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1.
This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks' monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare. 相似文献
2.
In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust. 相似文献
3.
Yasuhito Tanaka 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):693-700
Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry,
there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables,
price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an
assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition
(their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game,
a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献