内外资银行监管政策的国际比较及对我国的启示

随着我国全面履行加入世界贸易组织的承诺，银行业对外开放进一步加快。与此相应，内外资银行监管政策的调整也提上议事日程，《外资银行管理条例》已经公布，其实施细则也即将修订。监管政策的变化一方面要反映我国对外资开放政策的变化，同时也有必要借鉴国际上好的经验和做法，创造有利于促进我国银行业竞争、维护市场秩序和保持市场稳定的政策环境。     

我国银行监管面对加入WTO后的对策

我国加入世界贸易组织 (以下简称 WTO)后,银行业将逐步实现与国际金融体系的整体融合,中、外资银行竞争的焦点主要集中在人才、客户、产品与服务、市场以及竞争手段等方面;人民银行的监管也遭遇前所未有的挑战。面对更加激烈的竞争和金融风险的国际化,银行业监管应向国际惯例与标准靠拢。实现我国银行业监管的国际化,必须从监管的立法、监管的体制、监管的内容、监管方式与手段、监管国际合作等方面入手,从而构建适应市场经济、适应金融国际化和全球一体化的新的监管体系,保障我国银行业稳健有序运行,推动我国银行业的国际化进程…     

银行监管的微观基础和战略监管体系选择

本探讨了银行监管的微观基础，认为在信息不对称以及银行业不完全竞争的作用下，银行业具有内在的不稳定性，需要外部监管力量的支撑来维护稳健经营，但是政府机构监管作为监管垄断力量会引发一系列新的道德危害从而导致监管失灵。中详细分析了各种重要的监管措施带来的正负影响，在此基础上提出监管的战略体系至少应当包括监管、激励结构、市场约束和公司治理。     

我国银行业竞争环境的波特模型分析

运用迈克尔·波特的竞争力模型,从竞争强度、市场进入和退出壁垒、供求关系、替代品的威胁以及政府监管等方面分析了银行业的竞争环境问题.分析表明我国银行业市场竞争的有效性逐渐增强,市场竞争强度的加大、金融替代品的增多有助于银行效率的提高,退出机制的不严格使市场的有效性降低,监管政策的调整对银行业整体效率有较大的影响.     

中国银行业监管政策的调整取向

我国正处于经济体制转轨后过渡时期,银行业发展的制度条件、宏观环境、市场结构都发生了很大变化:经济增长方式转变对目前的银行业发展模式提出了挑战,银行业体制改革明显加速,银行业竞争程度日趋激烈,银行业对外开放迈出新步伐。与此相适应,监管当局应积极调整银行监管政策,强化银行监管制度的一致性和整体功能,增强银行监管的有效性。     

贷款损失准备金与资本充足率监管--来自日本银行业的实证分析北大核心CSSCISSCI

在以资本充足率监管为核心的国际银行业监管框架内,贷款损失准备金是影响资本充足率监管有效性的重要因素。本文运用向量自回归模型实证考察了日本银行业贷款准备金政策对资本的影响,实证结果表明:(1)银行增加贷款准备金计提在短期内会对资本造成负面冲击,而长期内却有利于提高资本水平;(2)短期内贷款准备金对资本的负面冲击向长期内贷款准备金对稳定和提高资本水平均衡调整的速度很慢,意味着贷款准备金政策的缺陷严重削弱了日本银行业资本监管的有效性。本文从日本银行业贷款准备金政策的发展进一步分析了实证结果的原因,并且指出我国实施资本充足率监管在完善贷款准备金政策方面的建议。     

浅议我国的银行监管理念

当前，随着我国经济和金融改革的不断深入，国内银行业正经历着一场大的变革和调整，竞争日趋激烈，重组和创新频繁，各种新问题和新情况不断涌现；与此同时，中国加入世贸组织使得外资银行将更多地参与竞争。在这种情况下，承担着银行监管重任的我们，该如何适应形势发展需要，更好地维护银行业的稳定与健康发展呢?当务之急就是与时俱进，树立正确的银行监管理念，在此基础上，及时调整监管工作思路，实现高效、规范监管。     

特许权价值、市场竞争与银行稳定研究述评

次贷危机、金融危机乃至主权债务危机持续牵动着金融从业者的神经,金融系统的稳定性,尤其是银行系统的稳定性引起了业界的广泛关注。在金融一体化和金融自由化日益发展的今天,银行业竞争的格局也在发生着深刻地变化,那么,市场竞争到底是有利于银行系统稳定还是不利于银行系统稳定？通过从特许权价值假说、竞争稳定假说以及市场竞争对银行稳定影响渠道等方面,对该领域的研究成果进行系统的分析和评价,以期为国内相关领域的研究提供借鉴和启示。     

贷款损失准备金与资本充足率监管——来自日本银行业的实证分析

在以资本充足率监管为核心的国际银行业监管框架内,贷款损失准备金是影响资本充足率监管有效性的重要因素。本文运用向量自回归模型实证考察了日本银行业贷款准备金政策对资本的影响,实证结果表明:(1)银行增加贷款准备金计提在短期内会对资本造成负面冲击,而长期内却有利于提高资本水平;(2)短期内贷款准备金对资本的负面冲击向长期内贷款准备金对稳定和提高资本水平均衡调整的速度很慢,意味着贷款准备金政策的缺陷严重削弱了日本银行业资本监管的有效性。本文从日本银行业贷款准备金政策的发展进一步分析了实证结果的原因,并且指出我国实施资本充足率监管在完善贷款准备金政策方面的建议。     

建立我国银行业持续性监管机制的几点思考

建立银行业持续性监管机制是提高银行业监管效率,发挥银行业监管职能作用的重要基础工程,也是保证银行业稳健发展的关键所在,本文在对建立我国银行业持续性监管机制保障性要素进行分析的基础上,就如何建立我国银行业持续性监管机制提出了若干政策建议。     

Are Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?

Using the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic as a measure of competition in 45 countries, we find that more competitive banking systems are less prone to experience a systemic crisis and exhibit increased time to crisis. This result holds even when we control for banking system concentration, which is associated with higher probability of a crisis and shorter time to crisis. Our results indicate that competition and concentration capture different characteristics of banking systems, meaning that concentration is an inappropriate proxy for competition. The findings suggest that policies promoting competition among banks, if well executed, have the potential to improve systemic stability.     

最优银行集中度之谜

本文通过对89组跨国数据的实证分析,系统研究了银行集中度和银行体系稳定性之间的关系。实证结果表明,银行集中度和银行稳定性之间的关系并不是过往文献所集中讨论的简单线性关系,而是存在一个最优的银行集中度区间(0.6,0.8],这一区间恰好位于样本均值附近,并向样本均值收敛;而当一国的银行集中度水平处于(0.8,0.9]时,银行体系的稳定性最低,极易发生银行危机。进一步的分析表明,在最优的银行集中度区间内,银行业的产业结构能较好地在适度竞争和盈利之间获得平衡,而隐藏在"最优银行集中度之谜"背后的机制极有可能是"优胜劣汰"这一自然法则在社会经济领域的再现。     

Concentration and foreign penetration in Latin American banking sectors: Impact on competition and risk

In the 1990s, Latin American banking sectors experienced an accelerated process of concentration and foreign penetration that prompted diverse views regarding its implications for the competitive behavior of banks and the financial stability of the system. In this paper, we examine these issues exploiting a rich bank-level database for eight Latin American countries. We find that, while increased concentration did not weaken banking competition within the region, foreign penetration appears to have led to a less competitive industry. Moreover, we find that bank risk has been negatively associated with competition which, coupled with the previous finding, explains the positive link between banking sector stability and foreign penetration revealed by the data.     

银行业竞争度问题研究最新发展

本文按照不同研究主线,对2000年前后至今银行业竞争度研究的相关文献进行系统整理。文献资料表明,国外研究主要从银行业竞争与经济金融发展与稳定的关系、银行业竞争度的测算方法、银行业竞争度在国别和规模上的差异以及银行业竞争度的影响因素这四个方面展开。国内研究则主要从中国银行业竞争度的识别、银行业竞争度的地区和规模差异、银行...     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

Bank Market Structure, Competition, and SME Financing Relationships in European Regions

How do concentration and competition in the European banking sector affect lending relationships between small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and their banks? Recent empirical evidence suggests that concentration and competition capture different characteristics of banking systems. Using a unique dataset on SMEs for selected European regions, we empirically investigate the impact of increasing concentration and competition on the number of lending relationships maintained by SMEs. We find that competition has a positive effect on the number of lending relationships, weak evidence that concentration reduces the number of banking relationships and weak persistent evidence that they tend to offset each other.     

Competition and stability in the credit industry: Banking vs. factoring industries

Over the last decade, most credit-industries registered a decline in lending volumes, while factoring industries instead registered a substantial growth in terms of turnover. Surprisingly, only a handful of papers so far investigate factoring companies. Do factoring firms display the same stability levels of banks? Is the competition similar in factoring and banking industries? Is the relationship between competition and stability the same in these industries? Focusing on Italy (one of the largest factoring and banking markets in Europe) and using a unique dataset, we show three main results: factoring companies are (on average) more stable than banks; 2) the stability of factoring companies increase when competition declines (competition-fragility view); 3) the competition-fragility view is weaker in the factoring industry than in the banking industry. Our findings indicate that competition in the Italian credit industry was greater in factoring than in banking.     

Banking stability,competition, and economic volatility

The paper analyzes the influence of banking stability on the volatility of industrial value added using data for 110 countries. Our results confirm the relevance of lending and asset allocation effects because banking stability reduces the volatility of value added more in industries that have greater external financial dependence and intangible intensity when they are located in countries with more developed financial and institutional systems. Moreover, banking stability helps reduce economic volatility more in countries with less bank market competition. We control for recessions, reverse causality problems, and endogeneity of banking stability.     

Bank concentration,competition, and crises: First results

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.     

Competition,Efficiency, and Stability in Banking

We examine the effect of competition on banking stability using a new measure of competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient banks to efficient ones. In a sample of European Banks, we find that this measure does capture competition, that competition is stability‐enhancing, and that the stability‐enhancing effect of competition is greater for healthy banks than for fragile ones. Our results suggest that efficiency is the conduit through which competition contributes to stability and that regulators must condition policy on the health of existing banks.