Efficiency in Islamic vs. conventional banking: The role of capital and liquidity

We show that higher capital and liquidity ratios increase the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. Using conditional quantile regressions, we further show that the effect is stronger for highly efficient, small, highly liquid, and highly capitalized conventional banks. We also find that more capitalized and liquid banks were efficient during the 2008/2009 financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Our findings support the view that the constraints imposed by Shari'a law may widen the efficiency gap between the two bank types, at the expense of Islamic banks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the efficiency of conventional banks not only depends on bank capital and liquidity, but also on the level of bank efficiency while the relationship is inconclusive for Islamic banks. These findings provide insight into how capital and liquidity can shape bank efficiency. They suggest that higher capital and liquidity buffers serve a constraint on policymakers and may function very differently depending on the level of bank efficiency.     

Does better capitalization enhance bank efficiency and limit risk taking? Evidence from ASEAN commercial banks

This paper assesses the dynamic causal relationships among bank risk, capital, and efficiency. Using a panel dataset of commercial banks in five ASEAN countries from 2005 to 2015, we employ panel vector autoregression analysis to take into account the endogeneity and interdependencies of these three variables while holding other shocks constant. We find that in general, better capitalized banks in ASEAN countries are more efficient and take less credit risk. However, high-efficiency banks tend to maintain low levels of capital, whereas low-efficiency banks have higher capital ratios. We also analyze the sensitivity of the relationships among capital, risk, and efficiency to ownership structure, bank size, and the periods before and after the 2008 crisis.     

Efficiency in the Vietnamese banking system: A DEA double bootstrap approach

This study analyses bank efficiency in Vietnam from 1999 to 2009. We use a unique data sample that allows us to capture the development of the Vietnamese banking sector over the last decade. We apply an advanced methodological approach introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) to examine bank efficiency in Vietnam. An integral part of the analysis is to explore the determinants of bank efficiency. The results indicate that large and very large banks are more efficient than small and medium sized banks with small banks having the lowest efficiency scores in the system. Non-state owned commercial banks are more efficient than state owned commercial banks assuming overall efficiency. We also argue that banks with large branch networks and those that have been in existence for a long time are less efficient than other banks.     

Efficiency and risk in European banking

We assess the inter-temporal relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in a sample of European commercial banks employing several definitions of efficiency, risk and capital and using the Granger-causality methodology in a panel data framework. Our results suggest that lower bank efficiency with respect to costs and revenues Granger-causes higher bank risk and that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements. We also find that more efficient banks eventually become better capitalized and that higher capital levels tend to have a positive effect on efficiency levels. These results are generally confirmed by a series of robustness tests. The results have potentially important implications for bank prudential supervision and underline the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains to support financial stability objectives.     

Are Differences in Acquiring Bank Profit Efficiency Priced in Financial Markets?

We analyze 271 bank mergers for 1986–2001 to attempt to determine if differences among acquirers in profit efficiency are priced in financial markets. We find that the acquirer’s pre-merger profit efficiency (as well as its experience in handling other mergers) has positive effects on the wealth of the acquiring bank’s shareholders. We also find that more profit efficient acquiring banks produce lower abnormal returns for the target, suggesting that well managed (i.e., more profit-efficient) banks are less likely to overpay when they enter into a merger agreement. Financial market participants apparently take something akin to the econometric concept of profit efficiency into account when they make decisions about bank stock purchases and sales around merger announcement dates.      

Bank globalization and efficiency: Host- and home-country effects

Analyzing 126 countries for 1995–2013, we investigate the link between bank globalization and efficiency from the perspective of both host and home countries. We find strong and consistent evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with lower efficiency in host countries (host-country effect), while foreign expansion in the banking sector improves the efficiency of banks at home (home-country effect). We further observe that the effect of bank globalization is dependent on the regulatory and institutional regimes of the respective host (home) countries. Specifically, stringent activity restrictions, tight supervision, fewer limitations on foreign banks, lower market entry barriers, and less government interference all help mitigate the efficiency loss from foreign bank entry. Less supervision power, multiple supervisors, more restrictions on foreign banks, and a competitive banking market are all conducive to the higher efficiency gain of incumbent domestic banks from the respective country’s outward investments in the banking sector. Moreover, we find that the adverse impact on efficiency from foreign bank presence is less pronounced for less risky, more profitable, and larger banks, while banks that are more efficient, more profitable, taking on more risk, and/or smaller gain more efficiency from their country’s foreign expansion.     

Bank performance,efficiency and ownership in transition countries

Using data from 1996 to 2000, we investigate the effects of ownership, especially by a strategic foreign owner, on bank efficiency for eleven transition countries in an unbalanced panel consisting of 225 banks and 856 observations. Applying stochastic frontier estimation procedures, we compute profit and cost efficiency taking account of both time and country effects directly. In second-stage regressions, we use the efficiency measures along with return on assets to investigate the influence of ownership type. With respect to the impact of ownership, we conclude that privatization by itself is not sufficient to increase bank efficiency as government-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than domestic private banks. We find that foreign-owned banks are more cost-efficient than other banks and that they also provide better service, in particular if they have a strategic foreign owner. The remaining government-owned banks are less efficient in providing services, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the better banks were privatized first in transition countries.     

Examining the Relationships between Capital,Risk and Efficiency in European Banking

This paper analyses the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 2000. In contrast to the established US evidence we do not find a positive relationship between inefficiency and bank risk‐taking. Inefficient European banks appear to hold more capital and take on less risk. Empirical evidence is found showing the positive relationship between risk on the level of capital (and liquidity), possibly indicating regulators' preference for capital as a mean of restricting risk‐taking activities. We also find evidence that the financial strength of the corporate sector has a positive influence in reducing bank risk‐taking and capital levels. There are no major differences in the relationships between capital, risk and efficiency for commercial and savings banks although there are for co‐operative banks. In the case of co‐operative banks we do find that capital levels are inversely related to risks and we find that inefficient banks hold lower levels of capital. Some of these relationships also vary depending on whether banks are among the most or least efficient operators.     

Market discipline and bank efficiency

This paper investigates whether depositors and market investors exert disciplinary pressure on bank management in terms of efficiency improvement. We find that banks with more outstanding deposits are more cost-efficient, although little effect is found with respect to profit efficiency. This implies that depositors, the primary providers of funds to banks, likely play an important role in disciplining bank management, at least in terms of enforcing efficient use of inputs. Market discipline has garnered increasing attention as a mechanism to ensure bank soundness. Our results imply that depositors, the largest creditors to banks, may be of primary importance in this mechanism.     

Is cloud computing the digital solution to the future of banking?

This study investigates the impact of banks’ strategic move to cloud computing on bank performance and risk-taking. Based on a novel index of banks’ exposure to cloud computing, we find that banks’ adoption of cloud computing is associated with lower cost efficiency, higher profit efficiency, and greater operational risk using data on Chinese banks over the period 2008–2019. We also find that cloud computing interacts with other newly emerging technologies, leading to synergy gains in cost efficiency and operational risk control but with a substitutive effect on profit efficiency from blockchain. The findings are of timely policy importance and practical relevance for regulators, policy-makers, and bank managers.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.     

Are Banks Affiliated with Bank Holding Companies More Efficient Than Independent Banks? The Recent Experience Regarding Japanese Regional BHCs

Few studies have investigated whether Japanese banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more efficient and profitable than independent banks. The present paper tests this hypothesis by using both a stochastic frontier approach and a market valuation approach. First, our results suggest that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are not more cost-efficient than are independent banks. Because of the brief history of Japanese BHCs, it is fair to conclude that the formation of regional bank holding companies has not achieved efficiency gains so far. Second, we find that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more profit-efficient than are independent banks. This is particularly apparent when the establishment of the bank holding companies increases market power in regional markets. This supports the Financial Services Agency’s policy to increase the profitability of regional banks through bank consolidation. Finally, based on standard event study methodology, we find that the market did not regard news about the establishment of bank holding companies as significant events.JEL Classification: G21     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

Foreign bank entry,deregulation and bank efficiency: Lessons from the Australian experience

This study considers the impact of foreign bank entry on banking efficiency in Australia during the post-deregulation period 1988–2001. Using Data Envelopment Analysis, Malmquist Indices and stochastic frontier analysis, we find foreign banks more efficient than domestic banks, which however did not result in superior profits. Major Australian banks have used size as a barrier to entry to new entrants. Furthermore, bank efficiency has increased post-deregulation and the competition resulting from diversity in bank types was important to prompt efficiency improvements. Finally, the recession of the early 1990s resulted in a distinct shift in the process of efficiency changes.     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries

To investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries, we take the largest banks in six relatively advanced countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Income and balance sheet characteristics and efficiency measures computed from stochastic frontiers are compared across four bank ownership types. Our empirical results support the hypotheses that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and government-owned banks are least efficient. In addition, the importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process is confirmed. However, counter to the conjecture that foreign banks cherry pick the most profitable opportunities, we find that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing fee-for-service business. Finally, we show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to performance; specifically, voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks, even though we find no evidence of a selection effect.     

Bank ownership and efficiency in China: What will happen in the world’s largest nation?

China is reforming its banking system, partially privatizing and taking on minority foreign ownership of three of its dominant “Big Four” state-owned banks. This paper helps predict the effects by analyzing the efficiency of Chinese banks over 1994–2003. Findings suggest that Big Four banks are by far the least efficient; foreign banks are most efficient; and minority foreign ownership is associated with significantly improved efficiency. We present corroborating robustness checks and offer several credible mechanisms through which minority foreign owners may increase Chinese bank efficiency. These findings suggest that minority foreign ownership of the Big Four will likely improve performance significantly.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

IMF Bank-Restructuring Efficiency Outcomes: Evidence from East Asia

We report new findings on bank efficiency in East Asian countries for the pre- and post-IMF restructuring periods. We find that bank efficiency has improved, but only to the pre-IMF intervention level, and that restructured banks are not more efficient than their unrestructured counterparts. Different restructuring measures have different effects. Bank closures are economically justified, but mergers show short-term efficiency losses. Recapitalization and reprivatization of badly performing banks lead to efficiency improvement, but also increase government ownership. Ease of entry that has allowed for more foreign bank participation results in slightly improved performance of badly performing banks.

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.