Capital inflows,monetary policy,and financial imbalances

Ahead of the global financial crisis, financial imbalances built up across advanced economies as credit grew and was increasingly funded in wholesale financial markets. This paper investigates empirically three potential drivers of the build-up of these financial imbalances: rising global imbalances (capital flows); loose monetary policy; and inadequate supervision and regulation. We perform panel data regressions for OECD countries from 1999 to 2007 to explore the relative importance of these factors. We find that differences in the build-up of wholesale-funded credit were driven by the strength of capital inflows. Moreover, we document an interaction effect, whereby the effect of inflows on the build-up was amplified where the supervisory and regulatory environment was relatively weak. In contrast, differences in monetary policy did not significantly affect differences across countries in the build-up of these financial imbalances ahead of the crisis.     

The nexus of macroprudential supervision,monetary policy,and financial stability

I discuss changes to bank supervision and regulation since the financial crisis. Microprudential supervision promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions, while macroprudential supervision focuses on emerging risks to financial system stability. I highlight tools for implementing this macroprudential approach to promoting financial stability, and discuss the interactions and proper relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. While macroprudential tools should be the first line of defense against emerging financial imbalances, in cases where those tools proved to be inadequate to limit risks to financial stability, monetary policy should be considered as a possible defense.     

Monetary and financial stability: Here to stay?

We argue that changes in the monetary and financial regimes over the last twenty years or so have been subtly altering the dynamics of the economy and hence the challenges that monetary and prudential authorities face. In particular, the current environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build up of financial imbalances, i.e. over-extensions in (private sector) balance sheets, which herald economic weakness and unwelcome disinflation down the road, as they unwind. As a result, achieving simultaneous monetary and financial stability in a lasting way may call for refinements to current monetary and prudential policy frameworks. These refinements would entail a firmer long-term focus, greater symmetry in policy responses between upswings and downswings, with greater attention to actions during upswings, and closer coordination between monetary and prudential authorities.     

IMF programs, financial and real sector performance, and the Asian crisis

This paper has three objectives. First, using a richer and more comprehensive set of IMF-related news than previous studies, we examine the impact of IMF-related news on both financial and real stock sector returns in Indonesia during the Asian crisis. Second, we draw lessons about financial and real sectoral patterns of adjustment in crisis countries, including whether and how IMF programs facilitate this adjustment. Third, we explore the interplay between IMF actions in crisis countries and the actions and responses of local authorities. To do so, not only do we account for the impact of news regarding IMF policy actions but also the government’s reaction to them and willingness to implement such policies, and the public sentiment about the implemented IMF programs and government policies. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

论全球国际收支失衡下的中国金融安全

全球国际收支失衡正在成为威胁金融安全的一个重要问题.中国作为全球经济增长最快的发展中国家,如何在全球国际收支失衡形势下维护自我金融安全,具有重要的现实意义.本文在总结评价国际金融学界观点的基础上重新定义了金融安全的概念.并根据全球国际收支失衡对中国金融安全的影响提出维护金融安全的对策和建议.     

Financial flows,financial crises,and global imbalances

In this lecture I document the proliferation of gross international asset and liability positions and discuss some consequences for individual countries’ external adjustment processes and for global financial stability. In light of the rapid growth of gross global financial flows and the serious risks associated with them, one might wonder about the continuing relevance of the net financial flow measured by the current account balance. I argue that global current account imbalances remain an essential target for policy scrutiny, for financial as well as macroeconomic reasons. Nonetheless, it is critically important for policymakers to monitor as well the rapidly evolving structure of global gross assets and liabilities.     

SAFE: An early warning system for systemic banking risk

This paper builds on existing microprudential and macroprudential early warning systems (EWSs) to develop a new, hybrid class of models for systemic risk that incorporates the structural characteristics of the financial system and a feedback amplification mechanism. The models explain financial stress using both public and proprietary supervisory data from systemically important institutions, regressing institutional imbalances using an optimal lag method. The Systemic Assessment of Financial Environment (SAFE) EWS monitors microprudential information from the largest bank holding companies to anticipate the buildup of macroeconomic stresses in the financial markets. To mitigate inherent uncertainty, SAFE develops a set of medium-term forecasting specifications that gives policymakers enough time to take ex-ante policy action and a set of short-term forecasting specifications for verification and adjustment of supervisory actions. This paper highlights the application of these models to stress testing and policy.     

论货币政策与金融稳定的内生性冲突——基于资产价格和流动性分析的视角

本文首先综述了国际上关于货币政策对金融稳定影响的主要学术观点,然后应用Shin(2006)基础性的研究成果.提出了一个用于分析货币政策对金融稳定影响的理论框架.文章分析了在一个信贷约束市场上货币政策对金融稳定影响机制.研究表明,由于具有自强化反馈机制和不对称性特征,货币政策在追求自身目标实现过程中,有可能导致金融失衡.     

“双支柱”调控、政策协调搭配与宏观稳定效应

本文通过构建包含金融部门和“双支柱”调控政策的DSGE模型,系统考察了货币政策和宏观审慎政策的组合在不同经济金融冲击下的宏观经济和金融稳定效应。相关分析得出了三个基本结论:一是纳入宏观审慎政策的“双支柱”调控框架确实比单一使用货币政策具有相对更好的经济和金融稳定效应;二是“双支柱”调控框架在应对金融冲击时的稳定效应表现得更加明显,这说明宏观审慎政策确实是通过金融稳定渠道发挥作用的,从而与货币政策侧重实体经济(产出和通胀)的稳定效应形成了有效互补;三是不论是在价格型的货币政策工具下,还是在数量型的货币政策工具下,“双支柱”调控框架都较单一使用货币政策具有更好的经济金融稳定效应,这说明“双支柱”调控框架的有效性不依赖于货币政策工具的改变而改变,在具体的政策工具组合方面具有较为普遍的适用性。     

“双支柱”调控、政策协调搭配与宏观稳定效应

本文通过构建包含金融部门和“双支柱”调控政策的DSGE模型,系统考察了货币政策和宏观审慎政策的组合在不同经济金融冲击下的宏观经济和金融稳定效应。相关分析得出了三个基本结论:一是纳入宏观审慎政策的“双支柱”调控框架确实比单一使用货币政策具有相对更好的经济和金融稳定效应;二是“双支柱”调控框架在应对金融冲击时的稳定效应表现得更加明显,这说明宏观审慎政策确实是通过金融稳定渠道发挥作用的,从而与货币政策侧重实体经济(产出和通胀)的稳定效应形成了有效互补;三是不论是在价格型的货币政策工具下,还是在数量型的货币政策工具下,“双支柱”调控框架都较单一使用货币政策具有更好的经济金融稳定效应,这说明“双支柱”调控框架的有效性不依赖于货币政策工具的改变而改变,在具体的政策工具组合方面具有较为普遍的适用性。     

The ECB's OMTs: A tale of governments,investors, and the central bank

This paper analyses official financial assistance via ESM programmes, with and without the ECB's OMTs. As long as macroeconomic imbalances are small, ESM stand-alone programmes galvanize creditors into rolling over their loans, alleviate the liquidity crisis and help the country to implement adjustment policies. Yet the impact of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms is likely to be recessionary in the short run, since these reforms take a long time to pay off. Recessionary effects raise strategic uncertainty in the roll-over decisions of creditors, thus reducing the effectiveness of ESM liquidity assistance. With large imbalances, liquidity problems can only be overcome with credible and sizable official assistance. Adding OMTs to an ESM programme mitigates the policy dilemma, but does not fully restore investor confidence when macroeconomic imbalances are too large.     

碳定价、双重金融摩擦与“双支柱”调控

本文构建包含异质性企业、双重金融摩擦和“双支柱”政策的DSGE模型来探究碳税和碳交易这两种碳定价政策对中国宏观经济的长短期影响和作用机制。研究发现:(1)两种碳定价政策均会导致经济在短期出现一定衰退,但在长期则有助于推进经济高质量发展,达到更高的均衡水平;(2)在面对碳排放技术冲击时,相比碳税政策,碳交易政策下,碳价大幅波动会进一步加剧经济波动,在碳交易市场中对碳价设定上下限,可以有效地减轻碳排放技术冲击所导致的经济波动;(3)面对气候政策冲击,包含金融部门风险规避的双重金融摩擦会进一步加剧气候政策对宏观经济的负面影响;(4)在经济转型过程中,结构性供需不平衡会引发一定的通胀现象,但此时货币政策不宜对通胀做出过多反应,而应刺激产出,支持绿色发展,推动供需平衡,从根源上解决通胀问题。引入“双支柱”调控后发现,考虑到经济转型风险的宏观审慎政策能显著减弱气候政策所导致的经济波动和金融不稳定,提高居民福利。     

房价波动、金融稳定与最优宏观审慎政策

本文通过构建包含家庭住房抵押借款摩擦和银行贷款摩擦的动态随机一般均衡模型,重点考察了异质性冲击下房价波动对金融稳定的影响。研究发现,房价上涨会导致银行风险溢价及杠杆率显著上升,进而加剧金融体系的内在不稳定。为降低房价波动及维护金融稳定,选取两类宏观审慎政策工具进行逆周期调控实验,结果表明,在住房需求冲击下,金融管理部门应选取贷款价值比政策,且应对房贷积极调控,而对房价进行中性调控。在最终产品部门生产率冲击、房地产部门生产率冲击及跨期偏好冲击下,应选取资本充足率政策,但对房贷和房价调控力度的把握则存在差异。本研究为厘清房价波动对金融稳定的动态传导机制,以及金融管理部门如何选取宏观审慎政策工具以稳定房价并降低系统性金融风险提供了启示。     

住房价格、金融稳定与宏观审慎政策

本文通过建立包含异质性家庭、异质性厂商和金融机构的DSGE模型,分析对预期房价作出反应的货币政策和宏观审慎政策的传导机制和政策效果,研究不同政策的选择和协调问题。研究发现,首先,由于政策的作用范围不同,不同政策会对金融稳定和经济稳定产生不同影响。对预期房价作出反应的货币政策能够抑制住房需求和信贷供给,但也会抑制消费需求和产出;而对预期房价作出反应的逆周期LTV政策和逆周期资本充足率政策在应对房价波动导致的金融稳定问题时更加有的放矢。其次,外生冲击的来源会影响政策的选择和协调——当经济波动来源于需求冲击时,固定LTV政策搭配逆周期资本充足率的宏观审慎政策、不对预期房价作出反应的货币政策表现最优;当经济波动来源于供给冲击时,固定LTV政策搭配逆周期资本充足率的宏观审慎政策、对预期房价作出反应的货币政策表现最优。     

“双支柱”调控框架的理论与经验基础

本文从基本事实、基本理论和基本实践等“底层逻辑”出发,系统阐述了“双支柱”调控的现实必要性、理论合理性和实践可行性,并在此基础上明确了中国实施“双支柱”调控框架的现实基础、实践经验和未来完善方向。本文的研究结果表明,随着金融和宏观经济之间关系的日益深化和复杂化,金融稳定对宏观经济的稳定具有重要影响,但传统旨在维护价格稳定的货币政策无法同时有效实现金融稳定,根据“丁伯根法则”和政策比较优势原理,在货币政策的基础上纳入宏观审慎政策,形成“双支柱”调控框架,分别致力于价格稳定和金融稳定的目标,既符合客观现实的调控需要,也具有理论和实践上的合理性和可行性。从目前全球范围内主要国家的“双支柱”调控实践来看,要进一步形成稳定可靠的政策规则和成熟的操作框架,未来还需重点解决“政策目标、政策工具、政策协调”三个核心问题。本文对这些问题的可能解决路径提供了一些初步的思路和建议。     

Mapping heat in the U.S. financial system

We provide a framework for assessing the build-up of vulnerabilities to the U.S. financial system. We collect forty-six indicators of financial and balance-sheet conditions, cutting across measures of valuation pressures, nonfinancial borrowing, and financial-sector health. We place the data in economic categories, track their evolution, and develop an algorithmic approach to monitoring vulnerabilities that can complement the more judgmental approach of most official-sector organizations. Our approach picks up rising imbalances in the U.S. financial system through the mid-2000s, presaging the financial crisis. We also highlight several statistical properties of our approach: most importantly, our summary measures of system-wide vulnerabilities lead the credit-to-GDP gap (a key gauge in Basel III and related research) by a year or more. Thus, our framework may provide useful information for setting macroprudential policy tools such as the countercyclical capital buffer.     

Monetary policy and financial stability in the long run: A simple game-theoretic approach

Many theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality, central banks play complex, long-horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these strategic interactions in a simple infinite-horizon game with a novel tradeoff: tighter monetary policy deters financial imbalances, but looser monetary policy reduces the likelihood of insolvency. We term these factors discipline and stability effects, respectively. The central bank's welfare decreases with dependence between real and financial shocks, so it may reduce costs with correlation-indexed securities. An independent central bank cannot in general attain both low inflation and financial stability.     

全球金融危机成因的综合反思

2007年金融危机发生在金融、经济、制度高度发达的中心国家,是由世界经济体系的薄弱环节断裂导致的,是对制度模式、经济失衡和国际货币体系的一种调整.金融层面的原因在于次贷危机,金融创新过度,金融衍生产品泛滥,美国金融体系存在诸多不完善之处,金融监管不力、缺失.从经济层面分析,美国国内经济失衡是危机爆发的基础原因,全球经济失衡是2007年金融危机爆发的深层原因,金融危机是市场经济周期运行的必然结果.制度层面的原因主要包括过度干预经济,美国模式的技术缺陷和不合理的国际货币体系.     

Complexity, concentration and contagion

This paper develops a network model of interbank lending in which unsecured claims, repo activity and shocks to the haircuts applied to collateral assume centre stage. We show how systemic liquidity crises of the kind associated with the interbank market collapse of 2007–2008 can arise within such a framework, with funding contagion spreading widely through the web of interlinkages. Our model illustrates how greater complexity and concentration in the financial network may amplify this fragility. The analysis suggests how a range of policy measures – including tougher liquidity regulation, macro-prudential policy, and surcharges for systemically important financial institutions – could make the financial system more resilient.     

External balance adjustment: An intra-national and international comparison

Large external imbalances have become a policy concern. This study investigates the determinants of external balances for regions within a single country—Canadian provinces—as well as for a sample of 18 OECD countries. External balance adjustment may differ for provinces since there are few intra-national barriers to the mobility of capital, goods and labour within Canada. Also, because Canada is a monetary union, there is no currency risk associated with lending and borrowing across provinces, and this may promote inter-provincial financial flows. The estimates show that the short run response of the external balance to disturbances, such as a deterioration in the terms of trade, is typically larger for Canadian provinces than for OECD countries. There is also a much greater speed of adjustment of the external balance in the Canadian provinces. This faster adjustment speed, combined with the larger response of the external balance, means that provinces may see a quicker resolution of external imbalances, but larger deficits or surpluses may emerge before adjustment occurs.