What determines early exercise of employee stock options in Australia?

Employee stock options (ESOs) are a popular way of remunerating employees. We analyse factors at the firm and option level affecting the employee's decision to exercise ESOs before they mature. Exercises over the period 1998–2004 are analysed and the key factor influencing early exercise is found to be dividends. Exercises frequently occur well before maturity, but in most cases little time value is sacrificed. Our findings have implications for the ‘fair’ valuation of ESOs in companies’ financial statements, as required by the relevant Australian accounting standard, AASB 2.     

Valuing qualitative options with stochastic volatility

We find a closed-form formula for valuing a time-switch option where its underlying asset is affected by a stochastically changing market environment, and apply it to the valuation of other qualitative options such as corridor options and options in foreign exchange markets. The stochastic market environment is modeled as a Markov regime-switching process. This analytic formula provides us with a rapid and accurate scheme for valuing qualitative options with stochastic volatility.     

Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Valuation and incentive effects of hurdle rate executive stock options

Traditional executive stock options are often criticized for inherently weak links between pay and performance. Hurdle rate executive stock options represent a viable improvement. However, valuing these options presents extraordinary analytic difficulties. With a constant dividend yield the strike price becomes a path-dependent function of the stock price and exact analytic valuation is intractable. To solve this problem, we apply the Monte Carlo valuation approach developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (Rev Financ Stud 4:113–147, 2001) to estimate the value of path-dependent American options. We also extend the methodology to incorporate the theoretical framework by Ingersoll (J Bus 79:453–487, 2006) to permit subjective valuation influenced by an executive’s risk aversion.

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.     

How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance

To ascertain whether the form of managerial compensation affects a firm's long-term operating performance, we track IPOs for 5 years after the expiration of the stabilization period. New public companies perform better when managers receive a balanced combination of stock option grants and equity ownership. Firms with unbalanced compensation arrangements, large option grants and little equity ownership or vice versa do not perform as well. This empirical finding is consistent with a theoretical explanation based on managerial risk aversion and the alignment of managerial and owner incentives.     

Optimal exercise of executive stock options and implications for firm cost

This paper conducts a comprehensive study of the optimal exercise policy for an executive stock option and its implications for option cost, average life, and alternative valuation concepts. The paper is the first to provide analytical results for an executive with general concave utility. Wealthier or less risk-averse executives exercise later and create greater option cost. However, option cost can decline with volatility. We show when there exists a single exercise boundary, yet demonstrate the possibility of a split continuation region. We also show that, for constant relative risk averse utility, the option value does not converge to the Black and Scholes value as the correlation between the stock and the market portfolio converges to one. We compare our model's option cost with the modified Black and Scholes approximation typically used in practice and show that the approximation error can be large or small, positive or negative, depending on firm characteristics.     

Rational early exercise of call options: Australian evidence

Alpert (2010) develops a detailed analysis of the conditions for rational early exercise of call options in the presence of taxes. Using Alpert’s analysis as the theoretical framework, we examine the early exercise of call options in Australia over the period from 1 January 2001 to 30 June 2008. We find that exercises occurring on the last cum‐dividend trading day can be fully explained by non‐tax reasons, whilst taxation is a potential explanation for a large proportion of the early exercises that occur at other times.     

Optimal exercise of executive stock options

Valuing executive stock options is a challenging problem, because the standard risk-neutral valuation of those options is not appropriate; the executive is not allowed to trade the stock of the firm, so is not operating in a complete market. As this paper shows, an executive holding many American-style call options on his firm’s stock will optimally exercise the options bit by bit, whereas a risk-neutral valuation of the options would assume that all are exercised at the same time. Comparative statics of the optimal exercise policy show many surprising features.      

Valuation of FX barrier options under stochastic volatility

This paper describes European-style valuation and hedging procedures for a class of knockout barrier options under stochastic volatility. A pricing framework is established by applying mean self-financing arguments and the minimal equivalent martingale measure. Using appropriate combinations of stochastic numerical and variance reduction procedures we demonstrate that fast and accurate valuations can be obtained for down-and-out call options for the Heston model.     

Pricing via recursive quantization in stochastic volatility models

We provide the first recursive quantization-based approach for pricing options in the presence of stochastic volatility. This method can be applied to any model for which an Euler scheme is available for the underlying price process and it allows one to price vanillas, as well as exotics, thanks to the knowledge of the transition probabilities for the discretized stock process. We apply the methodology to some celebrated stochastic volatility models, including the Stein and Stein [Rev. Financ. Stud. 1991, (4), 727–752] model and the SABR model introduced in Hagan et al. [Wilmott Mag., 2002, 84–108]. A numerical exercise shows that the pricing of vanillas turns out to be accurate; in addition, when applied to some exotics like equity-volatility options, the quantization-based method overperforms by far the Monte Carlo simulation.     

Empirical evidence on the use, size and cost of executive options schemes in Australia

In this paper we provide an overview of empirical data relating to the use, scale and cost of executive options schemes in Australia. Our data is based on a sample of 100 large listed Australian corporations. Our data suggests that approximately 80% of large listed corporations in Australia presently employ executive options schemes, but that the size and cost of these schemes reduced significantly after 2000. We argue that this reflects the impact of increased public scrutiny over options schemes and the impending move in Australia towards a financial reporting regime in which treating the cost of options as an expense for the purposes of calculating annual profit and loss is mandatory.     

Managerial discretion and the economic determinants of the disclosed volatility parameter for valuing ESOs

This study investigates the determinants of the expected stock-price volatility assumption that firms use in estimating ESO values and thus option expense. We find that, consistent with the guidance of FAS 123, firms use both historical and implied volatility in deriving the expected volatility parameter. We also find, however, that the importance of each of the two variables in explaining disclosed volatility relates inversely to their values, which results in a reduction in expected volatility and thus option value. This can be interpreted as managers opportunistically use the discretion in estimating expected volatility afforded by FAS 123. Consistent with this, we find that managerial incentives or ability to understate option value play a key role in this behavior. Since discretion in estimating expected volatility is common to both FAS 123 and 123(R), our analysis has important implications for market participants as well as regulators.

The relationship between implied and realized volatility: evidence from the Australian stock index option market

This paper examines the relationship between the volatility implied in option prices and the subsequently realized volatility by using the S&P/ASX 200 index options (XJO) traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) during a period of 5 years. Unlike stock index options such as the S&P 100 index options in the US market, the S&P/ASX 200 index options are traded infrequently and in low volumes, and have a long maturity cycle. Thus an errors-in-variables problem for measurement of implied volatility is more likely to exist. After accounting for this problem by instrumental variable method, it is found that both call and put implied volatilities are superior to historical volatility in forecasting future realized volatility. Moreover, implied call volatility is nearly an unbiased forecast of future volatility.

Australian chief executive officer remuneration: pay and performance

International studies document strong evidence that chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration is positively correlated with corporate performance. Prior Australian studies, however, find no positive link between CEO pay and market performance. In the present paper we re‐examine the association between Australian CEO remuneration and firm performance using standard empirical models from the international literature. We find that in every respect the Australian evidence is consistent with international findings for firms of the USA, UK and Canada. In particular, we document CEO pay–performance association as positive and statistically significant.     

American options under stochastic volatility: control variates,maturity randomization & multiscale asymptotics

American options are actively traded worldwide on exchanges, thus making their accurate and efficient pricing an important problem. As most financial markets exhibit randomly varying volatility, in this paper we introduce an approximation of an American option price under stochastic volatility models. We achieve this by using the maturity randomization method known as Canadization. The volatility process is characterized by fast and slow-scale fluctuating factors. In particular, we study the case of an American put with a single underlying asset and use perturbative expansion techniques to approximate its price as well as the optimal exercise boundary up to the first order. We then use the approximate optimal exercise boundary formula to price an American put via Monte Carlo. We also develop efficient control variates for our simulation method using martingales resulting from the approximate price formula. A numerical study is conducted to demonstrate that the proposed method performs better than the least squares regression method popular in the financial industry, in typical settings where values of the scaling parameters are small. Further, it is empirically observed that in the regimes where the scaling parameter value is equal to unity, fast and slow-scale approximations are equally accurate.     

Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52     

Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001–2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements’ continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders’ Association) and regulatory intervention.     

Pricing variance and volatility swaps in a stochastic volatility model with regime switching: discrete observations case

This study presents a set of closed-form exact solutions for pricing discretely sampled variance swaps and volatility swaps, based on the Heston stochastic volatility model with regime switching. In comparison with all the previous studies in the literature, this research, which obtains closed-form exact solutions for variance and volatility swaps with discrete sampling times, serves several purposes. (1) It verifies the degree of validity of Elliott et al.'s [Appl. Math. Finance, 2007, 14(1), 41–62] continuous-sampling-time approximation for variance and volatility swaps of relatively short sampling periods. (2) It examines the effect of ignoring regime switching on pricing variance and volatility swaps. (3) It contributes to bridging the gap between Zhu and Lian's [Math. Finance, 2011, 21(2), 233–256] approach and Elliott et al.'s framework. (4) Finally, it presents a semi-Monte-Carlo simulation for the pricing of other important realized variance based derivatives.