浅论有害税收竞争

有害税收竞争问题的提出是与不同税收管辖权之间税收竞争趋势日渐激烈直接相关的。贸易自由化和经济全球化的迅速发展,使经济活动日益突破国界,资源、资金、人员、技术、信息等要素的跨国流动日趋频繁。因此,经济活动的跨国界性和税收管辖权的传统地域限制的矛盾更加突出。它一方面促使各国原本差异很大的税收逐渐趋各规范和趋同,世界税制一体化进程加快;另一方面,税收作为吸引生产要素和影响基流动的重要因素,以降低税率或实施优惠为主旋律的税收竞争也成为各国维护自身利益的重要手段。在当今科技发展迅速,特别是通讯技术的日新月异和以互联网为依托的电子商务的迅猛发展的势态下,生产要素的国际流动更加便捷、迅速,经济活动方式日趋更新和多样化,特别是金融创新层出不穷,资本更具流动性和隐蔽性。因此,新的经济形势给各国税制带来了空间的压力和挑战,各国间的税收竞争将更加激烈。无疑,世界税制的规范和趋同就是各国税收竞争的直接结果。     

试析国际税收竞争及其协调

随着经济全球化的不断深入,阻碍生产要素跨国界流动的障碍逐渐消除,资本等要素的流动性大大增强,各国纷纷采用税收手段来增强本国对生产要素的吸引力,全球范围内的降税浪潮所导致的激烈的国际税收竞争,引发了国际社会对此现象的深入思考。国际税收竞争实质上反映了正在变化中演进的国家间的税收关系,这种变化的背后体现的是国家主权和经济全球化之间的矛盾。     

浅析国际税收竞争

1. 国际税收竞争的渊源进入新的世纪，经济全球化的趋势日益明显。各国在经济全球化过程中相继采取市场化的经济体制，世界统一的大市场正在形成，生产要素正以空前的规模和速度在全球范围内流动。经济全球化和现代市场经济的普遍确立，对某些国家来说并不能缓解和消除包括资本在内的资源的稀缺性问题，相反，在各国的经济发展中，资源供给的有限性进一步显现出来。各国都努力通过各种政策手段竞相吸引国际资本流向本国，以推动本国的经济增长。盈利是资本的本性，国际资本在全球范围内的流动也必然要遵循利润最大化的原则，流向那些能够产…     

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调

随着经济全球化的进一步加深，经济交往的日益复杂，国际税收也遇到了越来越多的问题。由于税收已构成了跨国经济活动的一项重要成本因素，为了吸引更多的资本流入，国际税收竞争日益加剧。在经济全球化的前提下，一国税收政策变动的影响常常会超出国界的范围，引起另一国采取相应行动，从而引起国家之间的税收分配关系发生变化，并有可能对其他国家造成有害的外部影响。因此，税收竞争逐渐成为国际税收的重要内容之一，有害税收竞争也随之成为人们关注的焦点。基于此，本文试图对税收竞争和有害税收竞争谈些个人的看法。     

浅论税收竞争

税收竞争的产生源于辖区政府为最大化提供公共物品而引致的收入最友化行为与居民的“搭便车”行为和理性行为双方的冲突，是辖区政府的一种必然化行为，税收竞争是一把双刃剑；它是在特定的财政体制背景下进行的，与财政体制密切相关；必须采取一定方式矫正其外在性。     

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调之辩证观

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调是经济全球化下国际税收关系主要矛盾的外在表现形式,二者之间存在着辩证统一的关系。国际税收协调既可以缓解恶性国际税收竞争,又会产生新一轮的国际税收竞争。各国对待国际税收竞争与协调的立场会因各自利益的不同需要而发生改变,但总体而言,走“税收竞争——税收协调”之路是处理国际税收关系的必然趋势,这一趋势的发展对我国税收政策的调整也有重要启示。     

国际税收竞争理论及我国国际税收政策取向

借鉴国内外税收竞争理论研究成果,我国的国际税收政策应从低层次的优惠大战,转向根据我国的优势战略性地设置税率和制定税收优惠政策上;从单边优惠提升到通过国际税收对话和协调,在高层次上制定有利于我国的“游戏规则”的交锋上来,以确保我国在经济全球化进程中的税收权益。     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union

This paper examines the tax competition literature and attempts to draw out its implications for the debate on corporate tax coordination within the EU. It begins with the early basic tax competition model, which derives conditions under which underprovision of public services occurs and tax harmonization unambiguously improves welfare for all states in the union. The paper then turns to a wide variety of extensions of this model, some of which reinforce its results and others that yield rather different conclusions. The analysis concludes by considering the implications of the tax competition literature for the debate on EU corporate tax coordination, drawing on some recent efforts to synthesize this vast literature by estimating the efficiency costs of tax competition and simulating the efficiency gains from various tax coordination palns.     

当前我国国内横向税收竞争的实证分析

目前我国理论研究的不足阻碍了对现实生活中各类税收竞争问题的有效治理。为此,着眼于我国国内横向税收竞争的实践,对其进行总结和归类,剖析其背后的体制与制度原因,评价其经济效应,并由此提出促进我国国内横向税收有序发展的政策措施是必要的。     

Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?

Some governments have recently called for international accords restricting the use of preferential taxes targeted to attract mobile tax bases from abroad. Are such agreements likely to discourage tax competition or conversely cause it to spread? We study a general model of competition for multiple tax bases and establish conditions for a restriction on preferential regimes to increase or decrease tax revenues. Our results show that restrictions are most likely to be desirable when tax bases are on average highly responsive to a coordinated increase in tax rates by all governments, and when tax bases with large domestic elasticities are also more mobile internationally. Our analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently contradictory results of the previous literature.     

奢侈品税理论与制度研究的文献综述

随着奢侈品消费群的迅速扩张,奢侈品税的研究受到众多学者的广泛关注。本文对国内外学者以不同角度对奢侈品税的研究文献进行综述,探讨奢侈品税制度的进一步改革与完善,为规范税收体系,完善税收制度提供理论依据与政策思考。     

Tax Competition and Foreign Capital

This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, we provide sufficient conditions on the number of host sectors and factors that support double-tax-rule equivalence. Examples violating these conditions help identify economic factors under which a home country has strict preferences over double taxation rules. If the home tax rate can influence host factor prices, the home country weakly prefers deductions over credits as in the pure-home-equity financing case.     

税收竞争和税收套利对国际税收制度的挑战

当前被动投资的税收竞争、主动投资的税收竞争和税收套利等问题阻碍了单一税收原则和受惠原则的实践运用。本文介绍了税收竞争和税收套利对国际税收制度的挑战,并以OECD成员国的应对为例,阐述了OECD成员国不断与时俱进修订税收法规的历程,试图引起人们关注国际税收制度的完善。     

国际税收竞争、资本管制与企业所得税负担调整

在经济全球化的背景下,为争夺国际资本,各国都实行了相当优惠的公司所得税政策。但是,减税等国际税收竞争措施的作用是不确定的,一国应采取的国际税收竞争战略与其国家规模、资本管制政策等因素密切相关。面对近年来引进外国直接投资(FDI)增速放缓和逐步放松资本管制的大背景,我国必须抓住内外资企业所得税制度合并的有利时机,合理调整我国企业所得税负担。     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Environmental Tax Competition in the Presence of Multinational Firms

We study the design of environmental policy in a two country model with an imperfectly competitive polluting industry. We show that when the firms are multinational, non-cooperative policy design leads to too severe emission taxation regardless of the mode of competition. The reason is twofold. First, when firms are multinational, changes in environmental policy do not influence the market shares of the firms. Second, when designing their policies, national governments ignore profits accruing to foreign shareholders of multinational firms.