The demand for local public goods: choosing an appropriate functional form

The demand for public goods is typically specified in direct form (prices are assumed exogenous, quantities are the choice variable) based on cross-section data. The fact that public goods are characterized by jointness suggests that the indirect form (quantity exogenous) may be more appropriate than the direct form. In addition, it is not likely that cross-sectional data will satisfy integrability. In this paper integrability. In this paper integrability is tested for in both the direct and indirect form using data on a typical cross-section of municipalities. It is found that the homogeneity, equality and symmetry conditions are violated in both the direct and indirect forms.     

Attributing technological bias to public goods

This note reports a modification of one use of the translog production function reported by Binswanger (1973, 1978). The method employed in this study recognizes that changes in factor shares over time are affected by a variety of decision variables including research and extension. In addition, some of the changes attributed to technical change may in fact be due to a change in the resource environment the individual decision maker faces, including the stock of public goods infrastructure. The study also investigates shifts in technological change which may be attributed to changes in the political climate.     

A new approach to the demand for public goods

The individual demand for public goods is measured by a new survey research instrument which permits respondents to make hypothetical expenditure and tax recommendations with moveable penny coupons. Because each respondent faces an identical coupon budget constraint, it may be expected that observed expenditure and tax recommendations represent individual maximum utility. The instrument was applied to a random sample of 1000 residents of North Carolina. Statistical analysis of the resultant data indicates significant socio-economic differences in the preferences for particular spending and tax categories.     

Tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers

This paper analyzes the effects of spillovers on the equilibrium population distribution across jurisdictions in a local public good economy with free mobility. Spillovers are parametrized by a matrix [α_ij] where α_ij ∈ [0, 1]. When spillovers are symmetric and close to 0 or 1 (pure local public goods and pure public goods), all equilibrium jurisdiction structures are symmetric. However, any population distribution can be sustained in equilibrium for some value of the spillover parameter α. In the class of utility functions with additive externalities, we identify the unique family of utility functions for which equilibria are symmetric except for an isolated value of α. This is a class of utility functions which are linear in the public good and a power function of the private good, u(c, γ) = − A(1 − c)^β + γ. With this specification of utility, we show that an increase in α results in a more fragmented equilibrium population distribution, and that when spillovers are asymmetric and large, a jurisdiction which is more centrally located (i.e. benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions) has a larger population in equilibrium.     

Efficient local taxation and local public goods

This paper considers local public goods which crowd both with respect to the number of people served and the amount of property served. It is shown that it may be possible to have efficient decentralized provision of such goods using marginal cost taxes; however, the pricing system in this case is likely to require very large numbers of competing communities. Thus, it appears to be preferable to have separate jurisdictions provide goods which crowd with respect to people — such as education. The implications for stratification are also considered.     

Experimental approach to the determination of the demand for public goods

The paper proposes a new method of estimating the demand for public goods in view of the ‘free rider’ problem. The idea is to establish an experimental setting in which only a random sample of the population is investigated. Alternative experiments are then proposed with the intent of discovering the true individual demand. First a statistical method is proposed to estimate the bias in response. Then, a random environment is created and it is shown under what conditions a successful elicitation of the demand is possible.     

公共物品供给不足对我国消费需求的制约

制度完全可以理解为一种公共物品。首先,制度是一种经济学意义上的物品,其效用表现在遵守者效用的增加,或者是违反者效用的减少。其次,制度同样需要供给成本,以保证制度的有效实施。     

Preferences and demand for local public spending

In this paper we present logit estimation results for individual demand equations for local public spending. Our data are derived from a large-scale survey, organized by a Belgian municipality. Respondents were informed that the results of the survey would influence actual decisions and the questions covered very specific projects and their immediate tax consequences. Sociological variables are dominant in the explanation of the willingness-to-pay for specific projects, while the explanatory value of income is limited. We also analyse the global choice between public and private spending: here income and education are the most important variables, and both have a positive effect on the demand for public spending. Fiscal ignorance is widespread but does not lead to a higher demand for public spending.     

Experimental approach to the determination of the demand for public goods: A comment

The paper argues that the Kurz experiments to elicit demand schedules for public goods will yield biased information if they are repeated. An alternative procedure is proposed.     

Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods

In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.     

Migration with local public goods and the gains from changing places

Without public goods and under fairly standard assumptions, in Hammond and Sempere (J Pub Econ Theory, 8: 145–170, 2006) we show that freeing migration enhances the potential Pareto gains from free trade. Here, we present a generalization allowing local public goods subject to congestion. Unlike the standard literature on fiscal externalities, our result relies on fixing both local public goods and congestion levels at their status quo values. This allows constrained efficient and potentially Pareto improving population exchanges regulated only through appropriate residence charges, which can be regarded as Pigouvian congestion taxes.     

Aggregation bias in estimates of demand for local services: Empirical evidence

Studies of demand for local public services have long been of interest for the value they can have for state and local public finance policy. While both macro and micro studies of these demands are common, most of these evidences are derived from macro studies based on the median-voter model. Specification error arising from a median aggregation can be quite significant. This paper finds a substantial difference in the coefficients on property tax prices and education service resulting from aggregated data compared with those from their micro data. These findings are important for the allocation and design of local budgets and state programs for intergovernmental revenue sharing.     

Distribution of tastes and skills and the provision of local public goods

This paper introduces into the Tiebout model individuals with different skills. It is shown that the production techniques, the distribution of tastes and skills and intercommunity trade will affect the pattern of communities. In the suggested model competition with local public goods is Pareto optimal: communities will not be composed of identical people. The optimal solution requires that every community will tax everybody according to his marginal social cost. A Pareto efficient redistribution policy can be carried out only by a central government using lump-sum taxes. A federal income tax will affect community patterns and therefore is inefficient.     

Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods

The existence of a public competitive equilibrium for any arbitrary (nondistortive) tax schemes (in particular, proportional taxes) for economies with local public goods, is proved. Allowing preferences to be both nontransitive and noncomplete enables an explicit introduction of the government as an (additional) agent in the economy. Moreover, we allow for “spillovers” of the public goods among localities, and for the production sets to depend on the amount of public goods produced in the economy. The only restriction on the tax system is that every individual is able to afford it and that the government's budget never runs a surplus. Since every equilibrium allocation is a Pareto optimum, every tax scheme is optimal (in the sense that its equilibrium allocation is a Pareto optimum).     

Observable preferences for public goods

This paper discusses the circumstances under which it is possible to use the market or aggregate demand functions generated from individual utility maximization to obtain consumers' preferences for certain classes of public goods, and thus obtain the information needed to satisfy the Samuelsonian efficiency conditions for these public goods. The restrictions on the preferences of all consumers which are sufficient to use the aggregate demand function are: (i) there exists a price vector such that the level of public good provisiion is valueless, and (ii) the marginal rate of substitution of the private good price for the level of public good provision is independent of income.     

Clubs,local public goods and transportation models: A synthesis

Clubs, local public goods, and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model. The emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation, pricing and the size of the sharing group. We derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit, as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient. Given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed. We show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs' local public goods and the transportation problems.     

Disentangling the demand function from the production function for local public services: The case of public safety

In this paper we develop a theoretical framework and an econometric model which allow us to separate the effect of income and other socioeconomic variables on the demand for publicly provided goods from their effect on the price of those goods. We apply our approach in a study of expenditures for police protection in a cross-section of 73 U.S. cities and counties. Our results suggest that studies of public expenditures which fail to incorporate community characteristics in production and cost functions can yield very misleading results.     

Quantities,qualities and multiple public services in the Tiebout model

This paper introduces a new, more realistic characterization of local public services. This characterization fits education, parks, and streets, none of which are a pure Samuelsonian good. It is shown that Tiebout's hypothesis holds for this new type of services, provided correct user charges are adopted. Introducing several local services considerably affects the results. The paper emphasizes the difference in tastes with regard to quality as opposed to quantity. Earlier literature is shown to apply to the role of quality and ignores the role of quantity. The effect of the latter makes mixed communities more efficient than segregated ones. It is shown that efficient allocation with mixed communities is an equilibrium in a costless mobility, Tiebout-type setting.