Alternation of parties in power and economic volatility: testing the rational partisan hypothesis and policy learning hypothesis

Right and left parties have distinct macroeconomic preferences that could create different levels of volatility during their executive tenures. But rational partisan theory argues that, because actors in the economy anticipate ruling party behavior, partisan differences only matter when election outcomes are uncertain. We argue that policy risk from ruling parties extends beyond elections, leading to important variation in growth volatility that occurs during a ruling party’s tenure. Building on theories of policy risk and learning, we argue that after elections, economic actors still face uncertainty about the policies of new ruling parties. With time in power, new ruling parties build policy track records, reducing policy risk and, thus, volatility. We estimate a learning curve model of ruling party duration’s effect on the variation in quarterly GDP growth rates. Using data from 44 democracies between 1981 and 2009, we find that learning processes extend beyond the conclusion of uncertain elections.     

Evolutionary dynamics of supervision-compliance game on optimal pre-positioning strategies in relief supply chain management

Emergency supply reserves are indispensable material bases in relief supply chain management. However, limited in-kind relief resources stockpiled in government-managed depositories may fail to meet the surging demand following the disaster. This paper develops an optimal pre-positioning strategy for emergency supplies with pre-purchasing contracts between local governments (LGs) and emergency supply manufacturers (ESMs) to properly address demand uncertainty in different disaster scenarios. Physical materials and production capacity are integrated into a holistic and hybrid reserve model to mitigate overstock or stock-out risks. Applying an evolutionary game-theoretic framework, contract enforcement has been extensively analyzed to avoid LGs dereliction of duty and ESMs’ breach of contract. A novel dynamic penalty mechanism is proposed to control the fluctuations in strategy choices and effectively improve ESMs’ compliance without LGs’ excessive inputs on supervision. The numerical simulation results, along with sensitivity analyses on major cost-accounting, demand characteristics, and environmental parameters, show that safety stock is the primary guarantee in most cases, while reactive stock acts as an important supplement for disasters with long-term consequences. The joint reserve policy (except for no action strategy) outperforms the price-only contract on the total reserved quantity of emergency supplies at a lower long-term average cost. The initial state and cost-benefit structures dominate the complex interplay and periodical fluctuations in the supervision-compliance game. The doomed cycle of order, disorder, and reorder in contract performance management can be well managed under the proposed dynamic penalty mechanism, which appears much more efficient and incentive-compatible in promoting both parties to fulfill their obligations.     

Does participatory budgeting improve decentralized public service delivery? Experimental evidence from rural Russia

We present findings of the first experimental evaluation of the participatory budgeting (PB) model carried out in rural Russia within the context of a major decentralization reform. The reform aimed (among other things) to increase citizens’ participation in budgetary decision making and to strengthen public oversight over budget implementation in rural settlements. The experiment provided randomly allocated training and technical assistance to the settlement population and local authorities helping to introduce PB practices into the budgetary cycle. We document that training alone was not successful to ensure an effective implementation of PB. By contrast, training coupled with on-the-ground technical assistance generated full implementation of the PB cycle. Overall, we find that the implementation of PB increased citizen’s engagement in public decision making and raised local tax revenue collection. However, we find larger effects when the PB model was implemented in settlements with more years of prior experience with political and administrative decentralization. Among these settlements, we find that PB not only increased citizen’s participation and tax revenue collection, but also that preferences for public services between authorities and citizens were better aligned, local administrations allocated larger fractions of public budgets to services identified as top priorities by citizens, and citizens were more satisfied with public services. Our findings highlight: (1) the importance of context specific on-the-ground technical assistance to ensure effective implementation of participatory models; and (2) the relevance of taking the historical and institutional context into account when planning and sequencing meaningful participatory decentralization reforms.     

Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending?

Do political institutions shape the structure of public spending? Based on a sample of elections in eighteen Western European countries over the period 1970–1998, this paper shows that governments’ margin of maneuverability to design and implement fiscal policies depends on the level of party linkage or the nationalization of party systems, defined as the extent to which parties are uniformly successful in winning votes across districts. The mechanism behind this argument is that in weakly nationalized countries there are additional transaction costs to change the structure of budgets as a consequence of the survival of local parties and interests. Therefore, the composition of public spending is more rigid here than in highly nationalized countries.     

A grant rationing model for a health care system.

Most public health programs are created through a political process and the health administrator's resource allocation decision is influenced not only by the relative performance of the subunits but also by political considerations. This paper presents a goal programming model for rationing available grants to competing health care subunits on the basis of performance subject to resource and political constraints. Performance is defined in terms of output adjusted for non-compliance on the identified quality of care and administrative efficiency criteria. The quality and efficiency criteria are those specified by the Federal agency as amended by local funding authorities and subunit administrators through a Delphi process. The model has the advantage of flexibility and can be easily adapted to suit prevailing financial and political conditions. In particular, it can be used as a viable analytical tool in health care and other public service agencies where political considerations are important in resource allocation decisions.     

Combining strengths of methods of party positioning to counter their weaknesses: the development of a new methodology to calibrate parties on issues and ideological dimensions

In this paper we review various methods of party positioning on issues and abstract political dimensions and describe the method that has been developed specifically for the Dutch voting advice application Kieskompas (Election Compass). Basically there are five methods for positioning political parties on political issues and on deeper-lying conflict dimensions: (a) expert surveys (b) voter surveys, (c) party elite surveys, (d) on the basis of roll-call behaviour (e) placements based on manifesto coding (either hand coded or by computer-based calibration). After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods, we argue that combining expert placements with text-based calibration (using party manifestos) results in an improved methodology to position political parties on issues and bipolar political dimensions. This new methodology, that was developed for the Voting Advice Application Kieskompas, combines a text-based expert judgement, party-manifesto coding (including computer-based search techniques) and a self-placement by political parties. This process increases the validity and reliability of estimating party positions on political issues.     

Career dynamics: managing the superior/subordinate relationship

Building on research and writing in the fields of career management and mentor relationships, Baird and Kram analyze the superior-subordinate relationship as an exchange to which each party brings different needs and resources. They point out that this relationship can be productive and satisfying--both for the parties concerned and for the organization--when the needs of one party match the resources of the other. The article includes a checklist for analyzing how the superior-subordinate relationship operates as an exchange and how the resources of the parties mesh or fail to mesh. They do on to show how the superior-subordinate relationship and the needs of the parties change as each moves through individual career and life cycles. What was once a productive relationship may, in time, become unproductive, or vice versa. In any event, its dynamic nature requires that it be managed. Baird and Kram suggest five steps for managing the relationship as it moves through these changes: (1) Recognizing that the relationship is an exchange; (2) identifying clearly one's own as well as the other party's needs; (3) understanding how the subordinate's and boss's needs fit together and recognizing that the relationship is likely to change; (4) understanding the constraints under which the boss operates; (5) establishing a feedback and evaluation process for continuously assessing the relationship.     

Do political parties matter for local land use policies?

Despite interest in the impact of land use regulations on housing construction and housing prices, little is known about the drivers of these policies. Conventional wisdom holds that homeowners have an influence on restrictive local zoning. In this paper, we contend that the party controlling local government might make a major difference. We draw on data from a large sample of Spanish cities for the 2003–2007 political term and employ a regression discontinuity design to document that cities controlled by left-wing parties convert much less land from rural to urban uses than is the case in similar cities controlled by the right. The differences between governments on the two sides of the political spectrum are more pronounced in places with greater population heterogeneity and in those facing higher housing demand. We also present evidence suggesting that these partisan differences might ultimately impact on housing construction and housing price growth.     

The Euro System as a Laboratory for Neoliberalism: The Case of Spain

Since the 1970s, neoliberalism has evolved from ideology to political agenda, from political program to public policy, and from public policy to a system that replaces democratic control over economic policy with a system of elite economic management. This process of change has been possible due to the endorsement of a meta‐political theory that destroys democracy and legitimizes technocratic despotism, financial deregulation, the debasement of labor into a new proletariat, and the purging of constitutional politics. In this article, we analyze this profound transformation of social and legal relations in the “euro system” and, specifically, in the regressive policies that have emerged from the “crisis” in Spain, a peripheral country of the European Union. The problems in contemporary Europe are a direct consequence of the neoliberal version of European economic unity. Their solution will depend on the capacity of the member states to create a social Europe that strengthens institutional democracy and develops universal systems of social protection. This, in turn, will depend on the ability of citizens to remodel state institutions in accordance with new social goals that place life at the center.     

Preferences of citizens for public expenditures on elementary and secondary education

This paper presents an empirical analysis of citizens' preferences for public elementary and secondary education expenditures. Survey data collected in conjunction with a school tax referendum and a multinomial probit random utility model are used to make inferences concerning the preference mappings of citizens. These estimated mappings, in turn, imply unique estimates of the demands of citizens for public education expenditures. Citizens' beliefs concerning whether expenditures are wisely spent and will affect school quality are seen to be important determinants of demand. The impact of citizens' perceptions of tax costs is also considered.     

通向社会主义的波兰道路的启示——以政党执政规律为视角

从政党执政规律的视角,考察战后初期波兰工人党"国内派"提出并付诸于实践的波兰道路,可以获得一些有益的启示。这就是执政党应坚持走适合本民族特点的发展道路,执政党要实行符合具体国情的政党体制,执政党确立的所有制结构要适应生产力的发展水平,执政党要始终代表最广大人民的根本利益。     

管理贸易的政治市场供求分析

一国贸易政策的制定不仅要考虑国与国之间的政治、经济关系,而且还要考虑国内公众、利益集团、政府等行为主体间的政治、经济关系.管理贸易既是一种贸易理论,也是一种贸易政策、贸易体制.在一些经济学家建立的贸易政策的政治供求基本模型基础上对管理贸易从政治需求、供给、均衡的角度进行分析后发现,一国的政治和社会体制对管理贸易政策有一定的决定作用,而一国管理贸易政策也会对该国的政治有一定影响,管理贸易政策与政治利益是相互作用、密不可分的.     

The political bottom line: the emerging dimension to corporate responsibility for sustainable development

This paper explores the idea that businesses are being moved to proactively manage their political activities and influence in relation to their often‐expressed responsibility for promoting sustainable development, which we define as managing the ‘political bottom line’. We argue that three key drivers account for this shift: first, the growing criticism of voluntary corporate responsibility initiatives; second, the increasing awareness and targeting of corporate political activities, and third, a realization among certain corporate executives and financiers that, without changes to public policies, an individual company's own voluntary responsibility may not deliver sufficient commercial returns. We describe several initiatives on public policy dimensions of sustainable development, which indicate that some companies are beginning to manage their political power in light of societal concerns. In conclusion, we discuss the potential and limits of a ‘political bottom line’ concept by critiquing the mainstream triple bottom line discourse.Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

战后初期波兰工人党与社会党基本主张的相近性及其启示

战后初期,波兰工人党与波兰社会党关于波兰未来发展道路的基本主张有着许多的相近之处。当时,两党都同意波兰将沿着社会主义的方向前进,政治上主张多党联合执政,经济上主张多元混合经济,都希望以两个工人政党的合作为基础,通过和平的民主方式,走一条符合波兰特点的社会主义道路。比较和总结波兰两个工人政党基本主张的相近性,对于共产党探索执政规律来说,能够获得一些可以借鉴的有益启示。     

The impact of matching mission preferences on well-being at work

A recent literature in economics assumes that workers differ in their mission preferences. These studies predict a premium on the matching of mission preferences between a worker and employer. This paper uses data from the Dutch LISS panel to examine this prediction for government workers. Results show that government workers report higher satisfaction with the type of work they do when their political preferences match those of the political parties in office as compared to when their political preferences do not match. A match of political preferences has no effect on the work type satisfaction of workers employed outside the government sector.     

网络民主对我国政党制度的影响和对策研究

网络民主对我国政党制度的影响有积极和消极两个方面,在坚持我国政党制度的基础上,要加强对网络民主的管理,推动网络民主的繁荣健康发展,建立和完善网络化政党。     

Political institutions behind good governance

The present paper investigates the role of political institutions — namely, political regimes and electoral rules — in shaping the capacity of the government to implement policies that address citizens’ preferences, i.e., “good governance”. The empirical analysis, conducted on a panel of 80 democratic countries over the period 1996–2011, shows that the performance of the government depends on the interaction between electoral rules and political regimes. In particular, the performance of a government under a presidential regime improves when associated with a majoritarian electoral rule, while it worsens with a proportional electoral rule.     

Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods

We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making on the provision of local public goods. Decisions are influenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdictional size. Centralized decisions are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result in either efficient, excessive, or misallocative provision of public goods. The form of centralized decision making has a significant influence on the incentives for centralizing decision making.     

Does ownership matter for service delivery value? an examination of citizens’ service satisfaction

Governments across the world outsource service delivery to external agents, but does ownership matter for service delivery value? Though theory points to clear ownership differences on effectiveness, there remains limited empirical evidence of the impact of ownership on citizens’ satisfaction. Focusing on local authorities in England, we draw on secondary data (2007 and 2009) to examine if ownership type matters. The findings indicate that ownership – public, non-profit, private – confers no direct benefits for citizens’ satisfaction suggesting that the outsourcing decision should not rely on unfounded assumptions about performance differentials between ownership types. The implications for public management are explored.     

Social networks and citizen election forecasting: The more friends the better

Most citizens correctly forecast which party will win a given election, and such forecasts usually have a higher level of accuracy than voter intention polls. How do citizens do it? We argue that social networks are a big part of the answer: much of what we know as citizens comes from our interactions with others. Previous research has considered only indirect characteristics of social networks when analyzing why citizens are good forecasters. We use a unique German survey and consider direct measures of social networks in order to explore their role in election forecasting. We find that three network characteristics –  size, political composition, and frequency of political discussion – are among the most important variables when predicting the accuracy of citizens’ election forecasts.