Whose property is it anyway? The social nature of economic actors and egalitarian remuneration ∗

This article formulates an egalitarian theory of property based on an ethic of remuneration for economic contributions. The principle of egalitarian remuneration is developed by revising basic notions of economic contributions. Economic contributions are found to be those activities that contribute to the value of commodities not just those that produce a product. Consumers, and not only producers, contribute to the creation of value, and these economic contributions make consumers eligible for remuneration. However, the concept of consumer contributions needs to be recast, for consumer contributions do not consist of neoclassical, individualistic actors maximizing subjective preferences. Rather, consumers economic contributions flow from their socially self-determined attributes as formed through relation to the system of economic actors. Indirect social contributions spread responsibility throughout the members of the system, affecting calculations of dueness. Other members indirect contributions are relatively equal in degree of responsibility for the social formation of the consumer's economic contributions. The dispersion and equalization of responsibility for the creation of economic contributions entails a correlative equalization of claims to remuneration, on a principle of dueness for economic contributions. This implies a property right to egalitarian remuneration.     

我国均衡性转移支付资金分配机制研究

财力均等化转移支付是公共服务均等化的前提条件,是落后地区提供基本公共服务的资金保障。均等化转移支付资金通常是按照一般公式分配的。本文首先通过均等化转移支付一般公式的推导和解释,明确了隐含在一般公式中的公共服务均等化理念以及资金分配原则。其后,根据一般公式的资金分配原则,实证地分析我国唯一按一般公式分配资金的均衡性转移支付。分析结果显示,仅就得到转移支付资金的省份而言,人均转移支付资金与财力水平之间呈现明显的正相关,财力越强的省份,得到转移支付资金人均值也越多。这一资金分配结果主要源于以财政供养人口为主的资金分配方式。财力较强的省份,总人口中财政供养人口比重较高,以财政供养人口为主的资金分配方式最终导致资金向财力较强的省份倾斜。资金分配过程中对少数民族省份的优待也是资金向财力较强省份发生倾斜的另一重要原因。     

Fair Accumulation under Risky Lifetime

Individuals save for their old days, but not all of them enjoy the old age. This paper characterizes the optimal capital accumulation in a two‐period OLG model where lifetime is risky and varies across individuals. We compare two long‐run social optima: (1) the average utilitarian optimum, where steady‐state average welfare is maximized; (2) the egalitarian optimum, where the welfare of the worst‐off at the steady‐state is maximized. It is shown that, under plausible conditions, the egalitarian optimum involves a higher capital and a lower fertility than the utilitarian optimum. Those inequalities hold also in a second‐best framework where survival conditions are exogenously linked to the capital level.     

Globalization and the Inequality–Unemployment Tradeoff

Over the last 20 years, advanced economies have experienced an “unemployment versus inequality” tradeoff that is critically uneven across countries. To explain this, we propose an extended HOS model in which: the factors are skilled and unskilled labor; there is a continuum of goods; the world comprises two North countries (one egalitarian and one nonegalitarian) and the South; there is no factor price equalization; globalization consists in the South cornering a growing share of world production. In the North, globalization entails an inequality–unemployment tradeoff and the adjustment to globalization is more painful for the country that was initially inequality‐oriented.     

Inflation,a disease of society

This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure, (interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies. In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.”     

Rewards for providing environmental services — Where indigenous Australians' and western perspectives collide

Rewards for environmental service provision, couched under market-based instruments, are widely touted in Australia as a means of improving natural resource management while empowering indigenous people. We document here the views of indigenous Australians in a community in Arnhem Land about their motivations for, and ways to provide, such services. Most respondents (93%) said that they ‘look after country’ to fulfil cultural responsibilities. Natural resource management, they said, should be carried out communally, primarily under the direction of elders and family. Sixty percent of respondents preferred direct payments such as cash or salaried remuneration like that commonly offered in return for ranger-like activities such as feral animal/weed control, coastal surveillance and prescribed burning. Some (14%) either did not want or did not need rewards for environmental service provision. Others (19%) preferred rewards in a form that benefited their community or family rather than themselves as individuals. There was agreement that outcomes should be monitored, consistent with the principle that reward payments should be conditional on performance. We suggest that a reward system that is too narrowly defined could thwart the potential for win-win outcomes from indigenous incentive-based natural resource management but that their articulation could allow solutions to be negotiated.     

The Impact of the Welfare State and Social Policy on the Working Population: The Recent British Experience

This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure, (interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies. In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.”     

Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization

The paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. Regions' choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes [Boadway, R., Flatters, F., 1982. Efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government: a synthesis and extension of recent results, Canadian Journal of Economics 15, 613-633; Weingast, B.R., 2006. Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Implication for Decentralized Democratic Governance and Economic Development, Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University]. We show that tax competition distorts (downwards) public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes. However, the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and, under a low degree of regional asymmetry, also for each region.     

The separability principle in bargaining

Summary. We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this subgroup with their payoffs, then the remaining agents face the same opportunities in both bargaining problems. The separability principle requires that under these hypotheses, the remaining agents should receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. We begin with investigating the logical relations between separability and two other axioms, contraction independence and consistency. Then, we establish characterizations of the Nash and egalitarian solutions on the basis of separability. Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78.Youngsub Chun: This work was supported by the Brain Korea 21 Project in 2003. I am grateful to William Thomson, a referee, and an associate editor for their valuable comments.     

Consumption dynamics and inequality of opportunity with an application to Uganda

This paper proposes the adoption of an opportunity egalitarian perspective to assess and compare growth processes and their distributional implications. To this aim, a set of graphical tools are introduced that allow one to evaluate the role of growth and recessions in the evolution of individuals’ opportunities over time. These tools satisfy the ex post principle of equality of opportunity and represent an extension of the “opportunity growth incidence curve,” a framework proposed by the literature to evaluate growth according to the ex ante principle of equality of opportunity. This measurement framework is applied to evaluate the economic dynamic between 2009 and 2011 in Uganda. The results show that despite a reduction in the real value of household consumption and a surge in outcome inequality, its effects appear to be less dramatic when the ex post equality of opportunity perspective is invoked.     

Self-interest and fairness: self-serving choices of justice principles

We introduce non-enforceable property rights over a bargaining surplus in a dictator game with production, where the agent’s effort is differentially rewarded and subsequently determines the size of the surplus. Using experimental data, we elicit individual preferences over the egalitarian, accountability and libertarian principles and provide evidence to support the inability of these justice principles to individually account for the observed behavior. We show that the justice principle that can be used to explain dictators’ choices depends on whether dictators are paid more or less than recipients for their effort. Our findings suggest that dictators do employ justice principles in self-serving ways and choose in each context the justice principle that maximizes their financial payoffs.     

Reproductive health,fairness, and optimal policies

We consider an overlapping generations economy in which agents differ through their ability to procreate. Ex‐ante infertile households may incur health expenditure to increase their chances of parenthood. This health heterogeneity generates welfare inequalities that deserve to be ruled out. We explore three different criteria of social evaluation in the long‐run: the utilitarian approach, the ex‐ante egalitarian criterion and the ex‐post egalitarian one. We propose a set of economic instruments to decentralize each solution. To correct for the externalities and health inequalities, both a preventive (a taxation of capital) and a redistributive policy are required. We show that a more egalitarian allocation is associated with higher productive investment but reduced health expenditure and thus, lower population growth.     

Multilateral tariff cooperation under fairness and reciprocity

Abstract This paper explores the impact of fairness and reciprocity on multilateral tariff cooperation. Reciprocal countries reward kind behaviour (positive reciprocity), but retaliate against countries behaving unkindly (negative reciprocity). We demonstrate that reciprocal countries that are moderately demanding from their trading partners regarding their commercial policy can support a greater degree of cooperation than self‐interested ones. However, when only very liberal import policies are considered fair, then reciprocity could have a detrimental effect on multilateral tariff cooperation.Thus, our model provides a novel perspective on the role of expectations in trade negotiations.     

Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good

This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents’ preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner–Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner–Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We thank Gabrielle Demange, William Thomson, two referees and seminar audiences at Boston, Palermo and Rochester University for their comments. Financial support from MIUR is acknowledged.     

A theory of reverse retirement

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long working career. However, only workers who have a sufficiently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. To re‐examine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e., individuals work before being retired) with—hypothetical—reverse retirement (i.e., individuals are retired before working). We show that, under standard assumptions, an economy with reverse retirement, once in place, converges towards a unique stationary equilibrium. At the normative level, we show that, when labor productivity declines with age, reverse retirement cannot be optimal under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), whereas reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst‐off in realized terms). Finally, we show that there exists a set of policy instruments that allow a government to organize a successful transition from standard to reverse retirement.     

Higher Education: Subsidizing Tuition versus Subsidizing Student Loans

We use a simple two‐period equilibrium framework to explore the effects of two different subsidization regimes for higher education on the formation of human capital and on the distribution of incomes. Individuals finance their investments in higher education through income‐contingent education loans as well as subsidies from the government. The subsidy is tax‐financed. We compare an egalitarian subsidy scheme, which reduces by a uniform amount the tuition charged to students, with a student loan subsidy which is proportional to the student's debt service obligation. We show that both types of subsidies reduce the economy‐wide underinvestment in higher education and lead to a more equal income distribution. Furthermore, according to some social welfare criterion, the student loan subsidy regime dominates the tuition subsidy regime if the subsidy level is predetermined, while the converse is true if the subsidy level constitutes a choice variable of the government.     

A characterization of egalitarian equivalence

Summary Consider a solution (an allocation rule) for an economy which satisfies the following criteria: (1) Pareto efficiency, (2) monotonicity, in the sense that if the set of attainable allocations of the economy becomes larger then the solution makes no consumer worse-off, (3) a weak and primitive notion of fairness with respect to some commodity, say commodityh, in the sense that in an exchange economy in which the aggregate endowment consists only of commodityh, the solution is equal division. We show that in the class of economies which includes non-convex technologies the only such solution is egalitarian equivalence with respect to commodityh. It is also shown that this characterization of egalitarian equivalence holds in convex exchange economies if we add a weak version of a positive association requirement.We are grateful to William Thomson and three anonymous referees for extensive comments on an earlier version. We also acknowledge helpful comments of the participants of the Social Choice and Welfare Conference held in Caen, June 1992.     

SUFFICIENCY OF THE LENS CONDITION FOR FACTOR PRICE EQUALIZATION

Abstract.  Demiroglu and Yun (1999 ) and Wong and Yun (2003 ) gave counterexamples to show that the lens condition is not sufficient for factor price equalization. However, they leave the following two important problems untouched: why the lens condition is not sufficient for factor price equalization in general; and whether counterexamples can be given only in a very special case. This paper extends these papers to a framework without two input vectors being proportional to explain why the lens condition loses sufficiency and gives a lot of counterexamples which include those provided in above papers as special cases.     

Introduction: Reform in the Provision of Health Care

The term “sustainable consumption” is subject to many interpretations, from Agenda 21's hopeful assertion that governments should encourage less materialistic lifestyles based on new definitions of “wealth” and “prosperity”, to the view prevalent in international policy discourse that green and ethical consumerism will be sufficient to transform markets to produce continual and “clean” economic growth. These different perspectives are examined using a conceptual framework derived from Cultural Theory, to illustrate their fundamentally competing beliefs about the nature of the environment and society, and the meanings attached to consumption. Cultural Theory argues that societies should develop pluralistic policies to include all perspectives. Using this framework, the paper examines the UK strategy for sustainable consumption, and identifies a number of failings in current policy. These are that the UK strategy is strongly biased towards individualistic, market-based and neo-liberal policies, so it can only respond to a small part of the problem of unsustainable consumption. Policy recommendations include measures to strengthen the input from competing cultures, to realize the potential for more collective, egalitarian and significantly less materialistic consumption patterns.     

Basic income,liberal neutrality,socialism, and work

Liberal critics often object to basic income (BI) on the grounds that it violates reciprocity and is biased toward those who choose voluntarily to opt out of work and thus violate the principle of liberal neutrality toward conceptions of the good life. In the first part of this paper I argue that liberal neutrality favors BI. Marxist critics of BI are less likely to accept liberal neutrality, but I argue in the second part that the argument for BI in the first part applies with equal force to Marxist objections that BI is unfairly exploitative of workers. Marxists are also less likely to accept current labor market trends, seeing socialism as affording more opportunity for guaranteeing everyone a right to decent work, and suspecting BI of making the unfair inequalities of capitalism a little more palatable while diverting attention from a more equitable socialist alternative. I argue that BI is not incompatible with socialism or Marxism, and should not be opposed to but rather combined with strategies for full employment.