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1.
This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all‐or‐nothing in patent litigation. If patents are sufficiently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives. 相似文献
2.
Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance. 相似文献
3.
Eren Inci 《International Tax and Public Finance》2009,16(6):797-821
This paper examines R&D tax incentives in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the conditions under which tax incentives
reach the socially desirable level of firm-financed R&D spending. The outcome of the market depends not only on the level
of technological spillover in the industry but also on the degree of strategic interaction between the firms. One major result
emerges from the model: The socially desirable level of R&D investment is not necessarily reached by subsidizing R&D. When
the technological spillover is sufficiently low, the government might want to tax R&D investments, and this result does not
necessarily arise because firms are overinvesting in R&D. There are also cases in which an R&D tax is desirable even though
firms are underinvesting in R&D compared with the first-best optimum. In practice, this theoretical finding calls for a lower
sales tax combined with an R&D subsidy in oligopolistic industries with high technological spillovers, and a lower sales tax
combined with an R&D tax in oligopolistic industries with low technological spillovers. 相似文献
4.
Florian Schuett 《The Rand journal of economics》2013,44(2):313-336
Patent examination is a problem of moral hazard followed by adverse selection: examiners must have incentives to exert effort, but also to truthfully reveal the evidence they find. I develop a theoretical model to study the design of incentives for examiners. The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as the variation in compensation schemes and patent quality across patent offices. It also has implications for the retention of examiners and for administrative patent review. 相似文献
5.
Chen-Lung Chin Picheng Lee Hsin-Yi Chi Asokan Anandarajan 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2006,26(1):67-84
Although prior research has examined the effect of patent citations on Tobin's Q in a variety of environments, in this study
we examine whether the parameters are affected by stage of a company in the value chain. Unlike other national semiconductor
firms, Taiwanese semiconductor firms typically specialize in one of the value-added activities, namely, either design or manufacturing
or packaging and testing. Our finding is that the effect of patent citation on Tobin's Q is accentuated when the firm is at
the front end of the value chain and diminishes as we proceed to the back end. This finding is novel in the literature. We
also find that frequency of patent citations and R&D spillover are positive and significant in relation to Tobin's Q. In addition,
the effect of R&D spillover on Tobin's Q is more pronounced for firms in the design sector relative to other sectors.
JEL Classification: M41, O3
Authors are grateful for insightful comments and suggestions from an anonymous reviewer. Picheng Lee also gratefully acknowledges
a research grant from Lubin School of Business at Pace University 相似文献
6.
This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, compensated with an equity-based contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. The contract creates incentives that affect both the sign and magnitude of a manager׳s optimal response to volatility shocks. The model is calibrated using compensation data to quantify this predicted investment response for a large panel of firms. Our estimates help explain the variation in firm-level investment responses to volatility shocks observed in the data. 相似文献
7.
Richard C. Green 《Journal of Financial Economics》1984,13(1):115-136
This paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing. The decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized. The paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives. These claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm's earnings, and this mitigates the incentive to take risk. It is shown that, under certain conditions, such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm. 相似文献
8.
Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm. 相似文献
9.
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort‐feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator. 相似文献
10.
《Journal of Financial Intermediation》2014,23(4):570-589
We examine the effect of liability protection on the compensation of directors and on takeover outcomes. Consistent with the hypothesis that directors require additional compensation if they bear liability, we find that director compensation is higher for firms that provide less liability protection. Examining takeovers, we find evidence that takeovers of firms with protected directors are less likely to succeed. Moreover, firms with protected directors are more likely to accept a lower bid premium, and this finding is consistent with protected directors having reduced incentives to negotiate for the highest possible price during the acquisition. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that director liability provisions have a significant impact both on director compensation and director duty. 相似文献
11.
《Journal of Accounting and Economics》1997,23(1):7-30
In a team setting, wherein only group performance is tracked, we show that muted incentive contracts may be sufficient to motivate team members. By having the team repeat a task, explicit (contractual) incentives can be substituted by implicit incentives team members provide to each other. We also study an example in which, despite uncorrelated individual performance measures being available, it is optimal to condition each manager's pay on both managers' performance. This can be viewed as creating a group performance measure. Using a group performance measure provides each manager with incentives to monitor and a means of punishing other managers. 相似文献
12.
This study explores the relationship between changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and adjustments of firms’ cost structures, particularly the operating leverage (fixed-to-variable cost ratio). We find managers reduce operating leverage by substituting fixed costs with variable costs, mainly in the selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) cost components, in response to reductions in option-based compensation following the issuance of FAS 123R. Managers facing a decrease in risk-taking incentives adjust operating leverage downward because high operating leverage intensifies the downside potential of earnings. Overall, we present compelling evidence that managers adjust the cost structure of their firms in response to a reduction in risk-taking incentives. 相似文献
13.
This paper examines the effects of executive compensation and potential for earnings management on the incidence of shareholder
class action lawsuits and their outcomes. Although damage measurement factors, managerial option intensity, and earnings management
all significantly affect the probability of lawsuits, they differ in their influence on the likelihood of positive settlement
and on settlement amount: Damage factors do not affect the likelihood of settlement versus dismissal. High option intensity
raises the probability of positive settlement, but does not affect its amount. High earnings management, on the other hand,
does not affect the likelihood of settlement, but does increase settlement amount. These findings suggest that factors typically
used to explain shareholder lawsuits should be interpreted with care. 相似文献
14.
Mahmoud Agha 《Accounting & Finance》2013,53(1):1-30
This paper analyses the effect of executive incentives and internal governance on capital structure. Using a large sample of non‐financial US‐listed firms over the period 1999–2005, it is found that managers have different attitudes towards leverage when offered different incentive schemes; leverage initially decreases in bonuses and stock incentives and then increases in these incentives after a certain incentive level, suggesting the existence of the entrenchment–alignment effects under these incentive schemes. In contrast, leverage initially increases in option incentives and then decreases after a certain option incentive level. When all of these incentive schemes are combined together into a single incentive package, the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail. It is also found that leverage increases in internal governance and managers behave differently under different governance regimes such that the entrenchment–alignment effects prevail under weak governance firms, whereas the alignment–entrenchment effects prevail under strong governance firms. The results also suggest that managers’ target leverage ratio is less than the one predicted by theory or preferred by firm shareholders. 相似文献
15.
Social insurance,incentives and risk taking 总被引:9,自引:4,他引:9
Hans-Werner Sinn 《International Tax and Public Finance》1996,3(3):259-280
From the perspective of parents, redistributive taxation can be seen as social insurance for their children, for which no private alternative exists. Because private insurance comes too late during a person's life, it cannot cover the same risks as social insurance. Empirically, 85% of social insurance covers risks for which no private insurance would have been available. Redistributive taxation can be efficiency enhancing, because it creates safety and because it stimulates income generating risk taking. However, it also brings about detrimental moral hazard effects. Both the enhancement of risk taking and the moral hazard effects tend to increase the inequality in the economy, and, under constant returns to risk taking, this increase is likely to be strong enough even to make the net-of-tax income distribution more unequal. Optimal redistributive taxation will either imply that the pie becomes bigger when there is less inquality in pre-tax incomes or that more redistribution creates more post-tax inequality.The author gratefully acknowledges reserach assistance by Claudio Thum and useful comments by two anonymous referees. The paper is a broadened and non-technical discussion that draws on previous writings by the author on the subject. See in particular Sinn (1995). 相似文献
16.
Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. 相似文献
17.
This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future. 相似文献
18.
《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2022,41(5):106949
Political decisions often affect macroeconomic activity, which triggers effects on corporate decisions. Using satellite night light data to proxy for economic activity, we show that manipulation of GDP figures is associated with earnings management by local companies, especially when local politicians face more promotion pressure. We show that local politicians seeking career advancement exchange favors with local companies and pressure them to inflate earnings to increase local GDP numbers. Our findings illustrate how the macro-level political agenda and GDP manipulation can affect micro-level corporate earnings management. 相似文献
19.
Kenneth Lee 《Futures》1979,11(6):482-490
In theory, health planning is a detailed and rational corporate attempt to handle broad social problems. But in practice it tends to be incremental—an institutionalised bargaining system which too often neglects the larger issues in favour of marginal adjustments. Mixed scanning, the detailed examination of selected, feasible proposals, combines the best features from theory and practice. Implementation still depends on the recognition of powerful interest groups (eg doctors, managers) and the inclusion of incentives to redirect their activities. Better planning does not guarantee better health—the influence of lifestyle and environment must not be neglected. 相似文献
20.
Qing Hao 《Journal of Corporate Finance》2011,17(3):438-456
I examine the relations between litigation risk, withdrawal risk, and the costs of going public using a sample of withdrawn and completed initial public offerings (IPOs) filed during 1996–2005. Firms with a higher probability of offer withdrawal face higher litigation risk if they complete these offers. Firms with higher litigation risk pay slightly higher gross spreads, but do not underprice their IPOs by a greater amount. Withdrawal probability is strongly and positively associated with underwriter gross spreads, consistent with underwriters charging fees that reflect the probability of not getting paid. When the pre-market demand for an IPO is weak, a higher withdrawal probability raises underpricing on completed deals. 相似文献