Preference for bid time in hybrid auctioned IPOs: Evidence from China

Using comprehensive bidding data of 783 Chinese IPOs from June 2009 to November 2012, we investigate institutions’ preference for bid time in hybrid auctions. We find that (1) earlier bids are associated with higher pricing errors, which is more pronounced in IPOs with greater uncertainty; (2) the bid prices of earlier bids tend to be aggressively high; (3) earlier bids are associated with fewer bid shares and allocations; (4) bidders submitting earlier bids (hereafter, earlier bidders) have inferior profits; and (5) earlier bidders show persistence in bid time. Overall, the empirical results remain robust after controlling for unobserved bidder-underwriter relationships and indicate that earlier bidders tend to be less informed. Our findings reveal and highlight the effect of bid time on identifying informative bids in hybrid auctions.     

Electricity Auctions

This article examines auctions in the electricity industry. We find that the laws of physics that rule power transmission networks defeat ex post productive efficiency: the cheapest combination of generating plants is not always selected, not even in the optimal auction. Furthermore, neither the pay-your-bid nor the uniform-price auction coincides in general with the optimal auction, nor do they yield productive efficiency. Our analysis also sheds light on behavior observed in existing power markets, and leads to policy recommendations. First, producers protected by transmission constraints must see their bids capped in the short run to curb their ability to extract large rents. Second, producers apparently hurt by the unavailability of transmission capacity may benefit from it. Hence, contrary to common wisdom, policy makers cannot rely on them to finance or advocate transmission expansion.     

The location of initial public offering headquarters: An empirical examination

We study the headquarters location of U.S. firms with an initial public offering (IPO) over the 2001–2011 period. Specifically, we examine IPO intensity, defined as IPOs in a state scaled by state population. We find that IPO intensity is positively related to various measures of education. We also find that IPO intensity is positively related to an economic climate (freedom) index, degree of urbanization, and whether a state contains a financial center. Some economists see IPOs as a driver of economic growth. Thus, our results suggest factors that government officials may consider to increase the number of IPOs headquartered in their states.     

Founders' Characteristics,Venture Capital Syndication and Governance in Entrepreneurial IPOs

Using a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France this paper examines links between founders' characteristics, venture capital (VC) syndication and the development of effective boards in entrepreneurial firms. It argues that VC-backed IPOs suffer from two sets of agency problems which are related to principal-agent and principal-principal relationships between the founders and members of the VC syndicate. The empirical evidence shows that there is a curvilinear relationship between the intensity of founders' external ties and VC syndication. Founders' retained share ownership is negatively associated with VC syndication. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher involvement of passive private equity firms and “business angels” investing alongside VC firms, both in terms of their number and equity presence. VC-syndicated IPOs have more independent boards than IPOs with no VC involvement. Board independence is negatively associated with founders' retained equity. These results are consistent with the assumption that board independence is used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement in IPO firms. Our findings also identify significant differences in governance characteristics between the UK and France. While French IPOs have less independent boards, they involve more VC backing in general and syndicated VC funding in particular, than UK IPOs.     

Factors affecting secondary share offerings in the IPO process

We investigate whether the sale of secondary shares in the IPO process is affected by an issuing firm's market-timing and window-dressing activities. We find that secondary share offerings in IPOs exhibit positive autocorrelation, and the positive autocorrelation is mainly affected by the overall stock market return. Similar to the IPO wave, this finding suggests that favorable market conditions attract existing pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares in IPOs and cause the clustering of secondary share offering in IPOs. In addition, we find that window dressing has a significant effect on both the probability of secondary share offering and the proportion of secondary shares offered in an IPO. The result is robust after controlling for firm age, industry affiliation, and other factors. Our result also indicates that the number of firms offering secondary shares in IPOs, the probability of secondary share offerings, and the proportion of secondary shares offered in IPOs are significantly lower in the Internet bubble period.     

The day of the week effect in IPO initial returns

Monday IPOs occur infrequently and have higher mean initial returns than those issued on other days. The latter result is not a product of outliers or penny stocks and remains after controlling for factors related to IPO underpricing. The Monday effect is generally robust across time, but during 1995–2003 is present only in IPOs with their first reported trade on their offer date. Volume patterns suggest Monday IPOs come to market later in the day, which has been linked to higher initial returns. We argue that the observed patterns are consistent with the incentives of underwriters and investors.     

Diamonds in the rough: The value of scouting for early-stage funding

IPOs of small early-stage companies have largely declined in the last few decades. Governments and exchanges have responded with new regulations to encourage access for small firms to public markets. Critics caution, however, that lower standards for going public may be worse for investors. In this paper, we document one exchange’s approach to encourage small IPOs: founders establish shell companies through which to scout and promote funding of early-stage companies. We find that founders earn compensatory returns for their search role, and that the average long-term performance of these companies is similar to that of small conventional IPOs, underscoring that conventional IPOs may fail to identify or screen companies of similar quality asymmetrically. Consistent with prior literature on small IPOs, the long-term post-IPO performance of both the conventional and alternative funding processes are highly right-skewed and poor, on average, but not statistically different.     

Calibration of a model of declining prices in cattle auctions

Using data from dairy cattle auctions plus independent appraisals of the cattle sold, this paper is able to verify the existence of the “declining price anomaly”: prices decline over the course of the auction, with the main decline occurring towards the end of the day. We show that the data are consistent with a simple model of sequential auctions of goods with independent values, and examine distributions which replicate the important features of the data. The crucial feature driving the price declines in the model is a limited capacity for purchases by the participants in the auction, which in turn decreases competition for the final units in the auction.     

Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders

We study a keyword auction model where bidders have constrained budgets. In the absence of budget constraints, Edelman et al. (Am Econ Rev 97(1):242–259, 2007) and Varian (Int J Ind Organ 25(6):1163–1178, 2007) analyze “locally envy-free equilibrium” or “symmetric Nash equilibrium” bidding strategies in generalized second-price auctions. However, bidders often have to set their daily budgets when they participate in an auction; once a bidder’s payment reaches his budget, he drops out of the auction. This raises an important strategic issue that has been overlooked in the previous literature: Bidders may change their bids to inflict higher prices on their competitors because under generalized second-price, the per-click price paid by a bidder is the next highest bid. We provide budget thresholds under which equilibria analyzed in Edelman et al. (Am Econ Rev 97(1):242–259, 2007) and Varian (Int J Ind Organ 25(6):1163–1178, 2007) are sustained as “equilibria with budget constraints” in our setting. We then consider a simple environment with one position and two bidders and show that a search engine’s revenue with budget constraints may be larger than its revenue without budget constraints.     

Learning through Simultaneous Play: Evidence from Penny Auctions

This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all‐pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning effects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid‐level information, we find that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders suffer from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Although we do find that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more effective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing toward bidders earning higher individual surpluses.     

Productivity,price recovery,capacity constraints and their financial consequences

Mining and fishing are both extractive industries, although one resource is renewable and the other is not. Miners and fishers pursue financial objectives, although their objectives may differ. In both industries financial performance is influenced by productivity and prices. Finally, in both industries capacity constraints influence financial performance, perhaps but not necessarily through their impact on productivity, and both industries encounter external as well as internal capacity constraints. In this study we develop an analytical framework that links all four phenomena. We use return on assets to measure financial performance, and our analytical framework is provided by the duPont triangle. We measure productivity change in two ways, with a theoretical technology-based index and with empirical price-based indexes. We measure price change with empirical quantity-based indexes. We measure internal capacity utilization by relating a pair of output quantity vectors representing actual output and full capacity output, and we develop physical and economic measures of internal capacity utilization. We also show how external capacity constraints can restrict the ability to reach full capacity output. The analytical framework has productivity change, price change and change in capacity utilization influencing change in return on assets.     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Analysis of capacity constraints on the backlog bullwhip effect in the two-tier supply chain: a Taguchi approach

This paper investigates the impact of capacity constraints and safety stock on the backlog bullwhip effect in a model of a two-tier supply chain. One of the most commonly applied methodologies to study the various aspects of the Beer Game model is the control theoretic technique. It is clear that these control theoretic models are linear and cannot deal with non-linearities, such as capacity constraints. Thereafter, simulation experiments together with Taguchi design of experiments are performed to study non-linear impacts of capacity constraints in a two-tier supply chain. This research gives supply chain operations’ managers and designers a practical way to develop a trade-off between capacity and safety stock at different echelons and to take better decisions about their capacity and safety stocks. Future work should investigate the total cost implications of capacity constraints and safety stocks in a multi-echelon supply chain.     

Informational externalities of initial public offerings: Does venture capital backing matter?

We examine the role of venture capital backing on informational externalities generated by IPO firms. Theoretical models predict that going public firms generate positive externalities creating a spillover effect for other firms to go public. In this paper, we posit that venture backed IPOs convey positive information about industry and this information is transferred to rival firms. We also hypothesize that intra-industry information transfer varies with rivals’ characteristics and IPO price revisions generate additional information that affects rivals’ valuation. The results show that rivals have positive valuation effects in response to venture backed IPOs and no significant reaction in response to non-venture backed IPOs. We find evidence that the effect on rival firms is stronger if they operate in less concentrated industries and have high growth opportunities. The larger the IPO proceeds, the higher the magnitude of rivals ‘valuation effects. Positive (negative) information revealed in the form of upward (downward) price revisions significantly impacts rivals’ reaction in response to venture backed IPOs.     

Financial contracts as coordination device

We study the use of financial contracts as bid‐coordinating device in multi‐unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the “volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.     

Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format

We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second-price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders’ strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of the original game. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies and their behavior as the degree of asymmetry increases. Finally, we compare the revenues at the optimal auction, the first-price auction and the second-price auction.     

(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)

This comment revisits Chung and Ely (Rev Econ Stud 74:447–476, 2007) in which robustly optimal auctions where investigated. Chung and Ely used a maxmin approach to define robust optimality. Chung and Ely provided conditions under which dominant strategy auctions are robustly optimal in their sense. This comment proposes a refinement of Chung and Ely’s criterion and shows that, with this refined criterion, dominant strategy auctions are not optimal if there are at least three bidders. According to the refinement the auctioneer should not choose dominated auctions, that is, auctions for which there exist other mechanisms that never generate lower expected revenue, and sometimes higher expected revenue. We construct such a dominating mechanism for dominant strategy auctions. The construction exploits the possibility of side bets when beliefs are not derived from common priors. Chung and Ely (Rev Econ Stud 74:447–476, 2007) admitted such beliefs.     

Anticipation of Auction Fever: Entry Decision,Reserve Price and the Choice of Auction Design

This paper analyzes the entry decision of rational bidders who expect to experience auction fever in English auctions. It shows that nonparticipation decision reduces seller's expected profit and this effect may outweigh the positive effect of the auction fever. We analyze the choice between English and second‐price sealed‐bid auctions and the optimal reserve price in English auctions. We show that it might be optimal for the seller to set a reserve price below her own valuation of the object. Finally, we show that the order in which bidders place their bids matters and the first bidder always has an advantage. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are venture capitalist-backed IPOs more innovative? Evidence from an emerging market

This study examines whether venture capital (VC)-backed IPOs are more innovative than otherwise equivalent non-VC-backed IPOs. Using manually collected R&D records from annual reports and patent data from the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office (CSIPO) from 2007 to 2012, we find that VC-backed IPOs have higher R&D expenditures and more patents granted in the three years after IPOs. More specifically, they have more invention, application, and design patents in post-IPO. We use a two-stage instrumental variable, propensity score matching, difference-in-differences approach to mitigate selection biases and find our results to be consistent with our hypothesis. We conclude that VCs can positively influence IPO firms to increase R&D expenditures and innovative output levels in China. In addition, we document that the government ownership adversely affects innovation of VC-backed firms. Policy implications are discussed.     

Valuation uncertainty and IPOs: Investment bank versus commercial bank underwriters

This paper tests commercial bank underwriting for the existence of a conflict of interest versus a certification role. Our tests compare samples of equity IPOs underwritten by both commercial and investment banks. We examine the degree of asymmetric information present in the market for these issues by examining their microstructure trading characteristics. Our results show that greater information asymmetry is present in the after-market when a commercial bank acts as underwriter. The asymmetry resolves itself as the market learns more about each issue, deciding which ones may have involved a conflict. This is consistent with greater uncertainty about the value of commercial-bank-underwritten IPOs, and is also consistent with the market perceiving a possible conflict of interest on the part of commercial banks.