在华风险投资分歧急剧加大

在中国宏观经济迅猛增长及政策层面强力推动下,2006年的中国风险投资业延续了自2004年以来的高速增长态势,2006年投资金额达到143.64亿元,比2005年增加22.17%.2006年新募集的风险资本中,超过一半的风险资本来源于海外,占到65.1%,由外资主导的投资额超过109.29亿元,占总投资额的76.1%.     

The poor are twice cursed: Wealth inequality and inefficient credit market

This paper investigates the role of unobservable wealth differences on credit market equilibrium, given there is also asymmetric information concerning effort preferences and choices. In equilibrium, poor but able entrepreneurs may subsidise the rich and incompetent or be excluded. As a result, investment may exceed or fall short of the optimal level. Low inequality may deliver conditions for perfect screening and an efficient level of investment. The equilibrium with cross subsidisation is consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical observations.     

贸易信用的未来

18个月前,使用贸易信用保险的公司还很少,他们中的大多数甚至还不了解贸易信用保险的真正价值所在。贸易信用保险是帮助贸易商规避坏账风险的工具。你不能指望一个评级机构会为其评级的差错提供赔偿。     

The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

On debt service and renegotiation when debt-holders are more strategic

The contingent claims analysis of firm financing often presents a debt renegotiation game with a passive bank that does not use its ability to force liquidation strategically, contrary to what is observed in practice. We consider two motives that may lead a bank to refuse to renegotiate: maintaining its reputation to preserve its future lending activity and deterring firms from overstating their debt service abatement when they renegotiate. We show that with public information and private debt only, the optimal probability of debt renegotiation is high when the firm’s anticipated liquidation value is high. Under asymmetric information about liquidation value, the high liquidation value firm may be tempted to mimic the low liquidation value firm to reduce its debt service. To deter such mimicking, banks may sometimes refuse to renegotiate with firms having a low liquidation value.     

On the nature of credit demand and credit rationing in competitive credit markets

Conventional analyses of the credit rationing problem seek to explain that problem within the context of classic demand analysis. In this paper we demonstrate that it is generally inappropriate to apply the notion of classic demand to credit markets, consequently, conventional notions of credit rationing must be rejected. In providing a new definition of credit rationing we also establish the previously rejected characterized by credit rationing.     

针对信用卡套现的监管难在哪里

信用卡套现,是指持卡人使用信用卡在商户进行虚假消费,使其信用卡账户产生消费记录,并通过披着合法外衣的商户取出现金的一种违法行为。一直以来,套现行为屡禁不止,套现手段花样翻新,而且此类案件往往破案代价极高,即便案件成功告破,大部分资金也无法追回,给发卡银行造成了无法弥补的资金损失。     

The alchemy of CDO credit ratings

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts. The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up. Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill the gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations we document the rating practices of CLOs and analyze their structures.     

The information content of trade credit

During 1992–2007, suppliers financed almost 10% of the total assets of US listed firms. This intensive usage of trade credit is puzzling in the light of its high (implicit) costs. By arguing that trade credit use provides valuable information to outside investors, we first derive a theoretical model that predicts a positive correlation between trade credit use and the quality of the firm’s investments. Then, using several proxies for firm’s investment quality (Z-score, return on assets, and long-run abnormal returns), we show that this prediction receives strong support from a large sample of US firms.     

The growth of US credit unions

The growth of US credit unions during the 1990s is investigated empirically, using univariate and multivariate cross sectional and panel estimation techniques. Univariate tests of the law of proportionate effect suggest that in general large credit unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts. On average credit unions with above-average growth in one period tended to experience below-average growth in the next. Smaller credit unions tended to have more variable growth than large ones. While credit unions share a common co-operative philosophy, they differ in terms of age profile, scope for membership growth, charter type and financial structure and performance. In estimations of a multivariate growth model, most of these characteristics are found to have a significant influence on the size-growth relationship. While large state chartered credit unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts, the reverse was true for federally chartered credit unions. In general, if larger credit unions grew faster than smaller ones, they tended to do so for specific reasons: because their charters were less restrictive, because they were more efficient, or because they had a financial structure that was more conducive to growth. Therefore credit union growth was not ‘random', but highly systematic.