Controller changes and auditor changes

Using listed companies in China’s A-share market from 1997 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship between controller changes (including changes in controlling shareholders, directors and CEOs) and auditor changes. The empirical evidence indicates that controller changes are positively related to auditor changes and that auditor changes are more likely if there are extensive controller changes. For companies in which both the controlling shareholder and the auditor change, if the successor controlling shareholder is controlled by an other-province government, the auditor is more likely to be replaced and the successor auditor is more likely to be a smaller auditor from the same province as the new controlling shareholder.     

Voluntary disclosure of reasons for auditor changes and the capital market reaction to information disclosure

This study examines the association between firm attributes and management’s voluntary disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor changes and evaluates the capital market reaction to information disclosure of the auditor change events accompanied by preexisting red flag and non-red flag issues. We find that managers are more likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes occurred because of benign business reasons or if the reasons do not indicate the presence of any underlying operating or financial reporting problem. On the other hand, managers are less likely to disclose the reason(s) for auditor changes when those changes are preceded by red-flag situations. Furthermore, auditor changes accompanied by preexisting red-flag situations are viewed negatively by the capital market, implying that the full disclosure of reasons for auditor changes is informative to investors. This observation is supported further by our market-based analyses, which consistently show that auditor changes accompanied by prevailing red flag issues are valued incrementally in the market above and beyond the reportable events (under FRR No. 31) and auditor-initiated changes. The study contributes to the recent policy debate related to mandating the disclosure of the reason(s) for auditor switches. Specifically, the results support the recent debates that the current voluntary disclosure regime results in selective disclosure practices that are likely to contribute to the general lack of transparency with respect to auditor changes.     

An empirical investigation of the impact of audit and auditor characteristics on auditor performance

We use a unique and confidential database of 15,392 tax audits performed by the Croatian Tax Administration during the 2002–2006 period to examine the impact of task complexity, auditor experience, and auditor effort on audit performance. We provide external validation to prior experimental and analytical research showing that task complexity decreases while auditor experience and effort increase audit performance. We also extend this literature by examining the roles of task complexity and experience in moderating the impact of the effort on audit performance. We find that task complexity mitigates, while experience enhances the positive relationship between auditor effort and performance. However, we also find that auditor experience reinforces the positive effect of auditor effort on performance to a greater degree when complexity is high. Taken together, our findings provide new evidence on how audit and auditor characteristics impact audit performance, and new insight into how task complexity and auditor experience separately and jointly moderate the impact of auditor effort on performance.     

Foreign ownership and auditor choice

We take advantage of the unique institutional background of the B-share stock market in China to explore the impact of foreign investors on auditor choice. Our results show that the percentage of B-share firms audited by Big 4 auditors has decreased with both economic and statistical significance since the segmented B-share market was opened to domestic investors in 2001. We find that the negative effect of opening the B-share market on demand for high audit quality is more pronounced for firms with greater decreases in foreign ownership and for firms with strong incentives to be opaque, such as those in a weak institutional environment, firms with more “other receivables,” firms with more related-party transactions, and firms with political connections. Additional analysis shows that our results are not driven by the concurrent decline in capital-raising activities in the B-share market.     

Educational interventions for teaching the new auditor independence rules

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought sweeping changes to the accounting profession. One important mandate was for the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to strengthen the rules of auditor independence. To meet its legal responsibility, the SEC issued Final Rule No. 68 [United States Securities and Exchange Commission (USSEC) (2003). Final Rule 68: Strengthening the commission’s requirements regarding auditor independence. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [Issue Date: January 28, 2003 (www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm and Retrieval Date: January 25, 2004)]], thereby adopting new independence rules for auditors of public companies.     

Consulting revenue sharing,auditor effort and independence,and the regulation of auditor compensation

The joint provision of audit and non-audit services by audit firms to their audit clients has posed a threat to auditor independence. To mitigate the independence problem, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a regulation (SEC, 2003) that prohibits audit partners from receiving compensation for the sale of non-audit services to their audit clients. This study examines the effects of this regulatory change on the effort and reporting decisions of audit partners. We show that partners in an audit firm strategically change the firm’s liability-sharing rule. As a consequence, the regulation restores truthful reporting but has an undesirable negative effect on audit effort. The effect of the regulation on the welfare of the economy (defined as the total payoff to both audit firms and their clients) hinges on the tradeoff between the benefit of the regulation, which is derived from the inducement of truthful reporting, and the cost of the regulation, which results from less diligent audit work. We show that the regulation is more likely to increase the welfare in a strong legal regime (where the legal liability cost of auditor litigation is high) than in a weak legal regime.     

Legal systems and auditor independence

This paper examines whether an appropriate legal system, which is a combination of a legal regime and a damage apportionment rule, effectively enhances auditor independence. Economic and psychological hypotheses derived from a one-period game model in which the auditor may commit either a technical audit failure (resulting from the auditor’s inability to detect true output given a lack of audit effort) or an independence audit failure (resulting from the auditor’s intentional misreporting on false output) are tested. Three major findings are documented. First, auditor independence affects firm investment, which in turn affects audit effort. Under this strategic dependence, no single legal system can provoke audit effort, improve auditor independence, and encourage firm investment simultaneously. To enhance auditor independence and motivate investment, a legal system consisting of both a strict regime and a proportionate rule is preferred. Second, the strict regime induces more auditor independence than the negligence regime, while the proportionate rule induces higher audit effort than the joint-and-several rule. Finally, auditors’ moral reasoning and penalty for misreporting are both positively associated with their independence. In addition, the effect of moral reasoning on auditor independence diminishes as the level of penalty increases. These two results hold only when the legal systems that auditors face are considered.     

The meaning of a defined accounting concept: regulatory changes and the effect on auditor decision making

Accounting standards exist in an attempt to “standardize” accounting practice. These standards contain definitions of accounting concepts whose function is to guide judgments made in practice. However, such judgments can have a major impact on a firm's externally reported accounting numbers, as their inherent subjectivity and discretion may be lent to the manipulation of earnings. This study provides empirical evidence of the effect of measured meaning on an accounting judgment, in the context of regulated changes to the definition of one key accounting concept used in measuring operating income. The extraordinary items classification decisions made by auditors were found to be systematically associated with differences in measured meaning of the extraordinary items definition. The study has important policy implications for accounting standard-setting.     

Third-party auditor liability and financial restatements

We examine whether U.S. state-level third-party auditor liability (TPAL) regimes affect firms' financial restatement decisions. Using a sample of 34,409 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2018, we find that state-level TPAL is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of firm-level financial restatements. We also observe that the negative relationship between TPAL and financial restatements persists for a subsample of firms with income-increasing financial restatements and the ‘restatement of torts standard’ (one of the more expansive subgroups of TPAL). Using a difference-in-differences regression design, we find that an increase in state-level TPAL regimes strengthens the negative relationship between TPAL and the incidence of restatements. Our main finding remains robust across several sensitivity tests. Finally, we find that the negative relationship between TPAL and restatements is more pronounced when firms are subject to greater litigation risk and when firms are audited by non-specialist auditors. Overall, we show that TPAL has important implications for client firms' financial restatements.     

The market reaction to auditor resignations

Under UK company law, external auditors who resign must warn shareholders and creditors of any matter that ought to be brought to their attention. Auditor resignations and the subsequent change in auditor are informative corporate events. Resignation from office is likely to be a costly signal for the audit firm, particularly when the client is a quoted company. Our analysis of daily data suggests that there is a negative reaction to the auditor resignation on the date of the resignation letter, even though very few auditors indicate there were problems of which the shareholders and creditors should be made aware. This provides backing for the statutory rules on disclosure of the auditor resignation. We also find that the extent of the market reaction on the day of the resignation is related to the size of the resigning audit firm.     

UK investors’ perceptions of auditor independence

The auditor’s role in society is that of validating the truth and fairness of financial statements. If owners of organisations doubt the auditor’s independence, financial statements will lack credibility. This questionnaire-based study investigated how investors perceive three potentially independence-impairing auditor–client relationships: the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, an audit firm’s economic dependence upon a client and long-term relationships between auditor and client. The objective was to determine whether, after a series of high-profile corporate collapses, owners retain faith in the integrity of the auditor. The results suggest that economic dependence and the provision of non-audit services are perceived as greater threats to auditor independence than long-term relationships between the auditor and client.     

审计委员会与外部审计独立性

本文首先从完全信息动态博弈的视角出发,推导得出,强化外部审计独立性是审计委员会的基本职能之一.然而,接下来的实证检验结果却与前述的理论预期相悖,即实证检验结果表明,我国上市公司审计委员会制度在实际运行中,并不具有强化外部审计独立性的功能.接下来的分析表明,由于缺乏"独立人"的资格,导致我国审计委员会很难打破原有的均衡,从而很难强化外部审计独立性.     

Public sector auditor identities in making efficiency auditable: The National Audit Office of Denmark as independent auditor and modernizer

This paper examines how the National Audit Office of Denmark (NAOD) manoeuvred in making the Danish military receptive to a performance-accountability project in the period 1990–2007. Evidence is provided from a detailed case study, where the actions of the auditors have been followed in their efforts to make the military activities auditable by focusing on the multiple and dynamic interactions between them, the auditee and others. This study contributes to our understanding of how auditors manoeuvre with their performance audit devices in different ways to make efficiency auditable. It appears that as the auditee initiated the implementation of a new accounting system called DeMars a stream of overflows threatened to destabilise it. Groups within the auditee were eager to put heat into the overflowing. This study illuminates how the auditors, equipped with their devices of purification in the later stages of the project, helped at least provisionally to contain the overflows and stabilize the construction. Due to such different manoeuvres by the auditors, this paper demonstrates the problems that emerge when state auditors manoeuvre in performance auditing with identities both as ‘modernizers’, i.e., participating in providing the reasons for change and defining its designs and as ‘independent auditors’, i.e., to legitimize the construction in which they participated themselves. Many allies to the auditors worked hard in protecting the NAOD as the two identities conflicted with each other during the execution of the project.     

Effect of audit report disclosure on auditor litigation risk

Internationally, the escalating number of cases levelled against auditors and the costs of defending such actions has led to the auditing profession calling for measures to reduce their liability burden. Relatively few measures have been taken by the auditing profession by way of adapting the disclosure contained in the audit report to mitigate their litigation risk. This study examines whether the issuance of an audit opinion with a going concern related ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph or work practices disclosure has any effect on potential litigants' likelihood of pursuing litigation against the auditor. An analysis of 69 responses from advanced law students and 18 practitioners working in corporate liquidation demonstrate that a modified (but not qualified) audit report effectively acts as a ‘red flag’ and reduces potential litigants' propensity to initiate litigation. However, work practices disclosure did not significantly alter potential litigants' inclination to recommend litigation. Despite this finding, respondents (particularly liquidators) indicated that work practices disclosure was an important factor in their litigation decision. These results suggest that further investigation into how to effectively disclose the work done on audit and assurance engagements is needed. This has implications for standard setters and the auditing profession, especially considering recent changes in the disclosure contained in audit and assurance reports.     

The effect of auditor IT expertise on internal controls

Material weaknesses in internal controls related to information technology (IT) represent unique threats to organizations. Utilizing the external auditor as an example of an externally observable governance mechanism, we investigate if firms with revealed IT internal control deficiencies employ a strategy of disassociation with their current auditor. Our tests show that prior evidence of disassociation strategies hold in both IT and non-IT contexts. Of particular focus to our study, we document a positive association between firms that report IT material weaknesses and subsequent auditor dismissals or switching. We next investigate the potential internal control benefits of switching to auditors with greater expertise in environments that emphasize the importance of IT. We argue that greater audit firm IT expertise promotes improved internal controls for their clients, especially those controls that are dependent on IT. We find that clients that switch to auditors with greater IT expertise, relative to their former auditor, have a greater likelihood of material weakness remediation within one year of reporting control weaknesses. Complementing these findings, we find that audit IT expertise is negatively associated with both non-IT and IT material weaknesses in an ex ante reporting setting. Prior literature takes a longstanding interest in both the incentive for developing auditor expertise and the effects of that expertise. We contribute to this literature stream by providing additional evidence related to a specific type of expertise.     

The review process as a control for differential recall of evidence in auditor judgments

This experiment examines whether there are systematic offsetting differences in the manner in which initial decision makers and reviewers attend to information which ensure that evidence inconsistent with initial judgments is given adequate consideration. Differences in attention are proposed, which result in differential recall of evidence by the initial decision maker and reviewer and thus influence what knowledge initial decision makers and reviewers bring to their discussions and subsequent decisions. The results suggest that the review process can act as an effective control by increasing the chances that the implications of inconsistent evidence are considered.     

The effects of feedback type on auditor judgment performance for configural and non-configural tasks

This study examines the effect of four different types of feedback (outcome, task properties, cognitive, combined task properties/cognitive) on the risk assessment judgments of auditors on two tasks, one requiring configural cue processing and the other not requiring configural cue processing. Task properties feedback and combined feedback improved performance on both tasks. Outcome feedback was more effective for the non-configural task, while cognitive feedback was more effective for the configural task. We also found that, on the configural task, the effect of cognitive feedback was heightened by lower levels of participant self-insight. Finally, combined feedback was particularly effective in transferring knowledge across tasks. These results have direct practical application for the use of feedback in audit practice. From a theoretical perspective they also help to reconcile earlier mixed results in accounting and psychology.