Are All Security Analysts Equal?

We examine the extent to which security analysts are homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation as measured by Tobin's Q. Earlier research documents a significant and positive relation between analyst coverage and firm valuation. We identify three classes of equity analysts and examine their differential effect on firm valuation associated with their coverage and their information production. We find that equity analysts are not homogeneous in their effect on firm valuation. The presence of analysts at national securities firms have the strongest effect on firm valuation followed by analysts at regional securities firms and finally analysts at nonbrokerage, or research, firms. We attribute this result to the differential monitoring and information dissemination function rendered by the analysts. Information produced by analysts, however, does not share the same credibility. Specifically, we find brokerage firms' buy recommendations are discounted by the market and have a weak effect on firm valuation. The results can be supported by arguments that brokerage firm analysts' recommendations are contaminated by their firms' investment banking relations with corporations.     

Contracting for information under imperfect commitment

We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent. The principal can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision‐making authority. Under an optimal contract, the principal should (i) never induce the agent to fully reveal what he knows—even though this is feasible—and (ii) never pay the agent for imprecise information. We compare optimal contracts under imperfect commitment to those under full commitment as well as to delegation schemes. We find that gains from contracting are greatest when the divergence in the preferences of the principal and the agent is moderate.     

Accounting Earnings Processes,Inter-temporal Incentives and Their Implications for Valuation

Accounting measures such as levels and changes in residual earnings are widely used for performance evaluation and executive compensation (Healy, 1985). Quite often, these compensation contracts are of the linear form. In a multiperiod agency setting with hidden actions, where the agent's effort influences the random evolution of a general model of residual earnings, we show that linear compensation contracts based on weighted sum of the levels and changes of residual earnings are indeed optimal. We characterize the contract explicitly and show that the weights are determined by the earnings persistence parameter. Residual earnings are known to be important for valuation too (Ohlson, 1995; Easton and Harris, 1991). In our setting, we demonstrate that residual earnings are also sufficient for valuation. This implies that residual earnings can be used to align incentive goals with valuation objectives. In essence, our paper provides the theoretical underpinnings for linear contracts based on residual earnings and their implications for valuation.     

Rewarding improvements: optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation

We study a T‐period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjective and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent for performing poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good in the past; at the same time, the agent should be given opportunities to make up for poor evaluations in the past with better performance in the future. Optimal incentives are thus asymmetric. Conditional on the same number of good evaluations, an agent whose performance improves over time should be better rewarded than one whose performance deteriorates.     

Investing in a relationship

A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable, informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts, as they induce higher investment ex ante: the principal invests not only to generate direct returns, but also to improve relational incentives. Unobservability of returns increases the principal's ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives. The optimal information structure depends on bargaining power.     

Information and delay in an agency model

This article studies how delay in contracting depends on an exogenous signal. The agent whose cost is his private information may produce in the first period or be delayed until the second period. A signal about the cost of the agent is available between the two periods. The quality of the good can vary; in the benchmark case of no signal, the principal offers the standard Baron‐Myerson contract and there is no delay. Delay is determined by the considerations at the margin and may increase or decrease with a better signal. The value of information can be negative, as a better signal may aggravate the principal's commitment problem. A better signal may also increase the agent's rent and decrease social welfare.     

Modeling dividends,earnings, and book value equity: An empirical investigation of the ohlson valuation dynamics

This study empirically investigates the information dynamics of the Ohlson valuation framework. Single-period lagged linear autoregressive relationships among dividends, earnings, and book values of equity are estimated for a sample of stochastically stationary firms and are found not to support the valuation framework. This study further extends the empirical analysis to a multilagged vector autoregressive linear information system. Consistent with the Ohlson valuation framework,the past time series of all three variables are generally found to be relevant for firm valuation. This study brings into question empirical research utilizing the Ohlson framework that presupposes a single-period lagged information dynamic.     

Can markets stimulate rights? On the alienability of legal claims

The alienability of legal claims holds the promise of increasing access to justice and fostering development of law. I develop a principal‐agent framework where litigation funders provide expertise in reducing uncertainty in agents' disutility of production. The model leads to the counterintuitive prediction that litigation funders prefer cases with novel issues, and social surplus is positively correlated with legal uncertainty. Consistent with the model, court backlog, court expenditures, and a slowing in average time to completion are associated with third‐party funding; cases with third‐party funding receive more citations and are reversed less often than comparable cases without such arrangements.     

Valuation of Family Firms: The Limitations of Accounting Information

This conceptual paper explores the extent to which reported accounting information captures unique family firm decision‐making and intangible asset factors that impact financial value. We review the family firm valuation‐relevant literature and identify that this body of research is predicated on the assumption that accounting information reflects the underlying reality of family firms. This research, however, fails to recognise that current accounting technology does not fully recognise the family firm factors in the book value of the firm or the implications for long‐run persistence of earnings. Thus, valuation models underpinning the extant empirical research, which are predicated on reported accounting information, may not fully reflect the intrinsic value of family firms. We present propositions on the interaction between accounting information, family factors and valuation as a road map for future empirical research with a discussion of appropriate methodologies.     

Family control,multiple institutional block-holders,and informed trading

This paper investigates how large family shareholders and institutional block-holders jointly influence informed trading and firm valuation in the Hong Kong stock market. It combines market microstructure research with studies on the governance roles of multiple block-holders and finds that institutional block-holders rely on their relative controlling power vis-à-vis family owners to mitigate problems associated with informed trading. They also use their ownership rights to improve the structure of informed trading. However, these governance roles are predominantly exercised by pressure-resistant institutional block-holders. Informed trading reduces firm valuation, while an improvement in its structure increases valuation. Therefore, the governance roles of controlling families and pressure-resistant institutional block-holders may have different implications in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information risk.     

Disclosure of Private Information and Reduction of Uncertainty: Environmental Liabilities in the Chemical Industry

We investigate the potential uncertainty-reducing role of accounting information in the context of contingent Superfund liability valuation. We first develop theoretical arguments for the way reduction of uncertainty regarding these contingent liabilities is expected to affect security prices. Empirical proxies are developed for two types of uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities: site uncertainty and allocation uncertainty. In a valuation framework, we then investigate whether financial statement disclosures and accruals reduce uncertainty and thereby affect security valuation. Specifically, we analyze the interaction of private information contained in firm disclosures and accruals with inherent uncertainty surrounding contingent Superfund liabilities. Results suggest that in a regulatory environment allowing substantial reporting discretion, firm-provided financial statement information affects valuation of contingent Superfund liabilities by reducing uncertainty. Further, we find that information revealed through accruals versus disclosures is differentially effective at reducing site and allocation uncertainty.     

Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection

ABSTRACT

In light of the richness of their structures in connection with practical implementation, we follow the seminal works in economics to use the principal–agent (multidimensional screening) models to study a monopolistic reinsurance market with adverse selection; instead of adopting the classical expected utility paradigm, the novelty of our present work is to model the risk assessment of each insurer (agent) by his value-at-risk at his own chosen risk tolerance level consistent with Solvency II. Under information asymmetry, the reinsurer (principal) aims to maximize his average profit by designing an optimal policy provision (menu) of ‘shirt-fit’ reinsurance contracts for every insurer from one of the two groups with hidden characteristics. Our results show that a quota-share component, on the top of simple stop-loss, is very crucial for mitigating asymmetric information from the insurers to the reinsurer.     

American-style Indexed Executive Stock Options

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula represents an instructive example of the usefulness of the change-of-numeraire technique. In the paper's numerical section we implement the valuation formula and demonstrate that not only may the early exercise premium be significant but also that the delta of the American-style option is typically much larger than the delta of the otherwise identical (value-matched) European-style option. Vega is higher for indexed options than for conventional options but largely independent of whether the options are European- or American-style. This has important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts. We finally extend the analysis to cover the case where the option contracts are subject to delayed vesting. We show that for realistic parameter values, delayed vesting leads only to a moderate reduction in the value of the American-style indexed executive stock option.     

Accelerated Equity Offers and Firm Quality

A series of deregulatory reforms has promoted accelerated equity issuance at the expense of adequate time for underwriter and market scrutiny. Today the majority of publicly listed companies can raise equity on a moment's notice, but many eligible issuers choose to allow additional time for scrutiny. We hypothesise that issuers with less favourable inside information (i.e. lower quality issuers) prefer to avoid the pre‐issue scrutiny that could reveal their inside information and are therefore more likely to accelerate their offer. We find supportive evidence using measures of stock valuation and earnings quality as proxies for firm quality. The results suggest that investors are slow to capitalise the information embedded in the speed of issuance.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Product Market Competition,Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.     

Does Corporate Governance Predict Future Performance? Evidence from Hong Kong

This study uses time‐series data to examine the relation between changes in the quality of corporate governance practices and subsequent market valuation among large listed companies in Hong Kong. The results indicate that firms that exhibit improvements in the quality of corporate governance display a subsequent increase in market valuation, whereas firms that exhibit deterioration in the quality of corporate governance practices tend to encounter a decline in market valuation. Additionally, the impact is greater for firms that are included in the MSCI index or with a China affiliation. The results provide evidence in support of the notion that good corporate governance can predict future market valuation.     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.     

An Analysis of the Relation between the Stewardship and Valuation Roles of Earnings

In this paper, we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes. We explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation. A distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in Paul [1992] produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients (VECs) and compensation earnings coefficients (CECs) are unrelated. Our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971–2000 rejects Paul's [1992] hypothesis of no relation. We also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation. Specifically, we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings.     

Multi‐period Asset Lifetimes and Accounting‐based Equity Valuation: Take Care with Constant‐growth Terminal Value Models!

The merits of accruals in forecasting cash flows or mitigating the volatility of financials shortly after the valuation date are indisputable. However, the usefulness of accounting in equity valuation is very limited if we step beyond a certain forecasting horizon. In this paper, this limitation is emphasized by shedding new light on the accounting‐based value driver model (VDM), a widely used constant‐growth terminal value tool that uses accounting variables as input. The paper shows that, if the lifetime of a firm's assets is, on average, longer than one period, the VDM works accurately only in an idealized academic environment with an even historical corporate investment activity, a single depreciation method for all assets, and no historical inflation volatility. Artificially adjusting real‐world figures to this steady state is possible in principle, but bloats the valuation model and requires exactly the same information that is used in our cash flow‐driven benchmark model (where no adjustment phase is necessary). Beyond these theoretical shortcomings, the VDM is also prone to being misused in valuation practice due to its reliance on book (rather than economic) rates of return, and to its shortcomings in dealing adequately with the assets with an ex ante indefinite lifetime.