A Test for Price Pressure Effects in Tender Offer Stock Repurchases

The evidence in this paper supports the hypothesis that the previously documented stock price reversal following a tender offer announcement is consistent with a price pressure caused by a temporary shift in the security's demand curve. The authors came to this conclusion by redocumenting the price reversal, by finding an increase in trading volume around the tender offer announcement and expiration, by showing the increase in volume to be larger than expected from only an information effect, and by showing that short selling activity increases after the announcement and before the expiration of the tender offer.     

The Optimal Timing of Open Market Stock Repurchases

Using a continuous-time real options approach we determine the conditions under which a value-maximizing company would conduct an open market stock repurchase to exploit the undervaluation of shares. We find the optimal timing of such repurchases as well as the optimal amount a company should repurchase and analyze how it depends on market parameters. Obtaining the announcement returns from the authorization of stock repurchases from our model allows us to derive testable empirical implications.     

The Market Reaction to Stock Splits

In this paper, a model of market reaction to stock splits is presented and tested. We argue that the announcement of a split sets off the following chain of events. The market recognizes that, subsequent to the (reverse) split ex-day, the daily number of transactions along with the raw volume of shares traded will increase (decrease). This increase in volume results in an increase in the noisiness of the security's return process. The increase in noise raises the tax-option value of the stock, and it is this value that generates the announcement effect of stock splits. Empirical evidence using security returns, daily trading volume, and shareholder data strongly supports this theory. The evidence, in conjunction with this theory, also agrees with extant literature that splits result in decreased liquidity, but there is no evidence that this reduction in liquidity is priced.     

Signaling and Takeover Deterrence with Stock Repurchases: Dutch Auctions versus Fixed Price Tender Offers

This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.     

Mixed Messages: Open‐Market Repurchases Following Stock Acquisitions

Management decisions and market reactions to those decisions do not occur in isolation. Despite this fact, little or no research has examined two events when they occur in a sequence, even when theory suggests that those two events convey opposite signals. We examine firms that do a stock‐based acquisition then announce an open‐market repurchase program. These two actions, according to the signaling theory, signal conflicting valuation errors. This paper is the first to examine a sequence of events that convey seemingly conflicting signals. Among other results, we find that repurchasers who had previously made a stock‐based acquisition have a less positive market reaction than do otherwise comparable repurchasers with no previous acquisition. These results indicate that the market reactions to events are tempered by previous information‐releasing events.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.     

The Market Reaction to Discontinuing Regular Stock Dividends

This paper investigates the behavior of returns to share-holders of NYSE and AMEX firms that publicly announce the discontinuance of regular stock dividends. Using event-type methodology, the results show that the average abnormal return for NYSE and AMEX firms is negative but not statistically significant on the event date. Partitioning the sample by stock-related characteristics shows that for small firms with low stock prices and low institutional ownership, management's decision to drop regular stock dividends conveys a significantly negative signal, which, in turn, causes stock prices to decline. Firms that drop a stock payment and simultaneously initiate or increase cash dividends experience a significant increase in shareholder wealth. However, firms that drop the stock dividend policy and do not begin a cash dividend policy experience a sharp decline in shareholder wealth.     

The Conditional Performance of REIT Stock Repurchases

This paper uses a conditional performance measure to test whether real estate investment trust (REIT) managers announcing stock repurchases have private information about their firms' prospects. We use stock price to condition for public information and measure the managers' implied private information by the covariance between repurchase size and subsequent stock payoffs (or operating performance). Results show that managers have private information but mostly with respect to long-term as opposed to near-term payoffs. We also find that repurchase size is positively related to a stock's idiosyncratic return volatility, perhaps because noisy stocks deviate farther from fundamental value, offering informed managers larger profit potential. JEL Classification G12 G14 G35     

Seasoned Equity Offerings: Stock Market Liquidity and the Rights Offer Paradox

This paper examines the impact of market liquidity on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) characteristics in France. We find that, besides blockholders’ takeup, liquidity is an important determinant of SEO flotation method choice. We document higher direct equity offering flotation costs, but also improved stock market liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. After controlling for endogeneity in the choice of SEO flotation method, we find that pure public offerings and standby rights are comparable in terms of direct costs and liquidity improvement. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public offerings despite apparently higher costs.     

上市公司立案公告的市场反应及其含义

以往关于我国上市公司违反法规行为给投资者带来的财富损失的文献基本都以监管机构处罚公告作为事件研究的原点,而未考察处罚公告之前的另一项重要事件:立案公告。我们发现,在证监会处罚公告附近的市场反应约为-2%(这与以往文献一致),而立案公告附近的市场负反应则高达-6%左右。这意味着仅关注处罚公告事件将明显低估投资者的实际财富损失。在尝试解释立案公告日附近市场反应的截面差异时,我们发现立案公告前最近年度的盈余管理幅度越大,市场反应越负面,这意味着投资者在面临模糊信息时可能参考了此前的会计信息质量进行投资决策。我们还讨论了本文证据对我国证券市场虚假陈述行为的民事诉讼制度的含义。     

The Effects of Stock Repurchases on Rival Firms

This paper investigates the stock price behavior of rival firms in the same industry as firms announcing stock repurchase tender offers. Using a sample of 134 repurchase announcements, I find that rival firms on average realize insignificant announcement period abnormal returns. Negative rival stock price performance is detected over longer intervals surrounding the announcement period and for a subset of announcements which ex ante were identified as most likely to affect rivals. This evidence, however, is statistically weak and does little to alter the overall conclusion that the information in repurchase announcements is primarily firm-specific.     

Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading

During the 1980s, U.S. firms announcing stock repurchases earned favorable long-run returns. Recently, concerns have been raised over the robustness of these findings. This concern comes at a time of explosive growth in repurchase programs. Thus, we study new evidence from the 1990s for 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs. Moreover, because of Canadian law, we can carefully track repurchase activity monthly. Similarly to the situation in the United States, the Canadian stock market discounts the information in repurchase announcements, particularly for value stocks. Completion rates in Canada are sensitive to mispricing. Trades also appear linked to price movements; managers buy more shares when prices fall.     

Stock Repurchases and Excess Returns: An Empirical Examination

The excess returns associated with repurchase announcements are viewed largely as a reaction to management's statement that the firm's shares are underpriced; management's signal provides new information that enhances the firm's market value. Although earlier studies have found the excess return to be closely related to the premium set by managment, other factors play a part in determining both the market reaction and the premium level set by management. Among these factors ar relative market capitalization, holdings by institutions, immediate alternative uses for cash, level of insider control, recent stock price performance, relative size of the tender offer, and the resultant change in the firm's capital structure.     

The Stock Market Reaction to Investment Announcements: The Case of Individual Capital Expenditure Projects

In this paper we provide novel evidence about the market reaction to capital expenditure announcements in the UK using a sample of nearly 500 disclosures made between 1989 and 1991. First, we show that the market reaction to joint venture announcements is significantly positive, whilst similar announcements from individual companies do not elicit any response. Second, we find that the market reaction to single company investments is positively related to the size of the expenditure, but only for projects which immediately generate cash. Finally, we report that the variability in the market response to announcements which follow large cash inflows is significantly lower than the variability in investors' reactions to announcements which are not preceded by such inflows.     

Stock Market Reaction to the Appointment of Outside Directors

This paper examines the UK stock market's reaction to the appointment of outside (non‐executive) board members. Tests conducted using a sample of 714 appointments reported by EXTEL between 1 July, 1993 and 31 December, 1996, indicate a strong interaction between appointee characteristics and the magnitude of the agency problem: the share price reaction to outside director appointments is significantly more favourable when board ownership is low and the appointee possesses strong ex ante monitoring incentives. In contrast, the appointment of independent and manager‐affiliated outside directors does not appear to benefit shareholders on average, even in the presence of serious agency problems.     

A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends

This paper develops a model in which managers can signal their firms' true values by using either a dividend or a stock repurchase or both. The authors explain a number of stylized facts about these cash-disbursement mechanisms, particularly those concerning the relative magnitudes of stock price responses to dividends and repurchases. Most importantly, they explain why a stock repurchase elicits a significantly higher price response, on average, than a dividend announcement.     

Corporate Cash Policy and How to Manage it with Stock Repurchases

At the end of 2004 total U.S. corporate cash holdings reached an all‐time high of just under $2 trillion—an amount equal to roughly 15% of the total U.S. GDP. And during the past 25 years, average cash holdings have jumped from 10% to 23% of total corporate assets. But at the same time their levels of cash have risen, U.S. companies have paid out dramatically increasing amounts of cash to buy back shares. This article addresses the following questions: What accounts for the dramatic increase in the average level of corporate cash holdings since 1980? And why do some companies keep so much cash (with one fourth of U.S. firms holding cash amounting to at least 36% of total assets) while others have so little (with another quarter having less than 3%)? Why do companies pay out excess cash in the form of stock repurchases (rather than, say, dividends), and what explains the significant increase in repurchases (both in absolute terms and relative to dividends) over time? The author begins by arguing that cash reserves provide companies with a buffer against possible shortfalls in operating profits—one that, especially during periods of financial trouble, can be used to avoid financial distress or provide funding for promising projects that might otherwise have to be put off. Such buffers are particularly valuable in the case of smaller, riskier companies with lots of growth opportunities and limited access to capital markets. And the dramatic increase in corporate cash holdings between 1980 and the present can be attributed mainly to an increase in the risk of publicly traded companies—an increase in risk that reflects in part a general increase in competition, but also a notable change over time in the kinds of companies (smaller, newer, less profitable, non‐dividend paying firms) that have chosen to go public. At the other end of the corporate spectrum are large, relatively mature companies with limited growth opportunities. Although such companies tend to produce considerable free cash flow, they also tend to retain relatively small amounts of cash (as a percentage of total assets), in part because of shareholder concern about the corporate “free cash flow problem”—the well‐documented tendency of such companies to destroy value through overpriced (often diversifying) acquisitions and other misguided attempts to pursue growth at the expense of profitability. For companies with highly predictable earnings and investment plans, dividends provide one means of addressing the free cash flow problem. But for companies with more variable earnings and less predictable reinvestment, open‐market stock repurchases provide a more flexible means of distributing cash to shareholders. Unlike the corporate “commitment” implied by dividend payments, an open market stock repurchase program creates what amounts to an option but not an obligation to distribute funds. The value of such flexibility, which increases during periods of increased risk and uncertainty, explains much of the apparent substitution of repurchases for dividends in recent years.     

The Return of the Size Anomaly: Evidence from the German Stock Market

This paper examines the size effect in the German stock market and intends to address several unanswered issues on this widely known anomaly. Unlike recent evidence of a reversal of the size anomaly this study documents a conditional relation between size and returns. I also detect strong momentum across size portfolios. The results indicate that the marginal effect of firm size on stock returns is conditional on the firm's past performance. I use an instrumental variable estimation to address Berk's critique of a simultaneity bias in prior studies on the small firm effect and to investigate the economic rationale behind firm size as an explanatory variable for the variation in stock returns. The analysis in this paper indicates that firm size captures firm characteristic components in stock returns and that this regularity cannot be explained by differences in systematic risk.