Session III: Securities Law in Twenty‐First Century America: A Conversation with SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson

SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson comments on three major issues the Commission has been investigating: (1) the concentration of ownership among American stock exchanges; (2) the extent of common ownership of, and potential for undue influence over, U.S. corporations by large institutional shareholders; and (3) the role of corporate boards in promoting and protecting stakeholder interests as well as shareholder interests. In the first of the three areas, Jackson argues that the ownership of 12 of the 13 U.S. stock exchanges by just three financial conglomerates suggests a competitiveness problem— one that, despite the significant reductions in trading costs during the last 15 years, should receive further investigation. To the concerns raised by the common and increasingly concentrated ownership of U.S. public companies by institutional shareholders, the Commissioner's main response is to note that whatever culpability corporate America is forced to assume for our large and growing environmental and social problems must be shared with the largest U.S. institutional shareholders, whose collective resources and influence confer a responsibility to help guide companies when responding to such problems. Finally, on the issue of stakeholder theory and ESG, Jackson insists that asking corporate boards to put the interests of all stakeholders on a par with their shareholders’ when making strategic business decisions would be a mistake. Besides creating a major accountability problem, the adoption of stakeholder theory in place of “the clear, single‐minded objective function of increasing long‐run shareholder value” would deprive boards of their principal guide “when making the difficult tradeoffs among stakeholders that effective oversight and management of public companies require.”     

Corporate governance in South Korea: the chaebol experience

Utilizing a large sample of South Korean firms, this paper explores the impact of corporate governance in an emerging market country dominated by a few large business groups. Firms affiliated with the top five groups (chaebol) exhibit significantly lower performance and significantly higher sales growth relative to other firms. Furthermore, top executive turnover is unrelated to performance for top chaebol firms, indicating a breakdown of internal corporate governance for the largest business groups. Internal corporate governance appears much more effective for firms unrelated to the top chaebol as managers at poorly performing firms are significantly more likely to lose their job. These results imply that the lack of properly functioning internal corporate governance among the top chaebol, which dominate the Korean economy, may have increased the severity of the recent financial crisis.     

THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORM

In South Korea, as in some other troubled Asian economies, banks and large public corporations have been run more in the interest of the government and the controlling share-holder group than to maximize efficiency and overall shareholder wealth. Any serious attempt to reform the South Korean economy must thus include significant changes in its system of corporate governance. After discussing in general terms how corporate ownership and control can affect economic performance, this article examines the corporate governance institutions that prevail in different countries, with particular attention to the U.S., Japan, and Germany. From such comparative analysis it then develops a set of criteria for appraising the effectiveness of corporate governance systems that are applied to the specific case of South Korea. The article concludes with number of suggestions for reforming the South Korean corporate governance system, including:

• 1 greater legal protection for minority shareholders from transactions involving potential conflicts of interest; and
• 2 strengthening of the incentives of management and large corporate holders, such as house or main banks, to maximize value (as the author notes, “charging management or the board with a legal mandate to ‘balance’ the interests of various constituencies or stakeholders is merely to diminish any legally enforceable responsibility to shareholders”).

As the article notes in closing, the main beneficiaries of such governance reforms will not be the new shareholders–including those foreign investors who might be persuaded to buy the stocks–but rather the existing owners, whose shares will command a higher price from “outside” investors. And the greatest beneficiary will be the South Korean nation as a whole, since the resulting improvements in corporate performance and reductions in cost of capital will increase productivity and international competitiveness.     

GLOBALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

This article has three basic aims: (1) to analyze the impact of the opening of their capital markets on the economies of host countries; (2) to investigate the causes of the Asian financial crisis; and (3) to evaluate the likely effects of the South Korean government's recent attempts to restructure its corporate sector. Although the recent Asian financial crisis has led some to question the merits of open capital markets and to call for regulatory restraints on capital flows across international borders, the scientific evidence suggests that the opening of stock markets to foreign investors has been largely beneficial for emerging economies. On average, stock market liberalization has been accompanied by increases in stock prices and reductions in stock return volatility, reductions in inflation, and reductions in the rate of currency depreciation. Much of the blame for the Asian currency crises is assigned to Asian policymakers' futile attempts to defy market forces by trying to maintain their currencies at artificially high levels. But a more fundamental cause of Asia's economic problems has been the widespread value destruction by Asian corporations, which has led to a lower value for the overall economy and weakened the banking sector. The government-directed banking systems and weak corporate governance structures (including managerial incentives to increase size and market share at the expense of shareholders) that characterize most Asian economies have resulted in systematic overinvestment, bloated payrolls, and sharp declines in corporate profitability. While applauding most of the Korean government's recent measures to reform the economy, the article expresses skepticism about the government-mandated restructuring of the chaebol known as the “big deal.” Rather than trying to direct the process of restructuring, Korean policymakers should limit their efforts to improving the market mechanism by increasing competition in the markets for capital, corporate control, and goods and services. The Korean market for corporate control transactions could be greatly improved by increasing the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings and by allowing hostile takeovers by foreign as well as domestic investors. To increase the productivity of capital, Asian companies should seek to realign managerial with shareholder interests by tying compensation to measures of value creation like EVA.     

Corporate Governance in India

The Indian corporate governance system has both supported and held back India's ascent to the top ranks of the world's economies. While on paper the country's legal system provides some of the best investor protection in the world, enforcement is a major problem, with overburdened courts and significant corruption. Ownership remains concentrated and family business groups continue to be the dominant business model, with significant pyramiding and evidence of tunneling activity that transfers cash flow and value from minority to controlling shareholders. But for all its shortcomings, Indian corporate governance has taken major steps toward becoming a system capable of inspiring confidence among institutional and, increasingly, foreign investors. The Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI), which was established as part of the comprehensive economic reforms launched in 1991, has made considerable progress in becoming a rigorous regulatory regime that helps ensure transparency and fair practice. And the National Stock Exchange of India, also established as part of the reforms, now functions with enough efficiency and transparency to be generating the third‐largest number of trades in the world, just behind the NASDAQ and NYSE. Among more recent changes, the enactment of Sarbanes—Oxley type measures in 2004—which includes protections for minority shareholders in family‐ or “promoter”‐led businesses—has contributed to recent increases in institutional and foreign stock ownership. And while family‐ and government‐controlled business groups continue to be the rule, India has also seen the rise of successful companies like Infosys that are free of the influence of a dominant family or group and have made the individual shareholder their central governance focus.     

Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings

This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.     

New Corporate Forms: One Viable Solution to Advancing Environmental Sustainability

There is a clear trend in corporate governance toward increased attention to the environmental and social impacts of business operations. Major consulting firms are advising Fortune 500 companies on how to become more environmentally sustainable, private equity and “impact” investors are measuring environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors, and voluntary reporting and shareholder resolutions on issues of environmental sustainability are on the rise. While traditional corporate forms allow companies to embrace social and environmental responsibility with some measure of success, various real and perceived risks encourage directors to focus on short‐term profitability. Even if a company has a strong social mission at inception, founders often have difficulty “anchoring their mission” over time. And the lack of required disclosure of social and environmental performance makes it more difficult for investors to evaluate and compare companies. Many believe that the institutionalized mispricing of natural resources and the continued failure to price externalities, combined with the progressive nature of climate change, require the transformation of both business and law. This article discusses social and environmental sustainability within the traditional corporate form and then explores three emerging alternatives that are now being used by businesses in California: limited liability corporations (LLCs); benefit corporations (B corps); and flexible purpose corporations (FPCs). Of these three alternatives, FPCs—a corporate form that requires shareholders to agree on one or more social missions with management and the board—may be best suited to meet the needs of the many small private firms (as well as some large public companies) that, whether for purely economic or altruistic reasons, plan to integrate ESG into their operations.     

The Case for Maximizing Long‐Run Shareholder Value

Criticism of the shareholder model of corporate governance stems in part from misunderstanding about what shareholder wealth maximization means for the other stakeholders of public companies. The corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization does not imply that such stakeholders “do not matter.” Managers maximize shareholder value by maximizing the total expected cash flows available to distribute to all of their stakeholders. To maximize such cash flows, managers must provide their customers with desirable goods and services at attractive prices—which in turn requires that managers attract the employees, suppliers, and financial capital needed to conduct their businesses by providing each of these groups with market‐determined returns on their contributions to firm value. In this way, successful corporations benefit all of their stakeholders, and what is good for the corporation is generally good for society. External forces such as the media and government exert considerable influence on corporate actions and, in so doing, they play a role in helping to limit negative corporate “externalities” such as pollution and climate change. But direct regulation of productive activities should be used sparingly, and subjected to ongoing cost‐benefit analysis. Government regulation replaces the collective decisions of a broad marketplace of stakeholders using their own resources to act in their own interests with decisions made by government officials with complicated incentives and using resources generated by others. More generally, government should seek to regulate corporate actions only in the limited situations in which there are no market solutions for reducing the effects of externalities. For example, government plays a critically important role in identifying and deterring corporate fraud, and in ensuring competition and a level playing field for companies and all their stakeholders.     

Tax Motivated Income Shifting and Korean Business Groups (Chaebol)

Abstract:  This paper examines tax-induced income shifting behavior among affiliated firms in Korean business groups (chaebols). Korean corporate income tax law does not require consolidated tax returns, and business groups with a large number of affiliated member firms have incentives to shift income across member firms to reduce the overall taxes of the group. For a large number of Korean companies that are subject to external audits, we perform univariate and multivariate regression analyses on the income shifting behavior of chaebol firms compared with non-chaebol control firms. Our evidence suggests that tax-motivated income shifting activities exist among chaebol firms, and that the extent of income shifting is found to depend on its effect on non-tax cost factors such as the earnings, leverage, and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders. We also find that income shifting is more pronounced in chaebol firms where the control-cash flow divergence is relatively large, suggesting that income shifting is affected by the controlling shareholders' opportunism. Our study provides some insights on the intra-group income shifting activities where research is limited.     

Global Drivers of and Local Resistance to French Shareholder Activism

Shareholder activism in France has made significant advances during the past 25 years even as it continues to face formidable sources of local resistance. But if the list of corporate governance improvements since 1989 described by the authors might lead one to conclude that France now has minority shareholder protection and shareholder activism comparable to those of the U.S. or U.K., powerful local interests, including much of French management, labor, and government, continue to mount effective resistance to such forces for change. The French government still works closely with French business elites and unions to manage both individual companies and the general economy. And government officials continue to speak publicly of “protecting” French firms from “illegitimate” foreign shareholders. Accordingly, the authors characterize French corporate governance as a “hybrid” model of shareholder activism, one that incorporates the perspectives and interests of the classic French stakeholder model as well as an emerging shareholder value movement. Although foreign institutional investors have increased their shareholdings in French companies and promoted “best practice” governance rules, particularly with respect to voting rights, local forces will continue to resist aggressive shareholder activism. Such a hybrid model makes the outcomes of shareholder activism less predictable, a risk that foreign investors and companies often respond to by seeking alliances with local proxy advisers and investor associations to gain “legitimacy.”     

Corporate Governance and Labor Relations*

This article begins with the premise that since the corporation involves a symbiotic relationship between labor and capital, a single‐minded focus on shareholder value is likely to be shortsighted, and some degree of employee influence on corporate governance has the potential to increase an organization's efficiency and value. But the set of findings and implications that emerge from the author's analysis is a complicated one. On the one hand, “moderate” levels of employee ownership (for example, the 6% ownership of the average American ESOP) are associated with increases in corporate productivity and values as well as worker morale and productivity. On the other hand, majority employee ownership and corporate ownership and governance systems like “co‐determination” that give labor a major say on governance issues often lead to worker‐management alliances that end up hurting the firm's investors—and, in the longer run, the workers themselves— by reducing competitiveness. The author ends with a call for a balanced governance system that, while aiming to maximize the total value of the enterprise, seeks to encourage the participation and emotional allegiance of workers—and indeed all important corporate stakeholders.     

FMA Roundtable on New Developments in European Corporate Governance

In this discussion that took place in Helsinki last June, three European financial economists and a leading authority on U.S. corporate governance consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of the world's two main corporate financing and governance systems: the Anglo‐American market‐based system, with its dispersed share ownership, lots of takeovers, and an otherwise vigorous market for corporate control; and the relationship‐based, or “main bank,” system associated with Japan, Germany, and continental Europe generally. The distinguishing features of the relationship‐based system are large controlling shareholders, including the main banks themselves, and few takeovers or other signs of a well‐functioning corporate control market. Given the steady increase in the globalization of business and international diversification by large institutional investors, the panelists were asked to address the question: can we expect one of these two systems to prevail over time, or will both systems continue to coexist, while seeking to adopt some of the most valuable aspects of the other? The consensus was that, in Germany as well as continental Europe, corporate financing and governance practices have already begun to look much like those in the U.S. and U.K., with much less reliance on bank loans and greater use of bonds and public equity. And these financing changes have resulted in major changes in ownership structures that have seen local main banks largely supplanted by foreign institutional investors—some of whom have demanded a greater voice in how companies are run. Moreover, Finnish economist Tom Berglund may well have provided a blueprint for the dominant European governance system of the future in describing the “Nordic model” as

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Do Large Blockholders Reduce Risk?

The conventional assumption in the asset pricing literature is that the identity of a company's owners is largely irrelevant, but studies of companies with “blockholders”—shareholders with large positions in a particular company—provide grounds for questioning this assumption. Unlike the well‐diversified investors of modern portfolio theory, blockholders have strong incentives to monitor corporate performance and, when necessary, to exert control over ineffective managements and boards. The findings of many studies support the idea that blockholders have a positive effect on rates of return. The authors of this article report the findings of their recent investigation of whether blockholders might also have a positive effect on shareholder value by reducing the risk of the companies in which their holdings are concentrated. After distinguishing between companies with individual as opposed to corporate blockholders, and those with one share, one vote as opposed to those with dual‐class shares, the authors find that ownership of large positions by individuals—but not corporations—was associated with lower systematic risk (when using both Fama‐French multiple factor and CAPM models). At the same time, they find that the firm‐specific risk of such companies was higher, but “biased” toward positive outcomes—that is, smaller downsides with larger upsides. What's more, this upward shift in performance and risk‐profile was achieved at least partly through increases in productivity as reflected in higher profit margins, profitability, profit per employee, and operating leverage, and lower costs of goods sold, SGA, and cash holdings. By contrast, in the case of blockholders in companies with dual‐class share structures, all of these positive associations with blockholders were either significantly weaker, or reversed. That is, whereas the presence of individual blockholders appears to increase productivity and value under a one share, one vote governance regime, blockholders in companies with dual‐class structures were associated with higher systematic risk and reduced productivity and value.     

Is Managerial Myopia a Persistent Governance Problem?

Critics of U.S. corporations have long argued that companies are overly focused on short‐term results and, as a consequence, sacrifice their own long‐run value and competitiveness. These criticisms have expanded in recent years to include those from prominent politicians, investors, consultants, and academics. If such criticisms have merit, they would imply a massive governance failure in which there has been decades of underinvestment with little adjustment on the part of managers, boards, or the market for corporate control. This article evaluates the economic underpinnings of these criticisms and analyzes their implications in the context of empirical evidence produced by several decades of research on corporate investment policies, the outcomes of corporate control events, investor horizons, and the market pricing of companies with little if any earnings. In reviewing the findings of these studies, the author finds little evidence to support the view that U.S. companies sacrifice long‐run value and competitiveness by systematically underinvesting. First, although U.S. companies have indeed cut back on tangible investments such as property, plant, and equipment, these cutbacks have been more than offset by the dramatic growth in investment in intangibles, such as spending on developing knowledge capital, brand‐building, and IT infrastructure. Second, when subjected to events that have the effect of reducing managerial control over investment policies and transferring control to outside investors—such as leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations, forced CEO dismissals, and shareholder activist campaigns—companies tend to reduce, not increase, investment spending. In fact, it is difficult to find any corporate control threats that have had the goal or effect of increasing investment. Third, and at the same time, the rising concentration of large institutional investors, including indexers such as BlackRock and Vanguard, suggests that investors have become, if anything, more long‐term oriented over time. Fourth, there is no evidence that the market shuns companies that have yet to report large (or indeed any) earnings. These findings suggest that curbing overinvestment, and not discouraging myopia and underinvestment, may well still be the larger corporate governance challenge facing investors when monitoring and attempting to influence the performance of U.S. companies.     

Financial Globalization,Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias

We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.     

Diversification,corporate governance and firm value in small markets: evidence from New Zealand

We find that diversified firms in New Zealand are associated with a value discount of 19–42 per cent relative to single‐segment (undiversified) firms. Although several competing explanations have been offered in the literature, we find that the strength of corporate governance explains between 15–21 per cent of this discount. Specifically, board size, busyness of directors, CEO ownership and whether or not compensation of directors includes equity‐based components collectively explain a large part of the reported discount. Our results from companies trading in New Zealand complement recent findings in the US by not only confirming the existence of a diversification discount but also emphasizing the role of poor governance in destroying shareholder wealth by pursuing a value‐destroying corporate strategy. All our results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in the decision to diversify and the choice of corporate governance structure by employing two‐way fixed‐effects and dynamic‐panel generalized method of moments regression techniques.     

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

Energy Infrastructure Investment and the Rise of the Uncorporation1

While most large U.S. businesses have long been organized as corporations, a significant portion of our economy, including major parts of our energy infrastructure, are organized as other types of legal entities. These “uncorporations” include such business forms as Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). Many practitioners have dismissed these alternative entities as merely tax devices and only peripherally important to mainstream business. But this view misses important features of the uncorporation that make it an important alternative in dealing with the “agency” costs that arise in public companies from separating managerial control from equity ownership. Corporate governance relies heavily on agents such as auditors, class action lawyers, judges, and independent directors to protect shareholders from managerial self‐interest. The obvious costs and defects of relying on these governance mechanisms have generally been seen as a reasonable price to pay for the benefits of the corporate form. But this conclusion depends on the availability and effectiveness of the alternative mechanisms for addressing agency costs. Uncorporations provide such an alternative by tying managers' economic well‐being so closely to that of their firms that corporate monitoring devices become less necessary. Uncorporate governance mechanisms include managerial compensation that is based largely (if not entirely) on the firm's profits or cash distributions, and restrictions on managers' control of corporate cash through liquidation rights and requirements for cash distributions. Business people and policy makers should evaluate the potential benefits of uncorporations before concluding that the costs of corporate governance are an inevitable price of separating ownership and control in modern firms.     

THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF CALPERS' FOCUS LIST

Shareholder activism can help to protect shareholder value by promoting sound corporate governance practices. As an active institutional investor, CalPERS takes its role in the corporate governance process very seriously. In addition to many other initiatives, CalPERS publishes each year a list of six to twelve public companies with poor corporate governance principles and poor financial performance—its well-known "Focus List"—in the hope that the managements of these companies will be motivated to improve their performance and increase shareholder value for CalPERS and their other equity owners.
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of CalPERS' governance program, the authors examine the market impact of the Focus List and find that companies on the list experience positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the three months following release of the list. Moreover, this wealth effect is even greater for companies with a large, widely dispersed shareholder base, as might be expected given the relative inability of such shareholders to act collectively.