Board Composition and Relationship‐Specific Investments by Customers and Suppliers

Firms are more likely to include a supplier‐customer on the board if the supplier‐customer invests more in relationship‐specific assets. The results are stronger when the firm has poorer financial reporting quality or is financially distressed, as well as post‐SOX. Suppliers‐customers also increase their relationship‐specific investment following their appointment to the board. Directorships help avoid underinvestment and mitigate contracting frictions by reducing information risks and strengthening informal contracts with the firm.     

政府研发补贴与降低企业杠杆率

本文利用中国上市公司数据,实证分析研发补贴对企业杠杆率的影响.研究发现,研发补贴对企业杠杆率的影响呈现U形特征,且主要体现在对企业短期杠杆率上,而对企业长期杠杆率没有显著影响.作用机制上,研发补贴对企业负债和所有者权益的影响均呈现U形特征;研发补贴对民营企业、小规模企业、强融资约束企业和中等创新能力企业的杠杆率呈现U形...     

企业过度负债的地区同群效应

本文研究中国上市企业过度负债的地区同群效应及其产生机制、作用因素和对企业经营的影响。数据表明,2009-2016年我国不同地区企业的过度负债水平存在明显差异。在排除个体、地区因素以及分选效应的替代性解释后,本文发现:企业的过度负债存在显著的地区同群效应,企业是否过度负债及其过度负债的程度分别与企业所在省区的过度负债企业占比和过度负债指数正相关;过度负债地区同群效应产生的潜在机制在于非领头企业、低融资约束企业和连锁董事网络中心度低的企业的模仿行为;地区市场化进程、金融发展程度以及企业高管的金融背景对过度负债的地区同群效应具有显著影响。过度负债的地区同群效应对企业经营的影响表现为:同群效应越强,企业过度负债水平越高、偿债能力越弱、过度投资越严重、盈利能力越低。     

Corporate Investments: Learning from Restatements

This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors.     

大股东控制、财务杠杆与公司价值——国有及民营上市公司治理的比较研究

本文以2002～2004年的上市公司为样本,研究了第一大股东持股比例、财务杠杆与公司价值之间的关系.研究发现,国有控制上市公司与民营控制上市公司公司价值并无显著差异;国有控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值呈U形关系,民营控制上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司价值则呈倒U形关系;国有控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值负相关,民营控制上市公司财务杠杆比率与公司价值则正相关.其政策含义是,政府应该继续贯彻"抓大放小"的战略方针;监管部门应该关注持股比例较高的民营上市公司第一大股东的资金来源及其行为特征,防止其对公司其他利益相关者的侵害行为;银行贷款应对国有及民营企业一视同仁,银行需要加强对国有控制上市公司贷款的监督.     

Leverage and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers

This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash flows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverage-increasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders.     

Corporate Leverage and Nondebt Tax Shields: Evidence on Crowding-Out

A negative relationship between corporate leverage and tax shields has been predicted because a large nondebt tax shield reduces the expected value of interest tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing. Previous studies, however, have provided inconclusive and contradictory evidence on whether nondebt tax shields crowd-out debt financing. The analysis herein relies on unique constructs of discounted depreciation tax shields and presents evidence that crowding-out does not occur. Furthermore, it is shown that contradictory inferences may result from analysis of annual tax depreciation deductions instead of discounted tax shields. The findings suggest that firms with substantial cash flow from depreciation exploit their higher debt capacity by maintaining a capital structure with significantly more debt than otherwise.     

非金融企业部门杠杆率与银行业风险研究

通过对实体经济,特别是非金融企业进行深入剖析,可准确判断银行业的风险和隐患。理论和实证分析表明,国际金融危机后我国非金融企业部门较为突出的加杠杆问题,已在"双支柱"调控框架及强监管的政策压力下得到有效控制,未来非金融企业部门杠杆率有望稳步下降。但不同行业之间仍存在差异,房地产行业和公共设施管理行业未来的债务风险尤其不容忽视。本文研究发现,虽然银行可以通过主动调整行业信贷政策来降低经营风险,但如果不能通过供给侧结构性改革有效地在宏观层面提升全要素生产率,以及在微观层面改善企业的经营效益,则非金融企业部门的债务风险依然可能向银行体系传导。     

公司客户需求变化及商业银行应对策略

现代商业银行“以客户为中心”的经营理念实质就是“以客户需求为中心”。客户需求因时而变。要求现代商业银行与时俱进。本课题依据现代营销学理论，立足分析客户需求，从响应客户需求，开展金融创新；顺应客户需求，调整业务结构；适应客户需求，提高服务效率三个方面设计我国商业银行应对公司客户需求变化的策略。     

公司客户需求变化及商业银行应对策略

现代商业银行“以客户为中心”的经营理念实质就是“以客户需求为中心”。客户需求因时而变,要求现代商业银行与时俱进。本课题依据现代营销学理论,立足分析客户需求,从响应客户需求,开展金融创新;顺应客户需求,调整业务结构;适应客户需求,提高服务效率三个方面设计我国商业银行应对公司客户需求变化的策略。     

The Effect of Taxes and Depreciation on Corporate Investment and Financial Leverage

This paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm's optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty. It extends the DeAngelo and Masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm's investment decision. The authors' results indicate that, when investment is allowed to adjust optimally, the existing predictions about the relationship between investment-related and debt-related tax shields must be modified. In particular, the authors show that increases in investment-related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level. In cross-sectional analysis, firms with higher investment-related tax shields (normalized by expected earnings) need not have lower debt-related tax shields (normalized by expected earnings) unless all firms utilize the same production technology. Differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross-sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of DeAngelo and Masulis.     

融资溢价、企业杠杆率与货币政策规则选择

本文构建了包含金融摩擦和价格黏性的动态随机一般均衡模型,研究了货币政策冲击对于产出和企业杠杆率的影响,及不同的企业融资溢价、杠杆率、高低风险企业比例对货币政策传导的影响,并对比了基准泰勒规则和宏观审慎的货币政策规则下的福利损失情况。数值模拟分析结果表明:一是随着企业外部融资溢价的增加,单位货币政策冲击引起的波动增大;二是企业杠杆率的降低有助于降低货币政策冲击的影响;三是技术冲击短期内有利于降低企业的杠杆率;四是紧缩性的货币政策会导致企业杠杆率的升高,而盯住企业杠杆率的宏观审慎的货币政策规则,社会福利损失下降得比较明显,企业杠杆率应成为货币政策对微观企业作用的一个"关注"变量。     

Investment Opportunities,Free Cash Flow and Stock Valuation Effects of Corporate Investments: The Case of Taiwanese Investments in China

This paper examines the importance of investment opportunities and free cash flow in assessing the stock market reaction to announcements of cross-border investments in China by Taiwanese firms. Our results support the investment opportunities hypothesis that Taiwanese firms with favorable investment opportunities have significantly positive response to the announcements of their investments in China whereas firms with poor investment opportunities have negative response to such announcements. In contrast, we find no support for the free cash flow hypothesis. Our findings add to the understanding of the determinants of the wealth effect of cross-border investment decisions in the Asia-Pacific region.     

中国企业高杠杆成因及去杠杆方式研究

目前,中国企业的高杠杆、高负债限制了企业进一步融资的能力,提高了商业银行的不良贷款率,带来的系统风险渗透到国民经济的各个部门,促使经济不断下行,进而可能引发全社会的信用危机。供给侧结构性改革的重要任务之一就是"去杠杆",引导社会资本"脱虚入实"。本文首先从中国经济持续下行和企业重复产能建设、金融体系的不完善、追求GDP为导向的经济增长等入手,剖析企业"高杠杆"的成因;其次,从直接减债、债务重组、企业资产证券化、债转股等探讨企业"去杠杆"的方式;最后,从政府加杠杆、需求侧与供给侧的双轮驱动、优化企业融资结构、创新融资方式以及实行差别化信贷享有权,营造健康的金融环境等方面,提出企业"去杠杆"的若干建议。     

我国企业部门杠杆率及其债务风险的辩证分析

我国企业部门杠杆率及其潜在债务风险受到国内外的广泛关注。本文在考察我国杠杆率的历史变动并进行国际比较的基础上,分析了造成企业部门杠杆率高企的周期性和结构性因素、国有企业高负债的特殊原因,以及宏观和微观杠杆率之间的背离与联系。本文还对我国债务风险进行了评估,并提出了推动我国企业"去杠杆"的具体建议。本文认为,应辩证看待我国债务风险:由于各国经济发展特征和债务结构各异,高杠杆率并不意味着债务危机的必然爆发;但过高的杠杆水平可能导致经济金融环境更加复杂,从而引发金融和实体经济的不稳定。对此,应对杠杆率的分子端和分母端同时采取有效措施,在分子端做减法,在分母端做加法。     

Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage

We find that firms protected by second generation state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.     

控股股东和财务杠杆的激励功能

以上海证券交易所的747家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,检验了财务杠杆与公司价值之间的经验关系,考察了控股股东性质对财务杠杆价值效应的影响.结果发现,财务杠杆对公司价值(成长性)具有显著的积极效应;另外,控股股东性质对财务杠杆的价值效应和激励功能具有显著的影响,财务杠杆在法人控股的公司中能够发挥更有效的激励作用.