Market-Making in the Third Market for NYSE-Listed Securities

This paper empirically examines market making in the third market for common stocks that are listed on the NYSE. Although the same non-NYSE members make a market on both types of stocks, bid-ask spreads are wider on Rule 19c-3 stocks than on Rule 390 stocks. Market-making by NYSE members is minimal and spreads posted by NYSE members are wider than those posted on identical stocks by non-NYSE members. This suggests that NYSE members do not compete on the basis of spread but use methods such as price matching and the internalization of orders to attract order flow to the third market.     

UNLISTED TRADING PRIVILEGES,LIQUIDITY, AND STOCK RETURNS

In this study we examine the effect of dual trading through unlisted trading privileges (UTPs) on liquidity and stock returns. Stocks with UTPs trade in a different market structure than stocks listed and traded only on the AMEX and NYSE. Differences in market structure may affect stock returns through liquidity services provided by the competing markets. The sample comprises 852 AMEX and NYSE firms that began unlisted trading on the Philadelphia, Pacific, Midwest, or Cincinnati exchanges between 1984 and 1988. The results show significantly positive abnormal returns around the SEC's announcement of a regional exchange's filing for UTPs. The results also suggest that increased competition improves trading liquidity. Only stocks with low liquidity before UTPs announcements experience significantly improved liquidity and positive stock returns.     

Liquidity of the CBOE Equity Options

We examine the CBOE option market depth and bid-ask spreads. Absence of price effects surrounding large option trades suggests excellent market depth. However, bid-ask spreads for the CBOE options and the NYSE stocks are nearly equal, even though an average option is equivalent to less than half a stock plus borrowing. We explain this tradeoff between market depth and bid-ask spreads on the CBOE and the NYSE by differences in market mechanisms. We also show that the adverse-selection component of the option spread, which measures the extent of information-related trading on the CBOE, is very small.     

Liquidity and market efficiency: A large sample study

Chordia et al. (2008, hereafter CRS) examine short horizon return predictability from past order flows of large, actively traded NYSE firms across three tick size regimes and conclude that higher liquidity facilitates arbitrage trading which enhances market efficiency. We extend CRS to a comprehensive sample of all NYSE firms and examine the dynamics between liquidity and market efficiency during informational periods. Our results indicate that although all NYSE firms experience an overall improvement in market efficiency across periods of different tick size regimes, this improvement varies significantly across the portfolios of sample companies formed on the basis of trading frequency, market capitalization, and trading volume. After controlling for these factors, we further document a positive association between a continuous measure of liquidity and market efficiency, and show that this effect is amplified during periods that contain new information, as reflected in high adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

Sources of liquidity for NYSE-listed non-US stocks

We examine the components of displayed (quoted) liquidity and the amount of non-displayed liquidity on the NYSE for a sample of non-US stocks. Consistently with prior work, non-US stocks have less displayed liquidity than similar US stocks. Extending prior research, we find that this is true both in the limit order book and on the floor. As Domowitz et al. [Domowitz, I., Glen, J., Madhavan, A., 1998. International cross-listing and order flow migration: Evidence from and emerging market. Journal of Finance 53, 2001–2027] posit, non-US stocks from transparent/linked home markets have more displayed NYSE liquidity when the home market is open but non-US stocks from opaque/non-linked home markets have more NYSE displayed liquidity when the home market is closed. Non-US and US stocks have similar supplies of non-displayed liquidity, consistent with the idea that the conditional nature of non-displayed liquidity allows NYSE traders to mitigate adverse selection problems inherent in trading non-US stocks. Our results imply that non-US stocks have less total (displayed plus non-displayed) liquidity than US stocks.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

WINNERS AND LOSERS ON NYSE: A RE-EXAMINATION USING DAILY CLOSING BID-ASK SPREADS

We study a sample of NYSE stocks that experienced a large one-day price change during 1992 and were reported as daily largest percentage gainers and largest percentage losers in the Wall Street Journal. The sample indicates significant reversals during the immediate post-announcement period. We test for market efficiency by using bid-ask spreads obtained from the transactions data for the days immediately after the announcement. The overall results indicate that the returns during the reversal period are less than the average bid-ask spread during the same time. We also find that major losers, firms with ?20 percent to ?50 percent event-date abnormal returns, experience price reversals generating returns that are significantly greater than the average bid-ask spread during that period. We interpret this result as consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. A test of a trading rule to exploit this overreaction is not profitable, providing support for weak-form market efficiency.     

Trading Mechanisms and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread

We compare the relative magnitudes of the components of the bid-ask spread for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks to those of National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ)/National Market System (NMS) stocks. We find that the order-processing cost component is smaller, and the adverse selection component is greater on the NYSE/AMEX trading systems than on the NASDAQ/NMS system. The inventory holding component is also greater for exchange-traded stocks than for NASDAQ/NMS stocks, but this may be attributable to differences in the characteristics of the firms whose stocks trade on the respective systems.     

OPTIONS LISTING, MARKET LIQUIDITY AND STOCK BEHAVIOUR: SOME CANADIAN EVIDENCE

This study examines the price behaviour, trading volume and liquidity of stocks in the Canadian market at the time of options listing. Unlike some studies examining similar effects in the United States, the present one finds no evidence to indicate that either daily return volatility or trading volume is affected by the listing. Similarly, liquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread, is unaffected. At the same time, cross-sectional tests indicate an inverse relationship between before-to-after trading volume and the before-to-after bid-ask spread.     

Tick size,market structure,and market quality

Large tick sizes imposed on high-priced stocks on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) are significant binding constraints on bid-ask spreads. Nearly 60% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks with the largest tick size and more than 87% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks in the largest size portfolio. We also show that the average spread of KSE stocks with large tick sizes is greater than that of matched NYSE stocks, whereas the average spread of KSE stocks with the smallest tick size is smaller than the corresponding figure for the matched NYSE stocks. We interpret these results as evidence that traders on the KSE are paying large trading costs because of the artificially imposed large tick sizes.     

Testing for micro-structure effects of international dual listings using intraday data

This paper examines the impact on the liquidity of NYSE/AMEX listed stocks when they were subsequently listed on the London or the Tokyo Stock Exchanges. It can be argued that the increased competition from foreign market makers will reduce the monopoly rents that specialists can earn, thereby improving their quotes. We find, however, that spreads do not decrease following a dual listing, though the depth of the quotes increases as predicted. The apparent increase in depth disappears once we account for changes in price, volume and return variance. We also find that the level of informed trading increases, which increases the cost to the specialist of providing liquidity, and explains why spreads do not decline in spite of increased competition. Consistent with an increase in informed trading, we also document an increase in trading activity.     

Liquidity Provision and Noise Trading: Evidence from the "Investment Dartboard" Column

How does increased noise trading affect market liquidity and trading costs? We use The Wall Street Journal's “Investment Dartboard” column, which stimulates noise trading, as a natural experiment to evaluate models of the bid-ask spread. We find that substantial increases in trading volume and significant but temporary abnormal returns occur when analysts recommend stocks in this column, especially when recommendations come from analysts with successful contest track records. We also find an increase in liquidity and a decrease in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

The trades of NYSE floor brokers

This paper studies the contribution of NYSE floor brokers to the Exchange's agency auction market. Floor brokers represent 44%, specialists 11%, and system orders 45% of the value of all executed orders in our sample. We analyze how the cross-sectional distribution of floor broker trading depends on liquidity, block volume, on- and off-exchange competition, volatility, and order flow internalization. Floor brokers participate in large trades, primarily in liquid stocks, and they trade more when volatility is high. They provide two-sided liquidity to the market and often provide liquidity that would otherwise have been supplied by NYSE specialists.     

Liquidity provision with limit orders and a strategic specialist

This article presents a microstructure model of liquidity provisionin which a specialist with market power competes against a competitivelimit order book. General solutions, comparative statics andexamples are provided first with un-informative orders and thenwhen order flows are informative. The model is also used toaddress two optimal market design issues. The first is the effectof 'tick' size - for example, eighths versus decimal pricing- on market liquidity. Institutions trading large blocks havea larger optimal tick size than small retail investors, butboth prefer a tick size strictly greater than zero. Second,a hybrid specialist/limit order market (like the NYSE) providesbetter liquidity to small retail and institutional trades, buta pure limit order market (like the Paris Bourse) may offerbetter liquidity on mid-size orders.     

Stock repurchases and treasury share sales: Do they stabilize price and enhance liquidity?

Can companies reduce the volatility and increase the liquidity of their stocks by trading them? In the context of the Italian stock market, where companies have far more leeway to sell as well as buy their own stocks than in the U.S., the answer is yes. We examine the effects of trading (open-market share repurchases and treasury shares sales) on liquidity (bid-ask spread) and volatility (return variance). Further, we examine the impact of shareholder approvals of repurchase programs on liquidity and volatility. We find clear evidence that trading increases liquidity and reduces volatility. These results are consistent with our analysis of the motives Italian companies give for making share repurchases.     

Liquidity,liquidity risk,and information flow: Lessons from an emerging market

This paper examines the role of public and private information flows in intraday liquidity and intraday liquidity risk in the Tunisian stock market. Our empirical results are based on ARMA and GARCH-type models and show that, for major Tunisian stocks, gradually elapsed public information together with gradually elapsed private information in the market is the dominant factor in liquidity improvements in the Tunisian stock market. Liquidity improvements are generated by a decrease in the bid-ask spread accompanied by an increase in the depth at best limit. Our results clearly indicate that the arrival of public information in a sequential manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the bid-ask spread, while the advent of private information in a contemporaneous manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the depth at best limit. Additionally, our results show that liquidity risk persistence disappears when trading volume and order imbalance are included as explanatory variables in the conditional variance equation.     

Determinants of the components of bid-ask spreads on stocks

In this paper we show that George et al. (GKN, 1991) estimators of the adverse selection and order processing cost components of the bid-ask spread are biased due to intertemporal variations in the bid-ask spread. We use alternative estimators that correct this bias and that are applicable to individual securities, and estimate these cost components empirically using data on NYSE/AMEX stocks. As expected, our results indicate that on average adverse selection costs account for approximately 50% of the bid-ask spread, sharply higher than the estimates of 8-10% obtained by GKN for NASDAQ stocks and 21% that we obtain for NYSE/AMEX stocks using GKN's estimators. We then conduct cross-sectional regressions designed primarily to determine whether adverse selection costs vary across specialists after controlling for firm size and other factors. Consistent with previously established hypotheses, we find that adverse-selection costs vary across specialists, and that this variation is related to the number of securities that the specialist handles.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Trading and Liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: A Bird's Eye View

The trading mechanism for equities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) stands in sharp contrast to the primary mechanisms used to trade stocks in the United States. In the United States, exchange-designated specialists have affirmative obligations to provide continuous liquidity to the market. Specialists offer simultaneous and tight quotes to both buy and sell and supply sufficient liquidity to limit the magnitude of price changes between consecutive transactions. In contradistinction, the TSE has no exchange-designated liquidity suppliers. Instead, liquidity is provided through a public limit order book, and liquidity is organized through restrictions on maximum price changes between trades that serve to slow down trading. In this article, we examine the efficacy of the TSE's trading mechanisms at providing liquidity. Our analysis is based on a complete record of transactions and best-bid and best-offer quotes for most stocks in the First Section of the TSE over a period of 26 months. We study the size of the bid-ask spread and its cross-sectional and intertemporal stability; intertemporal patterns in returns, volatility, volume, trade size, and the frequency of trades; and market depth based on the response of quotes to trades and the frequency of trading halts and warning quotes.