Specific taxation,asymmetric costs,and endogenous quality

This paper shows how a specific tax—in contrast to an ad valorem tax—alters industry structure and firm-level performance in a monopolistic competition framework, where firms chose product quality endogenously and differ exogenously in productivity (i.e., marginal production efficiency). Industry equilibrium mechanisms and selection based on productivity play a significant role: A specific tax shifts market shares and profits toward firms with costs and prices above the industry average at the expense of low-cost firms. This reallocation of market shares releases a novel scale effect such that low-cost firms may quality downgrade, while high-cost firms always quality upgrade. There exists a parameter subspace, where this combines to a decrease on average quality for the industry. In comparison: An ad valorem tax only reduces the number of firms/varieties in the industry due to demand absorption, but affects neither firm-level performance nor industry structure.     

Redistributive taxation with heterogeneous relative consumption concerns

Abstract This paper studies the impact of redistributive income taxation in a society where only some individuals are motivated by relative consumption concerns. Introducing this heterogeneity raises theoretical challenges since (i) earned income becomes an imperfect indicator of underlying ability and (ii) relative concerns may be inadmissable in the social objective. A new behavioural model is developed in which only relatively‐concerned individuals choose work effort strategically. Linear tax/transfer systems schemes are then characterized and simulated for a series of welfarist and non‐welfarist social objectives, and for different degrees of preference heterogeneity. A key result is that a government which understands the extent of relative consumption concerns–but places no social weight on individuals with such preferences–nevertheless sets a significantly more progressive tax system than a government which ignores relative consumption motivations altogether.     

Optimal income taxation in models with endogenous fertility

This paper studies the efficient taxation of factor income in infinite-lived models with elastic fertility choices. Two models are considered, one with physical capital only, and one with physical and human capital. In the model with physical capital only, capital income should be subsidized, while labor income taxed. In the model with two types of capital, instead, Ramsey optimality prescribes that the tax on physical capital is zero (negative), if effective labor is constant (decreasing) returns to scale in human capital and market goods, while the tax on human capital is negative and the tax on effective labor positive. Our findings depart from those obtained in immortal models with an endogenous labor supply and constant population growth, because physical and human capital affect the demand for fertility.     

Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance and endogenous labour supply

I determine the optimal income tax schedule when individuals both choose endogenously their labour supply and have the possibility of avoiding paying taxes. Considering a convex concealment cost function, I propose a formula for the optimal marginal tax rate, that generalizes the formula of the standard Mirrlees model to the case of tax avoidance. I also show that the results obtained by Casamatta (2021) in the fixed income case hold true when labour supply is endogenous: with a low enough marginal cost of avoidance, it is optimal to let some taxpayers, located in the interior of the skill distribution, avoid taxes.     

Firm taxation and the endogenous distribution of markups

Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) predicts a monotonic relation between productivity and markups. When including revenue taxes, however, this relation is non-monotonic and depends on taxes. Even without taxes, productivity and markups can be non-monotonic depending on how non-homotheticity is modeled.     

Optimal taxation in an endogenous growth model with variable population and public expenditure

In this paper we analyze second-best optimal taxation in an endogenous-growth model driven by public expenditure, in presence of endogenous fertility and labor supply. Normative analysis shows positive taxes on the number of children, which are necessary to correct for congestion in the publicly provided input (such as education and healthcare), negative public debt. Results on capital and labor income taxation depend on whether the public input is optimally provided.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.     

Optimal consumption taxation in a model of endogenous growth with external habit formation

This paper devises a consumption tax policy that allows to decentralize the efficient equilibrium in an AK endogenous growth model with external habit formation. The equilibrium dynamics, including that of the optimal taxes, is characterized by means of phase-diagram analysis.     

On local indeterminacy and endogenous cycles in Ramsey models with heterogeneous households

It is well-known that endogenous cycles can occur in Ramsey models with heterogeneous households and borrowing constraints. In this note, we address the issue of robustness in the more general case of endogenous labor supply and we explain the occurrence of local indeterminacy under progressive taxation.

Consumption taxation, social status and indeterminacy in models of endogenous growth with elastic labor supply

In this paper, we examine the effects of consumption taxation on long-run growth in an infinitely lived representative-agent model of endogenous growth with endogenous labor supply in which the desire for social status induces private agents to care about others’ wealth or consumption levels. This analysis shows that the increase in consumption taxation raises (reduces) the long-run growth rate when the equilibrium path is locally indeterminate (determinate), provided the desire for social status is not too strong in the relative wealth model. By contrast, in the consumption externalities model, the same result holds, if the Frisch labor supply and labor demand curves have the ‘normal’ slopes at their intersection point, while the result is reversed if these two curves have the ‘wrong’ slopes.     

The effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions

This paper analyzes the effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the segregative properties of the endogenous formation of jurisdictions. Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction which aims to produce a local public good and implement a redistribution policy by granting every household a demogrant of an amount determined by the jurisdiction. In every jurisdiction, production of local public services and the demogrant are financed with a local tax based upon the households wealth. Local wealth tax rates and the level of the demogrant are exogenously determined in every jurisdiction. Households are free to leave their jurisdiction for another jurisdiction that would provide them with their highest utility. We found that the existence of a demogrant seems to mitigate the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, because the condition identified by Gravel and Thoron to ensure segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure remains necessary, but is no longer sufficient.     

Competition,patent protection,and innovation with heterogeneous firms in an endogenous market structure

This paper revisits the relationship between competition and innovation by incorporating the heterogeneity of R&D efficiency across firms and an endogenous market structure in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Using an analytically tractable model, we show that competition and innovation can have either an inverted‐U or a negative relationship, as reported by several empirical studies. Furthermore, we show that the effect of strengthening patent protection on innovation depends on the competition level. In particular, we find a complementary relationship between competition policy and the strengthening of patent protection.     

Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality

I consider a model in which candidates of differing quality must win a primary election to compete in the general election. I show that there is an equilibrium in which Democrats choose liberal policies and Republicans choose conservative policies, but higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies than lower quality candidates. In this equilibrium, higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies if they have a larger quality advantage or there is less uncertainty about the median voterʼs ideal point in the general election, and the candidates in a given primary choose closer policies to one another when there is a smaller quality difference between the candidates in a primary. I further show that if the candidates have policy motivations, then a low quality candidate may strategically choose to enter a primary even if running for office is costly and the candidate will lose the primary election with certainty in equilibrium.     

Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation

This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856-869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225-239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive promises financed through distortionary taxes. We solve for the case of both targetable and non-targetable taxes. We prove that there is an imperfect efficiency-targetability trade off on the tax side. Politicians prefer targetable taxes over non-targetable ones, especially when the latter are less efficient. Yet, targetable taxation is always used even when it is very inefficient compared to non-targetable taxes.     

Congestion,quality deterioration,and heterogeneous tastes

The problem of congestion is analyzed as a consumption externality in a model in which the market demand of consumers of facility services reflects heterogenous taste for congestion avoidance and individual willingness to pay is a function of the aggregate level of facility use. The analysis demonstrates that the Pareto optimal toll for facility use depends on the pattern by which congestion cost is distributed among facility users. In general, this optimal toll will deviate from that derived from the standard analysis.     

Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs

This paper examines how the optimal Pigouvian tax should be adjusted to reflect adminisrative costs. Several cases are examined, depending on whether the administrative costs are fixed per firm taxed or are a function of the amount of tax collected, and on whether such costs are borne by the government or by the taxed firm. In some cases the presence of administrative costs leads to an optimal tax greater than the external cost, while in other cases it leads to a tax less than the external cost.     

Optimal taxation with positional considerations

This paper analyzes the optimal commodity tax policy, in a generalized vertical differentiation model in which consumers have positional considerations. Consumers enjoy having a product which is better than that owned by others, and feel envy when others own a better product than them. We examine the impact of these positional considerations on the optimal tax and welfare when a monopoly produces two variants of such good. The standard result that the government should subsidize the product, can be reversed in our setting. In the presence of positional concerns, the optimal tax rate can be positive. Furthermore, the positional effects determine the level of the tax pass-through on prices. Finally, the tax levied on the high-quality variant affects the price of the low-quality variant and vice versa.     

Estate taxation with warm-glow altruism

This article examines the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with warm-glow altruism (utility interdependence) and heterogeneous individuals. We propose a new efficiency concept, D-efficiency, that considers an implicit constraint in the act of giving: Donors cannot bequeath to donees more than their existing resources. Considering this constraint, we show that the market equilibrium is not socially efficient. The efficient level of bequest transfers can be implemented by the market with estate and labor-income subsidies and a capital-income tax. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the government faces a trade-off between minimizing distortions and eliminating external effects. The implied tax policy differs from Pigovian taxation since the government’s ability to correct the external effects is limited. Finally, we show that the efficiency-equity trade-off does not affect the qualitative features of the optimal distortionary fiscal policy.

Risk-taking and taxation

Conclusions This survey has considered the effects of taxation on risk-taking from both a partial and a general equilibrium viewpoint. The most relevant results to emerge at a very general level are that in the former taxation will typically increase risk-taking, while in the latter it is typically better to tax risky industries more heavily than safe; both results are contrary to conventional views.While the work surveyed shows that substantial progress has been made on this question it also shows that there remains much to be done. This seems to fall into three categories. Firstly, the investigation by variational methods of the properties of an optimal (not necessary linear) tax function in a simple model; secondly, the combination of these ideas on the optimal taxation of risky property income with those in the taxation of labor income, and also of expenditures; and finally, the incorporation of risk into all forms of optimal taxation model, not only those explicitly concerned with risky assets. These however are far from simple problems.This paper was presented at the International Economic Association Workshop in Economic Theory, Bergen 1971; I should like to thank the IEA for a stimulating month, and participants for comments, particularly J. A. Mirrlees for suggesting the analysis on page 207f. I am also grateful to A.B.Atkinson for comments.     

Testing the endogenous growth model: public expenditure, taxation, and growth over the long run

Endogenous growth models, such as Barro (1990), predict that government expenditure and taxation will have both temporary and permanent effects on growth. We test this prediction using panels of annual and period‐averaged data for OECD countries during 1970–95, isolating long‐run from short‐run fiscal effects. Our results strongly support the endogenous growth model and suggest that long‐run fiscal effects are not fully captured by period averaging and static panel methods. Unlike previous investigations, our estimates are free from biases associated with incomplete specification of the government budget constraint and do not appear to result from endogeneity of fiscal or investment variables. JEL Classification: H30, O40 Validation du modèle de croissance endogène: dépenses publiques, fiscalité et croissance à long terme. Des modèles de croissance endogène comme celui de Barro (1990) prédisent que dépenses gouvernementales et fiscalité vont avoir des effets temporaires et permanents sur la croissance. On met cette prévision au test à l'aide de données annuelles et pour certaines moyennes couvrant des sous‐périodes pour les pays de l'OCDE (1970–95) dans le but de départager les effets à court et à long terme. Les résultats valident fortement le modèle de croissance endogène et suggèrent que les effets fiscaux à long terme ne sont pas pleinement capturés par des méthodes utilisant des moyennes ou des méthodes statiques. Contrairement aux résultats d'enquêtes antérieures, les résultats proposés ne souffrent pas de distorsions attribuables à une spécification incomplète de la contrainte budgétaire du gouvernement, et ne semblent pas être l'effet d'écho de l'endogénéité des variables fiscales et de l'investissement.