Wages and Employment in China''s SOEs, 1980–1994: Corporatization, Market Development, and Insider Forces

Using firm-level panel data, we evaluate the importance of reform measures, market development, and insider forces in wage and employment determination in China's state sector. Initial output per worker is positively correlated with change in employment, and market wages are significantly associated with firm employment and wages in the later period. Both indicate development of the labor markets. Corporatization lowered wages by 11 to 15% and improved productivity by 6%. Finally, we find evidence that labor markets for managers and engineers have been developed more than those for production workers and that wage premiums for college graduates have increased dramatically since the late 1980's. J. Comp. Econom., December 1999, 27(4), pp. 702–729. IRIS, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742.     

Wealth inequality and employment fluctuations

This paper is concerned with the business cycle dynamics in search and matching models of the labor market when agents are ex-post heterogeneous. We focus on heterogeneity caused by different labor market histories and the resulting wealth inequality they generate. We show that this inequality implies wage rigidity relative to a complete insurance economy. The fraction of wealth poor agents prevents real wages from falling too much in recessions, since small decreases in income imply large losses in utility. Analogously, wages rise less during expansions than in models with homogeneous workers as small increases are enough for poor workers to accept job offers. This mechanism reduces the volatility of wages but generates more volatile employment levels.     

Wage differentials, discrimination and efficiency

I analyze a large labor market where homogeneous firms post wages to direct the search of workers who differ in productivity. I show that the model has a unique equilibrium. The wage differential depends positively on the workers’ productivity differential only when the latter is large. When the productivity differential is small, high-productivity workers get a lower wage than low-productivity workers. This reverse wage differential remains even when the productivity differential shrinks to zero. However, the equilibrium is socially efficient. High-productivity workers always get the employment priority and higher expected wages than low-productivity workers. Although discrimination in terms of expected wages does not exist, conventional measures are likely to incorrectly find discrimination in the model.     

The Role of the Safety Net and the Labor Market on Falling Cash Consumption in Russia: 1994–96 A Quintile-Based Decomposition Analysis

This paper investigates the relative importance of changes in social safety net support and labor market in explaining the decline in the purchasing power of Russian households that occurred during the period 1994–96. Drawing on three cross-sections of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, we find that labor market changes have been the main cause of the observed decline in cash consumption. Among these changes, reductions in the impact of the time spent in employment and increasing frequency of wage arrears are most important, more so than increases in open unemployment or the fall in real wages among workers who were fully paid. The contribution of falling state transfers to cash consumption is nonetheless substantial. We also find that the sources of the decline in household welfare vary substantially across quintiles in the distribution.     

DIRECTED SEARCH ON THE JOB AND THE WAGE LADDER*

We model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers' search using wage offers and employment probabilities. Applicants observe all offers and face a trade‐off between wage and employment probability. There is wage dispersion among workers, even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous. Equilibrium wages form a ladder, as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time. This is because low‐wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage, with a lower chance of success.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.     

Wages in a growing Russia

The robust Russian economic recovery after the 1998 financial crisis raised the economic standing of the population, especially for lowly paid workers, most of whom are women. In this paper I use the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey from 1996 through 2002 to ask whether this helped to reduce the gender wage gap. I first focus on those whose wages are paid in full. Next, I ask about the gender composition of wage arrears as the overall extent of wage arrears dropped from 60 to 20 per cent after the 1998 crisis. I show that a temporary widening of the overall gender wage gap in 2000 is due to low‐wage women becoming more likely to receive their wages in full than low‐wage men. Except for this effect, the male–female pay difference in Russia exhibits a stable pattern.     

Will East Germany Become a New Mezzogiorno?

Despite massive regional policy efforts, GDP per capita in Southern Italy has only briefly converged on Northern Italian levels in the 1960's. Failure of convergence since then is associated with a policy switch from investment toward income maintenance, with reduced wage sensitivity to regional labor market conditions and with increases in rent-seeking opportunities and corruption. East Germany's early experience of rapid wage and income, but not productivity, convergence raised fears that aMezzogiornoscenario could be repeated. Since then, however, investment and productivity have risen while wage setting has become more flexible. Given East Germany's greater “social capability” for growth, and provided that investment continues to be encouraged, the prospects for convergence are now more promising.J. Comp. Econom.,June 1997,24(3), pp. 241–264. Magdalen College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4AU, United Kingdom; University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom; and School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom.     

Asymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages and the Location of Firms

This paper studies the behavior of firms towards weak protection of labor standards in developing countries (South). A less than perfectly elastic labor supply in the South gives firms an oligopsony position in the labor market tempting them to strategically reduce output to cut wages. In an open economy, competitors operating where labor standards are recognized meanwhile enjoy less aggressive competitors and raise output. Delocation also increases Southern wages and triggers a competition effect, lowering ex post output and hence potential profits of a relocating firm. These effects reduce relative profitability of moving production to the South casting doubts on traditional beliefs that multinationals are attracted to regions with lower wages. Moreover, adopting a minimum wage policy in the South eliminates the oligopsony distortion and improves competitiveness of Southern firms in the world product market. It also enhances consumer and wage surplus in the South and hence unambiguously raises Southern welfare.     

Tenures That Shook the World: Worker Turnover in Russia, Poland, and Britain

We study worker turnover to investigate to what extent the length of time a worker has been employed by a firm shapes the turnover process in a transition economy. Using survey data, we compare the pattern of turnover with a Western economy, Britain. We show that tenure-turnover rates are higher in Russia and lower in Poland than in Britain. The characteristics of workers hired in the state and private sectors do not look very different. State and private sector firms in Poland offer the same wages to new recruits, but new private sector jobs in Russia appear to offer wage premia relative to new state jobs. We argue that these observations are consistent with a framework in which the value of seniority in jobs begun under the old order may be small and the value of a continued job match unsure, offset, in Poland at least, by insider resistance to layoffs.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 639–664. Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, IZA, Bonn, The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, and EERC, Kiev; Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, IZA, Bonn, and The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor.     

Minimum Wage: Does it Improve Welfare in Thailand?

We study the causal impact of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes, household consumption, inequality and poverty in Thailand by relying on policy variation in minimum wages over time across provinces. We find that minimum‐wage increases have a large and significant impact on the likelihood of working in the uncovered sector among workers with elementary education. However, the impact is very small and insignificant among other labor market groups. In contrast, the minimum wage has large positive effects on the formal sector wages of low‐earning workers, such as the young, elderly and low educated. Increases in the minimum wage are associated with reductions in household poverty and consumption inequality at the bottom half of the distribution.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion,Firm Size,and Growth

This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium wage dynamics and wage dispersion across firms. It considers a labor market where firms set wages and workers use on-the-job search to look for better paid work. It analyzes a perfect equilibrium where each firm can change its wage paid at any time, and workers use optimal quit strategies. Firms trade off higher wages against a lower quit rate, and large firms (those with more employees) always pay higher wages than small firms. Non-steady-state dispersed price equilibria are also analyzed, which describe how wages vary as each firm and the industry as a whole grow over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, J41.     

Oligopsony and the distribution of wages

We propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market. Our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. We completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that “inside” and “outside” forces interact in wage determination. This interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Labor Market Institutions, Wages, and Investment: Review and Implications

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure,affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets withfrictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequalityin the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europein the 1980s. These different trends are the result of differentinvestment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held byless skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives toinvest in less skilled workers, because minimum wages or unioncontracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paidto these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investmentsin training and physical capital across the Atlantic, whichis roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning. (JEL E22,E24, J23, J24, J31)     

劳动力市场的所有制分割与城乡收入差距

目前缺少系统的农民工工资的面板数据妨碍了对城镇劳动力市场的所有制分割如何影响城乡收入差距的研究。本文证明城镇集体经济部门的平均工资可以作为农民工工资的代理变量,并将城镇国有部门的平均工资与集体部门的平均工资的比例作为衡量城镇劳动力市场所有制分割的指标。笔者通过对中国1978—2008年间省际面板数据的回归分析发现,劳动力市场的所有制分割本身具有扩大城乡收入差距的效应,但是,非国有部门职工比重的增加会削弱所有制分割的影响,从而有助于缩小城乡收入差距。     

PRODUCT MARKET AND THE SIZE–WAGE DIFFERENTIAL*

Using directed search to model the product market and the labor market, I show that large plants can pay higher wages to homogeneous workers and earn higher expected profit per worker than small plants, although plants are identical except size. A large plant charges a higher price for its product and compensates buyers with a higher service probability. To capture this size‐ related benefit, large plants try to become larger by recruiting at high wages. This size–wage differential survives labor market competition because a high wage is harder to get than a low wage. Moreover, the size–wage differential increases with the product demand when demand is initially low and falls when demand is already high.     

MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY IN A SEARCH MODEL*

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option.     

Networks in labor markets: Wage and employment dynamics and inequality

We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which agents hear about jobs. We show that both wages and employment are positively associated (a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor market, then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop-out rates and there will be a persistent differences in wages between groups according to the starting states of their networks.     

Migration and imperfect labor markets: Theory and cross-country evidence from Denmark,Germany and the UK

We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock. In Germany immigration involves only moderate wage, but large unemployment effects, since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility. The reverse is true for the UK and Denmark.