Just‐cause provisions,severance pay,and the efficiency wage hypothesis

A simple model of employment contracting is employed to examine the effectiveness of just‐cause provisions in alleviating employer opportunism in two types of efficiency wage contracts—standard contracts, in which wages exceed the worker's marginal contribution, and deferred wages, which are paid after a period of tenure in the firm. It is argued that just‐cause employment policies are necessary and sufficient to prevent employer opportunism when standard efficiency wages are utilized. However, just‐cause policies are not sufficient to deter employer opportunism when employment contracts are of the delayed‐payment type. In these contracts, other contractual provisions, such as severance provisions, are also necessary. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

Labour market oligopsonistic competition: The effect of worker immobility on wages

We suggest that firms in a local labour market may be able to exploit worker mobility costs and offer immobile workers wages that are lower than their marginal product. If so, the ability of employers to exploit worker immobility in setting wages would decline in the competitiveness of the local labour market. We test this intuition using a measure of individual mobility costs and measures of local labour market competition. Our findings suggest that worker immobility causes substantial wage variation across workers in small, weakly competitive markets, and in occupations where wages are individually bargained.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles

This paper analyzes the effect of recontracting and matching verifiable wage offers on the intertemporal structure of contract wage and consumption profile for a two-period economy. A contract firm provides specific training for a worker during the first period, which increases his productivity if he stays in the second period, but the worker may quit to accept an alternative wage offer after a successful search. Wage offers are private to the worker but can be presented to the contract firm for matching. This paper shows that when capital markets are imperfect and wage offers are verifiable, the contract firm recontracts and matches any wage offers the worker receives up to the second-period productivity. The ex ante contract wage profile will be flat. Inefficient quits will be eliminated and there will be complete ex ante consumption smoothing. It is significant to note that the result of rising wage profile derived in numerous contract models is fragile with respect to assumptions on mechanism of interfirm labor mobility.     

The commuting time paradox

We examine the conditions for the ‘commuting time paradox’ which states that the average commuting time does not vary between different periods. We develop therefore an equilibrium job search model with endogenously chosen commuting costs. Presuming wage bargaining between workers and firms, the optimally chosen maximum commuting costs jointly maximise the worker's and firm's payoffs. We demonstrate that when productivity levels increase over time, average commuting costs and average wages both increase, which affects the optimally chosen commuting time. We establish the conditions under which the paradox holds.     

Corporate mergers and union wage premiums

Corporate mergers possibly enhance the labor negotiation advantage of employers. This study investigates the association between wage levels and merger activity to test the employer bargaining strength hypothesis. The results indicate significantly lower union wages as a consequence of merging. Merger activity, however, does not influence wage levels of non-union workers. These findings are supportive of the employer bargaining strength hypothesis.     

Do inter-city differences in intra-city wage differentials have any interesting implications?

Recent research has related characteristics of cities to differences in the distribution of wages across workers with different skill levels. We demonstrate that these differences in wage differentials arise naturally as a compensating variation in Rosen’s theoretical model of inter-city wages. For example, if the income elasticity of demand for housing services is less than unity, cities with higher house prices will have smaller money wage differentials between low and high skill workers. This result has no implications for differences in either absolute or relative real productivity or welfare of unskilled workers. Similarly, changes in the amenity of an urban area may result in changes in relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers with no implications for real productivity or welfare differentials.Empirical tests in which housing cost differentials are added as a determinant of inter-city differences in an intra-urban wage differential model provide empirical confirmation of the theoretical expectations. It appears that intra-urban money wage differentials, differences in the quality of life, and variation in the cost of living in each city are jointly determined variables just as Rosen’s model of inter-city wage differentials predicts.     

Do inter-city differences in intra-city wage differentials have any interesting implications?

Recent research has related characteristics of cities to differences in the distribution of wages across workers with different skill levels. We demonstrate that these differences in wage differentials arise naturally as a compensating variation in Rosen’s theoretical model of inter-city wages. For example, if the income elasticity of demand for housing services is less than unity, cities with higher house prices will have smaller money wage differentials between low and high skill workers. This result has no implications for differences in either absolute or relative real productivity or welfare of unskilled workers. Similarly, changes in the amenity of an urban area may result in changes in relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers with no implications for real productivity or welfare differentials.Empirical tests in which housing cost differentials are added as a determinant of inter-city differences in an intra-urban wage differential model provide empirical confirmation of the theoretical expectations. It appears that intra-urban money wage differentials, differences in the quality of life, and variation in the cost of living in each city are jointly determined variables just as Rosen’s model of inter-city wage differentials predicts.     

Wage‐setting Decisions on Newly Hired Employees: Survey Evidence from Colombian Firms

This paper uses a survey on wage formation applied to 1305 Colombian firms to study wage‐setting decisions of newly hired employees. The survey indicates that wages of the newly hired are based mainly on a predefined wage structure. This may help to explain, in part, the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities in the Colombian formal labour market, since firms are unwilling to differentiate the pay of new hires from the wages of existing workers. Using multinomial logit models, we find that firm size and the share of temporary workers increase the relative risk of using a predefined internal structure over bargaining between employee and employer when setting the wages of the newly hired employees. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance Pay and Offshoring

In this paper, we construct a North–South general equilibrium model of offshoring, highlighting the nexus among endogenous effort‐based labor productivity and the structure of wages. Offshoring is modeled as international transfer of management practices and production techniques that allow Northern firms to design and implement performance compensation contracts. Performance–pay contracts address moral hazard issues stemming from production uncertainty and unobserved worker effort. We find that worker effort augments productivity and compensation of those workers assigned to more offshorable tasks. An increase in worker effort in the South, caused by a decline in offshoring costs, an increase in worker skill, or a decline in production uncertainty in the South, increases the range of offshored tasks and makes workers in the North and South better off. An increase in Southern labor force increases the range of offshored tasks, benefits workers in the North, and hurts workers in the South. International labor migration from low‐wage South to high‐wage North shrinks the range of offshored tasks, makes Northern workers worse off and Southern workers (emigrants and those left behind) better off. Higher worker effort in the North, caused by higher worker skills or lower degree of production uncertainty, decreases the range of offshored tasks and benefits workers in the North and South.     

Firm heterogeneity and wages in unionised labour markets: Theory and evidence

In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by firm-specific arrangements determining actual paid wages as a mark-up on the industry wage floor. What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage floor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. Furthermore, since the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They are then confirmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991–2000.     

Product Market Competition and Returns to Talent

This paper investigates how product market competition influences the wages paid to workers and the distribution of talent across industries. We develop a model where firms facing different competitive conditions bid for workers. The model predicts that wages are increasing in talent, decreasing in competition, and the interaction between talent and competition is positive. In addition, the most talented workers will be concentrated in competitive industries and talent dispersion rises with competition. We use linked employee–employer data to test these predictions.     

Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments

Life cycle wages of immigrants from developing countries fall short of catching up with wages of natives. Using linked employer–employee data, we show that 40% of the native–immigrant wage gap is explained by differential sorting across establishments. We find that returns to experience and seniority are similar for immigrant and native workers, but that differences in job mobility and intermittent spells of unemployment are major sources of disparity in lifetime wage growth. The inferior wage growth of immigrants primarily results from failure to advance to higher paying establishments over time. These empirical patterns are consistent with signaling disadvantages of immigrant job seekers, but not with the explanation that low wage growth follows from inferior information about employers and job opportunities.     

Technology,Labour Characteristics and Wage‐productivity Gaps*

We use plant‐level employer–employee data in production functions and wage equations to examine whether wages are based on productivity. We use a stepwise procedure to find out how the results are influenced by the kind of data that is available. The models include shares of employee groups based on age, level and field of education, and sex. The gap between the age‐related wage and productivity effects increases with age. Education increases productivity, but wage under‐compensates productivity especially for those with the highest level of non‐technical education. For women the results depend greatly on the specification and method used.     

Great expectations: Past wages and unemployment durations

Decomposing wages into worker and firm wage components, we find that firm-fixed components are sizeable parts of workers' wages. If workers can only imperfectly observe the extent of firm-fixed components in their wages, they might be misled about the overall wage distribution. Such misperceptions may lead to unjustified high reservation wages, resulting in overly long unemployment durations. We examine the influence of previous wages on unemployment durations for workers after exogenous lay-offs and, using Austrian administrative data, we find that younger workers are, in fact, unemployed longer if they profited from high firm-fixed components in the past. We interpret our findings as evidence for overconfidence generated by imperfectly observed productivity.     

Foreign ownership,human capital,and the structure of wages in Japan

We examine the differences in the structure of wages between domestic and foreign-owned establishments in Japan. We use high-quality datasets from the Japanese government and construct a large employer–employee matched database consisting of 1 million workers in 1998. Our results confirm that foreign-owned establishments in Japan pay higher wages. We estimate that one percentage increase in foreign-ownership share of equity raises wages by 0.3%. We surmise that this foreign-ownership wage premium can be explained, at least in part, by compensating wage differentials. Workers in foreign-owned establishments are not protected by lifetime employment. They receive higher compensation for being exposed to higher risk and forfeiting their employment security. We also find that in foreign-owned establishments, wages are determined more by general skills, and less by firm-specific skills. These effects become more pronounced among establishments with a higher share of foreign ownership. The gender wage gap is considerably smaller among foreign establishments. Given the lack of long-term prospects for women in the Japanese labor market, foreign-owned establishments may be one source of ‘brain drain’ for highly skilled women there.     

Wages,non-wage characteristics,and predominantly male jobs

This paper estimates the wage premium associated with working in predominantly male jobs. It also examines whether this wage premium is greater than the compensation workers demand for the less desirable non-wage characteristics of such jobs. The coefficients of the change in the proportion of men in an occupation on the change in wages for quits and layoffs provide opposing biased estimates of the wage premium; because workers who voluntarily quit move to better matches, but those that are laid off accept jobs from the representative distribution of job offers. Specifically, when the premium paid over- (under-)compensates for undesirable work characteristics, the quit estimate is a downward (upward) biased estimate of the wage premium, while the layoff estimate is biased upward (downward). Results from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) indicate that: (1) the estimated bounds of the wage premium are large; and (2) the wage premium overcompensates for the non-wage characteristics of male jobs.     

Noncompete agreements,training, and wage competition

We study the effects of noncompete agreements in an environment where firms invest in training junior workers. After obtaining employer-provided training, trained workers can choose whether to remain loyal to their initial employer or switch to the competing employer. We evaluate the effects of noncompete agreements on wages, employment, investment in training, production, profits, and total welfare. Firms earn higher profits and pay lower average wage when they require workers to sign noncompete agreements.     

Measuring labor cost for productivity comparison

This paper presents measures of labor cost applicable when the wage and marginal product are not equal by period. The user cost of labor, an alternative to the wage, is the price of hiring the services of the worker per unit time. This user cost is dependent on the sequence of wages earned by a worker over a career, interest rates, and career length or eventual tenure. For the United States, 1963–1978, labor compensation shares based on the wage exceed those for the user cost. After 1978, the reverse obtains. The contribution of labor, and measured productivity performance is sensitive to the price of labor services.This paper was processed by M. Brown.