Extraneous Alternatives And Strategy-Proofness

It is well known that the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem cannot be circumvented by adding extraneous alternatives that are included in the individual preference information but are never selected. We generalize this by proving that, for any domain on which every strategy-proof rule is dictatorial, the addition of extraneous alternatives will not permit the construction of a non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rule if the new domain is a product set. We show how this result, and our other theorem, can be applied to seven families of social choice situations, including those in which more than one alternative is selected.     

Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

A social choice function satisfies the tops‐only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most‐preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy‐proofness implies the tops‐only property provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this paper, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy‐proof social choice function satisfies the tops‐only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences.     

Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object

We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rules. Alternatively, this class of rules, which largely consists of serially dictatorial components, can be characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness (in terms of welfare). Furthermore, we study properties of fairness such as anonymity and no-envy. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D63, D71.     

Inequality and Participative Democracy: A Self-Reinforcing Mechanism

During the last three decades, a notable increase in economic inequality is observed, accompanied by a decline in people's engagement in politics and electoral participation. This is an unsatisfactory phenomenon as it undermines the legitimacy of democratic representation. This negative association is produced by a complex salient mechanism. This study aims at investigating this issue. Using data from a panel of 28 OECD and European countries, this paper identifies a two-way causal relationship between inequality and political participation. The results show that greater income inequality alienates and discourages people from engaging with common affairs, thus leading to lower political participation. Yet, lower electoral participation leads towards a less equitable distribution of income. Hence, this study reveals a self-reinforcing mechanism where the unequal distribution of income leads to political exclusion, which in turn leads to more inequality.     

Democracy and growth

Growth and democracy (subjective indexes of political freedom) are analyzed for a panel of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. The favorable effects on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and high human capital. Once these kinds of variables and the initial level of real per capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative. There is a suggestion of a nonlinear relationship in which more democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained. Improvements in the standard of living—measured by GDP, health status, and education—substantially raise the probability that political freedoms will grow. These results allow for predictions about which countries will become more or less democratic over time.     

From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy

A critical issue of a constitutional democracy is to determine an optimal limitation of citizens' political liberties. This problem is analysed here within the framework of a parliamentary system of government, and in the context of Rawls' principle of equal political participation. It is argued that optimal barriers to entry into political competition are a function of the legislative decision rules, the domain of collective choices, and the rules for selecting (and dismissing) the executive. Contrary to Schumpeter and Riker who rejected populism (the approach that public policy should be a result of citizens' preferences), we argue that it is possible to reconcile greater citizen participation and liberal democracy with an appropriate institutional design.     

Democracy and environmental quality

We develop and estimate an econometric model of the relationship between several local and global air pollutants and economic development while allowing for critical aspects of the socio-political-economic regime of a State. We obtain empirical support for our hypothesis that democracy and its associated freedoms provide the conduit through which agents can exercise their preferences for environmental quality more effectively than under an autocratic regime, thus leading to decreased concentrations or emissions of pollution. However, additional factors such as income inequality, age distribution, education, and urbanization may mitigate or exacerbate the net effect of the type of political regime on pollution, depending on the underlying societal preferences and the weights assigned to those preferences by the State.     

社会资本与草根民主——罗伯特·帕特南的《使民主运转起来》

文章回顾了历史以来关于民主理论的研究 ,认为帕特南于 1993年发表的《使民主运转起来 :现代意大利的公民传统》是近年来西方民主理论研究方面影响最大的著作之一。作者对《使民主运转起来》一书的宗旨、理论框架、主要观点及其创新之处进行了评论 ,指出“社会资本”是《使民主运转起来》引入的最重要的分析范畴 ,而《使民主运转起来》的出版无疑有力地推动了西方民主理论的发展。     

Choosing Democracy

In an autocracy, the ruling elite allocates resources to unproductive contest activities in order to protect its power. This paper establishes that a flatter income distribution, a slow-growing or shrinking capital stock, and a decrease in the relative size of the workforce increases the likelihood of a decision by the ruling elite to negotiate a transition to democracy. In a model of economic cooperation and political conflict, the losses from ceding control over the tax rate may be lower than the costs of defending minority privilege. These predictions are evaluated in the light of the South African and other recent transitions.     

协和式民主——对阿尔蒙德西方民主体系类型的扩展

加布里埃尔·阿尔蒙德曾把西方民主体系归结成三种类型。文章在此基础上进行了拓展,讨论了协和式民主概念,并从亚文化中的精英关系、亚文化中的大众关系、亚文化中的精英与大众关系三个方面探讨了促进协和式民主的若干因素。通过区分离心民主与向心民主,文章进一步明确了协和式民主政治的特征。     

民主和二分法:一种实用主义的概念选择

关于民主与非民主之间的差异,究竟是使用二分法还是等级法去进行区分,从事民主比较研究的知名学者们有着重大的分歧.这一选择至关重要,因为它会对实证研究发现的结果产生影响.它还具有很重要的方法论意义,因为它会导致定性分析家与定量分析家都要面对的根本问题,并且涉及到概念选择的标准是否合理.从实用主义的立场出发,本文认为:学者们对民主概念的理解与运用,可能而且应该部分地取决于他们的研究目的.此外,我们还应该根据研究目标和背景的变化来认识民主的概念、定义及其实施.     

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.     

Aid, Growth and Democracy

To the extent that aid is justified by the benefits to the recipient, rather than to the donor, it might be reasonably judged on two criteria: growth and poverty-alleviation. We study the first of these criteria. We find that the long-run growth impact of aid is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties in the recipient country. Aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with an institutionalized check on governmental power; that is, in more democratic countries. The data suggest, however, that if this is not the case, aid will be used to satisfy the government's own non-productive goals. We also find that aid on average is not channeled to more democratic countries, even though there are large cross-country differences between major donors.     

西方工业民主和员工参与研究述评

本文认为，从19世纪初期的工团主义和社会劳工运动理论，到马克思主义，再到经济民主思想和现代经济学、管理学的员工参与理论，工业民主理论在不断发展演进。伴随着理论的繁荣，现实中出现了工业民主和员工参与的许多形式，包括工人自治、自治和半自治工作团队、工人代表参与决策、财政参与、集体谈判和共同咨询等。虽然在1980年代后工业民主面临着挑战，但与经济全球化相伴随的劳工运动全球化正在促进工业民主和员工参与。     

实践党内民主(上)

近年来，党内民主的思想受到了越来越多的关注。本文探讨了党内民主的优缺点，考察了政党在采用更具内部包容性的决策程序时可能遇到的一些具体问题。作者认为，由于政党所处环境及其政治观点的不同，党内治理并不存在惟一一套“最佳实践”方案。政党领导人应该根据各种党内民主程序的实际效果，理智地评估它们的优缺点。