THE LEGALITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BY-LAW IN DELAWARE: PRESERVING THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Just as some lawyers almost killed the takeover market with the invention of the poison pill in the 1980s, others are now about to reinvigorate it with another legal invention. The “shareholder rights bylaw,” which promises to be the next major legal battleground in the market for corporate control, aims to eliminate the current ability of target company boards of directors to block changes of control by keeping their poison pill defenses in place. The new bylaws require the poison pill (and other defensive measures) to expire automatically whenever the firm receives an allcash offer for 100% of the firm's stock at a price at least 25% above the prebid market price. The firm can keep its poison pill, but only if shareholders vote to keep it after receiving the offer. Although the legality of the share-holder rights bylaw has been challenged as an undue infringement on boards of directors' power to run companies, this article argues that their legality will be upheld for three reasons:

• ? First, shareholder rights bylaws merely reinforce the corporate manager's responsibility to manage the firm to maximize shareholder value.
• ? Second, Delaware and most other jurisdictions give shareholders the specific right to amend the bylaws of a corporation; and the shareholder rights by-law is a straightforward exercise of this explicit right granted to shareholders.
• ? Third, the adoption of shareholders rights by-law does not prevent the board of directors from advising share-holders to vote to reject a takeover bid, nor does it prevent shareholders from giving management the authority to use defensive mechanisms such as the poison pill.

As the article concludes, upholding this right of shareholders to choose whether a poison pill is used to block a takeover is critical to the vitality of the takeover market and, hence, to the preservation of the agency relationship between directors and shareholders. Upholding this right may also prove critical to Delaware's ability to maintain its predominance in the market for corporate chartering.     

Re‐equitizing Corporate Balance Sheets: Choosing Among the Alternatives

Companies are generally reluctant to issue new equity because it can be expensive capital. Among the largest costs of an equity offering are so‐called “market‐impact” costs. To the extent the typically negative market reaction to a stock offering causes an issue to be underpriced, such underpricing dilutes the value of current shareholders. Despite such costs, many companies—particularly financial institutions—are raising equity capital to “delever” balance sheets that have been squeezed by the credit crunch and economic slowdown. And far from transferring value from existing shareholders, these offerings can preserve and even increase the value of highly leveraged companies by shoring up their capital bases and providing the flexibility to get through a difficult period. According to recent studies, announcements of equity offerings by distressed companies have been accompanied by positive stock returns in excess of 5 %. The challenge for CFOs is to determine why and when issuing equity is the value‐maximizing strategy. The kinds of companies that are most likely to benefit from equity offerings are those that score low on credit metrics, have experienced cyclical declines in operating performance, and have growth opportunities as part of their recovery. There are a number of options for raising equity capital, but no set rules for identifying the optimal one. Nevertheless, the author offers a number of suggestions designed to help CFOs make smarter decisions: Communicate clearly to investors the intended uses of the proceeds from the equity offering and how they are expected to create value; Consider judicious cuts to the dividend to preserve capital; Involve current shareholders to minimize dilution, perhaps by considering a rights offering, and strengthen their commitment; Seek out “smart money” such as private equity or SWFs as long‐term investors; Get the offer size right the first time so a second offering can be avoided; and Monetize volatility in uncertain markets by issuing convertible securities.     

The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.     

Seasoned Equity Offerings: Stock Market Liquidity and the Rights Offer Paradox

This paper examines the impact of market liquidity on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) characteristics in France. We find that, besides blockholders’ takeup, liquidity is an important determinant of SEO flotation method choice. We document higher direct equity offering flotation costs, but also improved stock market liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. After controlling for endogeneity in the choice of SEO flotation method, we find that pure public offerings and standby rights are comparable in terms of direct costs and liquidity improvement. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public offerings despite apparently higher costs.     

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

Abstract:  Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders.     

Underwritten Dividend Reinvestment Plans and Conflicts of Interest

We examine conflicts of interests arising from the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in underwritten dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs). A DRIP is a type of SEO that enables shareholders automatically to reinvest their dividend entitlements in the issuing company's shares. The underwriters have an incentive to sell stock during the DRIP pricing period in order to hedge price risk and/or to reduce the price at which shares are issued. Using individual brokers’ transactions, we show that underwriting brokers engage in an abnormally high level of selling during the issue pricing period. Comparison of pricing period returns between stocks with underwritten DRIPs and a matched sample of non‐underwritten DRIPs shows that significantly more negative returns accrue to firms that have their issues underwritten.     

Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms

Abstract

This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.     

Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World

This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.     

Are Performance Shares Shareholder Friendly?

Performance shares, or PSUs, have become the largest element of pay for top executives in corporate America. Their spread was ignited by institutional investors looking for more “shareholder‐friendly” equity awards—as opposed to restricted stock and stock options, which have been characterized as “non‐performance” equity. Although that characterization has been challenged by many directors and compensation professionals, proxy advisers like Institutional Shareholder Services have continued to insist that the majority of stock be granted based on performance, compelling public companies to conform to that standard. With over a decade of experience with PSUs, the evidence is in regarding their net effect:

• PSUs greatly complicate long‐term incentives. Pay disclosures are dominated by discussion of PSUs, including metrics, goals, performance and vesting, and any differences in one grant year versus the next over three overlapping periods.
• PSUs may be contributing to the increase in pay. Companies issuing a significant portion of their long‐term incentives in the form of PSUs have been granting about 35% more in value than companies granting only restricted stock and stock options.
• Shareholders don't appear to be getting anything for that added complexity and cost. S&P 500 companies using PSUs have underperformed their sector peers, and companies using solely “non‐performance” equity have significantly outperformed their sector peers, and in every single year over the last decade.

Given these findings on PSUs, it is time for institutional investors and their proxy advisors to reconsider their view of these vehicles as “shareholder‐friendly,” and rethink their unqualified promotion of their use by the companies they invest in.     

Rights Offerings and Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders

We investigate rights issues and open offers in Hong Kong. We observe that the greater the severity of firms’ management‐agency problems, the more unfavourably shareholders tend to react, leading to more negative cumulative abnormal returns or rights forfeiture. Controlling shareholders do not forfeit rights, and may increase their percentage ownership at deep price discounts by underwriting rights offerings. Our results suggest that, although certain rights offerings can be described as value‐enhancing, many other rights offerings closely resemble the expropriation activities of controlling shareholders.     

Capital gains taxation and shareholder wealth in takeovers

Before December 1999, the capital gains of shareholders who sold their shares into Australian takeovers have been taxable irrespective of payment method. Subsequently, shareholders can elect to rollover capital gains in equity takeovers. We examine the effect of this change on the association between target shareholder capital gains and bidder and target firm shareholder wealth. The results indicate that prior to the regulatory change, cash consideration results in higher target shareholder returns for non‐taxation reasons. After the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief, we find that target and acquiring firm shareholders earn lower returns when cash consideration is offered to shareholders with greater capital gains.     

WHO WINS IN LARGE STOCK BUYBACKS – THOSE WHO SELL OR THOSE WHO HOLD?

Both fixed-price and dutch auction repurchases offer large premiums over current values to tendering shareholders. And, because announcements of such offers are generally accompanied by significant increases in stock prices, economists view selftender offers as mechanisms for signaling undervaluation. Using samples of fixed-price and dutch auction self-tender offers from the 1980s, this study attempts to answer the following questions: Are non-tendering shareholders fully compensated for the premium wealth transfer by the increase in the intrinsic value of their shares? Since fixed-price offers feature larger premiums, are they accompanied by larger increases in intrinsic value (or do insiders have a tendency to “overpay” in fixed-price offers)? Is the premium wealth transfer a big component of the returns to the two shareholder groups—and what percentage of firm value does the transfer represent? The findings of this study, unlike those reported by earlier research, suggest that the two types of offers generate roughly the same total returns (about 10–11%, on average, during the offering period) to shareholders who do not tender. Fixed-price offers involve considerably larger premiums (over the new, “full-information” price) and wealth transfers than dutch auctions. Reflecting the higher premiums, shareholders tendering into fixed-price offers receive higher returns than those tendering into dutch auctions (13.8% vs. 11.3% during the announcement period). But while fixed-price offers involve a considerably larger wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders, fixed-price repurchases compensate the non-tendering shareholders for the larger wealth transfer with larger increases in “intrinsic value,” thus generating the same total return as dutch auctions. Moreover, despite the large premiums offered in both types of offers, the wealth transfer implicit in the premium represents a small cost (less than 1% in fixed-price offers, and less than 0.1% in dutch auctions) to non-tendering shareholders.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable on the International Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets

The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation issued an Interim Report (known as the “Paulson Report”) near the end of 2006 that concluded that the U.S. “is losing its leading competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers abroad.” This report was quickly followed by a study, which reached similar conclusions, that was commissioned by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer and prepared by McKinsey & Co. At its July 2007 annual meeting, the Financial Economists Roundtable (FER) — a group of senior financial economists at universities and other organizations recognized as having made significant contributions to the finance literature—discussed the issues raised by the Report and decided to publish its own report. The report makes the following four policy recommendations:

• 1 Securities class action suits —Abolish enterprise liability under rule 10b‐5 in situations arising out of security purchases and sales in the secondary trading market among outside shareholders, while retaining managerial and firm liability where the company itself or its insiders (officers and directors) transact to their own benefit. Imposing massive liability on a company that is not a party to the securities transactions and does not benefit from the fraud does not serve a deterrence function since it is the continuing shareholders of the corporation who bear the burden of what the company must pay if found guilty, either directly or indirectly through insurance premiums.
• 2 Shareholder rights—Require all corporations to obtain shareholder approval to adopt a poison pill, regardless of whether a company has a staggered board. This requirement would conform to the broad principle that the board of any company should not be able to deny its shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover bid, and it would help restore the market for corporate control as an effective disciplinary mechanism for poorly performing boards and managers.
• 3 Compliance costs associated with SOX §404—Adopt a statutory amendment that makes it optional for a company to adopt the §404 procedures for a management assessment and auditor attestation of the effectiveness of its internal controls, with the requirement that if the company chooses not to comply it must explain why in its financial statements. Thus, in effect, the FER effectively recommends that the market be allowed to determine the value of §404 compliance. If a company chooses not to comply, the market will assess its explanation for non‐compliance and will value the company accordingly.
• 4 Maintaining open markets—Allow both foreign and U.S. firms to choose to report in conformity with either IFRS or U.S. GAAP. The FER recognizes both IFRS and U.S. GAAP as high‐quality accounting standards that provide reasonable foundations for financial reporting for investors. Allowing both foreign and U.S. firms to adopt whichever of these standards they believe to be the most cost‐effective provides an opportunity for the market and investors themselves to sort out which reporting standard best serves their interests.

     

The effect of pre-emptive right amendments on shareholder wealth

Pre-emptive rights allow existing shareholders to purchase a new offering of shares before the general public. This paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth of removing pre-emptive rights from corporate charters. Two hypotheses are constrasted: (1) Shareholder wealth maximization suggests that management uses this extra degree of freedom to pick the least cost method for raising new equity; hence, the amendment increases shareholder wealth. (2) Management welfare maximization holds that management will use the passage of the amendment to maximize their own welfare, sometimes to the detriment of shareholders; hence, the amendment decreases shareholder wealth. The evidence indicates that the amendment decreases shareholder wealth.     

Creating Value Through Best‐In‐Class Capital Allocation1

With the economy showing signs of recovery, companies are shifting their focus from liquidity and balance sheet concerns back towards capital allocation and value creation. This article provides a comprehensive framework to examine shareholder value creation through capital allocation, and discusses important capital allocation lessons that have re‐emerged over the last few years. Notable among the key lessons are the following:

• ? Growth alone does not guarantee value creation, which suggests that companies should allocate capital based on the economic value of each investment opportunity.
• ? The limits of diversification in a financial crisis should be considered when allocating capital and managing liquidity.
• ? Companies should be conservative with base‐case cash flow projections and incorporate the possibility of downside scenarios into their projections.
• ? It is important to incorporate all forms of capital when managing liquidity.
• ? Whether using a long‐term or current‐market approach, companies should be consistent throughout the cycle in their cost of capital methodology.
• ? Companies should continually rethink investments and allocate capital in an attempt to maintain a competitive advantage.
• ? Evaluate returns relative to risk and cost of capital, and not against the company's average ROIC.
• ? Comparing the IRR of share repurchases to new investments is not an apples‐to‐apples comparison.

Finally, companies should concentrate on the strategic uses and value of particular assets and not allow their decisions to be driven by the value they might receive relative to their initial cost.     

Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm

This paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability. If investors want managers to be monitored, the monitors should be residual claimants (shareholders), and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm. When liquidating wealth is costly, contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device; however, if wealth is unobservable, under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium. This may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers. Comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements.     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY: COMPATIBLE OR NOT?

Complicating the current corporate governance controversy is a major disagreement about the fundamental purpose of the corporation. There are two main views on what should constitute the principal goal of the firm. Most economists tend to endorse value maximization—that is, maximization of the value of the firm's debt plus equity—or a version of value maximization known as “value‐based management” (VBM) that aims to maximize shareholder value. The main challenger is “stakeholder theory,” which argues that the corporation exists to benefit not just investors but all its major constituencies—employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and the federal government, as well as shareholders. Thus, whereas the success of a corporation under VBM could be assessed simply by its long‐run return to shareholders, under stakeholder theory a company's success would be judged by taking account of its contributions to all its stakeholders. Using statistical analysis of various measures of corporate success in satisfying non‐investor stakeholders, the author investigates whether a broader focus on multiple stakeholders is necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of long‐term shareholder value. His main findings in fact suggest just the opposite—namely, that long‐term value creation appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining corporate investment in stakeholder relationships. More specifically, the author's study shows that companies with higher levels of value creation tend to have stronger reputations for treating stakeholders well while companies that create little value end up shortchanging not just their shareholders but all their constituencies. For profitable companies that have previously failed to devote the optimal level of resources to their non‐investor stakeholders, the message of this article is that investing in stakeholders can add value—and, in fact, it pays for companies to spend an additional dollar on stakeholder relationships as long as the present value of the expected (long‐run) return is at least a dollar.     

Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies

This paper studies the impact of the features of the shareholder base on the performance of a large sample of Italian listed firms between 2007 and 2019, both within and across firms. We expand the empirical evidence on the relation between shareholder type and different dimensions of firm performance by dividing shareholders into six categories, and further differentiating between domestic and foreign investors. We provide extensive evidence on the relation between firm performance and different types of shareholders, showing how diverse performance metrics are correlated with the voting rights of specific types of shareholders. Consistent with previous studies, the picture that emerges from our analysis shows that the ownership structure of Italian listed companies is characterized by a high degree of concentration. In this context, we find that ownership concentration or the presence of a controlling shareholder is in general associated with better performance. Moreover, a positive relation exists between diverse firm performance metrics and the voting rights of family shareholders, founders and foreign investors, while government ownership is detrimental in the short-term.