外资并购的财富效应及影响因素的实证分析

本文以1995～2005年间发生的49起外资并购中国上市公司事件为样本,运用事件研究法对外资并购的财富效应进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,外资并购增加了我国上市公司的股东财富。研究还发现,外资并购方式、外资是否控股以及目标公司与政府的关联程度对外资并购的财富效应都有一定程度的影响。     

中国上市公司跨国并购的财富效应分析

本文对中国上市公司跨国并购的财富效应以及影响因素进行了经验分析,结果发现,中国上市公司的跨国并购事件发生前后20天内具有比较显著的股东财富效应;按行业细分后,电子信息行业的股东财富效应显著大于家电行业的股东财富效应;并且被收购公司所在国的宏观经济情况和并购支付方式对跨国并购的股东财富效应有影响,收购公司所在国的经济增长率比并购前一年的经济增长率越低,则中国上市公司的财富获得越多,以现金作为对外并购支付方式时,财富获得也越多。     

医药上市公司并购动机与绩效——以华润三九为例

并购,作为一种企业扩张的模式,受到各行各业的欢迎。医药行业由于研发风险高,更倾向于选择并购作为扩张的模式。但是,并购能否给医药企业带来合并收益?文章对华润三九并购案例进行分析,发现华润三九的并购动机主要表现在扩大生产规模以产生经营协同效应、盘活内部资金以产生财务协同效应、缩减机构层次以产生管理协同效应、遵从母公司策略以产生战略协同效应以及收购关联企业以降低代理成本等方面,并从企业财务绩效、股东财富变化等多方面对华润三九的并购活动进行评价,认为医药企业的并购活动产生了协同效应,使股东获得了短期的财富效应。     

中国企业跨国并购的战略目标与经营绩效:基于A股市场的评价

根据战略目标的不同,中国企业的跨国并购可分为战略资源类并购和创造性资产类并购,如何评价战略目标与经营绩效的关系成为亟待解决的现实问题。本文以A股上市公司的跨国并购公告为切入点,通过事件研究发现:无论是战略资源类并购,还是以先进技术、知名品牌等创造性资产为目标的并购,总体上都获得了市场的积极评价,公告日附近的累计异常收益率高达5.22%。这意味着投资者预期中国企业的跨国并购能够成功地创造协同效应。并购公司实际控制人的国有性质以及并购目标的战略资源资产能够让市场对并购绩效产生更加积极的评价,并且管理层的能力表现越强,预期其创造的协同价值越大。     

政府干预与多元化并购特征、绩效——来自中央和地方国有上市公司的经验证据北大核心CSSCI

文章以发生多元化并购的594家国有上市公司为样本,检验不同层级政府干预下国有上市公司多元化并购特征和并购绩效是否存在显著差异。实证结果显示政府干预程度会显著影响国有上市公司多元化并购的行业特征、关联特征和区域特征,而中央和地方政府不同的职能目标和管制策略使得中央和地方国有上市公司在特征表现上有所差异。中央公司的多元化并购明显呈现出对控制行业、关联并购和跨地区的偏好,并未出现预期的"多元化折价"现象,证实中央国有上市公司在落实国家宏观调控政策方面发挥了主导作用。受地方政府目标多元性和寻租等问题影响,地方国有上市公司多元化并购的关联交易特征和同区域特征更明显,成为"多元化折价"的根源。     

中国银行业海外并购视野的资本重组及其业务整合

始于20世纪80年代中国银行海外并购历程,着眼于国际市场布局与拓展、业务整合、资本重组,经历了业务整合的协同效应阶段、战略协同效应阶段。选择工商银行并购香港友联银行典型案例进行财务分析,证明目标企业在中长期跨国并购运作以后,产生较大的协同效应。选择9家中资银行的跨国并购事件进行事件研究,结果表明在短期内跨国并购事件将显著影响银行的股价,存在协同效应的财务效应。     

行业锦标赛激励与并购业绩承诺达标程度

高管的行业竞赛心理不仅会影响其并购决策行为,还会刺激其关注企业并购整合及并购业绩承诺的履行情况和达标程度。以2011-2019年中国A股上市公司签订业绩承诺协议的并购事件作为研究对象,考察行业锦标赛激励对标的公司业绩承诺达标程度的影响。研究发现行业锦标赛激励与业绩承诺达标程度显著正相关,表明高管受到的行业锦标赛激励效应越强,越有动机和压力督促标的公司提高业绩承诺达标率。进一步研究发现,真实盈余管理在行业锦标赛激励与业绩承诺达标程度之间起到中介作用。行业锦标赛激励对业绩承诺达标程度的提升作用在并购方是非国有企业、并购支付方式为股份支付、承诺补偿方式为股份补偿的情形下更显著。     

国有上市公司的上市模式、并购类型与绩效

本文从国企改制上市的制度根源上考察国有上市公司的并购重组问题,以199起国有控股上市公司的并购事件为样本,检验了改制上市模式与并购类型,以及并购类型与并购绩效之间的关系。结果表明:不同模式上市的公司倾向于进行不同类型的并购,分拆上市的公司倾向于进行改制型并购,而整体上市的公司更倾向于进行投资型并购和行政主导型并购;不同类型的并购进而导致了不同的并购绩效,改制型并购显著提高了公司的经营绩效水平,投资型并购对公司经营绩效的改进产生了正面影响,但绩效改进的持续性不足,行政主导型并购则导致了公司经营绩效的显著、持续下滑。     

从三一重工并购研究我国重工企业海外并购绩效

本文通过案例研究法分析三一重工并购普茨迈斯特并购绩效,得出短期内该并购事件引起三一重工财务状况恶化,但长期绩效良好,能为股东带来价值的研究结论.通过对实证研究结果进行分析,得出重工企业进行海外并购可通过与私募股权合作降低海外并购风险及应选择合理的整合方式以获得并购协同效应的启示.     

成长企业面临并购威胁的动态模型

以Shleifer与Vishny股市推动型并购理论为基础,本文提出了成长企业面临随机并购威胁的动态新模型．具体分析了在随机的股票市场产生定价错误和收购者预期有协同效应收益的情况下,利润最大化企业面对并购威胁所采取的防御性红利支付策略。本模型运用可靠性理论的“风险率”概念。不但解释了并购活动和观察到的成长型企业的红利支付行为,还导出了关于反并购成本影响目标企业价值的可验证性推论。     

THE IMPACT OF M&As ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWANESE CORPORATIONS

This study, using forty‐six M&A events in Taiwan between 1987 and 1998, investigates the effects of M&As on shareholder wealth. The shareholders of the acquiring firms gain modestly positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates. We also distinguish M&As of different purposes, finding that M&As for technology‐acquiring purposes are most favored by the market, while vertical M&As are detrimental to shareholder wealth.     

高管报酬影响因素的分析

文章基于前人对高管报酬理论研究的基础上,对有可能影响高管报酬的因素进行了实证检验.发现高管报酬与销售额显著正相关,与利润、总资本额的相关性也较强;报酬与行业的相关性小于与地区的相关性而与股东权益是负相关的;高管持股比例低,股票激励作用不明显.研究结果说明我国高管报酬虽然已初具合理性但仍有有待改进的方面.     

Discretionary Accounting Choices and CEO Compensation*

This paper makes four contributions to the literature relating accounting choices to CEO compensation. First, it shows that discretionary accruals are associated with CEO cash compensation, a result that holds after controlling for both the nondiscretionary components of income and increases in shareholder wealth. Although significant, the coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly lower than that on nondiscretionary accruals, which in turn is significantly lower than the coefficient on operating cash flows. Second, the paper shows a differential reaction to positive and negative discretionary accruals —- the association between positive discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation is significantly greater than the association between negative discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. Third, the paper shows the association between discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. In particular, when positive discretionary accruals allow the firm to reduce or avoid a loss, the association between CEO cash compensation and discretionary accruals is significantly greater. Finally, this paper shows that the association of CEO cash compensation with reported income generally increases with the level of discretionary accruals, consistent with management responding to the incentives provided.     

定向增发、控制权变动及其信号传递效应

 当公司再融资引起股权结构显著变动时,其必然会对公司控制权配置、竞争和转移产生重要影响,这种影响传递到资本市场会使公司股价发生相应波动。这种效应在股权高度集中公司更为明显,因为大股东是公司的实际控制人,大股东股权进而公司控制权变动传递了公司经营管理的内部信息。采用事件研究法,本文研究发现定向增发在我国具有正的公告效应;但是,定向增发对大股东控制权的影响不同其公告效应也不同：使得大股东控制权发生转移的定向增发其AAR和CAR最大,控制权强化类定向增发居次,控制权弱化类最后。可见,我国上市公司定向增发传递出了明确的公司控制权变动信号,彰显了大股东控制在上市公司中地位突出的治理角色。     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.     

并购交易中的信息传递机制研究——基于业绩承诺的视角

由于并购具有金额大与标的资产质量难以辨别等特点，如何在并购交易中降低交易风险一直是学术界持续关注的话题。文章以中小板和创业板公司2015年至2016年审核通过的并购事件为样本，从业绩承诺视角探讨市场对于并购重组交易契约中信息传递机制的看法。研究表明，市场会对业绩承诺这一信息传递机制予以积极反应，业绩承诺越乐观，并购方在公告期间的超额收益越大。进一步研究发现，在非关联并购、投资者专业化程度较低或财务信息更稳健的情况下，业绩承诺所带来的财富效应更明显。文章以业绩承诺为切入点，为学术界了解如何降低并购交易中的信息风险提供了重要的视角与经验证据。     

企业并购绩效评价实证研究

国内外学者对企业并购的绩效评价通常采用非正常收益法和会计指标法进行实证研究。研究结果表明，被并购方股东总是并购活动的绝对赢家，不同的仅是收益多少而已。并购方股东能不能从并购活动中获利则存在一定的争论。从指标因子分析、并购类型和股权结构等方面对企业并购绩效的实证研究则得出了一些有指导意义的结论。     

公司治理、董事会规模与上市公司的实际控制

最优合约理论和管理权力理论都从不同侧面对高管人员的激励报酬进行了解释,但都有不足。在分析和评述这两种理论的基础上,从公司治理角度,通过对公司治理与高管人员报酬的实证研究,发现在我国上市公司中公司治理机制的改进对高管人员报酬的影响正在逐步体现:当董事会规模大、流通股中机构投资者多、发行了外资股或实现了海外上市、公司的实际控制人为个人及公司规模扩大都能显著提高高管人员报酬;任职年限、ROA和独立董事占比与高管人员报酬正相关但不显著。     

Discussion of “Financial Statement Comparability and the Efficiency of Acquisition Decisions”

Chen, Collins, Kravet, and Mergenthaler (CCKM, 2018 ) is an empirical investigation of whether, after controlling for other known determinants of an acquirer's abnormal stock returns and expected and realized synergies, financial statement comparability impacts the investment decisions surrounding the acquirer's purchase of another company. The primary result is that higher financial statement comparability, as measured by De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (DKV, 2011 ), yields improvements on outcomes associated with mergers and acquisitions. This discussion presents some criticisms of the DKV measure as applied to this study; the main criticism being whether the DKV measure captures accounting comparability or the risk of the target firm. The empirical results presented in CCKM are consistent with both explanations, thus making it difficult to disentangle CCKM's interpretation from an alternative explanation of their empirical findings.     

CEO Power and Relative Performance Evaluation

We model relative performance evaluation (RPE) when a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index‐based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer‐group performance. As a consequence, the Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE. Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEOs choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (i) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong‐form and weak‐form RPE in the presence of powerful CEOs, and (ii) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.