of unemployment-compensation finance, as most studies acknowledge, but also as part and parcel of a virtuous EPL system.     

Severance Pay and Corporate Finance: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of Austrian and Italian Firms

This paper examines the empirical link between severance pay and corporate finance. Severance pay is an economic debt of the employer and hence should be taken into account by the market in its assessments of risk. Using a hand-collected dataset of accounting data from Italy and Austria we find there is only a limited relationship between severance pay and market risk indicators. This suggests that arguments that severance pay systems destroy corporate value may need to be reassessed.     

The internalization of externalities in the production of electricity: Willingness to pay for the attributes of a policy for renewable energy

This paper investigates the willingness to pay of a sample of residents of Bath, England, for a hypothetical program that promotes the production of renewable energy. Using choice experiments, we assess the preferences of respondents for a policy for the promotion of renewable energy that: (i) contributes to the internalization of the external costs caused by fossil fuel technologies; (ii) affects the short-term security of energy supply; (iii) has an impact on the employment in the energy sector; and (iv) leads to an increase in the electricity bill. Responses to the choice questions show that our respondents are in favour of a policy for renewable energy and that they attach a high value to a policy that brings private and public benefits in terms of climate change and energy security benefits. Our results therefore suggest that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for electricity in order to internalize the external costs in terms of energy security, climate change and air pollution caused by the production of electricity.     

Human capital,employment protection and growth in Europe

Using data for a large sample of manufacturing and service sectors in 14 EU countries, this paper shows that the value added and TFP growth rate differential between high and low human capital intensive industries is greater in countries with low than countries with high levels of employment protection legislation. We also find that such negative effect of EPL is slightly stronger for countries near the technology frontier, in the manufacturing sector and after the 1990s. We interpret these results suggesting that technology adoption depends on the skill level of the workforce and on the capacity of firms to adjust employment as technology changes: therefore, firing costs have a stronger impact in sectors where technical change is more skill-biased and technology adoption more important.     

GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX‐BASED PUBLIC PENSION REFORM*

This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which: (i) firms create emissions as by‐products of production; and (ii) tax revenue from the working young is transferred to the retired elderly as pay‐as‐you‐go pension benefits. The paper focuses on a replacement ratio, which measures the proportion of after tax work earnings replaced by the public pension, and considers a replacement ratio neutral reform in which the newly introduced environmental tax is devoted to cutting the social security tax, keeping the replacement ratio unchanged. It is shown that the reform may improve growth, environmental quality and the nonenvironmental utility of every generation.     

A natural experiment on sick pay cuts,sickness absence,and labor costs

This study estimates the reform effects of a reduction in statutory sick pay levels on sickness absence behavior and labor costs. German federal law reduced the legal obligation of German employers to provide 100% continued wage pay for up to six weeks per sickness episode. In 1996 statutory sick pay was decreased to 80% of foregone gross wages. Within the reform's target group – private sector employees – this measure increased the proportion of employees having zero days of absence between 6 and 8%. Quantile regression estimates indicate that employees with up to 5.5 annual absence days reduced their days of absence by about 12%. Extended analyses suggest that in industries that enforced the cut, behavioral effects were about twice as large. We show that the direct labor cost savings effect stemming from the cut in replacement levels clearly exceeds the indirect effect due to the decrease in absenteeism. Our calculations about the total decrease in labor costs are very much in line with official data which suggest that total employer-provided sick pay decreased by 6.7% or €1.7 billion per year.     

Staggered wages,unanticipated shocks and firms’ adjustments

This paper empirically investigates the employment and wage effects of contract staggering, i.e., the asynchronous and infrequent way in which wages adjust to changes in the economic environment. Using an identification strategy based on exogenous start dates of collective agreements around the Great Recession, we estimate the effect of increases in base wages on firms’ labor cost adjustments. Our analysis is based on a large employers-employees dataset merged to collective agreements in the Netherlands, a country in which collective bargaining is dominant and contract staggering is relatively pervasive. The main result is that staggered wage setting has no real effect on employment. We find significant employment losses only in sectors covered by contracts with much longer durations than those normally assumed in macroeconomic models featuring staggered wages. Instead, we show that firms adjust labor costs by curbing other pay components such as bonuses and benefits and incidental pay. The overall result supports the idea that wage rigidities are not the main source of employment fluctuations.     

就业保护与劳动力市场绩效——基于跨国面板数据的实证分析

本文采用世界经济自由度指数和世界银行的世界发展指标,选取2002-2008年面板数据对就业保护的理论假说和经验分析进行了相应的验证。实证结果表明,就业保护提高了失业率,女性和青年受就业保护制度的影响程度更大;就业保护子指标对失业率的影响与理论估计一致,但显著性较低。其中,雇佣/解雇管制越低,失业率越低;法定解雇成本越高,失业率越低;服兵役时间越长,失业率越高;最低工资、集体协商、工时管制与失业率之间没有显著关系。就业保护问题的研究有助于改进我国的劳动立法,改善女性、青年的就业机会,提高就业率,发挥法律的增进市场效率的作用,为完善劳动力市场的运行机制提供理论支持。     

Job search requirements for older unemployed: Transitions to employment,early retirement and disability benefits

We use a recent policy change in the Netherlands to study how changes in search requirements for the older unemployed affect their transition rates to employment, early retirement and sickness/disability benefits. The reform, becoming effective on January 1 2004, requires the elderly to formally report their job search efforts to the employment office in order to avoid a (temporary) cut in benefits. Before the new law was passed, unemployed individuals were allowed to stop all search activity at the moment they turned 57.5. Estimating various duration models using difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity approaches, we find that for several groups of individuals who are affected by the policy change, the stricter search requirements significantly increases their entry rate into employment. However, we also find evidence of a higher outflow to sickness/disability insurance schemes, a presumably unwanted side-effect of the policy change.     

The Austrian Severance Pay Reform: Toward a Funded Pension Pillar

With the beginning of 2003 a new severance pay scheme was introduced in Austria. The reform extends the coverage of the scheme to all employees, and moves it to full and enterprise external funding, but average payments will be lower than previously. This paper provides some evidence on two explicit aims of the reform, namely to generate more fairness in the distribution of severance payments among employees and the creation of a basis of the underdeveloped second pillar of the Austrian pension system. The empirical analysis based on a cross section of completed job spells of different durations indicates that differences in payments among groups will be stronger in the new scheme compared to the old system. Based on retirement income projections and simulations of a multi-pillar pension reform for the blue and white collar workers’ pension system, we conclude that, an increase of the contribution rate would be necessary to achieve a sufficient second pillar retirement income. Helpful comments by Milan Vodopivec and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Employment Hysteresis in an Overlapping-Generations Insider-Outsider Model

This paper shows, within an overlapping generations insider-outsider model, that, in the presence of training costs, there may be multiple employment equilibria. Adverse technology shocks may shift the system from 'high' to 'low' employment steady states. Restoration of the initial technological state does not always lead to the 'high' employment equilibrium being returned - the system may get 'stuck' in a 'low' employment state.     

Exchange Rate Movements and Unemployment in the EU Accession Countries—A Panel Analysis

According to the traditional “optimum currency area” approach, not much will be lost from a very hard peg to a currency union if there has been little reason for variations in the exchange rate. This paper takes a different approach, and highlights the fact that high exchange rate volatility may as well signal high costs for labor markets. The impact of exchange rate volatility on labor markets in the CEECs is put to the test, finding that volatility vis‐à‐vis the euro significantly increases unemployment. Hence, the elimination of exchange rate volatility could be considered as a substitute for a removal of employment protection legislation. However, labor market reform could be argued to be an equally worthy strategy, backed up by central bank independence and the adoption of an anti‐inflation monetary policy rule.     

Pareto-improving firing costs?

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage-smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments.     

CASELOAD IMPACTS OF WELFARE REFORM

A welfare reform demonstration program designed to reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recidivism through increased employment and training services resulted in significantly higher short-term caseload growth. Demonstration sites attracted proportionally more households onto assistance early in the demonstration than did comparison sites. These entrants tended to have more extensive previous employment histories. This result suggests that the demonstration attracted individuals who previously qualified for AFDC but did not apply for benefits and/or individuals who reduced their employment to qualify for AFDC. Exits from AFDC also were delayed under the demonstration, suggesting that the more intensive services provided through the demonstration required more time to complete. Finally, certain groups—nonwhites and those with language problems, for example—apparently avoided the demonstration by not migrating into demonstration sites or by migrating out of demonstration sites. These results have important implications for the likely costs of state welfare reform efforts under the Family Support Act of 1988 .     

Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice

We consider a monopoly physician offering free public treatment and, if allowed, a private treatment for which patients have to pay out of pocket. While patients differ in the propensity to benefit from private treatment it always yields better health outcomes than public treatment but is also more costly in terms of money and time. We study the physician's supply of private care and allocation of time costs across public and private patients and contrast these with the first‐best allocation. To increase the willingness‐to‐pay for private treatment the physician shifts time costs to public patients. While this turns out to be socially optimal, the resulting positive network effect leads to an over‐provision of private care if time costs are sufficiently high. A second‐best allocation arises when the health authority sets public reimbursement but has no control over private provision. Depending on the welfare weight the health authority attaches to physician profits, a ban of dual practice may improve on the second‐best allocation. Notably, a ban benefits not only public patients but also private patients with a moderate propensity to benefit from private care.     

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN HONG KONG

A respiratory health survey conducted in Hong Kong in 1989 identified significant health differences between school age children living in an industrial area with poor ambient air quality and those in a control group living in a relatively clean area. In 1990, the government banned the use of high sulphur fuel. As a result, ambient sulfur levels dropped sharply and particulate levels dropped moderately. The avoided costs of doctor consultations alone offset a moderate fraction of the costs of this air quality improvement. If even the lower end of estimates from elsewhere apply to Hong Kong's willingness to pay for symptom relief, such values offset a major share of the costs of the air quality improvement simply through near-term improvements in health. Considering longer-term health and other benefits leads one to conclude that the economic benefits likely far outweigh the costs.