企业成本控制存在的问题及应对策略

当下各个行业的利润空间被市场不断压缩,尤其是建筑行业的企业的利润不断被压缩,需要通过成本控制的方式来降低企业的运营成本,以此来保证企业利润空间的拓宽。随着建筑企业竞争的激烈,要想在建筑行业当中占据一席之地就必须要将成本控制工作落到实处,只有通过成本控制才能够将建筑企业降本增效的目标实现。但是企业成本控制是一项比较系统的工作,而且企业成本管理的缺失给成本控制埋下诸多困难,必须要对企业成本控制的问题进行深入分析,才能够帮助企业落实成本控制工作。通过成本控制可以促进企业成本管理的高效化,为企业发展奠定重要基础。     

论成本控制在旅游企业管理中的地位及作用

随着知识经济、网络经济时代的到来,旅游企业要想在激烈的市场竞争者生存和发展,除了要具备一套增产、高效能的创收方式外,亦要开源节流,加强成本控制。本文主要从成本的影响因素、成本控制的重要性以及具体的成本控制方式等几个方面论述成本控制在旅游企业管理中的地位及作用。     

加强H公司成本控制的探讨

如何有效地进行成本控制是永不过时的课题.本文从H公司这一实例着手,全面客观的分析了该公司目前成本控制管理状况,存在的问题并针对其成本控制管理采取相应改进措施.企业只有充分意识到成本控制管理的重要性,用科学发展的战略方法来指导、控制、降低成本,才能提高企业竞争力.     

试论买方市场下的成本管理

一、买方市场条件下,企业的成本控制要求与传统的成本管理系统的不足之处 传统成本控制中,企业成本控制的手段,主要针对于生产领域展开,把业务量（如产量）看作是唯一的成本动因（自变量）,至少认为它对成本分配起着决定性的制约作用.成本管理的中心思想是：产品单位成本越低越好,要不断扩大产量,通过单位产品固定成本的降低来降低产品单位成本.     

流程化推进银行运营管理

运营是商业银行存在发展的基础。而商业银行要在削减成本、提升服务、风险控制的基础上实现差异化竞争优势,就有必要用产业化、柔l生化和服务化的模式来重构运营管理体系。     

关于煤矿推行四级成本控制体系的探讨

市场经济条件下,一些煤矿推行四级成本控制体系来降低生产成本。笔者根据本矿实践从四级成本控制体系的基本原则、划分、职责及作用四方面来探讨四级成本控制体系。     

施工企业项目成本控制浅析

<正>一、施工企业项目成本控制中存在的问题(一)成本预测控制工作滞后,不适应市场发展的需要项目成本管理作为企业成本中心,要实施对成本的事前、事中和事后的全过程控制。施工前期要详细编制施工图预算、制定科学可行的成本控制计划,     

企业的目标成本控制

在市场经济条件下,产品制造行业的成本控制要遵循目标成本的规则来进行。目标成本控制从一开始就引入市场概念,注重外部环境和具有以占有市场份额为目的的产品发展前瞻性。实现成本控制的目的主要在企业内部管理中实现,最有效的做法是把所涉及的项目分门别类,然后有针对性地制订控制措施。     

财务管理与会计成本控制融合下的模式探究

从传统角度分析,企业会计成本控制的实施往往要依赖于工程技术领域的一些方法和手段,但是这些和手段的更新有着明显的周期性。由于会计控制关系着企业的生产与发展,要求不断提高会计成本控制水平以提高企业财务管理的整体水平,在工程技术革新的周期中应采用何种方式来实现这一目的呢?本文为了做到这一点,基于大量的文献资料扼要分析了财务管理和会计控制之间的融合性及两者之间的融合机制,以优化成本控制与管理效果。     

财务管理与会计成本控制融合下的模式探究

从传统角度分析,企业会计成本控制的实施往往要依赖于工程技术领域的一些方法和手段,但是这些和手段的更新有着明显的周期性。由于会计控制关系着企业的生产与发展,要求不断提高会计成本控制水平以提高企业财务管理的整体水平,在工程技术革新的周期中应采用何种方式来实现这一目的呢？本文为了做到这一点,基于大量的文献资料扼要分析了财务管理和会计控制之间的融合性及两者之间的融合机制,以优化成本控制与管理效果。     

Market Overreaction to Product Recall Revisited—The Case of Firestone Tires and the Ford Explorer

We revisit the issue of market reaction to product recall and evaluate the magnitude of market reaction to the news of recall. We also examine how the competitors' stock prices are affected by the product recall. Specifically, we evaluate the stock price effects of events relating to the recall of Firestone tires by the Bridgestone Corporation, which were linked to the rollover accidents of the Ford Explorer SUVs. Our results indicate that the initial loss in the market value both for the Bridgestone Corporation and Ford Motor Company was far in excess of direct costs associated with recall. The market losses are approximately equal to the near worst-case estimates of direct and indirect costs, litigation costs, regulation compliance costs and costs associated with future losses in sales. The firms recovered their market value as more information on actual costs became available. These results suggest that the market initially overreacts negatively to the recall news and this reaction is generally based on all potential losses associated with recall. This reaction is corrected as information on actual costs becomes available. With regard to the competitors, our results show that the major competitors in the tire and auto industries experienced a significant gain in the market value of their stocks probably because their products were substitutes for the products affected by recall.     

Dynamic auction environment with subcontracting

This article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction‐based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints. We demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation. Restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12% and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20%. The article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability.     

An examination of the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets for foreign firms

We examine whether voluntary deregistrations after the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) were intended to benefit common shareholders by avoiding firms’ costs of complying with SOX or to protect the control rents of managers or controlling shareholders (MCOs). We find that, compared with foreign firms that maintained their SEC registrations, foreign firms that voluntarily deregistered on average had weaker corporate governance, had a significantly less negative stock market reaction when SOX was passed, and suffered a significant price decline when they announced their decision to deregister. We also find evidence indicating that the deregistrations were (to a lesser extent) motivated by firms’ compliance costs related to SOX. Taken together, our results suggest that both agency costs (that is, private benefit of control of the MCOs) and the compliance cost of SOX play a role in motivating foreign firms to withdraw from the U.S. market.     

The determinants of debt maturity in Australian firms

We examine the determinants of debt maturity in the Australian capital market with the Top 400 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 1989–2006. We find that Australian firms not only exhibit a positive leverage–maturity relationship but also use short‐term debt to signal their high quality to the market. Our results are robust to different estimation methods that control for endogeneity and error‐dependence. We also find that ignoring the interaction between leverage and maturity can lead to erroneous conclusions about the support for the matching principle, the agency costs hypothesis and the transaction costs hypothesis.     

Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan

Many governments have perceived the rural moneylender as usurious.This article takes a first step toward directly testing thevalidity of this view. In a study of services, costs, and chargesof fourteen informal market moneylenders and their clients inChambar, Pakistan, the article examines whether the high implicitinterest rates charged reflect the actual costs of operatingin that market. Estimates of the resource costs incurred byinformal lenders for screening, pursuing delinquent loans, overhead,and cost of capital (including unrecoverable loans) suggestthat lenders' charges are equal to their average cost of lendingbut exceed their marginal cost. This finding is consistent withthe view that the informal credit market is characterized byexcess capacity and monopolistic competition in the presenceof imperfect information.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

透明度变化对股票市场投资者委托单提交行为和交易成本影响研究

基于2003年12月8日沪深交易所交易前市场透明度改革背景,本文利用一家营业部的投资者报价和交易数据,研究同一个机构投资者和散户投资者在透明度改革前后委托单提交激进程度的变化,以及这种变化对其完成交易的成本的影响。我们发现,透明度改革前后,机构投资者的委托单提交激进程度都显著大于散户投资者的委托单提交激进程度。透明度增加以后,机构投资者的委托单激进程度显著减少,而散户投资者的委托单提交激进程度增加。同时发现,透明度增加以后,机构投资者通过分拆委托单,增加交易次数,导致完成交易的时间增加,但价格影响力基本没有变化,散户投资者的成交时间和价格影响力有显著改善。     

Political activism,information costs,and stock market participation

This paper examines whether political activism increases people's propensity to participate in the stock market. Our key conjecture is that politically active people follow political news more actively, which increases their chance of being exposed to financial news. Consequently, their information gathering costs are likely to be lower and the propensity to participate in the market would be higher. We find support for this hypothesis using multiple micro-level data sets, state-level data from the US, and cross-country data from Europe. Irrespective of their political affiliation, politically active individuals are 9–25% more likely to participate in the stock market. Using residence in “battleground” states and several other geographic instruments, we demonstrate that greater political activism reduces information gathering costs and causes higher market participation rates. Further, consistent with our conjecture, we find that politically active individuals spend about 30 minutes more on news daily and appear more knowledgeable about the economy and the markets.     

Affirmative obligations and market making with inventory

Existing empirical studies provide little support for the theoretical prediction that market makers rebalance their inventory through revisions of quoted prices. This study provides evidence that the NYSE's specialist does engage in significant inventory rebalancing, but only when not constrained by the affirmative obligation to provide liquidity imposed by the Price Continuity rule. The evidence also suggests that such obligations are associated with better market quality, but impose significant costs on the specialist. The specialist mitigates these costs through discretionary trading when the rule is not binding. These findings shed light on how exchange rules affect market makers’ behavior and market quality.     

Dynamic portfolio optimization with liquidity cost and market impact: a simulation-and-regression approach

We present a simulation-and-regression method for solving dynamic portfolio optimization problems in the presence of general transaction costs, liquidity costs and market impact. This method extends the classical least squares Monte Carlo algorithm to incorporate switching costs, corresponding to transaction costs and transient liquidity costs, as well as multiple endogenous state variables, namely the portfolio value and the asset prices subject to permanent market impact. To handle endogenous state variables, we adapt a control randomization approach to portfolio optimization problems and further improve the numerical accuracy of this technique for the case of discrete controls. We validate our modified numerical method by solving a realistic cash-and-stock portfolio with a power-law liquidity model. We identify the certainty equivalent losses associated with ignoring liquidity effects, and illustrate how our dynamic optimization method protects the investor's capital under illiquid market conditions. Lastly, we analyze, under different liquidity conditions, the sensitivities of certainty equivalent returns and optimal allocations with respect to trading volume, stock price volatility, initial investment amount, risk aversion level and investment horizon.