The new-Keynesian liquidity trap

Many new-Keynesian models produce a deep recession with deflation at the zero bound. These models also make unusual policy predictions: Useless government spending, technical regress, capital destruction, and forward guidance can raise output. Moreover, these predictions are larger as prices become less sticky and as changes are expected further in the future. I show that these predictions are strongly affected by equilibrium selection. For the same interest-rate path, equilibria that bound initial jumps predict mild inflation, small output variation, negative multipliers, small effects of far-off expectations and a smooth frictionless limit. Fiscal policy considerations suggest the latter equilibria.     

Steady-state equilibrium with state-dependent pricing

State-dependent pricing models are now an operational framework for quantitative business cycle analysis. The analysis in Ball and Romer [1991. Sticky prices as coordination failure. American Economic Review 81 (3), 539-552], however, suggests that such models may be rife with multiple equilibria, for in their static model, price adjustment is always characterized by complementarity, a necessary condition for multiplicity. We study existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium in a discrete-time state-dependent pricing model. We find only weak complementarity and no evidence of multiplicity. However, nonexistence of symmetric steady-state equilibrium with pure strategies arises in the region of the parameter space between flexible and sticky prices.     

Equilibrium Bitcoin Pricing

We offer a general equilibrium analysis of cryptocurrency pricing. The fundamental value of the cryptocurrency is its stream of net transactional benefits, which depend on its future prices. This implies that, in addition to fundamentals, equilibrium prices reflect sunspots. This in turn implies multiple equilibria and extrinsic volatility, that is, cryptocurrency prices fluctuate even when fundamentals are constant. To match our model to the data, we construct indices measuring the net transactional benefits of Bitcoin. In our calibration, part of the variations in Bitcoin returns reflects changes in net transactional benefits, but a larger share reflects extrinsic volatility.     

Signalling and entry deterrence: a multidimensional analysis

I consider whether a privately informed incumbent can use limit pricing and upward distortions in advertising to deter profitable entry. Profitable entry is not deterred when the incumbent is privately informed only about its cost type. Profitable entry may be deterred, however, if the incumbent is privately informed about its cost type and its patience level. An equilibrium foundation is thus provided for the traditional hypothesis that limit pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent may deter profitable entry. At a methodological level, the article contributes by characterizing the refined equilibria of a signalling model with multiple dimensions of private information and multiple signals.     

Feedback Effects and Asset Prices

Feedback effects from asset prices to firm cash flows have been empirically documented. This finding raises a question for asset pricing: How are asset prices determined if price affects fundamental value, which in turn affects price? In this environment, by buying assets that others are buying, investors ensure high future cash flows for the firm and subsequent high returns for themselves. Hence, investors have an incentive to coordinate, which may generate self‐fulfilling beliefs and multiple equilibria. Using insights from global games, we pin down investors' beliefs, analyze equilibrium prices, and show that strong feedback leads to higher excess volatility.     

Stability of Radner equilibria with respect to small frictions

We study risk-sharing equilibria with trading subject to small proportional transaction costs. We show that the frictionless equilibrium prices also form an “asymptotic equilibrium” in the small-cost limit. More precisely, there exist asymptotically optimal policies for all agents and a split of the trading cost according to their risk aversions for which the frictionless equilibrium prices still clear the market. Starting from a frictionless equilibrium, this allows studying the interplay of volatility, liquidity and trading volume.     

Networks in Production: Asset Pricing Implications

In this paper, I examine asset pricing in a multisector model with sectors connected through an input‐output network. Changes in the network are sources of systematic risk reflected in equilibrium asset prices. Two characteristics of the network matter for asset prices: network concentration and network sparsity. These two production‐based asset pricing factors are determined by the structure of the network and are computed from input‐output data. Consistent with the model predictions, I find return spreads of 4.6% and ?3.2% per year on sparsity and concentration beta‐sorted portfolios, respectively.     

Good‐Specific Habit Formation and the Cross‐Section of Expected Returns

I study asset prices in a general equilibrium framework in which agents form habits over individual varieties of goods rather than over an aggregate consumption bundle. Goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms whose elasticities of demand depend on consumers' habit formation. Firms that produce goods with a high habit level relative to consumption have low demand elasticities, set high prices for their product, have low expected returns on their stock, and have low asset pricing betas and stock return volatilities. I find supportive evidence for these predictions in the data.     

Margin requirements and equilibrium asset prices

This paper studies the effect of margin requirements on asset prices and trading volume in a general equilibrium asset pricing model where Epstein-Zin investors differ in their degree of risk aversion. Under the assumptions of unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution and zero net supply of riskless assets, I show analytically that binding margin requirements do not affect stock prices. This result stands in contrast to previous partial equilibrium analysis where fixed margin requirements increase the volatility of stock prices. In this framework, binding margin requirements induce a fall in the riskless rate, increase its volatility, and increase stock trading volume.     

Equilibrium Pricing of General Insurance Policies

Abstract

A model is developed for determining the price of general insurance policies in a competitive, noncooperative market. This model extends previous single-optimizer pricing models by supposing that each participant chooses an optimal pricing strategy. Specifically, prices are determined by finding a Nash equilibrium of an N-player differential game. In the game, a demand law describes the relationship between policy sales and premium, and each insurer aims to maximize its (expected) utility of wealth at the end of the planning horizon. Two features of the model are investigated in detail: the effect of limited total demand for policies, and the uncertainty in the calculation of the breakeven (or cost price) of an insurance policy.

It is found that if the demand for policies is unlimited, then the equilibrium pricing strategy is identical for all insurers, and it can be found analytically for particular model parameterizations. However, if the demand for policies is limited, then, for entrants to a new line of business, there are additional asymmetric Nash equilibria with insurers alternating between maximal and minimal selling. Consequently it is proposed that the actuarial cycle is a result of price competition, limited demand, and entry of new insurers into the market. If the breakeven premium is highly volatile, then the symmetric equilibrium premium loading tends to a constant, and it is suggested that this will dampen the oscillatory pricing of new entrants.     

Assessing the quality of a security market: a new approach to transaction-cost measurement

I discuss a new method for measuring the deviations betweenactual transaction prices and implicit efficient prices. Theapproach decomposes security transaction prices into random-walkand stationary components. The random-walk component may beidentified with the efficient price. The stationary component,the difference between the efficient price and the actual transactionprice, is termed the pricing error. Its dispersion is a naturalmeasure of market quality. I describe practical strategies forestimating these quantities. For a sample of NYSE stocks, theaverage pricing error standard deviation estimate is roughly0.33 percent of the stock price. If the pricing error is normallydistributed and if it is always a positive cost incurred bythe transaction initiators, the corresponding average transactioncost for these traders is 0.26 percent of the stock price. Thedispersion of the pricing error is also found to be elevatedat the beginning and end of the trading session.     

Divisional performance measurement and transfer pricing for intangible assets

This paper examines the effectiveness of three transfer pricing methodologies for an intangible asset that is developed through bilateral, sequential investment. In general, a royalty-based transfer price that can be renegotiated provides better investment incentives than either a non-negotiable royalty-based transfer price or a purely negotiated transfer price, and in some cases induces first-best investment. This result contrasts with previous research that finds that the inability to limit renegotiation of initial contracts reduces investment efficiency. Further, I examine how tax transfer pricing rules inform optimal internal transfer prices when the firm decouples internal and external transfer prices.     

Block trading and information revelation around quarterly earnings announcements

I investigate the empirical importance of information revelationin the pricing of block trades. In particular, I examine whetherblock prices are correlated with the unexpected part of firms'quarterly earnings. For my sample of block trades, informationrevelation does indeed appear to be a significant factor shortlybefore earnings announcements.     

Equilibrium asset pricing: with non-Gaussian factors and exponential utilities

We analyse the equilibrium asset pricing implications for an economy with single period return exposures to explicit non-Gaussian systematic factors, that may be both skewed and long-tailed, and Gaussian idiosyncratic components. Investors maximize expected exponential utility and equilibrium factor prices are shown to reflect exponentially tilted prices for non-Gaussian factor risk exposures. It is shown that these prices may be directly estimated from the univariate probability law of the factor exposure, given an estimate of average risk aversion in the economy. In addition, a residual form of the capital asset pricing model continues to hold and prices the idiosyncratic or Gaussian risks. The theory is illustrated on data for the US economy using independent components analysis to identify the factors and the variance gamma model to describe the probability law of the non-Gaussian factors. It is shown that the residual CAPM accounts for no more than 1% of the pricing of risky assets, while the exponentially tilted systematic factor risk exposures account for the bulk of risky asset pricing.     

科创板基础性制度改革能否提升市场定价效率?

作为中国资本市场基础性制度改革的创新载体,科创板市场改革能否达到改革预期目标,是当前资本市场热切关注的重要问题。本文基于市场定价效率的视角,对科创板基础性制度改革下的定价机制改革效果进行评估,着重考察询价机制改革和价格限制改革对市场价格发现的影响效应。研究发现,相比主板及创业板市场(试点注册制改革之前),科创板市场定价效率显著提升、价格发现功能显著优化。从具体改革路径来看,询价机制改革更好地实现了发行定价市场化,通过“询价机构报价行为”路径提升了科创板新股发行定价效率,且促进了中长期理性定价;价格限制改革则更好地实现了交易定价市场化,不仅抑制了科创板新股首日溢价程度,也加速了市场日后均衡价格的形成。     

Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Option Prices as Predictors of Equilibrium Stock Prices

The Black-Scholes option pricing model, modified for dividend payments, is used to calculate jointly implied stock prices and implied standard deviations. A comparison of the implied stock prices with observed stock prices reveals that the implied prices contain information regarding equilibrium stock prices that is not fully reflected in observed stock prices. The implications of this finding are discussed.     

How to reduce unemployment: A new policy proposal

This paper uses a model with a continuum of equilibrium steady state unemployment rates to explore the effectiveness of fiscal policy. The existence of multiple steady state equilibria is explained by the presence of search and recruiting costs. I use the model to explain the current financial crisis as a shift to a high unemployment equilibrium, induced by the self-fulfilling beliefs of market participants about asset prices. I ask two questions. (1) Can fiscal policy help us out of the crisis? (2) Is there an alternative to fiscal policy that is less costly and more effective? The answer to both questions is yes.     

寡头电信企业价格决策微分博弈模型及其分析

在随机需求环境下,电信企业的价格策略表现为一个随时变化的调整轨迹,将寡头电信企业之间的价格竞争博弈刻画为微分博弈模型,并对模型进行了数值模拟和仿真分析,结果表明:在随机需求下,寡头电信企业的价格策略存在唯一的鞍点均衡路径,否则很难实现均衡状态;虽然寡头电信企业的价格处在动态调整中,但市场份额会相对稳定维持在某一均衡状态下。     

The capital asset pricing model as a general equilibrium with incomplete markets

We recast the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in the broader context of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI). In this setting we give proofs of three properties of CAPM equilibria: they are efficient, asset prices lie on a security market line, and all agents hold the same two mutual funds. The first property requires a riskless asset, the latter two do not. We show that across all GEI only one of these three properties of equilibrium is generally valid: asset prices depend on covariances, not variances. We extend CAPM to many consumption goods in such a way that all three properties hold. But now the definition of a riskless asset depends on preferences and endowments, and so cannot be specifieda priori.We wish to acknowledge assistance of NSF Grant No. 88-12051, and a referee's comments. We are grateful for conversations with H. Polemarchakis, especially concerning Section II.4.