Inflation and Welfare in a Competitive Search Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information

We study an economy characterized by competitive search and asymmetric information. Money is essential. Buyers decide their cash holdings after observing the contracts posted by firms and experience match-specific preference shocks which remain unknown to sellers. Firms are allowed to post general contracts. In the baseline model with indivisible goods, we show that, when the number of potential buyers is fixed, inflation decreases markups. This, in turn, increases aggregate output and ex ante welfare. When goods are divisible the negative effect of inflation on markups holds for unconstrained agents but is ambiguous for constrained agents. Still, optimal monetary policy implies a positive nominal rate. When there is buyers' free entry, asymmetric information causes a congestion effect that can be corrected by monetary policy.     

Firm entry,markups and the monetary transmission mechanism

Two business cycle models with endogenous firm and product entry are estimated by matching impulse responses to a monetary policy shock. The ‘competition effect’ implies that entry lowers desired markups and dampens inflation. Under translog preferences, where the substitutability between goods depends on their number, we find evidence of such an effect. That model generates more countercyclical markups than Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition model, where price stickiness is the only source of markup fluctuations. In contrast, a model with strategic interactions between oligopolistic firms cannot generate an empirically relevant competition effect and is statistically equivalent to the Dixit–Stiglitz model.     

Markups,Tobin's q,and the Increasing Capital Share

Increasing markups have recently gained prominence as a leading explanation for the increasing share of income going to capital since the 1980s. However, the existing analysis has been limited to the United States, covers only short periods, and generally does not control for potentially important confounders. Constructing data for the share of income going to capital and markups based on Tobin's q over the period 1870–2018 for 21 advanced countries, this research examines the ability of markups to explain the movements of income shares and the tendency for factor shares to converge toward constants in the long run. We find strong support for the markup hypothesis.     

Sequential location games

We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone and—under some additional restrictions—hump‐shaped and U‐shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner‐take‐all competition, trade‐offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.     

Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review

I review recent empirical research documenting offer premiums and bidding strategies in corporate takeovers. The discussion ranges from optimal auction bidding to the choice of deal payment form and premium effects of poison pills. The evidence describes the takeover process at a detailed level, from initial premiums to bid jumps, entry of rival bidders, and toehold strategies. Cross-sectional tests illuminate whether bidders properly adjust for winner's curse, whether target stock price runups force offer price markups, and whether auctions of bankrupt firms result in fire-sale discounts. The evidence is suggestive of rational strategic bidding behavior in specific contexts.     

Firm dynamics, markup variations, and the business cycle

We present a model in which net business formation is endogenously procyclical. Variations in the number of operating firms lead to countercyclical variations in markups that give rise to endogenous procyclical movements in measured total factor productivity (TFP). Based on this result, the paper suggests a simple structural decomposition of variations in TFP into those originating from exogenous shocks and those originating endogenously from the interaction between firms’ entry and exit decisions and the degree of competition. The decomposition suggests that around 40% of the movements in measured TFP can be attributed to this interaction. Moreover, the paper analyzes the effects on (i) the measurement of the volatility of exogenous shocks in the U.S. economy and (ii) the magnification of shocks over the business cycle.     

The Wealth Effects of Reducing Private Placement Resale Restrictions

Recently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission reduced resale restrictions on Rule 144 private placements from 12 months to 6 months with the intention of lowering the cost of equity capital for issuing firms. In Canada, similar regulatory changes were adopted several years ago, providing a unique opportunity to test the wealth effects of reducing private placement resale restrictions. We find that shortening resale restrictions reduces the liquidity portion of offer price discounts, and thus lowers the cost of equity capital for issuing firms, but has no significant effect on announcement‐period abnormal returns after controlling for issuer type. However, there is a fundamental shift in the types of firms making private placements of common stock after the legislation‐induced easing of resale restrictions. Specifically, we find that smaller firms and firms with greater information asymmetry are less likely to issue privately placed common stock after the legislative change, suggesting that the easing of resale restrictions reduces the costly signal that helps to overcome the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem.     

From Implicit to Explicit: The Impact of Disclosure Requirements on Hidden Transaction Costs

This paper provides evidence that disclosing corporate bond investors' transaction costs (markups) affects the size of the markups. Until recently, markups were embedded in the reported transaction price and not explicitly disclosed. Without explicit disclosure, investors can estimate their markups using executed transaction prices. However, estimating markups imposes information processing costs on investors, potentially creating information asymmetry between unsophisticated investors and bond‐market professionals. We explore changes in markups after bond‐market professionals were required to explicitly disclose the markup on certain retail trade confirmations. We find that markups decline for trades that are subject to the disclosure requirement relative to those that are not. The findings are pronounced when constraints on investors' information processing capacity limit their ability to be informed about their markups without explicit disclosure.     

The Relaxation of Entry Barriers in the Banking Industry: An Empirical Investigation

Until recently, state laws restricted entry into local banking markets in many states by limiting both branching and multibank holding company (MBHC) operations. To the extent that these laws impeded entry into local banking markets, the removal or relaxation of the restrictions should have reduced barriers to entry, leading to more competitive price levels in the affected markets. This paper tests for such effects by examining the changes in deposit interest rates offered by banks operating in markets affected by liberalization of state banking law relative to the changes in deposit interest rates offered during the same time period by banks operating in markets not affected by such liberalization. We find evidence that liberalization of state laws restricting intrastate MBHC operations, interstate branches, and interstate MBHC operations caused deposit interest rates to become more competitive. We, however, find no evidence of such effects associated with the removal of restrictions on intrastate branching.     

Optimal taxation with monopolistic competition

This paper studies optimal taxation in a Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. In this setting, taxes may be used as an instrument to offset distortions caused by producer markups. Since markups tend to be higher in industries where firms face less elastic demand, tax rates will be pushed lower in these industries. This tends to work against the familiar inverse elasticities intuition associated with the Ramsey tax rule. However, a key feature of the model is that the Ramsey rule responds to the industry demand curve (Chamberlin’s DD) while the monopolistic markup is a response to the demand curve faced by firms (Chamberlin’s dd). Hence, the elasticities of both these curves influence the optimal tax rate, but in opposite directions.     

Do Americans consume too little natural gas? An empirical test of marginal cost pricing

This article measures the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs in the U.S. natural gas distribution market during the period 1991–2007. We find large departures from marginal cost pricing in all 50 states, with residential and commercial customers facing average markups of over 40%. Based on conservative estimates of the price elasticity of demand, these distortions impose hundreds of millions of dollars of annual welfare loss. Moreover, current price schedules are an important preexisting distortion which should be taken into account when evaluating carbon taxes and other policies aimed at addressing external costs.     

Competition among Financial Intermediaries When Diversification Matters

Many models predict that the diversification and efficiency of financial intermediaries (“banks”) increases with their size, so that a relatively unrestricted banking sector will settle into an equilibrium with several large, well-diversified, and competitive banks. However, this prediction is at odds with the actual pattern of unrestricted banking sector evolution in many countries. I develop a model that motivates this actual pattern and examine the model's implications for regulatory policy. I show that an investor's return from a bank depends on the number of investors using that bank; this adoption externality makes investor beliefs about other investors' actions critical for bank competition. In a young banking system with free entry, coordination problems lead to excessive fragmentation, and debt overhang makes it difficult for small banks to capture additional market share. As the system matures, many banks fail, and the survivors become the focus of investor beliefs; these incumbents gain a strong advantage over entrants, facilitating collusion. Entry restrictions reduce fragmentation but aid collusion, while government insurance for investors reduces incumbency advantage and collusion but may cause excessive fragmentation. Thus, regulators may wish to impose temporary entry restrictions, along with partial insurance. These results are consistent with historical evidence from several countries.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G21, G22, L13.     

“When the cat's away the mice will play”: Does regulation at home affect bank risk-taking abroad?

This paper provides the first empirical evidence that bank regulation is associated with cross-border spillover effects through the lending activities of large multinational banks. We analyze business lending by 155 banks to 9,613 firms in 1,976 different localities across 16 countries. We find that lower barriers to entry, tighter restrictions on bank activities, and to a lesser degree higher minimum capital requirements in domestic markets are associated with lower bank lending standards abroad. The effects are stronger when banks are less efficiently supervised at home, and are observed to exist independently from the impact of host-country regulation.     

Board size and firm performance: the moderating effects of the market for corporate control

We examine whether takeover threats affect the importance of board size using the passage of state antitakeover laws enacted in mid-to-late 1980s as our empirical setting. While the Complement Hypothesis predicts that board size matters more before the passage of the laws, the Substitute Hypothesis predicts the opposite. For a sample of 350 Forbes 500 firms over the period 1984–1991, we find a significant association between smaller boards and better firm performance before passage of antitakeover laws, but a much weaker relation (reduced by more than one-third) after the takeover restrictions were in place. Consistent with the Complement Hypothesis, this finding suggests that decreasing board size is more valuable when the market for corporate control is more active.

Liquidity Constraints,Competition, and Markup Cyclicality

This article provides evidence on the relation among financial constraints, competition, and the cyclicality of markups. Based on a long series of industry data from a large number of countries, we find that markups increase in conjunction with the business cycle in environments with higher short‐term financial constraints (liquidity constraints) and more competition. The evidence also suggests that these two elements complement each other: the procyclicality of markups in firms facing both high competition and high liquidity constraints is higher than that explained by each determinant independently.     

On the optimality of bank competition policy

This study examines whether the effect of market structure on financial stability is persistent, subject to current regulation and supervision policies. The methodology of Sala-I-Martin (1997) is employed over a sample of 2450 banks operating within the EU-27 during the period 2003–2010. The results show a potential trade-off between market power and soundness, and how possible it is to regulate this trade-off above 21% markups. Financial stability appears more pronounced in markets of less concentration, where policies lean towards limited restrictions on non-interest income, official intervention in bank management and book transparency. Regulation and competition can act as substitute or complementary policies vis-à-vis a more stable financial system with less competition distortions.     

Vertical control of a distribution network—an empirical analysis of magazines

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions, we develop two empirical entry models. In the benchmark coordinated entry model, the upstream firm sets market‐specific wholesale prices and implements the first best. In the more realistic restricted/free entry model, the upstream firm only sets a uniform wholesale price. As a second‐best solution, it restricts entry in markets where business stealing (encroachment) is high, and allows free entry elsewhere. We apply the model to magazine distribution, and assess the profitability of alternative vertical restraints. Banning restricted licensing reduces profits only slightly, so the business rationale for restricted licensing should not be sought in the prevention of encroachment. Furthermore, market‐specific wholesale prices implement the first best, but the profit increase would be small, providing a rationale for the commonly observed uniform wholesale prices. Finally, uniform franchise fees are much less effective than a uniform wholesale price to cope with local market differences.     

International Pricing in a Generalized Model of Ideal Variety

We examine international markups and pricing in a generalized version of an "ideal variety" model. In this model, entry causes crowding in variety space, so that the marginal utility of new varieties falls as market size grows. Crowding is partially offset by income effects, as richer consumers will pay more for varieties closer matched to their ideal types. We show theoretically and confirm empirically that declining marginal utility of new varieties results in: a higher own-price elasticity of demand (and lower prices) in large countries and a lower own-price elasticity of demand (and higher prices) in rich countries. The model is also useful for generating facts from the literature regarding cross-country differences in the rate of variety expansion.     

The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic Deregulation in Banking: Implications for Productive Efficiency

Deregulation of geographic restrictions in banking over the past 20 years has intensified both potential and actual competition in the industry. The accumulating empirical evidence suggests that potential efficiency gains associated with consolidating banks are often not realized. We evaluate the impact of this increased competition on the productive efficiency of non-merging banks confronted with new entry in their local markets and find that the incumbent banks respond by improving cost efficiency. Thus, studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare-enhancing aspect of merger activity.     

Competition among the big and the small

Many industries are made up of a few big firms, which are able to manipulate the market outcome, and of a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. We provide a general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of competition, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect generated by the shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe. Furthermore, social welfare increases with the number of big firms because the procompetitive effect associated with entry dominates the resulting decrease in product diversity.