从非合作博弈到合作博弈——基于当前农村社区公共产品供给机制“一事一议”制度分析

"一事一议"制度成为农村社区公共产品供给的重要运行机制,是我国农村公共产品供给制度变迁的结果;但在实践中机制运行却存在着农村公共产品供给的"政府失灵"与"市场失灵"两个非合作博弈,即"农户选择不提供,基层政府也选择不提供"成为唯一的纳什均衡。因此,中央和基层政府需要调整政策,从积极引导农民组织化,培育多元的供给主体,确立公共财政理念等多方面入手,使基层政府与农民、农民与农民之间的非合作博弈走向合作博弈。     

分工协作、经济规模与大国区域合作中公共产品供求均衡

公共产品的有效供给是新兴大国进行区域合作的基础,它能够有效地降低贸易成本、促进要素的跨区域流动以及提高交易效率,从而促进区域经济协调发展。通过构筑理论模型,对新兴大国内部跨区域经济合作中公共产品的供求进行均衡分析,研究发现：大国区域经济分工协作必须达到一定的条件之后,区域才能在内部公共产品与合作中公共产品的需求之间实现均衡;利率决定着大国区域经济合作中公共产品的供求均衡,当利率上升时,区域购买公共产品的数量会下降;当利率下降时,区域购买公共产品的数量会增加;大国经济规模与公共产品需求是正相关关系,两者通过利率机制的媒介作用形成良性循环。新兴大国必须基于要素禀赋,大力发展经济,提升经济规模,积极参与区域经济分工协作,以有效地利用国际国内市场。     

Rule-Inequality-Aversion Preference and Conditional Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Economic Experiment Evidence from China

We provide an experimental investigation of the fair rule preference and its effect on anonymous cooperation, intending to test the hypothesis that people who exhibit high degrees of rule inequality aversion—consider “equality and mutual obligation under the social contract” as justified, are disgusted with free-rider behavior in the public goods game and are more likely to be conditional cooperators and make conditional contributions. Based on experimental work related to rule-preferences Chlaß and Moffatt (Giving in dictator games: experimenter demand effect or preference over the rules of the game? (No. 2012, 044). Jena Economic Research Papers, 2012) and the public goods game Fischbacher et al. (Am Econ Rev 100(1):541–556, 2010), we designed a dictator game with the option of buying a veto (when the veto was purchased, the level of rule inequality decreased, making it an ultimatum game) to measure rule preference, i.e., rule inequality aversion, and conducted a two-stage public goods experiment to identify the cooperation preferences and repeated cooperation levels of participants. We investigated the relationship between rule preferences and cooperative preferences (conditional reciprocal preference) and tried to explain the adjustments people made when making repeated contributions of public goods (conditional cooperation behavior) from a rule preference perspective. The results show that: (1) Heterogeneous rule-inequality-aversion preferences are found in lab; (2) The stronger the rule-inequality-aversion preference is, the higher the probability is for the individual to become a conditional cooperator in public goods experiment; (3) Individuals who have stronger rule-inequality-aversion are more sensitive to the contributions that are deviated from the norm. Compared to the theory of conditional cooperation types, rule-inequality-aversion preference has a better explanation power when it comes to the behavior adjustment in repeated public goods contribution.     

Financing the Provision of Global Public Goods

This paper examines the concept of global public goods (GPGs) and in that context explores the extent of aid (ODA) presently being diverted to GPG provision and whether such diversion skews aid‐flows towards some recipients. These are examined on the basis of OECD data for the late 1990s. The main argument of this paper is that ODA should not be used for financing GPG provision by developing countries. Instead, it is suggested that other sources of financing the provision of GPGs should be developed keeping in view the various technologies by which the GPGs can be produced and design principles for supra‐national institutions. Various arguments from Sandler, Barrett and Kanbur are considered. In particular, Kanbur's suggestion of two tensions involving the principles of economies of scale, subsidiarity, economies of scope and specialisation, is explored further.     

公共品概念的价值

"公共品"的概念正经历着它历史上最为尴尬的境遇.一方面是它在公共政策话语中日益普及,另一方面,其理论和现实价值却面临着被解构的危机.作为一篇关于公共品概念的综述性文章,本文通过解读当代公共品理论的若干重要文献,回顾了"公共品"概念的发展历程,试图通过阐明"公共性"的确切含义,重新认识公共品概念的理论及政策含义.本文认为,尽管"公共品"的概念不应再被视为政策标签,或者政府干预的充分条件,但这一概念对于集体行动之潜在收益的显示,依然是一个必要的分析工具,它为建立在相容利益基础上的集体行动开拓了地盘,赋予人类以积极进取、改善自身福利的动力和能力.     

从区域性国际公共产品供给角度析东亚区域合作中的中韩自贸区建设

区域经济一体化势不可挡,成为了提供区域性国际公共产品的有效途径。中国作为地区性大国,在推进东亚区域合作方面责任重大,其利益亦不应仅仅局限于贸易创造效应。在目前东亚地区大国间尚难形成合力共同推动地区经济一体化的情况下,中韩自贸区建设将成为本地区区域性国际公共产品集体供给的有益尝试。     

"国家治理财政论":从公共物品到公共秩序

本文沿着"财政制度一增进公共秩序一国家能力支柱一实现国家治理目标"的逻辑,建立起"国家治理财政论"的基本框架,详细阐明了财政与国家治理的关系.本文理论要点有:(1) "公共秩序"是人的基本需要和经济社会运行的保障;(2)市场经济发展带来经济从社会中脱嵌、利益格局分化、创造性破坏三大进程,公共秩序不断面临冲击和重建过程;(3)国家治理依赖于"国家能力"的支持,国家能力的两大支柱是市场增进能力和组织动员能力;(4)为建设良好的公共秩序,国家治理目标是经济有效、社会有序、政治包容;(5)财政支出、收入、预算和政府间财政关系中的一系列制度安排,从不同侧面有助于经济增长和稳定、社会保护和控制、权利开放和维护权威等目标的实现.     

西方公共物品理论的最新研究进展

公共物品理论是财政学或者公共经济学的基础性理论之一.近几十年里,西方学者并不满足于传统公共物品理论对公共物品问题的有关解释,围绕公共物品的提供、需求以及搭便车问题,他们对公共物品进一步展开了深入分析.本文述评了这一领域的最新研究进展.     

论公共物品权的设定

人们消费社会产品,在法律上必然存在消费该物品的权利,否则就可能存在其他权利或权力阻止人们消费这种物品。设定公共物品权具有重要意义,天赋人权和社会契约理论、自然法思想和社会连带思想、分级财政与公共财政理论为其理论基础。公共物品权是生存权和发展权的体现,属于应有权利和社会权的范畴,具有非独占性和平等性特征,属于基本权利,但不能超越社会经济发展水平。     

基于博弈论的软件产品定价决策

针对正版、盗版软件在消费者心目中的差异,建立贝特兰德价格博弈模型,探讨了正版软件生产商、盗版软件生产商及代理商之间的价格博弈策略,得出分别使三者利润最大化的均衡价格,三者均衡价格、销售量及利润的变化趋势的结论。     

农村公共物品投资的消费效应实证研究——以河南省为例

<正>一、引言河南省作为我国的农业大省,人口大省,2007年底,全省农村人口占全省人口的比例高达65.66%,高于全国10.6个百分点,农村人口众多。2007年河南省农村家庭人     

西部农村公共产品有效供给分析

西部的新农村建设和新一轮的西部大开发应形成合力,两者互为契机。农村公共产品的有效供给是西部农村发展的基石,也是西部大开放的重要着力点。新农村建设推动农村公共产品的有效供给,也将有力推动西部大开发取得更加坚实和可持续的成就。     

农村公共产品供给与相关体制安排

农村公共产品和服务的有效提供,对于改善农民的生产、生活环境,对于发展农业生产和增加农民收入具有重要作用.长期以来,从方式、范围和数量方面看,我国农村在各类公共产品的提供上存在着诸多矛盾,并在一定程度上制约着"三农"问题的解决.在构建农村公共财政框架体系的过程中,应适当增加各类农村公共产品的供给,处理好体制框架建设与公共产品供给之间的关系,为县乡基层财政逐步解困创造必要的条件.     

消费品市场信用缺失的博弈分析

当前我国的整个市场特别是消费品市场存在着严重的信用缺失问题,对消费者的身心造成了极大的伤害.市场经济是信用经济,诚信原则是市场经济的灵魂和基础,重建消费品市场诚信环境,维护消费者权益是当务之急.信用是博弈的结果,从消费者与企业、企业与监管部门的博弈可以找到消费品市场信用缺失产生的原因.针对问题,可以对症下药,从根源上进行治理:建立高效的信息传输机制;完善法律体系,加大监督执法力度,建立高额赔偿金制度,让造假者付出高昂的成本;深化产权制度改革,使产权所有者具有进行重复博弈的动力,而着眼于长远利益.     

Regional Cooperation Toward Green Asia: Trade in Low Carbon Goods

Governments in the Asian region have been taking actions in the form of voluntary targets and policy commitments to improve the production and use of low carbon goods (LCG). However, these commitments are often challenged by many constraints, such as technological barriers and financial deficiencies. Within this context, the main objective of this study is to measure the potential of major emerging Asian economies for exports in LCG under the grand regional coalition, partial regional coalition, and standalone scenarios. The analysis indicates that emerging Asian economies will increase their export potential in LCG more under the grand coalition scenario.     

浅谈农村公共物品有效供给方式问题

农村公共物品对于农村社会的发展起着至关重要的推动作用,完善农村公共物品供给可有效地提高农村经济的发展效率。目前,我国农村公共产品供给总量不足、供需结构失衡、供给效率低下。为进一步完善农村公共产品有效供给,应建立城乡均衡的公共物品供给制度,建立农民需求偏好表达机制以及以政府为主导的多元化供给方式。     

博弈论视角下的公共财政形成分析

<正>公共财政制度的建立对经济运行有着重大意义,公共物品供给不足的问题需要政府解决。现实中经济参与人(公众)并不满足具有相同偏好的假定,因而政府需要提供何种服务、承担哪些责任,就需要一种机制来确定。此外,政府虽然是作为一个抽象法人而存在,但政府行为却是由具体的行为人(代理人)来实现。这样又会产生新的委托代理问题。如何构建使代理人权责对应、民众付出与保障相对应的均衡机制,成为构建公共财政的关键一步。     

试析区域市场合作的博弈

博弈论是解决社会成员利益冲突与一致问题的有效的实证分析工具,利用博弈论的相关理论对区域市场之间的协调发展问题进行分析,阐述加强区域间经济合作的方式与途径,解决区域利益冲突、开放区域市场等问题,促进统一大市场的形成。     

我国公共产品价格形成机制的深层次矛盾分析

合理的公共产品价格对于提高居民消费能力和生活质量、稳定物价总水平、提高国民经济的整体竞争力以及促进民营经济发展起着举足轻重的作用。推高公共产品价格上涨的表面因素是成本上升,深层次原因是制度因素,如公共产品产业拆分改革不到位、国有资产保值增值的经营目标与政府定价调控政策相冲突、对公共产品政府定价行为缺乏有效的制衡机制。     

Effect of Order of Contribution in a Sequential Public Goods Dilemma

This study examined how order of contribution in a sequential public goods dilemma affected cooperation. Under a sequential protocol of play, players of different levels of efficacy made decisions one after another. We contrasted a High-to-low versus Low-to-high Efficacy order in a nine-person game. Under a High-to-low order, high-efficacy players made decisions in positions 1–3, medium-efficacy players in positions 4–6, and low-efficacy players in positions 7–9. Under a Low-to-high order, the positions of high- and low-efficacy players were reversed. We hypothesized that cooperation rates would be higher in the High-to-low order that high-efficacy players (assigned in early positions), who would likely cooperate, would induce subsequent players to cooperate also. We found the anticipated effect that cooperation rate was higher in the High-to-low than the Low-to-high efficacy order. The efficacy order effect was the most prominent when people perceived that their group was becoming uncooperative. This study illustrates a new type of structural solution to social dilemmas that by systematically assigning people to different sequential positions, a group can be made more or less cooperative.