THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PREVENTING RESPIRATORY AND CARDIOVASCULAR HOSPITALIZATIONS

This article provides estimates of the economic benefits of reducing respiratory and cardiovascular hospitalizations based on cost of illness and willingness to pay. The willingness-to-pay estimates indicate that individuals value prevention of a five-day hospitalization event at an average of approximately $2,400. Average total costs of illness per hospitalization are $22,000–39,000. A comprehensive cost-of-illness estimate that includes value of time losses for the hospitalization and at-home recovery periods provides a close approximation of total costs borne by third parties plus individual willingness to pay. Both exceed previous cost-of-illness estimates by about 10–25%. (JEL D61, I18, Q25 )     

AVERTING AND INSURANCE DECISIONS IN THE WILDLAND–URBAN INTERFACE: IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEY AND EXPERIMENTAL DATA FOR WILDFIRE RISK REDUCTION POLICY

When confronted by catastrophic wildfire risk, homeowners simultaneously allocate resources between insurance and averting activities. Expected utility theory suggests that complete insurance coverage precludes investment in averting activities. However, when potential losses include a significant nonmarket component, optimal choice includes both. To investigate this issue, the authors analyze a unique combination of contingent valuation and experimental data. Both settings include a split-sample treatment to test the influence of wildfire risk zone information. The authors find that amenity values, subjective risk, averting efficacy perception, and demographic factors influence both willingness to pay and averting share and that risk information has the predicted ordering effect. (JEL C9 , Q51 , Q54 )     

A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion

In this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a second‐degree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second‐degree price discrimination and from a third‐degree price discrimination and high willingness‐to‐pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability.     

Congestion,quality deterioration,and heterogeneous tastes

The problem of congestion is analyzed as a consumption externality in a model in which the market demand of consumers of facility services reflects heterogenous taste for congestion avoidance and individual willingness to pay is a function of the aggregate level of facility use. The analysis demonstrates that the Pareto optimal toll for facility use depends on the pattern by which congestion cost is distributed among facility users. In general, this optimal toll will deviate from that derived from the standard analysis.     

THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL SENTIMENTS: THE CASE OF ENVY

The widespread externality produced by the sentiment of envy is modelled in this paper. We show its specific structural properties, the conditions of its existence, the various reasons for its normative relevance, the basic tool of its analysis ("envy-free preferences") and its crucial relation with the property of equality of liberty ("equity"). We then show that the envy externality respects the efficiency of classical allocative processes in the relevant conditions (competitive markets with not too unequal incomes, cases with indivisibilities, equal-freedom individual choices, etc.). We in particular derive conditions of consistency between efficiency and the vanishing of the envy externality, as well as the effects of actual envy on "divide and choose" processes, preferences to reassignment, multidimensional maximin, "egalitarian equivalence", degrees of envy in society and the rationality of choices.     

Weak complementarity and production

This paper describes how weak complementarity, a common assumption to characterize consumer preferences for recovering measures of willingness to pay for nonmarketed environmental resources, can be used to evaluate the effects of pollution that may affect profits or costs. In such cases, pollution serves as an externality imposed by third parties on production activities.     

VALUATION OF WILDLIFE: REVISING SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SCOPE TESTS

In this article, we build on previous valuation studies to contribute to the understanding of preferences toward conservation of endangered species elicited via willingness to pay. In particular, we assess the effect of the existence of biological substitutes of local endangered species. We also incorporate biological concepts such as the minimum viable population level into the valuation scenario. Furthermore, the role of ethical and environmental beliefs and their relationship with preferences toward conservation levels are explored. Results are discussed and contrasted with previous studies . ( JEL Q2)     

ESTIMATING THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM BENEFITS OF LARGE CHANGES IN SPATIALLY DELINEATED PUBLIC GOODS*

The purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the general equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality. We estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios characterizing the availability of public goods within a system of communities. Welfare measures take into consideration the adjustments of households in equilibrium to nonmarginal changes in public goods. The framework is used to analyze willingness to pay for reductions in ozone concentrations in Southern California between 1990 and 1995.     

CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES, PREFERENCE CHANGES AND THE 'SAMARITAN'S DILEMMA'

This paper examines the desirability of an exogenously induced change in the preferences of individuals in an economy characterized by (i) asymmetrical, localized positive consumption externalities, (ii) private, non-market, negotiation-free transfers, and (iii) the ‘Samaritan's dilemma.’ A model is analysed in which a benefactor (individual 1) makes an unrestricted voluntary transfer to a beneficiary (individual 2) who ran use the transfer to increase 2's consumption of either a purely private good x or a good y that generates external benefits for 1. Once 1 makes a transfer to 2, 1 cannot control how 2 spends it. If 2 fails to take into account this externality, then good y is under consumed and a loss in social welfare results. When such externalities and their concomitant welfare losses arise, conventional solutions are frequently inappropriate, impractical or impossible. This power shows that exogenously inducing the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences by the benefactor and the beneficiary not only increases the benefactor's transfer and the beneficiary's consumption of good y but also produces a ‘socially superior’ state. The welfare improvement is measured in terms of a welfare criterion that is based on the initial and new preferences of each individual     

The Willingness to Accept Value of Statistical Life Relative to the Willingness to Pay Value: Evidence and Policy Implications

Large disparities between willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) based values of statistical life are commonly encountered in empirical studies. Standard economic theory suggests that if a public good is easily substitutable there should be no marked disparity between WTA and WTP values for the good, though the disparity increases with reduced substitutability. However, psychologists have shown that people often treat gains and losses asymmetrically and tend to require a substantially larger increase in wealth to compensate for a loss than the amount they would be willing to pay for an equivalent gain. Although most transport projects may aim to improve safety, situations arise when a relaxation of an existing regulation saves resources but increases the risk of death and injuries. A survey was recently carried out in New Zealand to determine people’s willingness to pay to reduce road risks and their willingness to accept compensation for an increase in risk. This paper reports the disparity observed between the two measures and considers some of the problems posed for policymakers.     

TRADEMARK SALES,ENTRY, AND THE VALUE OF REPUTATION*

We develop an infinite‐horizon, overlapping‐generations model of reputation in which consumers base willingness to pay for agent services on past performance summarized by a trademark. We show that when trademarks can be sold, successful firms capture the full value of their reputations upon sale but receive smaller premia for good performance while active as service providers. With discounting, all agents are worse off with trademark trade. Taking entry cost into account, we show that trademark trade typically reduces entry. When entry costs are high, welfare is increased by prohibiting such trade.     

Temporal insensitivity of willingness to pay and implied discount rates

A number of studies have defined and tested the temporal sensitivity of willingness to pay to payment schemes and the resulting implied discount rates for environmental projects. We demonstrate that those studies have imposed restrictive assumptions on the structure of the willingness to pay function and the underlying decision process. We investigate the temporal sensitivity of willingness to pay using a new temporal willingness to pay function applied to a proposed oyster reef restoration program. We find that (1) holding the length of the project constant, the temporal willingness to pay for the project is the same across different payment schemes, (2) temporal willingness to pay does not vary significantly across projects of varying lengths, and (3) estimated discount rates are low relative to previous studies, but vary significantly across payment schemes and project lengths.     

延长退休年龄还是增加缴费基数： 养老金改革的路径选择与政策效应*

随着人口老龄化加剧和预期寿命延长,我国养老保险体系面临预期养老金支付严重不足的挑战。本文基于总量视角建立基础养老金收支模型,利用中国人口预测数据,分别测算基于实施“延长退休年龄”和“增加缴费基数”两种不同的改革策略未来30年中国基础养老金的收支余额,并评估政策效果。研究结果表明,“推迟退休年龄”对缓解养老金基金支付压力作用明显,但存在增加就业压力等负外部性。“增加缴费人数”亦可以缓解养老金支付困境,且不存在负外部性,但推行时间缓慢,或将产生新的公共财政压力。     

Multicultural Evaluation of the Performance of Contingent Valuation for Forest Fire Prevention

This article evaluates the ability of contingent valuation to measure the benefits received by several ethnic groups from a prescribed burning forest fire reduction program similar to President Bush's Healthy Forest Initiative. Reasons for refusing to pay higher taxes for the prescribed burning program were not statistically different between African Americans, Hispanics, and whites. Mean willingness to pay of whites was $400, whereas for African Americans it was $505, but the difference is not statistically significant. The results suggest a substantial statewide willingness to pay by whites and African Americans for forest fuel reduction projects using prescribed burning in California. (JEL Q26 , Q23 , J15 )     

THE IMPACT OF BESTSELLER RANK ON DEMAND: EVIDENCE FROM THE APP MARKET*

This article uses daily data on the ranking by sales of the top 100 apps sold through Apple’s App Store to provide evidence of the causal impact of today’s bestseller rank information on tomorrow’s demand. The estimates indicate that the willingness to pay of consumers is about $4.50 greater for a top ranked app than for the same unranked app. The results also indicate that the effects of bestseller status on willingness to pay decline steeply with rank at the top ranks, but remain economically significant for the apps in the first half of the top 100 list.     

Reference Dependence Effects on WTA and WTP Value Functions and Their Disparity

In this study we investigate two reference dependence effects in a choice experiment. The first is the effect of the well-known distinction between gains and losses, the second is the effect of changing the reference value on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The latter has to our knowledge not been studied before. We hypothesize that there are differences between WTA and WTP, and that both value functions and their disparity are affected by the absolute value of the reference point. We test our hypotheses using a choice experiment with trade-offs between changes in flood probabilities and costs. The choice experiments elicit WTP and WTA, using two flood probability reference values, yielding four separate value functions. Our findings show that a substantial WTA–WTP disparity exists, and that this disparity increases when moving away from the reference point. Also, both WTA and WTP value functions are affected by the flood probability reference value, and the WTA–WTP disparity increases when the flood probability reference point increases. Both findings suggest that welfare effects caused by changes in public good provision depend not only on the direction of change (loss aversion), but also the reference value. Moreover, our results show that the latter effect is larger for losses than for gains. We introduce the concept of reference point updating as a possible explanation for these findings.     

Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime

The European Commission has recently invited national regulatory authorities to decrease access charges to the cost of an efficient operator. Some large operators warned regulators and users that cutting access charges could result in the US style business model, where mobile users pay for both making and receiving calls. I show that mobile operators charge for incoming calls when the access charge is below cost even if receivers can hang up. In such a case profits are neutral with respect to the level of the access charge. I further show that ‘bill and keep’ is a constrained social optimum when the call externality is strong, even if receivers pay and can hang up. Finally, I discuss the policy implications of these results.     

Versioning of information goods under the threat of piracy

The present study investigates the effects of piracy on the quality decisions of a firm that produces two versions of an information good: that is, one version for a consumer with a high willingness to pay and a second version for a consumer with a low willingness to pay. On the assumption that there is no quality difference between the original and the illegal copy and that the cost of the copy is constant across users, we show that the presence of piracy induces the firm to choose a lower level of quality of the former and a higher level of quality of the latter relative to decisions made in the absence of piracy. We also discuss policy implications concerning the socially optimal level of copyright protection.