The effect of unemployment insurance on weekly hours of work in Canada

Major revisions to the Canadian unemployment insurance program in 1997 created a benefit structure that effectively provides more insurance to workers who are employed for longer workweeks. This anomaly creates an incentive for workers and firms to tailor their weekly work schedules to maximize net program benefits. Analysis of Labour Force Survey data shows that workers and firms responded to these changes by altering weekly hours as expected. This behavioural response demonstrates the sensitivity of hours of work decisions to labour market policies. JEL classification: J65
Les effets de l'assurance-chômage sur le nombre hebdomadaire d'heures de travail au Canada. Des changements majeurs dans le programme canadien d'assurance-chômage en 1997 ont mis en place une structure de prestations qui fournissait un support additionnel aux travailleurs qui travaillaient de plus longues heures dans la semaine. Cette anomalie a créé une incitation pour travailleurs et entreprises à ajuster leur cédule hebdomadaire de travail de manière à maximiser les bénéfices nets du programme. L'analyse des données de l'Enquête sur la population active montre que travailleurs et entreprises ont répondu à ces changements en ajustant les heures hebdomadaires de travail comme prévu. Cette réaction montre bien la sensitivité des heures de travail aux politiques du marché du travail.     

Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment. This paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other.     

The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting

Public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy. Abstracting from incentive effects, we focus on redistribution. Some results are: because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities, public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist: and because of the dynamics, even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous, the equilibrium benefit level (or duration-benefit schedule) deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature. The effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated, with some unanticipated results.     

中国失业社会保险制度改革探讨

当前,我国的失业社会保险制度出现了统筹层次低、覆盖面较窄、促进再就业的功能弱化等问题,需要通过适时提高统筹层次、扩大企业社会保险的覆盖面和完善失业社会保险促进再就业等措施进一步改革完善。     

Unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment: The case of adverse selection

This paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device. It is shown that private provision will not occur, essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage. Respecting the same informational constraints, public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions, but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate.     

The impact of regulation on the riskiness of electric utilities

The impact of regulation on public utility riskiness has been investigated using common stock systematic risk (stock beta). We show that the stock beta confounds the relevant risk arising out of regulation with the riskiness because of other factors. Our illustration with a sample of electric utilities underscores the importance of this distinction and, contrary to the literature, does not support Stigler's capture theory view of regulation.     

Jobs specialization versus unemployment: more on the productivity effect of unemployment benefits

We use the Marimon and Zilibotti (Econ J 109: 266–291, 1999) circle model and we endogenize the choice of the degree of specialization of jobs. We show that an increase in unemployment benefits not only reduces the mismatch of talents (as in Marimon and Zilibotti), but it also raises the degree of specialization of jobs. This reinforces the productivity enhancing effects of unemployment benefits.      

A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection

This paper examines the role of coalition formation in the empirically observed negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit. We study an economy composed of four groups of agents (capitalists, unemployed people, low- and high-skilled workers), each one represented by a politician. Politicians first form political parties and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by simultaneously proposing policy bundles composed of an employment protection level and an unemployment benefit. We first show that, in the absence of parties (i.e., in a citizen-candidate model), low-skilled workers are decisive and support a maximum employment protection level together with some unemployment benefit. We then obtain that, under some conditions, allowing for party formation results in all policy equilibria belonging to the Pareto set of the coalition formed by high-skilled workers together with unemployed people. Policies in this Pareto set exhibit a negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit.     

Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance policy in general equilibrium

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of unemployment insurance reforms in a general equilibrium incomplete market model. In particular, it decomposes the total welfare effect for each individual into different factors. I consider a model where the consumers face an uninsurable unemployment risk, can save in an interest-bearing asset, and are subject to a borrowing constraint. The labor market is modeled using a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides style search and matching model. The decomposition exercises reveal how each factor contributes to the heterogeneity of welfare effects among different consumers.     

Flight insurance pricing and the theory of choice

The conclusion of Eisner and Strotz that the purchase of air-travel insurance is inconsistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of choice is shown to depend critically upon their specific pricing formula. An alternative pricing scheme eliminates this inconsistency.     

Partial unemployment insurance benefits and the transition rate to regular work

In Finland, unemployed workers who are looking for a full-time job but take up a part-time or very short full-time job may qualify for partial unemployment benefits. In exchange for partial benefits, these applicants must continue their search of regular full-time work. This study analyzes the implications of working on partial benefits for subsequent transitions to regular employment. The timing-of-events approach is applied to distinguish between causal and selectivity effects associated with the receipt of partial benefits. The results suggest that partial unemployment associated with short full-time jobs facilitates transitions to regular employment. Also part-time working on partial benefits may help men (but not women) in finding a regular job afterwards.     

The effect of self-employed health insurance subsidies on self-employment

This paper estimates the effect of an increase in the deductibility of health insurance premiums for self-employed individuals on the probability of being self-employed. Using a panel of tax returns from 1999 to 2004, we estimate fixed effects instrumental variable regressions for the probability of being self-employed, entering into self-employment, and exiting from self-employment. Our results suggest that this policy increased the probability of being self-employed by 1.5 percentage points, and increased the probability that a taxpayer would be primarily or exclusively self-employed by 1.1 and 0.35 percentage points respectively. These effects explain about a third to a half of the total increase in self-employment by these definitions over the sample period. We also find that the probability of entering self-employment increased by 0.8 percentage points and find suggestive evidence that the probability of exit decreased by 2.8 percentage points.     

The effect of unemployment on labour productivity: an international comparative analysis

This is a comparative empirical analysis of the effect of unemployment - via a ‘work-intensity effect’ and/or a ‘workplace-innovation effect’ - on manufacturing productivity growth in eight advanced capitalist economies. My econometric results confirm earlier findings of positive work-intensity and workplace-innovation effects of unemployment on productivity growth in the United States; but I do not obtain similarly strong results for the other countries, and in Germany and Sweden I find evidence of negative unemployment effects. My findings are consistent with the comparative hypothesis that the sign and strength of unemployment effects on productivity growth will vary negatively with the degree to which a country's socioeconomic environment is characterized by cooperative capital-labour relations and worker security.