Optimal auction design in two‐sided markets

A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depend on the searchers' expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers. This article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run, where clicking rates are mechanism dependent. In line with the practice of the major search engines, the revenue‐maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers. By trading off rent extraction and clicking volume, this mechanism works as a cross‐subsidization device between searchers and advertisers.     

Dynamic auction environment with subcontracting

This article provides evidence on the role of subcontracting in the auction‐based procurement setting with private cost variability and capacity constraints. We demonstrate that subcontracting allows bidders to modify their costs realizations in a given auction as well as to control their future costs by reducing backlog accumulation. Restricting access to subcontracting raises procurement costs for an individual project by 12% and reduces the number of projects completed in equilibrium by 20%. The article explains methodological and market design implications of subcontracting availability.     

An optimal investment model with Markov-driven volatilities

We consider a multi-stock market model. The processes of stock prices are governed by stochastic differential equations with stock return rates and volatilities driven by a finite-state Markov process. Each volatility is also disturbed by a Brownian motion; more exactly, it follows a Markov-driven Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. Investors can observe the stock prices only. Both the underlying Brownian motion and the Markov process are unobservable. We study a discretized version, which is a discrete-time hidden Markov process. The objective is to control trading at each time step to maximize an expected utility function of terminal wealth. Exploiting dynamic programming techniques, we derive an approximate optimal trading strategy that results in an expected utility function close to the optimal value function. Necessary filtering and forecasting techniques are developed to compute the near-optimal trading strategy.     

An optimal execution problem with market impact

We study an optimal execution problem in a continuous-time market model that considers market impact. We formulate the problem as a stochastic control problem and investigate properties of the corresponding value function. We find that right-continuity at the time origin is associated with the strength of market impact for large sales; otherwise the value function is continuous. Moreover, we show the semigroup property (Bellman principle) and characterise the value function as a viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. We present some examples where the form of the optimal strategy changes completely, depending on the amount of the trader’s security holdings, and where optimal strategies in the Black–Scholes type market with nonlinear market impact are not block liquidation but gradual liquidation, even when the trader is risk-neutral.     

An optimal stopping problem with a reward constraint

This article studies an optimal stopping problem with an endogenous constraint on the set of admissible stopping times. The constraint stipulates that continuation is permitted, at any given date t, only if the endogenous reward achieved exceeds a prespecified threshold. Characterizations of the value function and the optimal stopping time are presented. An application to the pricing of corporate claims, when the capital structure of the firm includes equity-trigger debt, is carried out.     

An empirical examination of the externalities of neighborhood churches on housing values

Recently, establishment of churches in residential neighborhoods has become controversial. This study is the first to address the issue of whether a neighborhood church positively or negatively affects the value of nearby single-family properties. This hypothesis is tested with a standard hedonic pricing model, using a sample of 469 sales transactions drawn from a large metropolitan area. Nonchurch effects are held constant with a standard set of housing-related variables. A distance variable is included to measure the direction and magnitude of the externality effect. Results indicate the effect of churches on sales price is negative up to approximately 850 feet. The authors suggest that empirical evidence such as this will inform both public and private parties involved in land use decisions relating to neighborhood churches.     

On the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multi‐unit,oral, ascending‐price auction within the common‐value paradigm

Using a clock model of a multi‐unit, oral, ascending‐price auction, within the common‐value paradigm, we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a fraction of losing drop‐out bids, that price converges in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, value. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.     

Nasdaq ex‐day behavior: An out‐of‐sample test

We test various explanations of the ex‐dividend day price anomaly using Nasdaq‐listed firms. Similar to NYSE‐listed firms, on average the prices of Nasdaq‐listed firms drop by less than the dividend amount. However, the average Nasdaq price‐drop is substantially smaller than what existing theories would predict and translates to an imputed dividend tax rate that is double the maximum tax rate. We thus find little support for the tax hypothesis. We also find little support for the short‐term trading hypothesis and various other explanations. The significant disconnect we document between Nasdaq dividends and price changes seems to support the “free dividends fallacy.”     

Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for “patient” platforms; with an infinite time horizon, however, there are multiple equilibria where either the low- or high-quality platform dominates. If qualities are stochastic, the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability, even when its realized quality is lower, and this probability increases as platforms become more patient. Hence, social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking.     

Twenty‐five years of consumer bankruptcy in continental Europe: internalizing negative externalities and humanizing justice in Denmark

This paper explores the problems and processes that led to the birth of consumer bankruptcy in continental Europe, a process that began in Denmark in January 1972 and culminated with the adoption of the Danish consumer debt adjustment act, Gældssaneringslov, on 9 May 1984. While this law is often described in primarily humanitarian terms, in the sense of offering a respite to “hopelessly indebted” individuals, both the motivation for the law and its intended scope were not simply accretions on an already multi‐layered welfare system. Instead, the law was designed primarily as a pragmatic response to economically wasteful collections activities that imposed negative externalities on debtors, creditors, and especially Danish society and state coffers; the law was intended to force creditors to internalize (or eliminate) these externalities with respect to all debtors unable to pay their debts within a reasonable period of 5 years. The paper also examines the growing pains of this new system. The law originally left significant administrative discretion to judges, which produced vast disparities in treatment of cases in different regions of the country. Ultimately, a reform implemented in October 2005 made the system more accessible, more unitary throughout the country, and more humane. The effects of this reform are already visible in statistical observations of the system, though significant regional variations persist. Given the striking coincidence in timing, this paper also offers brief comparative comments on the parallel design—but very different effect—of the most significant reform of the US consumer bankruptcy law, also effective in October 2005. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An Information‐Based Theory of Time‐Varying Liquidity

We propose an information‐based theory to explain time variation in liquidity and link it to a variety of patterns in asset markets. In “normal times,” the market is fully liquid and gains from trade are realized immediately. However, the equilibrium also involves periods during which liquidity “dries up,” which leads to endogenous liquidation costs. Traders correctly anticipate such costs, which reduces their willingness to pay. This foresight leads to a novel feedback effect between prices and market liquidity, which are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model also predicts that contagious sell‐offs can occur after sufficiently bad news.     

Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency

This article studies cost‐minimizing two‐stage procurement with Research and Development (R&D). The principal wishes to procure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D to discover a more cost‐efficient production technology. First‐stage R&D efficiency and effort and the realized second‐stage production cost are the agent's private information. The optimal two‐stage mechanism is implemented by a menu of single‐stage contracts, each specifying a fixed provision price and remedy paid by a defaulting agent. A higher delivery price is paired with a higher default remedy, and a more efficient type opts for a higher price and higher remedy.     

Cream‐Filled Cookies: An Assurance In‐Class Case

This case presents students with a case situation that they can visualize, resulting in some unique learning opportunities. The case is an assurance simulation centered on cookies that can be purchased in the grocery store that have a cream filling, and the same type of cookie but with twice as much cream filling. These cookies are manufactured by various companies including long‐standing brands and generic brands from national supermarkets. Given the popularity of these cookies, and the ease of access to them, they make for a perfect introductory simulation to students during their first assurance class. Mr. Cookie becomes a fictional character in the case to represent the client that the auditors are working for. The case is easy enough for students to work independently, and has been tested in both small and large classes; working equally as well. It does require the instructor to invest in some cookies and measurement tools such as rulers, plastic knives and weigh scales. The group discussion at the end consistently results in students gaining a greater understanding of the scope and limitations of assurance services, setting the foundation for the balance of the introductory assurance course.     

Work‐related perks,agency problems,and optimal incentive contracts

Work‐related perks, such as corporate jets, nice offices, and so forth, improve the tradeoff between incentives and insurance that determines the optimal incentive contract. We show that (i) such perks may be offered even if their direct consumption benefits are offset by their costs; (ii) they will be offered for free; (iii) agents in more uncertain production environments will receive more perks; (iv) senior executives should receive more perks; and (v) better corporate governance can lead to more perk consumption by CEOs. Our analysis also offers insights into firms' decisions about how much autonomy they should grant to their employees.     

The positive externalities of IFRS R&D capitalization: enhanced voluntary disclosure

Studies comparing IFRS with U.S. GAAP generally focus on differences in the attributes and consequences of the recognized financial items. We, in contrast, focus on voluntary disclosure resulting from arguably the most significant difference between IFRS and GAAP: the capitalization of development costs—the “D” of R&D—required by IFRS but prohibited by GAAP. Using a sample of Israeli high-technology and science-based firms, some using IFRS and others U.S. GAAP, we document a significant externality of IFRS development cost capitalization in the form of extensive voluntary disclosure of forward?looking information on product pipeline development and its expected consequences. We show that this disclosure is value-relevant over and above the mandated financial information, including the capitalized R&D asset. We also show that the capitalized development costs (an asset) is highly significant in relation to stock prices, and enhances the relevance of the voluntary disclosures.     

An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds

Using a novel dataset of 386 first‐price municipal bond auctions held in California, I perform counterfactual revenue comparisons, based on the theoretical result of Milgrom and Weber (1982). I show that the revenue in the second‐price auction is nonparametrically identified, and the counterfactual revenue in the English auction can be bounded in an informative way. These results form a basis for nonparametric estimation of counterfactual revenue differences. I find that the revenue gain from using the English auction would be in the range of 11%—19% of the gross underwriting spread, and that most of it would already be captured by using the second‐price auction. The recent explosive growth of Internet English auctions, administered by Grant Street Group, provides external support to the claim that auction design matters in this market.     

Capital market equilibrium with externalities, production and heterogeneous agents

The paper studies general equilibrium in an economy with externalities, production and heterogeneous agents. The model developed builds on Brock [Brock, W.A., 1982. Asset prices in a production economy. In: McCall, J.J. (Ed.), The Economics of Information and Uncertainty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1–43] and Merton [Merton, R.C., 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510]; it involves both a stock market and a market for loans, together with negative externalities produced by a subset of firms. Importantly, the technological production structure of the firms is reflected in the properties of the shares traded in the stock market. Agents are heterogeneous in their financial choices, potentially discriminating against the firms producing a negative externality. The model sheds light on the utility costs of the discriminating behavior and on the impact on the price of the stock issued by the firm which is responsible for the externality. The model is used to study the factors which may magnify or reduce the impact of discrimination. A set of discriminated firms may be seriously affected only if the discriminating investors command a large portion of overall wealth and/or they do not represent important diversification instruments. The model can be applied to understanding the effects of socially responsible investment, whereby investors discriminate against companies belonging to some sectors which are perceived as socially dangerous or unethical.     

An Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital with Market‐Price Triggers

We report an experiment that evaluates three market‐based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a “fixed‐trigger” regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion; a “regulator” regime, where regulators make conversion decisions based on prices; and a “prediction market” regime, where regulators also observe a market that predicts conversion. Consistent with theory, we observe inefficiencies and conversion errors in the fixed‐trigger and regulator regimes. The prediction market somewhat improves the regulator's performance, but inefficiencies and conversion errors persist. The regulator regime has conversion errors over the widest range of shocks.