The impact of regulating mobile termination rates and MNO-MVNO relationships on retail prices

A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) provides mobile telecommunication services by eluding the constraints of the radio communication infrastructure and establishing an agreement with a hosting network operator (HNO) for the use of its spectrum. Thus, MVNOs offer a wide range of mobile services and directly compete with every mobile network operator (MNO). This paper studies the economic justifications for potential regulatory intervention that defines the level of mobile termination rates (MTRs) and negotiations and agreements among MVNOs and HNOs. The results show that symmetric MTR reduction leads to competition growth among operators, forcing every operator to reduce retail prices and, consequently, to enhancing consumer welfare. The paper also finds that a collaborative strategy adopted by an HNO and an MVNO is advantageous for both and induces a reduction in retail prices, thus weakening other MNOs.     

The effects of lower mobile termination rates in South Africa

The effects of a 90% reduction in mobile termination rates (MTRs) are evaluated over the period between 2009 and 2017 in South Africa. Prepaid prices and quality-adjusted postpaid prices declined by over 40%. However, only approximately 30% of the decline in prepaid prices and 60% of the reduction in quality-adjusted postpaid prices can be explained by lower MTR costs. On-net and off-net prepaid prices converged as MTR costs dropped. Regulators concerned about high retail prices and differences between on-net and off-net prices should reduce MTRs.     

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.     

An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices

In several major deregulated electricity generation markets, the market operator uses an “automatic mitigation procedure” (AMP) to attempt to suppress the exercise of market power. A leading type of AMP compares the offer price from each generation unit with a recent historical average of accepted offer prices from that same unit during periods when there was no transmission-system congestion to impede competition. If one or more units' offer prices exceed the recent historical average by more than a specified margin, and if these offer prices raise the market-clearing price by more than a specified margin, the market operator replaces the offending offer prices with lower ones. In an experiment, we test an AMP of this type. We find that it keeps market prices close to marginal cost if generation owners have low market power in uncongested periods. However, with high market power in uncongested periods, a condition that may apply in many parts of the world, the generation owners are able to gradually raise the market price well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the AMP. We also test the effect of the AMP on the frequency with which high-variable-cost units are used, inefficiently, in place of low-variable-cost units.     

Royalties vs. upfront lump-sum fees in data communication environments

Mobile communications markets worldwide, today, are saturated, the number of mobile network operators (MNOs) in market is declining, mobile revenues are stagnant or falling, MNOs are becoming wireless Internet service providers, and economies of scope are strengthening. This paper challenges existing dominant views on spectrum assignment and license fee payments, estimates spectrum fees that MNOs would have paid under royalties and then compares them with upfront lump-sum fees actually paid by 3G licensees. This paper further proposes that governments need to consider assigning additional spectrum to incumbents as needs arise without using auctions and adopting royalties as a way of collecting spectrum fees should they collect them.     

Competition in wholesale markets: Do MNOs compete to host MVNOs?

This paper extends previous research examining wholesale market shares of mobile network operators (MNOs). This study demonstrates that wholesale market concentration has decreased over time because of the increase of competition of MNOs for hosting mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). However, differences in wholesale market shares between MNOs have not disappeared. We propose that those operators that are late entrants in a market and belong to an international group with a proactive attitude towards hosting virtual operators positively influences wholesale market shares of MNOs. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data from 2000 to 2010 corresponding to MNOs and virtual operators in five European countries with high development of the virtual mobile industry. By closely examining KPN we show how being an international mobile group specialising in the wholesale market across Europe has enabled it to exploit complementarities that exist between traditional and virtual businesses.     

Tariff-mediated network effects versus strategic discounting: Evidence from German mobile telecommunications

Mobile telecommunication operators routinely charge subscribers lower prices for calls on their own network than for calls to other networks (on-net discounts). Studies on tariff-mediated network effects suggest this is due to large operators using on-net discounts to damage smaller rivals. Alternatively, research on strategic discounting suggests that small operators use on-net discounts to advertise with low on-net prices. We test the relative strength of these effects using data on tariff setting in German mobile telecommunications between 2001 and 2009. We find that large operators are more likely to offer tariffs with on-net discounts but there is no consistently significant difference in the magnitude of discounts. Our results suggest that tariff-mediated network effects are the main cause of on-net discounts.     

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

While mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) increase competition in the mobile telecommunications industry, granting market access to MVNOs may have unwanted consequences. In particular, infrastructure investment by incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) may be smaller. This paper examines the effects of MVNO entry and access regulation on the investment behavior of MNOs. It uses firm-level data for 58 MNOs in 21 OECD countries during 2000–2008. The results suggest that mandated provision of access is related to lower investment intensity of MNOs, while voluntary access provision has no effect. Although reduced investment incentives do not necessarily correspond to under-investment, this underscores the need for those countries where MVNOs are provided access to address the issue of investment incentives.     

Link between termination rates and retail prices in Namibia,Kenya and South Africa

This paper analyses the link between mobile termination rate reductions and retail prices. It draws on in-depth case studies of South Africa, Namibia and Kenya where regulators have reduced termination rates towards the cost of an efficient operator. To varying degrees these have all led to lower retail prices and significant market expansion. While retail prices in both Namibia and Kenya dropped following substantial termination rate reductions, the South African case demonstrates that termination rate reductions are not always passed on to consumers as is hoped by such regulatory interventions. In South Africa, it was only after the second reduction in March 2012 that smaller operators were able to reduce their off-net prices to a level that could tempt the subscribers to dominant operators to switch. All the case studies confirm nevertheless that retail prices do not go up in response to termination rates going down as contended by dominant mobile operators around the world. This is in contrast to a body of literature stating that termination rates and mobile retail prices constitute a two-sided market and that termination rate reductions will lead to a so-called “waterbed effect”.     

Firm and target country characteristics as factors explaining wealth creation from international expansion moves of mobile network operators

Although mobile network operators (MNOs) carried out numerous international expansion moves over the past 25 years industry-specific empirical research on shareholder reactions to such moves and on factors explaining differences of the wealth effects of international expansion moves is scarce. Using event study methodology, the present investigation empirically captured the impacts of 148 major expansion steps into foreign mobile communication services markets announced by 29 large MNOs during the period from December 1989 to December 2004 on “abnormal” market value changes of the expanding MNO. Further, it sought to explain differences in cumulative abnormal shareholder returns related to an announcement by four characteristics of the expanding firm (e.g., foreign experience) and nine characteristics of the country targeted by an internationalization step (e.g., cultural distance; intensity of MNO regulation).     

Search engines: Left side quality versus right side profits

Search engines face an interesting tradeoff in choosing the way to display their results. While providing high quality unpaid, or “left side” results attracts users, doing so can also cannibalize the revenue that comes from paid ads on the “right side”. This paper examines this tradeoff, focusing, in particular, on the role of users' post-search interaction with the websites whose links are displayed. In the model, high quality left side results boost demand from users, causing them to tolerate a search engine on which advertisers do not offer the lowest possible prices for the goods that they sell. However, because websites appearing on the left side still have an incentive to compete in the same market as advertisers, an increase in quality on the left side may reduce advertisers' equilibrium prices. I analyze the circumstances under which this will occur and discuss the model's potential implications for antitrust policy.     

Termination notice of mobile network operator customers after a tariff switch: An empirical study of postpaid subscribers in Germany

Proactive subscriber churn management strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs) require that steps are taken to keep customers before they hand over a formal notice of termination to their provider. Therefore, several studies have analyzed how MNO customers who gave a termination announcement differ from individuals who did not communicate this message. However, no work has examined such differences among subscribers who recently switched to another tariff of their MNO. Therefore, this paper explores socio-demographic, service consumption and tariff change differences between contract cancellation “announcers” and “non-announcers” in a sample of 1810 postpaid customers who had changed their rate plan not long ago. Cancellation announcers were more likely to be males who decreased their mobile voice consumption after their tariff switch, had already attempted to churn in the past, had moved from an unmetered to a metered rate type, paid higher monthly bill amounts and received no discounts on their current rate plan that was introduced on the market some time ago. Among subscribers who gave a termination notice, early (late) cancellation announcers were more likely to be older (younger) customers with a growing (shrinking) SMS consumption after their tariff switch, had not attempted (had already tried) to leave their current MNO in the past, and were in a rate plan that was (not) recently introduced. The findings contribute to the literature on mobile customer retention and have implications for practitioners and scholars.     

On optimal scarcity prices

This article contributes to the debate of missing money (compare Joskow(2007a)). This debate has seriously questioned the desirability of limiting scarcity prices in markets with fluctuating demand by emphasizing their potentially negative impact on firms' investment decisions in the long run. A prominent example are recently liberalized electricity markets, where competition authorities have imposed price caps³ or adopted other measures to mitigate high scarcity prices.The impact of reduced scarcity prices in the long run still is only incompletely explored. We thus analyze investment of firms in base load and peak load technologies in a market with fluctuating demand under imperfect competition. We show that an appropriately chosen limitation of scarcity prices is not only beneficial in the short run but also in the long run. It leads to a strict increase of investment in peak load technologies, leaving investment in base load technologies unchanged. Furthermore, we characterize the optimal limit on scarcity prices.     

Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities

We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality.     

The Influence of Regulation and Disruptive Potential on Incumbents' Submarket Entry Decision and Success in the Context of a Network Industry

This paper uses the theoretical perspectives of disruptive innovation, network externalities, and regulation to study the submarket strategies of incumbent firms that operate in a regulated network industry. In this setting, the impact of potentially disruptive innovations might be different because of the tighter regulation of incumbent firms. By analyzing the entry and success patterns of incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) in the public hotspot markets in 17 Western European countries, we focus on how regulation and network effects as well as disruption factors influence the incumbent firms' strategies. In doing so, this paper departs from prior research that has primarily focused on unregulated industries and combines contradicting explanations from disruptive innovation theory, the motivation/ability framework, regulation theory, as well as network effects to provide a comprehensive analysis on how incumbents behave in a regulated network industry that is being confronted with a potentially disruptive innovation. In particular, while disruptive innovation theory predicts that the incumbents' vast experience in an industry could cause them to avoid entering new submarkets created by potentially disruptive innovations, the desire to avoid regulation could encourage such submarket entry. Furthermore, in regulated network industries, incumbent firms might have a stronger motivation to enter new submarkets as the importance of single customers and high market shares could be substantially different. These contrasting insights are used to develop an integrative research model and to derive hypotheses on incumbents' submarket entry decision and success. Drawing on cross‐sectional, multicountry data of 62 MNOs that operate in 17 Western European countries, this study uses logit and tobit regressions to test the impact of disruption factors, regulation, and network externalities on the entry decision and success of incumbent firms. The results reveal that the incumbent MNOs are caught in an area of conflict between the regulated industry context and their international technology strategy. The findings suggest that the incumbent MNOs' motivation and ability to escape regulation positively influenced their submarket entry and success in the public hotspot market. Thus, the potentially disruptive scenario was successfully turned into a potentially sustaining one as the incumbent MNOs could enhance their presence in the mobile broadband market. The testing on a multicountry basis as well as the positive influence of ethnocentric technology strategies for public hotspots, which are devised in the headquarters' location and are then brought out internationally, shed new light on an industry that has typically been characterized by country‐by‐country decisions. These findings may also reveal challenges for future research on disruptive innovations in multinational industries and expose future challenges for regulative authorities and managers. This paper thereby adds to the theory of disruptive innovation as it includes the influence of regulation on incumbents in network industries. Additionally, this study expands on previous findings on the disruptive potential of wireless local area network technology by employing a multi‐country analysis in 17 Western European countries.     

Endogenous capacities and price competition: The role of demand uncertainty

We analyze the role of demand uncertainty in markets of fixed size, in which firms take long-run capacity decisions prior to competing in prices. We characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria under various assumptions regarding the nature and timing of demand uncertainty. In order to prove equilibrium existence, we identify a sufficient condition for the capacity choice game to be submodular. This condition resembles the standard downward-sloping marginal revenue condition used in Cournot games. A robust conclusion of the analysis is that equilibrium capacity choices are asymmetric, even when firms are ex-ante identical. Concerning the equivalence between the capacity-price game and the Cournot game, we find that with inelastic demands, the equilibria of the former belong to the equilibrium set of the latter. However, as compared to the Cournot game, the capacity-price game leads to lower prices and generates price dispersion.     

The competition among mobile network operators in the telecommunication supply chain

In the mobile telecommunication sector, the high competitiveness has increased the complexity of strategic interactions among operators. As the vertical integration has become anything but a choice and not a compelling technical solution, the contest takes place at different levels of the components of the operator value chain: the network infrastructure, the service development and supply, and the relationship with consumers.Mobile virtual network operators act as retailers and concentrate on the last segment of the value chain by establishing commercial agreements with hosting network operators, which act as manufacturers, to get access to radio communications infrastructure. Productive processes of mobile services offered by operators are different and this difference is imperceptible to customers. Processes difference mainly consists in the infrastructural diversity of the operators and implies different consequences on each network service element.A model has been defined to analyze the consequences of such diversity in the competition among HNOs, MNOs, and MVNOs by focusing the attention on the characteristics of the call path, in dependence of the types of operators. In fact, many variables interact to define the call path, such as marginal costs and revenues, infrastructural investments, and interconnection charges among operators. The analysis of the results, obtained by the model, gives information on variations of retail prices, market shares, and profit allotment, to adopt the proper strategies. In particular, the model results shed light on how certain MVNOs should enter the markets and adopt a collaborative strategy with HNOs. The model owns the capability of being applied to different contexts, thus representing for the regulator a potential instrument of relevant usefulness.